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INTRODUCTION
As a student, professor, and practitioner of criminal law for more
decades than I care to admit, I have encountered a myriad of concepts,
principles, rules, and abstractions, many of which are reasonably com-
prehensible and some of which make damn little sense. In some cases,
such as in connection with my authorship of the "definitive" (or so my
publishing company claims) work on Illinois criminal law, my goal is to
sort out and explain the "elements" of criminal law theories of culpabil-
ity (e.g., accountability principles), offenses (e.g., murder), and defenses
(e.g., self defense). In the classroom, I face the constant challenge of
developing the students' analytical minds by confronting them with criti-
cal queries about this or that case, hypothetical situation, principle, or
law and, at other times, developing formulas for their benefit designed to
simplify a bundle of confusing applications of law to facts (e.g., criminal
attempt = a defendant's "substantial step" towards criminality + defen-
dant's "specific intent" to achieve a criminal goal; constitutional death
penalty = a defendant's commission of murder (not rape, etc.) + elements
of aggravation (e.g., killed a cop) + consideration of any (not just some)
mitigating circumstances). In the continuing legal education programs
with which I am regularly involved, I strive to prepare a captivating lec-
ture, a useful outline, or well researched written materials that will nei-
ther confuse nor bore the attendee. In the courtroom, I am to present the
brief, the case precedent, or the argument that wins-over her honor. In
each of these situations, the challenge is to analyze, synthesize, explain,
reason, rationalize, and/or distinguish a legal concept. After examination
and reexamination over the years, I believe (perhaps naively) that I un-
derstand quite well most criminal justice concepts, including the more
complex that may confuse even the criminal court judges I lecture (e.g.,
Fourth Amendment). Others (e.g., what really separates the "legally"
insane from those who are not) I never will.
In my opinion, one of the subjects that defies principled reasoning is
the concept of vagueness in the criminal law. Past explaining the ba-
sics-criminal laws must give "fair notice"1 and contain an "ascertain-
able standard of guilt",2 that guide the arm of enforcement-most treat-
ments of the subject, whether in treatises, commentary, or judicial opin-
ion, provide the reader with no semblance of criteria, guidelines, or stan-
dards that might assist even the trained eye with the ability to predict
1. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
2. See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) (per curiam).
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whether a given stricture challenged on vagueness grounds will survive
constitutional attack. And, quite frankly, this is true because there exists
no criteria, guidelines, or standards that provide a meaningful measuring
stick for making such prediction. Vagueness analyses seem to me to be
devoid of objective tests. Vagueness is a concept that appears heavily
dependent on the "I know it when I see it"'3 test, where one begins with a
conclusion and thereafter works backward for rational support. Vague-
ness challenges require a highly subjective mode of analysis that in-
volves an unpredictable assortment of paths a court might take in arriv-
ing at a ruling.
Less confusing is another concern that can plague criminal legisla-
tion, namely, ambiguity. A relative of vagueness, ambiguity appears
where otherwise understandable legislation lends itself to two or more
equally plausible interpretations. When faced with ambiguity, the
reviewing court will usually (although not necessarily) plug in a doctrine
that gives the accused the advantage. In other words, whatever interpreta-
tion is most beneficial to the accused is the one that wins out. Having
said that, however, does not mean that identifying an uncertainty in legis-
lation as an ambiguity, as opposed to a problem of vagueness, is neces-
sarily a simple task. For example, at what point is it permissible to con-
clude the legislation contains sufficient specificity that it can be described
as ambiguous rather than vague? Or, at what point can there be agree-
ment that the law in question lends itself to two equally possible
interpretations?
Beyond vagueness and ambiguity, there exists what this article will
simply call uncertainty in legislation. Here, a court is not entertaining a
vagueness challenge nor convinced the legislation under consideration is
ambiguous, because the law, at first blush, appears to carry one meaning
that is more likely than any other. Instead, the court in its analysis of the
somewhat uncertain law will struggle to clarify for the benefit of both the
citizenry and law enforcement the actual scope of the law in question.
The purpose, then, of this article is not to offer a useful measuring
stick for predicting the outcome of a vagueness claim in criminal law,
but rather a description of the vehicles used by courts to justify their con-
clusions as to whether a defendant had "fair notice, ' 4 or police, prosecu-
tors, and juries had an "ascertainable standard of guilt"5 that might avoid
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Similarly, it will attempt to
identify, beyond simply referring to certain doctrinal rhetoric, how a
court goes about addressing ambiguities. Finally, legislation not chal-
lenged on vagueness grounds nor considered ambiguous may neverthe-
3. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390.
5. See Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545.
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less contain uncertain language that will require a court to seek out its
true meaning. Again, this article will undertake an examination of a
court's methods in such cases.
Part I examines the basics-the principle of legality and its corol-
lary concerns of fair notice and avoidance of arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement. Part II examines the concept of ambiguity. Part HI ad-
dresses the dichotomy between overbreadth and vagueness concerns that
have often been confused in court opinions. Parts IV, V, and VI are de-
signed to examine the concerns that may explain the ultimate conclusion
that arises out of a vagueness dispute. Specifically, Part IV points out
that a legislature's statutory inclusion of (1) a detailed listing of items or
activities which a particular criminal measure seeks to restrict and (2) an
element of mens rea in a criminal enactment, while certainly not out-
come dispositive, may offer the court a basis for concluding the offense
in question offered the necessary notice. Part V offers a number of possi-
ble sources of information that may provide instruction as to the meaning
of language in a criminal proscription. Alternatively, examination of
such sources may reveal a complete lack of consensus as to how certain
words might be interpreted, thereby reinforcing a complainant's assertion
that a particular criminal law failed to offer any direction to the citizenry
as to the scope of questionable enactments or terminology within. Here,
it will be pointed out that consultation of common dictionaries, for ex-
ample, might provide a court with an "answer" as to whether the mean-
ing of a law is clear or nebulous. Part VI offers a few rules of thumb that
courts may employ to rationalize their position. For instance, it is obvi-
ous the courts will demand more specificity or precision of language if
the law in question might implicate constitutional terrain than will be
expected if it does not. Hopefully, this journey through the case law will
contribute to a better understanding of these subjects, quite appropriately,
called vagueness, ambiguity, and uncertainty.
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
The most fundamental tenet of criminal law is the principal of legal-
ity,6 which today means that criminal liability and punishment can only
be predicated on a prior legislative enactment that states what is pro-
scribed as an offense in a precise and clear manner.7 This is a concept
that is reliant on various doctrines, most significantly the "void for
vagueness" doctrine and the doctrine of "strict construction."8 The
6. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
7. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2, at 74-75 (1997).
8. PACKER, supra note 6, at 93, Two classic treatments of these subjects are Anthony
Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960), and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REv. 189 (1985).
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vagueness doctrine is directed toward providing an adequate definition of
what behavior is criminal and to whom it applies.9 The doctrine of strict
construction of penal statutes, which has been described as the "junior
version of the vagueness doctrine,"' 0 requires resolution of differing in-
terpretations of language in a criminal statute to the advantage of the
accused." If a criminal stricture is sufficiently nebulous that it fails to
define that which is supposed to be illegal, then it suffers from the perils
of vagueness.12 If vague, it is void; it is unsalvageable. In contrast, if the
criminal measure, cast in relatively clear language, lends itself to two or
more equally plausible interpretations, then the enactment is merely am-
biguous.13 In this latter case, in steps the doctrine of strict construction.
This doctrine, also called the rule of lenity, which serves as a "tie-
breaker," insists the ambiguity be resolved against the government and to
the advantage of the accused. 14 Thus, as a general matter, if the statute is
deemed vague, the court has been unable to decipher where the legisla-
ture drew the line between illicit and licit behavior. It has thrown in the
towel. Alternatively, if the statute is found to be ambiguous, the court is
bent on making the determination as to where the legislature drew the
line and, to that end, plugs in the rule of lenity to bring about resolution.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution, which guarantee that "no person shall
• ..be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,"' 5 have been construed as requiring that citizens have notice of what
behavior is or is not illegal.' 6 To preserve this guarantee, the courts have
adopted the "void-for-vagueness doctrine."' 7 This doctrine requires that:
the terms of a penal statute... must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties.., and a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process of law.'
8
9. PACKER, supra note 6, at 93-94.
10. d. at95.
11. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 76 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 5.04, at 47 (3d ed. 2001).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
16. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
17. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)).
18. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1914)); see also Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)
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The void-for-vagueness doctrine also requires that penal statutes be de-
fined in a manner that does not encourage "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement" bylaw enforcement authorities.'
9
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,20 the United States Supreme Court
articulated the critical policy considerations that are at the heart of the
due process mandate requiring avoidance of statutory vagueness:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because [this
Court] assume[s] that man is free to steer between lawful and unlaw-
ful conduct, [this Court] insist[s] that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and. . .. . 21
discriminatory applications.
Consequently, when a claim of unconstitutional vagueness is raised in a
court of law, there are two basic questions to be asked when determining
whether a statute is void because of its vagueness:
(1) Does this statute provide fair notice or warning to the citizens as
far as what is and is not prohibited or required by the statute?
22
(2) Does this statute provide an ascertainable standard of guilt so that
it does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement?
23
If the answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative, then the
statute will be upheld against a void-for-vagueness challenge. 24 How-
(stating that the statute in Int'l Harvester presented no standard of conduct that was possible to
know).
19. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
20. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
21. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
22. See, e.g., Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Vague statutes fail to
provide citizens with fair notice or warning of statutory prohibitions so that they may act in a lawful
manner." (citing Connally, 269 U.S. at 391)), affid on other grounds on reh'g, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th
Cir. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ("Where the legislature fails to provide certain
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep [thatl allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."' (alteration in original) (quoting Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974))).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (upholding a statute
prohibiting mailing pistols and "other firearms capable of being concealed on the person" because it
established a "reasonably ascertainable standard of conduct" and because it provided notice to the
citizens as to what actions are proscribed by the statute).
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ever, if a statute fails either part of the test, the statute is void because of
its vagueness.25
It is important to understand from the outset that the pursuit of a
void-for-vagueness finding is an uphill battle. An elementary, but criti-
cal, point in this type of challenge is that courts begin their analysis with
the presumption that the statute under attack is valid.26 Also, a court, if in
fairness such is possible, must give a statute a reasonable construction or
interpretation to avoid unconstitutional indefiniteness.
27
A second fundamental point regarding any vagueness challenge is
that a reviewing court is not restricted to an examination of the legisla-
tion on its face; rather, whether the statute provides fair notice and an
ascertainable standard of guilt turns on prior judicial construction or in-
terpretation. 28 An authoritative construction of a statute by a jurisdic-
tion's highest court will be considered as interpretative of the "words in
,,29the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature.
Thus, in some cases, a narrowing construction may save the enactment
from a successful attack.30 However, in other cases, a judicial "gloss"
may narrow the scope of the act, but not enough to save it.31 In yet other
cases, what may appear is an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial ex-
pansion of narrow and precise statutory language that can only aggravate
the integrity of the law.1
2
25. See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927) (finding that the Colorado
Anti-trust Act is void because it fails to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt); see also People
v. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 45 (i. 1987) (finding an Illinois drug paraphernalia prohibition void
because it failed to afford fair notice of what conduct was prohibited and also lent itself to arbitrary
enforcement).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (finding that
federal Robinson-Patman Act making it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably low prices" in order
to destroy competitors not vague and that a "strong presumptive validity ... attaches to an Act of
Congress").
27. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 n.6 (1954) (citing United States v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909), and finding the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act not
vague).
28. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (noting that, in reviewing a claim of
vagueness of a state statute, the United States Supreme Court must take the statute as though it read
precisely as the highest court of the state has interpreted it).
29. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,514 (1948).
30. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (finding that the prohibition
outlawing threats to the President of the United States requires proof of a "true threat" to the
President's life or limb and, thus, the statute as construed is "certainly" not void on its face).
31. See, e.g., Winters, 333 U.S. at 518-19 (holding that the state statute outlawing "obscene
prints and articles" was not saved by New York Court of Appeals determination that statute only
reached materials "so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes").
32. See, e.g., Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (finding that the South Carolina
Supreme Court violated the defendant's due process rights in applying its 1961 construction of state
statute prohibiting entry of lands of another after notice not to enter as prohibiting the act of
remaining on premises after being asked to leave, to affirm the conviction of the defendant, who in
1960 refused to leave luncheonette department of drug store after requested to leave).
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A. The "Fair Notice 03 Requirement
Providing adequate notice does not require that a defendant actually
know that his conduct constitutes a violation of the law.34 An actual no-
tice requirement would run afoul of the principle that ignorance of the
law is no excuse. Thus, as a practical matter, the requirement of "fair
notice"35 merely insists (although no court will admit it) that a defendant
have constructive notice that his act is criminal; that is, that the defendant
could have found out whether his conduct was prohibited by the statute.36
A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to draw reasonably clear lines
between lawful and unlawful conduct such that the defendant has no way
to find out whether his conduct is controlled by the statute.37 Vague stat-
utes are constitutionally unacceptable because they fail to provide citi-
zens with fair notice or warning of statutory prohibitions so that they
may act in a lawful manner.38
On various occasions, the United States Supreme Court has struck
down federal and state criminal statutes under the Due Process Clause
for not being sufficiently explicit in informing those who were subject to
the laws what conduct on their part would render them liable to criminal
penalties.39 In this connection, it has been pointed out that there are no
mechanical standards to be rigidly applied to every case; rather, the de-
gree of vagueness that may be tolerated depends on "the nature of the
33. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
34. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1(d), at 441 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the
fact that ignorance of the criminal law is not a defense is based upon the early notion that the law
was "definite and knowable" and that everyone is presumed to know the law that is, of course, an
"obvious fiction").
35. Colauni, 439 U.S. at 390 (finding stricture outlawing abortion of "viable" fetus vague for
failing to provide "fair notice" regarding test for viability).
36. Cf Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50, 53 (1975) ("Even trained lawyers may find it
necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any
certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid."); see also Connally, 269 U.S. at 393 ("The
crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can
intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue."); Columbia Natural
Res., Inc., v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the United States Supreme
Court case law on vagueness "reflects the common sense understanding that the average citizen does
not read, at his leisure, every federal, state, and local statute to which he is subject"), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1158 (1996); Jeffries, supra note 8, at 207 ("[T]he kind of notice required is entirely
formal. Publication of a statute's text always suffices; the government need made no further effort to
apprise the people of the content of the law . . . .In short, the fair warning requirement of the
vagueness doctrine is not structured to achieve actual notice of the content of the penal law.").
37. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (finding that the Massachusetts flag misuse
statute outlawing "contemptuous treatment of flag" was vague because the statute failed to delineate
the kinds non-ceremonial treatment that is criminal and that which is not).
38. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 388 (finding that the Oklahoma statute requiring employees to
be paid "not less than the current rate per diem wages in the locality" was vague).
39. See Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1964) (discussing prior opinions where the
Court employed the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
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enactment." 4 First, the Court has suggested that the need for notice is
greater when the statute imposes penalties on individual behavior than
when it regulates the economic behavior of businesses inasmuch as the
"subject matter" under regulation "is often more narrow ...because
businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully,
can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action," and
because these entities "may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the
regulation by [their] own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative proc-
ess. ' 41 Second, greater latitude is given when the enactment is civil rather
than criminal because "the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively
less severe" given their differing penalty structures.42 Third, statutes
which involve a scienter requirement are more likely to withstand a
claim of vagueness where they ensure that the law punishes only those
who are aware that their conduct is unlawful.43 Fourth, in cases where the
statute under consideration may affect constitutionally protected conduct,
particularly First Amendment speech, the reviewing court is less likely to
find that constructive notice exists than in cases where the statute could
not possibly infringe upon such constitutional freedoms. 44 A study of the
case law in this area prompted one commentator to observe that as a
practical matter, the courts actually measure vagueness claims by con-
sideration of: (1) the significance of the legislative enactment, i.e., its
importance in the larger social scheme; 45 (2) the necessity of the statutory
ambiguity in achieving the underlying goal;46 and (3) the impact of the
legislation "on protected or desirable conduct. ' '47 Moreover, judges
40. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
41. Id.at498.
42. Id. at 498-99.
43. Id. at 499. A requirement of specific intent that is interpreted as the intentional
commission of an act which is (or just happens to be) criminal obviously does not give rise to a
presumption of fair notice in the same way as where the specific intent is interpreted as the willful
commission of an act knowing the act to be wrong. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02
(1945) (plurality opinion); see also Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394-95 (finding lack of criminal mens rea
aggravated ambiguity in Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 579-80 (finding
Massachusetts flag misuse prohibition that outlawed treating the flag in a "contemptuous" manner
did not clarify whether contempt had to be intentional or could be inadvertent and, as such, statute
was vague).
44. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99. These decisions may be based on the
assertion the statute is violative of due process. E.g., Goguen, 415 U.S. at 566 (finding
Massachusetts flag misuse prohibition that outlaws "contemptuous treatment" of the flag is void for
vagueness in violation of due process). Other decisions are claimed to be a violation of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963) (finding Virginia prohibition
against solicitation of legal business which made it a crime for a person to advise another that his
legal rights may have been infringed and to refer him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys
was vague and in violation of the First Amendment).
45. See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-Balancing Acts,
5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 10 (1997).
46. See Batey, supra note 45, at 2.
47. Id. at 2; see also Jeffries, supra note 8, at 215-16 (pointing out that the vagueness doctrine
"is so often invoked against street cleaning statutes-local ordinances directed against some form of
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"veil" these analytical considerations lest they appear less like judges and
more like legislators.48
For example, in Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County,49 the Georgia
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a local anti-loitering
statute. In that case, the defendant was arrested after being observed on
the same street corner on which police had observed him four times over
the two days prior to his arrest, and on all four previous occasions the
defendant was told by the police to move along.50 The defendant was
prosecuted under a county municipal ordinance outlawing "loitering or
prowling.'
Although in previous cases the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld
the State's loitering statute against vagueness challenges,52 the court was
troubled with this particular municipal loitering ordinance because of the
final clause of the ordinance, which proscribed as illegal a person's pres-
ence "under circumstances which cause a justifiable and reasonable
alarm or immediate concern that such person is involved in unlawful
drug activity. 53 The court noted that:
an innocent person unfamiliar with the drug culture could stand or sit
in a 'known drug area' without knowing the area had such a designa-
tion, and could return to the area for a legitimate reason, or for no
reason at all, and, as the facts of this case show, be subject to arrest
and conviction.
54
The court found no language in the ordinance that would put an innocent
person, such as the defendant, on notice that his behavior was forbid-
den.55 The court distinguished this ordinance from the ordinance that it
had previously reviewed in Bell v. State.56 In Bell, the Georgia Supreme
Court had upheld a State anti-loitering statute that prohibited conduct
that created a "reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of
public nuisance, typically involving trivial misconduct, usually with no specifically identifiable
victim, and carrying minor penalties").
48. See Batey, supra note 45, at 2.
49. 529 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2000).
50. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 614.
51. Id. ("A person commits the offense of loitering or prowling when he is in a place at a time
or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant a justifiable
and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity or
under circumstances which cause a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern that such
person is involved in unlawful drug activity." (quoting ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY MON.
ORDINANCE § 3-5-23 (1993))).
52. See State v. Burch, 443 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. 1994); Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984).
53. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 615.
54. Id. at 616.
55. Id.
56. 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984).
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persons or property in the vicinity." 57 While the court in Bell had deter-
mined that a person of average intelligence could understand what con-
duct created a "reasonable alarm or immediate concern of the safety for
persons or property in the vicinity," the court in Johnson concluded that
a person of average intelligence could not necessarily understand what
activity would "cause a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate
concern that such person is involved in unlawful drug activity. 58
The court examined the criteria that were used by the arresting offi-
cer in the present case to determine whether the defendant was in viola-
tion of the statute.59 Here, the officer had arrested the defendant because
the area that he was in was a known drug area and the defendant's con-
duct in returning to the same spot repeatedly was characteristic of drug
related activities. 60 The court pointed out that the determination of
whether or not the defendant was in violation of the statute was based on
the officer's law enforcement experience in that area, not on general
knowledge and common experience of a person of ordinary intelli-
gence.61 The court held that because the statute failed to provide fair
warning to persons of ordinary intelligence as to what the language at
issue that was contained in the ordinance actually prohibited, the statute
was "void for vagueness., 62 Here, then, the court seemed to hang its hat
on the concern over application of the statute to wholly innocent conduct.
In addition, the statute was directed at the behavior of an individual,
rather than a business, and was criminal, rather than civil, which made
the nebulous language more problematic. Although not mentioned by the
court, government proof of scienter was not required. Finally, loitering
constitutes no significant threat to life, limb, or property.
Of course, the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to
review a statute and conclude it failed to provide fair notice as to what
was proscribed. An oft-cited case in this area is Winters v. New York,63
where a defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor offense of possess-
ing with intent to sell certain magazines "devoted... principally... [to]
criminal news, police reports, and accounts of criminal deeds, and pic-
tures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust and crime" contrary to the
New York Penal Code.64 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
interpreted this statute to apply to only those "collections of criminal
deeds of bloodshed or lust [which] 'can be so massed as to become vehi-
cles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person"' and





62. Id. at 617.
63. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
64. Winters, 333 U.S. at 508 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW, ch. 39 § 1141(2) (McKinney 1944)).
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upheld the defendant's conviction. 65 However, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed.66 The Court first noted basic First Amendment
protections of free speech and press were implicated by this stricture.
67
"[E]ven considering the gloss" the New York Court of Appeals had put
on this statute in order to narrow its scope to not include "detective tales
and treatises on criminology," for example, it remained highly uncertain
as to what type of materials might still "be interdicted because of the
utter impossibility of the actor or the trier to know where this new stan-
dard of guilt would draw the line between the allowable and the forbid-
den publications. 68 Also, no criminal intent or purpose was required in
order to convict an alleged offender. 69 Moreover, this measure reflected
"no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law."70
It carried "no technical or common law meaning., 71 In addition, the stat-
ute had the capacity to reach, for example, "[c]ollections of tales of war
horrors" and criminalize other "innocent" activity.72 The statute set nei-
ther guidelines for the distributor of questionable materials nor a useful
measuring stick for courts or juries.73 Because the "standards of certainty
in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending pri-
marily upon civil sanction for enforcement," this proscription that was
devoid of "fair notice" was contrary to due process of law and thus void-
for-vagueness.74
Winters, like the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Johnson,
reflects the type of measure that is most vulnerable to a vagueness at-
tack.75 Innocent, as well as constitutionally protected, behavior was im-
plicated.76 Proof of scienter was lacking.77 The penalty was criminal, not
civil.78 The defendant was an individual, not a collective entity.79 Finally,
no demonstrable threat to person or property was involved.80
65. Id. at 512-13 (quoting People v. Winters, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100 (N.Y. 1945)).
66. Id. at 520.
67. id. at 518-19.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 519.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 520.
73. Id. at 519-20.
74. Id. at 509-10, 515.
75. Id. at 509-10; Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 615.
76. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 616.
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B. The "Ascertainable Standard of Guilt"81 Requirement
Although an analysis of a vagueness claim focuses both on the ade-
quacy of the notice to citizens and concern over arbitrary enforcement,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the more important
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other prin-
cipal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. ''82 "The absence of a
determinate standard" in a given legal proscription "gives police officers,
prosecutors, and the triers of fact unfettered discretion to apply the law
and, thus there is a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"
of such a law. 83 Consequently, the void-for-vagueness doctrine demands
that these measures provide "officials with explicit guidelines in order to
avoid [such] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 84 They must
reflect what the Court has described as an "ascertainable standard[] of
guilt. '85 The Court has long recognized that "[i]t would certainly be dan-
gerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large., 86 To that end, laws
are invalidated if they are "wholly lacking in 'terms susceptible of objec-
tive measurement."' 87 It has been observed that "[l]aws that have failed
to meet this [vagueness] standard are, almost without exception, those
which turn on language calling for the exercise of subjective judgment
[of the enforcer] unaided by objective norms. 88
Beyond concerns relating to providing guidance to police, "[I]t is
established that a law [also] fails to meet the requirements of the Due
Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves ... judges
and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is
prohibited and what is not in each particular case., 89 An act's criminality
cannot depend upon, as a general rule, whether a jury may think one's
81. See Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545.
82. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574).
83. Kramer, 712 F.2d at 176 (holding that a Texas harassment statute outlawing
communications which "annoy" or "alarm" another is vague).
84. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that
the definition of "educational" contained in a federal treasury regulation governing tax exemptions
for charitable and educational organization was vague).
85. Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545 (holding municipal "suspicious persons" ordinance vague);
Winters, 333 U.S. at 515 (holding state Obscene and Prints Article Act vague); Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 459-60 (1927) (holding Colorado Anti-Trust Act vague).
86. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
87. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961)).
88. NAACP, 371 U.S. at 466 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (emphasis added).
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conduct is unreasonable, improper, or immoral. 90 Rather, there must be
some definiteness and certainty written into the law.9' The Court has
made clear that "[t]he dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful
cannot be left to conjecture.,, 92 "The citizen cannot be held to answer
charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that
they will reasonably admit of different constructions" by the fact finder.
93
When a law fails to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt, "[i]t
leaves open ... the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no
one can ... foreshadow or adequately guard against."
94
One example of a statute being struck down for vagueness because
of its potential for arbitrary enforcement appeared in Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville.95 In this consolidated case, nine defendants were
arrested for violating Jacksonville's vagrancy ordinance.96 The first four
defendants, Papachristou, Calloway, Melton, and Johnson 97 were riding
in Calloway's car on a main thoroughfare in Jacksonville, Florida, on the
way to a nightclub.98 They were arrested because "the defendants had
stopped near a used-car lot that had been broken into several times.' 99
These four individuals were charged with "prowling by auto.
'' 00
Two other defendants, Smith and Henry, were waiting for a friend
in downtown Jacksonville.10' It was a cold day and Smith did not have a
jacket. 0 2 The two entered a dry cleaning shop to continue their wait but
90. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (citing Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917,
919 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892)).
91. Nash, 229 U.S. at 377,
92. Connally, 269 U.S. at 393.
93. Id.
94. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
95. 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
96. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156. The Florida ordinance provided in part:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
person who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, person
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places were
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon
the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon
conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 26-57.
97. Papachristou and Calloway were white females; Melton and Johnson were black males.
Papachistou, 405 U.S. at 158.
98. Id. at 158-59.
99. Id. at 159. The Court pointed out that there was no evidence of any breaking or entering
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were asked to leave.10 3 After they left, they walked up and down a two
block area two or three times, whereupon the observing storeowners con-
tacted the police.' °4 The police officers arrested Smith and Henry be-
cause they did not have any identification and because the police officers
did not believe the defendants' story. 105
The seventh defendant, Heath, was arrested after he and his com-
panion drove down his girlfriend's driveway, where they noticed police
officers arresting a third party, whereupon the two proceeded to back
out.1°6 At this point, police arrested Heath and his companions. Heath
was charged with being a "common thief' because he had a reputation of
being a thief. 10 7 Heath's companion was arrested for "loitering" in the
driveway.
0 8
The eighth defendant, Campbell was arrested when he arrived home
in the very early morning hours."°9 Police officers stopped him for speed-
ing, but no speeding charge was ever issued against him. 10
The ninth defendant, Brown, was arrested when police officers
called him over to their car.1 ' The police officers began to search him
and, when Brown started to resist, the officers discovered two packets of
heroin in his pocket." 2 However, Brown was charged with "disorderly
loitering on the street, and disorderly conduct - resisting arrest with vio-
lence."
1 13
In reviewing the charges, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the activities codified in the Jacksonville ordinance involved "nor-
mally innocent" behavior.' 14 These activities included "night walking,"
"loafing," "wandering or strolling," and "habitually ... frequenting...
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served."' 1 5 The Court used
the writings of Walt Whitman, Vachel Lindsay, and Henry David Tho-
reau to illustrate:
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the ameni-
ties of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the











113. Id. at 160-61.
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id. at 163-64.
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been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of inde-
pendence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.
... They are embedded in Walt Whitman's writings, especially
in his 'Song of the Open Road.' They are reflected too, in the spirit of
Vachel Lindsay's 'I Want to Go Wandering,' and by Henry D. Tho-
116reau.
The Court determined that the Jacksonville ordinance cast a net too large
such that the crimes it defined were "so all-inclusive and generalized...
[that] those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating
affronts to police authority."'1 7 Additionally, law enforcement had "un-
fettered discretion" in determining when an individual was violating the
ordinance." 8 The Court concluded that the statutory "scheme permits and
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law."' 19
The Court, therefore, held that the Jacksonville ordinance was unconsti-
tutionally vague. 1
20
Another case that predicated a claim of vagueness on inordinate
police discretion was Kolender v. Lawson,'2' wherein the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a California statute
22
that the California appellate court had interpreted as requiring persons
who wander on the streets to provide "credible and reliable" identifica-
tion and "to account for his presence" when requested by a peace officer
under circumstances that would justify a valid stop.' 23 While the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals had construed the statutory mandate that an indi-
vidual provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a
police officer as requiring a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to justify a Terry stop,124 "credible and reliable" identifications
had been defined by the appellate court as identification "carrying rea-
sonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing
116. Id. at 164.,
117. Id. at 166-67.
118. Id. at 168.
119. Id. at 170.
120. Id. at 171.
121. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353-54.
122. Id. at 354 n. I ("Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor: .. .(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his
presence when requested by any peace officer to do so, if the surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification." (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970))).
123. Id. at 355-56 (quoting People v. Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974)).
124. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (providing that the police may conduct a brief
investigatory detention of a suspect where the officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual
may have committed, or is about to commit, an offense).
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means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified him-
self."
125
The Court noted that the statute and case law interpreting it con-
tained "no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to
satisfy the requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' identifica-
tion."1 26 Thus, a suspect would be held to have violated this statute unless
"the officer [was] satisfied that the identification [was] reliable. 1 27 The
statute was construed by the Court as vesting "virtually complete discre-
tion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satis-
fied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way."'' 28 The Court
saw the result of the statute as entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-
moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."' 29 In addition, the Court
noted that this statute furnished "a convenient tool for 'harsh and dis-
criminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular
groups deemed to merit their displeasure,""130 and conferred "on police a
virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a viola-
tion."' 31 Here, the Court held that this statute was unconstitutionally
vague because it allowed "arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe
with sufficient particularity" what a citizen must do in order to comply
with the statute.
1 32
Similar to the decision in Papachristou, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a Chicago gang loitering ordinance because it failed
to set forth an ascertainable standard of guilt in City of Chicago v.
Morales.133 In Morales, the United States Supreme Court reviewed Chi-
cago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibited "criminal street
gang member[s]" from "loitering" with one another in any public
place. 34 For three years, the Chicago police enforced this ordinance,
125. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 356 (quoting Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73).
126. Id. at 358.
127. Id. at 360.
128. Id. at 358.
129. Id. at 360 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. 111, 120 (1969))).
130. Id. (quoting Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97-98 (1940))).
131. Id. (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
132. Id. at 361.
133. 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
134. Morales, 527 U.S. at 47 n.2 (1999) (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015
(1992)).
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to
be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more
other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves
from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in
violation of this section.
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issuing over 89,000 dispersal orders and arresting approximately 42,000
people for violating the ordinance.135 When the ordinance was challenged
in the Illinois appellate court, it ruled the ordinance was vague and over-
broad and, thus, struck the ordinance down.' 36 After the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, 137 the United States Supreme Court inquired into whether
the statute was "invalid on its face."' 138 The Court noted there were two
separate doctrines under which an ordinance may be found unconstitu-
tional. 39 "First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation
of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the
impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."",140 Second, the Court
pointed out that where a proscription "does not reach a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly
vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty
interests."' 41 The Court decided the First Amendment overbreadth claim
advanced in this case did not provide a sufficient basis to invalidate the
ordinance because no free speech or right of association was infringed by
the anti-loitering ordinance.142 Moving to the Due Process Clause, the
Court stated in dictum:
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this Section:
(1) 'Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) 'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing organization, association in fact
or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one
of its substantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity . . .
(5) 'Public place' means the public way and any other location open to the
public, whether publicly or privately ow~ied.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992).
135. Morales, 527 U.S. at 49.
136. Id. at 50 (citing City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 38, 41-42 (ill. Ct. App.
1995)). The Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the "ordinance impaired the freedom of
assembly of nongang members in violation of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and
Article I of the Illinois Constitution, that it was unconstitutionally vague, that it improperly
criminalized status rather than conduct, and that it jeopardized rights guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment." Id.
137. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court determined "that the gang loitering ordinance violate[d]
due process of law in that it [was] impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on
personal liberties." Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (1ii. 1997)).
138. id. at 52.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973)).
141. Id. at 52 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
142. Id. at 52-53.
While we, like the Illinois courts, conclude that the ordinance is invalid on its face,
we do not rely on the overbreadth doctrine. We agree with the city's submission
2002] VAGUENESS, AMBIGUITY, AND OTHER UNCERTAINTY 259
[A]s the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent
purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have expressly identified this
"right to remove from one place to another according to inclination"
as "an attribute of personal liberty" protected by the Constitution. In-
deed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public
place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of
movement inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage," or the right
to move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" iden-
tified in Blackstone's Commentaries.143
However, the Court stated it was unnecessary to decide "whether the
impact of the Chicago ordinance on constitutionally protected liberty
alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under the overbreadth
doctrine" inasmuch as a facial vagueness challenge appropriately ad-
dressed the claim that the law was invalid.' 44 The Court noted that the
ordinance did not "simply regulate[] business behavior."'145 Rather, this
ordinance was a criminal statute that contained no mens rea.146 Also, it
"infringe[d] on constitutionally protected rights" and, as such, was sub-
ject to a facial vagueness attack.
147
Applying the vagueness standard to the ordinance, the Court rea-
soned that a criminal statute could be void for vagueness under two sepa-
rate rationales. 148 "First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will
enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it
may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory con-
duct."' 49 In this case, the Chicago ordinance prohibited individuals from
"loitering," which the enactment itself defined in the following terms: "to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.' ' 150 Under this broad
definition, the Court reasoned that "any citizen of the city of Chicago"
that the law does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by
the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit
speech. Because the term "loiter" is defined as remaining in one place "with no
apparent purpose," it is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that
is apparently intended to convey a message. By its terms, the ordinance is
inapplicable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's support of, or
opposition to, a particular point of view. [citations omitted] Its impact on the social
contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment
"right of association" that our cases have recognized.
Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 126 (1958); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
* 130).
144. Id. at 55.
145. Id. (quoting Vil. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 56.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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would have extreme difficulty in ascertaining whether "he or she had an
apparent purpose" while standing in a public place.151 The Court sug-
gested that individuals simply engaged in conversation with one another
might wonder if they had no "apparent purpose." 152 Because citizens
might not be aware that they were impermissibly loitering, they would
not be receiving fair notice of what conduct the ordinance prohibited in
order to conform their behavior prior to receiving notice from a police
order to disperse. 53 The Court pointed out that if the loitering was
"harmless and innocent," then the police dispersal order would constitute
an "unjustified impairment of liberty."'154 Here, if the police were able to
arbitrarily decide who was guilty of loitering and who was not, then the
law was not providing "advance notice that [would] protect the putative
loiterer from being ordered to disperse. Such an order cannot retroac-
tively give adequate warning of the boundary between the permissible
and the impermissible applications of the law."' 55 Additionally, individu-
als subject to dispersal orders were not afforded clear instructions as to
how comply with the police order. 56 The Court illustrated this problem
with the following questions: "[H]ow long must the loiterers remain
apart? How far must they move? If each loiterer walks around the block
and they meet again at the same location, are they subject to arrest or
merely to being ordered to disperse again?' 57 Because the answers to the
Court's questions could not be ascertained from the ordinance, the Court
concluded that "the entire ordinance fail[ed] to give the ordinary citizen
adequate notice of what [was] forbidden and what [was] permitted."'
' 58
The Court held that the ordinance was vague because "no standard of
conduct is specified at all.'
159
II. AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS DICHOTOMY
The dividing line between statutory vagueness, which renders an
enactment void, and statutory ambiguity, which means a law is fixable
by judicial interpretation, is not entirely clear.' 6° Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to not only attempt an explanation of vagueness, as in the previ-
ous section, but also one of ambiguity. Scholars have, of course, man-
aged to see a difference by pointing out that while a vague statute does
151. Id. at 56-57.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 58-59 ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes." (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453 (1939))).
154. Id. at 58.
155. Id. at 59.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 60.
159. Id. (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971)).
160. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.2(d), at 86, § 2.3(b), at 100-01.
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not satisfactorily define the proscribed conduct, one that does define pro-
hibited conduct with some precision, but is subject to two or more differ-
ent interpretations, is ambiguous. 161
For instance, an expression is ambiguous when a criminal statute
outlaws conduct "P" and "P" can alternatively be read to encompass ei-
ther conduct "a" or conduct "b" and it is beyond dispute that the defen-
dant engaged only in conduct "a.', 162 To illustrate, using Chomsky's lin-
guistic literature, "the sentence, 'flying planes can be dangerous' can
mean either 'it can be dangerous to fly planes' or 'planes that are aloft
can be dangerous.' 163 While a vague statute is void as unconstitutional,
an ambiguous statute may be saved by using a variety of techniques to
determine the legislature's intent. 64 To interpret an ambiguous statute,
courts may employ three techniques: (1) utilizing rules for interpreting
the statute's actual language; (2) using rules directing a court to look
outside of the statutory language; and (3) in criminal cases only, relying
on the rule of strict construction, which commands an ambiguity to be
resolved in the defendant's favor. 65 This latter rule is the rule of len-
ity.
166
To interpret the statute's actual language, the courts have recog-
nized five basic principles: (1) a statute that uses different language in
different sections is presumed to have a different meaning in each of the
different sections; (2) catch-all phrases are limited by the rule of ejusdem
generis (Latin for "of the same kind") which limits interpretation to a
common theme or factor; (3) statutes that set forth a list of exceptions
implicitly exclude other exceptions by utilizing the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius (Latin for "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another"); (4) where two statutes conflict, the specific stat-
ute has priority over the general; and (5) where two statutes conflict, the
later enacted statute has priority over the earlier. 67 If these rules do not
help the court to resolve the ambiguity or conflict, the court may look
beyond the actual statute at the legislative history or another authoritative
interpretation. 1
68
In addition, because criminal statutes are held to a higher standard
of precision and clarity, courts apply the rule of lenity, which one noted
161. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 76; LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2-3(b), at 100-01.
162. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57,62 (1998).
163. Id. (quoting NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX § 4, at 21 (1965)).
164. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 76.
165. Id. § 2.3, at 90.
166. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (citing Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81, 83 (1995), and finding Travel Act vague and therefore no violation by out-of-state
gamblers frequenting a gambling operation).
167. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 2.3, at 90-91.
168. Id. § 2.3, at 92.
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scholar aptly called the "junior version of the vagueness doctrine."' 69
Although it is not constitutionally required, 170 this rule directs that an
ambiguity in a statute be resolved in the defendant's favor. 17 1 It should be
understood that "[t]he motivating purpose of the rule is to provide ade-
quate notice to defendants (due process), and to reinforce the notion that
only the legislature has the power to define what conduct is criminal and
what conduct is not (separation of powers).' 72
This rule has been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in
their interpretation of federal law. 173 Although the rule had an established
history in English law, the first United States Supreme Court decision to
apply it appeared in 1820.74 In United States v. Wiltberger,75 the Court
was faced with the question of whether a federal statute that proscribed
manslaughter "on the high seas" could apply to a homicide that occurred
on an American merchant marine vessel on a river in the interior of a
foreign country. 176 While one section of the Crimes Act of 1790 simply
referred to commission of manslaughter "on the high seas," another sec-
tion of the Act, which addressed murder and other felonies committed on
water, specifically referred to commission of such acts "upon the high
seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any
particular [American] State."'177 The government asserted if consideration
was given to the "construction of the whole act," one could logically
conclude the "obvious intent of the legislature" was to define manslaugh-
ter on the high seas as including such a homicide on a foreign river.
17 8
169. PACKER, supra note 6, at 95.
170. DRESSLER, supra note 14, § 5.04, at 47-48.
171. Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812 (citing Bell, 349 U.S. at 83).
172. Solan, supra note 162, at 58. This rationale appears in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347-48 (1971).
173. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) ("The Court has often
stated that when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language."). Here,
mail fraud does not encompass schemes to defraud people of their right to honest government;
rather, it is interpreted as applying only to schemes to defraud one's property rights. Id.; see also
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425, 426, 428, 433-34 (1985) (holding rule of lenity
commands offense of unlawful acquiring and possessing food stamps requires mens rea of
knowledge); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1978) (holding rule
of lenity requires interpretation of federal Sherman Antitrust Act as requiring intent); Bass, 404 U.S.
at 347-48 (holding rule of lenity requires that offense of receipt, possession or transportation of
firearms by a felon in interstate commerce require proof that receipt and possession as well as
transportation be in interstate commerce).
174. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820); see also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and
Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 357, 358 (1994).
175. 18 U.S. 76.
176. Id. at 93-96.
177. Id. at 92-96, 98-99.
178. Id. at 94-95.
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However, the Court responded, "The rule that penal laws are to be
construed strictly . . . is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of pun-
ishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.'
' 79
The Court added, "The intention of the legislature is to be collected from
the words they employ [and] [w]here there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction."' 80 Here, the plain language of the
manslaughter statute outlawed a killing "on the high seas," nothing
more. 81 This indictment, for the commission of manslaughter that oc-
curred on a river, then, was not based on a "cognizable" offense of the
laws of the United States.'
82
In Jones v. United States,183 the Court relied, in part, on the rule of
lenity in finding that the commission of "arson of an owner-occupied
dwelling" fell outside the scope of federal criminal law. 84 In this case,
the defendant was convicted of a federal offense for damage or destruc-
tion "by means of fire or an explosive, [of] any ... property used in in-
terstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce."' 85 Upon examination of the defendant's claim that
an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose did
not qualify as property "used in" commerce or "affecting" commerce, the
Court said the proper inquiry involved considering the function of the
building itself and how, if at all, that function could be considered com-
merce-related. 86 The government had claimed the defendant's arson
involved "use" of interstate commerce in three ways: (1) the homeowner
"used" the dwelling as collateral to get a loan from an out-of-state lender;
(2) the homeowner "used" the residence to obtain a casualty insurance
policy from an insurer in another state; and (3) the homeowner "used"
the dwelling to receive natural gas from another state.1 87 However, the
Court responded that "[i]t surely is not the common perception that a
private, owner-occupied residence is 'used' in the 'activity' of receiving
natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy."' 88 The Court felt that
''active employment" in commerce was what needed to be established,
while in this case the only "active employment" was the "everyday liv-
ing" of the residents of the damaged premises. 189 Applying the rule of
179. Id. at 95.
180. Id. at 95-96.
181. Id. at 104-05.
182. Id. at 105.
183. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
184. Jones, 529 U.S. at 858.
185. Id. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
186. Id. at 854 (citing United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
187. Id. at 855.
188. Id. at 856.
189. Id.
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lenity to the "choice... between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alterna-
tive, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite."190 This Congress had failed to do and, thus, the de-
fendant was given the benefit of the ambiguity.'
9'
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the federal rule of
lenity only applies where a court determines that a "grievous ambiguity
or uncertainty" exists.192 The Court limits the use of lenity since "most
statutes are ambiguous to some degree."' 193 In addition, a statute does not
suffer the infirmity of ambiguity unless, "'after seizing everything from
which aid can be derived,' [the Court] can make 'no more than a guess as
to what Congress intended."' 194 Thus, if the Court understands what
Congress intended in choosing a particular word or phrase in a criminal
statute, there is neither ambiguity nor need to resort to the rule of len-
ity. 195
Also, "the fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not ex-
pressly anticipated by Congress does not"' establish ambiguity but rather
breadth. 96 In other words, merely because a statute is all-encompassing
does not establish ambiguity. When the rule does apply, the law in ques-
tion should not be interpreted in a manner which defies common sense
nor should the law be given a "forced, narrow or overstrict construc-
tion.' 9 7
190. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22
(1952)).
191. Id. at 859.
192. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). In Staples, for example, the Court found it unnecessary to employ
the rule of lenity in concluding that a conviction for possessing an unregistered machine gun
required proof of scienter. Id. The Court established that crimes without a mens rea have a most
disfavored status in criminal law. Id. at 605-06. In addition, the Court had not previously held that
"statutes silent with respect to mens rea are ambiguous." Id. at 619.
193. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).
194. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239
(1993); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)). Reno held that a prisoner who spent
time at a community treatment center while "released" on bail was not in "official detention"
entitling him to sentence credit. Id.
195. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138-39 (holding that where Congress clearly intended to
use a broad definition of "carry" for purposes of outlawing the carrying of a firearm during a drug
transaction, there existed no need to consider rule of lenity); United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201,
204 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that where Congress clearly intended to outlaw all forms of marijuana,
there was no ambiguity in a federal statute that only referenced one species of marijuana).
196. Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 .(1985)). Yeskey held that the American Disabilities Act
"unambiguously extends to state prison inmates." Id.
197. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.2(d), at 84.
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While the federal courts and many state courts 198 rely on the rule of
lenity, other states have abolished the rule.' 99 At the core of this move-
ment to eliminate the rule lies the notion that its implementation often-
times runs contrary to legislative intent.200 The Model Penal Code rejects
the rule of lenity and states:
The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair
import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing
constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes
stated in this Section and the special purposes of the particular provi-
sion involved. The discretionary powers conferred by the Code shall
be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the Code and,
insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general pur-
poses stated in this Section.
20 1
This fair import rule is considered less "strict" because it allows for in-
terpretation in a way that does not frustrate the legislative purpose.20 2 The
rule seeks to ensure that some reasonable notice of the offense is possi-
ble.2 °3 This strikes a compromise between the principles of legality and
countervailing interests.204 However, it is not clear that the rule of lenity
and the rule of fair import generate a significant difference in applica-
tion.20 5 Arguably, the fair import rule allows a court more leeway to fol-
low legislative intent that conflicts with a literal reading, but this is mere
speculation.0 6 The difference may lie in the use of judicial discretion in
the fair import rule.20 7 This may be the reason some courts prefer the rule
of strict construction since it permits discretion yet appears mechanical••• 208
and thereby leaves a decision less open to cnticism.
HI. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS DICHOTOMY
The concepts of overbreadth and vagueness are, in some sense, dis-
tinct and yet, in other regards, inseparable. As mentioned previously, "[a]
198. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 766 N.E.2d 641,644, 647 (Ill. 2002) (stating in dicta that rule of
lenity would compel a finding that a pellet gun is not a "dangerous weapon" within meaning of
Illinois armed violence statute).
199. DRESSLER, supra note 14, § 5.04. Compare Kahan, supra note 174, at 346 (criticizing the
doctrine), with Solan, supra note 162, at 59-60 (defending the rule of lenity).
200. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 2.3, at 93 ("The rule can frustrate a legislature's obvious intent
on what can be an important issue and risks bringing the criminal justice system into disrepute,
subjecting it to criticism that it is a game governed by technicalities having little reference to fairness
or justice."); DRESSLER, supra note 14, § 5.04, at 47 ("A statute should be interpreted to further, not
frustrate, the legislative policies behind the specific law in question.").
201. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1962).
202. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 94.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people
of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it in-
vites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement., 20 9 If a party challenges
an enactment based on the assertion that one cannot determine whether
the regulation intrudes upon otherwise "innocent terrain," then the com-
plaint is one of vagueness. t° On the other hand, if a challenge is based
on an objection that the regulation does, in fact, intrude into territory
where it does not belong, then the claim is one of overbreadth. t1
While a statute may often be found both vague and overbroad at the
same time, the two concepts are distinct. A statute is too vague when
it fails to give fair notice of what it prohibits. It is overbroad when its
language, given its normal meaning, is so broad that the sanctions
may apply to conduct which the state is not entitled to regulate.
212
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that the possible "vagueness of a
law affects overbreadth analysis. 2 t3 When a court looks at a claim of
overbreadth and considers whether "a substantial amount of constitution-
ally protected conduct" is involved, it must examine both the uncertain
and the clear reach of the proscription in order to decide whether the
nebulous aspect of the proscription may be discouraging the citizenry
214from engaging in protected speech or behavior.
In any event, some discussions of vagueness confuse the concepts of
"vagueness" and "overbreadth." In some sense, this is a product of seem-
ingly inconsistent statements and analyses which appear in the case law.
This section will first discuss overbreadth, followed by discussions of
"facial vagueness" and "vagueness as applied."
A. First Amendment (or Facial) Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine is atypical of ordinary constitutional adju-
dication because it does not insist on the traditional requirements of
standing.2 t5 The United States Supreme Court "has altered its traditional
209. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984).
210. Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 n.9 (1982)
(stating that if the respondent's objection to the statute is based on the question of "whether the
ordinance regulates items with some lawful uses, then it is complaining of vagueness").
211. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 n.9; see also Schwartzniller, 752 F.2d at 1346
("A law is overbroad if it prohibits not only acts the legislature may forbid, but also constitutionally
protected conduct.").
212. Ariz. ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ariz. 1975).
213. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6.
214. Id. at 494.
215. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1973) (reiterating that under the
traditional rule of standing which governs constitutional adjudication, it is impermissible for a
person to challenge a statute on the grounds that the statute infringes upon other persons'
constitutional rights; but in regards to First Amendment overbreadth challenges, there exists no
standing requirement); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1982) (declaring that the
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rules of standing to permit -- in the First Amendment area -- 'attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a stat-
ute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. ' ' 21 6 Therefore, an indi-
vidual may allege that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and de-
prives either himself or another person of his or her First Amendment
rights.217 The Court's reasoning for this deviation from the traditional
standing requirement rests upon "a judicial prediction or assumption that
the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to re-
frain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. 218
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine prevents any enforce-
ment of a law that interferes with free speech "until and unless a limiting
construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seem-
ing threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression., 2 9 In-
asmuch as the effect of this doctrine is so dramatic, by allowing pre-
enforcement challenges without any showing of traditional standing, this
"strong medicine" has historically "been employed by the Court spar-
ingly and only as a matter of last resort., 22 0 Furthermore, these claims,
"if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary




Thus, where a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of a common law breach
of the peace for playing a phonograph record attacking the Catholic
Church in the presence of two Catholics, the Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction but refused to void the offense "in toto because it was
capable of some unconstitutional applications. 2 22
traditional rule of standing "reflects two cardinal principles of our constitutional order: the personal
nature of constitutional rights and prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication" and that the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is an exception to this principle).
216. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,486 (1965)).
217. Id. at 611-12.
218. Id. at612.
219. Id. at 613.
220. Id. However, the Court is not disinclined to use this doctrine. For example, after stating
that the Communications Decency Act's "coverage is wholly unprecedented," the Court ruled it to
be facially overbroad. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-82 (1997) (striking down the
Communications Decency Act which prohibited transmission of obscene or indecent
communications by means of telecommunication to persons under 18, or sending patently offensive
communications through use of interactive computer service to persons under 18, because the Act
was contrary to the First Amendment); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
258 (2002) (holding that the ban on "virtual child pornography" contained in Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 was overbroad and contrary to the First Amendment).
221. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 614.
222. Id. at 613-14 (discussing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 311 (1940)).
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This concept of overbreadth, also referred to as "facial over-
breadth,,223 clearly arises where a criminal statute seeks to regulate "only
spoken words" protected by the First Amendment.224 In addition, these
challenges have been allowed where a broadly worded statute might bur-
den innocent associations,225 "regulate the time, place, and manner of
expressive or communicative conduct, ' 226 or give "standardless discre-
tionary power to local functionaries" to refuse such expressive conduct in
advance, thereby creating "unreviewable prior restraints on First Amend-
ment rights., 227 As stated, overbreadth challenges have "been limited
with respect to conduct-related regulation. 228 When a defendant alleges
that a statute is overbroad and vague, the reviewing court first focuses on
whether the statute "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct., 229 The substantial overbreadth requirement applies to
challenges to legislation that "arise in defense of a criminal prosecution
as well as civil enforcement or actions seeking a declaratory
judgment., 230 In making this evaluation, a court must measure the am-
biguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the law in an effort to de-
termine if it is deterring innocent citizens from engaging in licit speech
or conduct.23' When ruling on an overbreadth challenge, a court must
initially attempt to interpret the enactment in a fashion that avoids a find-
ing of unconstitutionality. 232 If the statute does not implicate a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct, then the statute is not
233 h oroverbroad. Next, the court must examine the facial vagueness chal-
lenge (discussed more fully below). Assuming the stricture impedes no
constitutionally protected conduct, the court should sustain a challenge
only if the law "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 234 In
223. Id. at 612; see also Byrum v. Texas, 762 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that a claim of "facial overbreadth" may arise where a statute either intrudes on the First Amendment
or impedes some other "fundamental interest" that restricts one's "conduct").
224. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972)).
225. Id. (citing cases such as Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), where the
Court granted injunctive relief while striking down a New York Statute which made treasonable or
seditious acts grounds for removal from state employment).
226. Id. at 612-13 (citing cases such as Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940), where a
statute forbidding loitering and picketing was successfully challenged on overbreadth grounds
because the law also restricted "nearly every practicable, effective means" of educating the public
about a labor dispute).
227. Id. at 613 (citing cases such as Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), where the Court
found as overbroad a general breach of the peace statute which punished people for expressing
unpopular views that might agitate others).
228. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
229. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 (quoted in State v. Dixon, 998 P.2d 544, 547
(Mont. 2000)).
230. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772-73 (emphasis added).
231. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6.
232. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24.
233. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 (quoted in Dixon, 998 P.2d at 547).
234. Id. at 494-95.
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contrast to the First Amendment overbreadth challenge, a vagueness
challenge, not involving First Amendment freedoms but mere conduct,
does not allow an individual to challenge the possible inappropriate ap-
plication of the law to others.235
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,236 the United States Supreme Court
invoked the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a municipal ordinance
restricting "opprobrious language." In that case, the defendant had been
found guilty of an offense that made it unlawful and a breach of the
peace for any person "wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city
police while in the actual performance of his duty. '237 The charge arose
out of a verbal confrontation between the defendant and a police officer
that included utterances of profanity directed at the officer.238 In its
analysis, the Court ultimately concluded "opprobrious" language em-
braced words that did not inflict injury or "incite an immediate breach of
the peace. In addition, it observed that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect speech, including that which might be deemed
"vulgar or offensive." 24° Because the ordinance punished "only spoken
words" and was "susceptible of application to protected speech," it was
"constitutionally overbroad and therefore.. . facially invalid." 241
Just as the Court has employed the overbreadth doctrine to void
legislation where a defendant has raised it in defense of a criminal
charge,242 it has relied on it to undo an enactment in a pre-enforcement
action.243 For example, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,244 the plaintiffs sought
an injunction, under provisions contained in two federal civil rights stat-
utes, restraining various Louisiana officials from prosecution or other
enforcement of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Con-
trol Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law.246 The plaintiffs
235. Id. at 495.
236. 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974).
237. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132 (quoting NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7).
238. Id. at 132 n.1.
239. Id. at 133 (quoting Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525).
240. Id. at 134.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 2 (1973) (per curiam) (holding
municipal ordinance outlawing use of "menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language" was
invalid on its face); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-21 (holding Georgia statute outlawing use of
"opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace" was on its face
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
243. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241-43 (affirming pre-enforcement challenge of prohibition
against "virtual child pornography" contained in federal Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
on First Amendment overbreadth grounds).
244. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
245. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964)).
246. Id. at 481-82.
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were several civil rights activists who were concerned about the State of
Louisiana's possible use of this legislation to curtail the activities of
those asserting or vindicating the rights of African-American citizens.
247
The Court began its consideration of the plaintiffs' claim by noting that
concerns of federalism normally required postponement of consideration
of federal issues that might arise in a state prosecution until state court
248processes had run their course. 8 However, the Court observed that alle-
gations in the complaint in this case "depict a situation in which defense
of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication
of constitutional rights. 249 Specifically, it was suggested that "substan-
tial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression" violative of appel-
lants' First Amendment rights would occur in the interim between com-
mencement of prosecution by the state and federal review of any adverse
determination.250 When faced with such a claim, due to "the sensitive
nature of constitutionally protected expression," the Court stated "we
have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk
prosecution to test their rights., 251 To hold otherwise, "free expression -
of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising
their rights - might be the loser. 252 Indeed, the Court stated it had "con-
sistently allowed attacks on overly broad statutes" without insisting that
the complainant "demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regu-
lated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.25 3 This
exception to the usual rules of standing was developed, in the context of
the First Amendment, to insure against "the existence of a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application. 254 Such an exception
avoids the spector of "case by case" review of the applicability of an
enactment "tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecu-
tion" in order to challenge its integrity while free expression hangs in the
balance awaiting "the outcome of protracted litigation. 255
In the instant case, several of the plaintiffs had been arrested by
Louisiana state and local police, had their offices raided and records
seized-all of which was voided by subsequent court rulings. 56 Never-
theless, state officials continued to threaten prosecution, while repeatedly
247. Id. at 482.
248. Id. at 483-85.
249. Id. at 485.
250. Id. at 486.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97-98; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963);
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-
22 (1960)).
254. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487 (quoting NAACP, 371 U.S. at 433).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 487-89.
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announcing their belief that the plaintiffs' organization was a "subversive
or Communist-front organization., 257 The consequence was the paralyza-
tion of the plaintiffs' efforts to vindicate minority civil rights.258 As a
result, the Court concluded that the individual plaintiffs' refusals to com-
ply with the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control
Law by not registering as members of a Communist-front organization-
which had given rise to the plaintiffs' criminal indictments-was pro-
tected by the plaintiffs' due process rights inasmuch as what constituted
"a subversive organization" was "unduly vague, uncertain and broad." 25 9
Accordingly, plaintiffs' "failure to register as member[s] of a Commu-
nist-front organization" was not actionable by the State and thus ruled
invalid.2 60 These enactments challenged by the plaintiffs, said the Court,
were "void on their face. 261
Yet another case where the Court entertained an overbreadth chal-
lenge was Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffinan Estates,
Inc.,262 wherein the Court reviewed and upheld a drug paraphernalia or-
dinance. The municipal ordinance in question made it "unlawful for any
person 'to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which
is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined
by Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a license therefor.'
263
Plaintiff Flipside, in "a pre-enforcement facial challenge," alleged that
the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad as well as vague.26 The
Court began its analysis by stating that "[in a facial challenge to the
overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine
whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must
fail. ' 265 The Court noted that in this context, a facial challenge of a stat-
ute "means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto - and therefore incapa-
ble of any valid application.'
266
To determine whether the drug paraphernalia ordinance was over-
broad, the Court examined whether the ordinance violated "Flipside's
First Amendment rights or [was] overbroad because it [inhibited] the
,,267hedtathoriFirst Amendment rights of other parties. The Court held that the ordi
nance was not overbroad because it did not infringe on the "noncommer-
257. Id. at 488.
258. Id. at 488-89.
259. Id. at 493-94.
260. Id. at 494-95.
261. Id. at 497.
262. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
263. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 492 (citing VILL. OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILL., MUN.
CODE § 8-7-16 (1978)).
264. Id. at 491-93.
265. Id. at 494.
266. Id. at 495 n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,474 (1974)).
267. Id. at 495.
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cial speech of Flipside or other parties" inasmuch as it only regulated and
licensed "the sale of items displayed 'with' or 'within proximity of lit-
erature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs.' ' 268 The
Court ruled that, even assuming commercial speech was implicated by
the ordinance, "it is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad
scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, be-
cause the overbreadth challenge does not apply to commercial
speech.,269 Thereafter, the Court also rejected Flipside's claim that the
ordinance was overbroad in that it outlawed "innocent" or "lawful" be-
havior and that it was unconstitutionally vague.
In New York v. Ferber,27 2 the United States Supreme Court ex-
pounded at great length on what it described as the "First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine" when it evaluated the troublesome subject of child
pornography. 273 In Ferber, the Court reviewed a New York statute274 that
criminalized "promoting a sexual performance by a child. 275 In this
case, the defendant was a proprietor of a bookstore located in Manhattan,
New York.276 The defendant's bookstore specialized in "sexually orien-
tated products." 277 After the defendant sold to an undercover police offi-
cer two films "depicting young boys masturbating, 2 78 the defendant was
prosecuted and convicted of violating section 263.15 of the New York
Penal Law, which read that "[a] person is guilty of promoting a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof,
he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age., 279 "Sexual perform-
ance" was defined as including any "sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age., 280 Following the defendant's conviction in the trial
court, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction after de-
ciding that section 263.15 was "overbroad because it prohibited the dis-
tribution of materials produced outside the State, as well as materials,
such as medical books and educational sources, which 'deal with adoles-
268. Id. at 496 (quoting VILL. OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILL., LICENSE GUIDELINES FOR ITEMS,
EFFECr, PARAPHERNALIA, ACCESSORY OR THING WHICH Is DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE
WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS (1978)).
269. Id. at 496-97.
270. Id. at 497 n.9.
271. Id. at 505.
272. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
273. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768.
274. Id. at 750 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00 to .25 (McKinney 1981)).
275. Id. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1981)).
276. Id. at 751-52.
277. Id. at 752.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1981)).
280. Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1) (McKinney 1981), and citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.00(3) (McKinney 1981) (defining "sexual conduct")).
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cent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner."' 28 1 However, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals decision,
holding that section 263.15 was not overbroad.
After concluding this enactment did not restrict the production and
distribution of material protected by the First Amendment, 282 the Court
turned to a consideration of whether the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it curtailed "the distribution of material with serious
literary, scientific, or educational value or material which [would] not
threaten the harms" the state sought to combat.28 3 While noting that
"[t]he traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitu-
tionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not
before the Court,"'284 it explicitly ruled that "[w]hat has come to be
known as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is one of the few
exceptions to this principle. 285 The Court observed that this "doctrine is
predicated on the sensitive nature of protected expression: 'persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from
exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute suscepti-
ble of application to protected expression.' 28 6 The Court then reiterated
its prior pronouncements on the subject:
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most
exceptions to established principles, must be carefully tied to the cir-
cumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted.
Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its
face at the request of one whose own conduct may be punished de-
spite the First Amendment, we have recognized that the overbreadth
doctrine is "strong medicine" and have employed it with hesitation,
and then "only as a last resort." [This Court has held] that the over-
breadth involved be 'substantial' before the statute involved will be
invalidated on its face.
287
The Court next pointed out that it had previously explained the basis for
this requirement:
[T]he plain import of our cases is ... that facial overbreadth adjudica-
tion is an exception to [the] traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise un-
protected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
"pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct - even if expressive -
281. Id. at 752-53 (quoting Ferber, 422 N.E.2d at 526).
282. Id. at 765-66.
283. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 767.
285. Id. at 768.
286. Id. (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)).
287. Id. at 769 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect le-
gitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if
too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown
extent, there comes a point where that effect - at best a prediction -
cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and
so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that
is admittedly within its power to proscribe.
288
The Court then turned to an explanation as to the reason overbreadth
"must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep" where conduct, and not mere speech,
is at issue.289
The requirement of substantial overbreadth is directly derived
from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping stat-
ute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill
the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of
deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the
declining reach of the regulation. This observation appears equally
applicable to the publication of books and films as it is to activities,
such as picketing or participation in election campaigns, which have
previously been categories as involving conduct plus speech....
Indeed, the Court's practice when confronted with ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied against protected conduct
is not to invalidate the law in toto, but rather to reverse the particular
conviction.
... [Tihe fact that a criminal prohibition is involved does not
obviate the need for the inquiry or a priori warrant a finding of sub-
stantial overbreadth.
290
In addition, the Court stated that the nature of the penalty to be imposed
for violating a statute was "relevant in determining whether demonstra-
ble overbreadth [was] substantial. 29'
Applying the above principle to the statute at issue, the Court held
that section 263.15 was "not substantially overbroad" because the statute
could only be impermissibly applied in a "tiny fraction of the materials
within the statute's reach., 292 The Court concluded by stating that "what-
ever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analy-
288. Id. at 770 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
289. Id. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
290. Id. at 772-73.
291. ld. at 773.
292. Id.
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sis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be
applied. 293
B. Facial Vagueness
Although a statute may be found not to be overbroad because it does
not reach constitutionally protected conduct, it may nevertheless be held
to be vague on its "face" or "as applied. 294 As earlier stated, a facial
challenge is a challenge that the law is totally invalid and incapable of
any constitutional application.295 When considering whether a statute is
facially invalid, a court must "consider any limiting construction that a
9296state court or enforcement agency has proffered."
In Young v. American Mini-Theaters,297 the United States Supreme
Court extended the "substantial" deterrent effect requirement, which it
had developed in connection with facial overbreadth claims, to the analy-
sis of whether a statute was facially vague.29 8 The Court indicated that
where a statute's arguable vagueness was "real and substantial," and not
"readily subject to a narrowing construction," a defendant whose own
speech might be unprotected could challenge the statute if "the very exis-
tence of [the] statute[) may cause persons not before the Court to refrain
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression" due to
the "overriding importance of maintaining a free and open market for the
interchange of ideas. 299
Facial vagueness challenges have been approved in two circum-
stances. First, a statute may be challenged on its face when it has the
capacity "to chill constitutionally protected conduct, especially conduct
protected by the First Amendment. ' '300 Thus, the Tenth Circuit has con-
cluded:
[A court will] allow a person who is prosecuted for conduct which the
state may constitutionally forbid to challenge the statute as vague on
its face, rather than restricting him to challenging it as applied to his
conduct, because those who will refrain from speech will never have
a chance to make their claims in court. In this way the claims of those
293. Id. at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
294. Dixon, 998 P.2d at 547; Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497.
295. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.5; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474
(1974).
296. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.5 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
297. 427 U.S. 50(1976).
298. Young, 427 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12, 615).
299. Id. at 60 (citing Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,216 (1975)).
300. United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 390-91, 394, 396 (1979); Lauzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
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who would be silenced are heard. Vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges are similar in this respect.
301
Second, pre-enforcement challenges are also appropriate where the chal-
lenger attacks the statute as "vague in all its applications," which neces-
sarily means that the statute is void on its face.
302
The 1971 case of Coates v. City of Cincinnati30 3 offers an illustra-
tion of the Court's willingness to find a statute vague on its face, contrary
to due process, and violative of the First Amendment. In Coates, several
defendants had been convicted under a Cincinnati ordinance which made
it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble, except at a public meet-
ing of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, .... and there conduct themselves
in a manner annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent
buildings. ' 3° In its consideration of the defendants' appeal, the Court
concluded that the ordinance was vague, not in the sense that it required
compliance with an "imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."305
An examination of this statute suggested its enforcement could entirely
turn on "whether or not a policeman [was] annoyed" by a particular
assembly. 3°6 Furthermore, the Court observed more than due process
vagueness was involved in that the ordinance was at odds with First
Amendment rights of free assembly and association.30 7 The Court de-
clared that the First and Fourteenth Amendments could not be dependent
on whether a particular assembly was annoying to "some people. 308 This
ordinance provided a recipe for discriminatory enforcement against as-
semblages of groups whose "ideas ... lifestyle, or ... physical appear-
ance" engender resentment by "the majority of their fellow citizens."
3°9
In this case, where the Court ultimately reversed defendants' conviction
on vagueness grounds, it was obvious to the Court that this ordinance
had the capacity to limit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, and
at the same time, result in quasi-criminal sanctions.310 Moreover, while
not explicitly discussed in the opinion, an additional problem with this
ordinance was that a conviction could be predicated on the conduct of the
group without regard to any mens rea.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 360-61.
303. 402 U.S. 611,614-15 (1971).






309. Id. at 616.
310. Id. at 614-16.
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The case of Colautti v. Franklin311 provides another example of a
statute that was determined to be void on its face. In this case, the Court
reviewed the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, which contained a sec-
tion that required persons, including physicians, to exercise the same
standard of care to preserve a fetus' life and health as would be required
in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive if the fetus was "viable" or
if there was "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable."
312
Inasmuch as the "may be viable" language set out either a subjective or
mixed subjective and objective standard test for viability, the Court ruled
in this pre-enforcement action brought by a group of physicians that a
person of ordinary intelligence would not have fair notice of its scope.
313
In addition, the required "standard of care" provision was deemed
equally vague.314 The Court's concern regarding the language in question
was aggravated by the fact that the measure included criminal penalties,
contained no scienter, and carried the potential of inhibiting the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights.315
Notwithstanding Coates and Coluatti, it should be recognized that
claims of facial vagueness that prove successful are the exception rather
than the rule. The difficulties inherent in advancing a facial challenge are
illustrated in the following two cases. In United States v. Gaudreau,
316
the defendants were prosecuted under the Colorado commercial bribery
statute, which was used as a component of a federal RICO indictment." 7
The state commercial bribery statute was challenged as vague on the
ground that its prohibition of a "knowing violation of a duty of fidelity"
to a corporation by an officer of the corporation was vague.31 8 The fed-
eral district court agreed and dismissed the RICO counts of the indict-
ment as both facially vague and vague as applied.319 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.320 Here, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in rejecting the facial vagueness claim, stated that the Colorado
statute did not threaten to chill constitutionally protected conduct and,
inasmuch as it had been applied to the defendants, it would be necessary
to conduct an examination of the statute as applied for vagueness, in
light of the conduct for which the defendants had been charged.32 ' After
consulting various treatises, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defen-
dants had fair notice of the meaning of the language they had challenged
311. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
312. Coulautti, 439 U.S. at 380-81 n.1 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (West 1977)).
313. Id. at 388-97.
314. Id. at 397.
315. Id. at 391, 394-96.
316. 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988).
317. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 359.
318. Id. at 358 (quoting CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-401(1)(a), (d) (1986)).
319. Id. at 358-59.
320. Id. at 358.
321. Id. at 361.
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and that the statute did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement stan-
dards.322
Another case where a facial vagueness claim failed was Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,323 part of which was
324discussed in the previous section. In that case, which reflects both an
in-depth discussion of facial overbreadth and facial vagueness, the
United States Supreme Court pointed out that in cases involving a facial
challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a statute, the reviewing
court must initially ascertain if the statute is overbroad by examining
whether the statute touches "a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct." 325 If the statute fails to do so, the reviewing court should
then proceed to the facial vagueness challenge and, if it finds the statute
does not cover constitutionally protected conduct, it must "uphold the
challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its appli-
,,326cations.
The Court explained that a complainant who commits some acts that
are "clearly proscribed" in the enactment "cannot complain of the vague-
ness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. 327 In other words, a
reviewing court should "examine the complainant's conduct before ana-
lyzing other hypothetical applications of the law., 328 Also, when evaluat-
ing any facial challenge, the Court in Flipside noted a reviewing court
must consider any "limiting construction" that a lower court or enforce-
ment agency has provided.329 Moreover, when the reviewing court ap-
plies the tests of whether the statute under consideration (1) provides the
citizenry with fair warning of what it prohibits and (2) contains explicit
standards that avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application, the court
should not insist that these "standards ... be applied mechanically.
330
Rather, the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates - as well
as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement - depends
in part on the nature of the enactment., 331 A greater tolerance has been
expressed with "civil rather than criminal penalties because the conse-
quences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. 332 If the stricture
requires government proof of scienter, this mental state requirement
322. Id. at 362-64.
323. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
324. See supra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
325. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494.
326. Id. at 494-95.
327. Id. at 495.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 495 n.5.
330. Id. at 498.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 498-99.
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"may mitigate a law's vagueness." 333 The most important factor, how-
ever, "affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is
whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or
of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply."
334
Following the Court's rejection of the complainant's pre-
enforcement overbreadth challenge,335 the Court subjected the drug para-
phernalia ordinance to a vagueness analysis.336 The Court determined
that the ordinance simply regulated the complainant's "business behav-
ior" and observed that it required proof of scienter with respect to the
alternative "marketed for use" standard. 337 Also, this ordinance carried a
nominal civil sanction.338 Although the Village conceded that the ordi-
nance was "'quasi-criminal,' and its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect
[would consequently] warrant a relatively strict test, ' 339 the Court con-
cluded that this facial vagueness challenge could not succeed inasmuch
as whatever analysis might be used to examine "either a quasi-criminal
or a criminal law, the ordinance [was] sufficiently clear as applied to
Flipside.,
340
First, Flipside's suggestion that the language outlawing distribution
of paraphernalia "designed for use" or "marketed for use" with cannabis
or drugs could not withstand a facial challenge, which implied that the
statute was vague in all its applications, was contradicted by the facts
that the language covered "at least some of the items that Flipside sold"
and Flipside's co-operator admitted that the business sold items "princi-
pally used for illegal purposes. ' 341 And second, the scienter requirement
belied the notion that one might be entangled innocently in the web of
the enactment.342 Thus, one could not seriously assert that this measure
offered this complainant insufficient "fair warning" as to its reach.343
Additionally, regarding the arbitrary and discriminatory application
claim, the absence of such evidence at this juncture militated the conclu-
sion that this concern be best addressed when any such problem actually
arise. 34
333. Id. at 499.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 496-97; see supra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
336. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497-501.
337. Id. at 499.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 500.
341. See id. at 500, 502.
342. See id. at 502.
343. See id. at 498, 502.
344. Id. at 503-04.
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Gaudreau and Flipside together reflect the substantial barriers that
sit in the path of a facial vagueness challenge. First, if the enactment
does not somehow have the potential for intrusion into constitutionally
protected terrain, as turned out to be the case with Gaudreau, then the
claim comes to an abrupt halt.345 Second, even when the defendant's
assertion proceeds beyond the first obstacle just mentioned, if the com-
plainant is unable to convince the reviewing court that the statute is
vague "in all its applications," as occurred in Flipside, it fails. 346 As one
court stated, "facial vagueness review is not common because ordinary
concerns of judicial restraint do not permit a party whose particular con-
duct is adequately described by a criminal statute 'to attack [the statute]
because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to
other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit."'
3T
C. Vagueness As Applied
A defendant may bring an "as applied" vagueness challenge on the
grounds that a statute failed to clearly define the criminally proscribed
conduct with which he has been charged.348 Unlike a facial challenge,
which allows an attack on the entire enactment, an "as applied" challenge
focuses only on whether the statute was inappropriately applied to the
complainant's conduct., 349 In an "as applied" challenge, the court exam-
ines the statute in light of the facts of the case at bar.350 In other words,
an "as applied" vagueness challenge must be decided on its own facts.35'
"In scrutinizing a statute for intolerable vagueness as applied to spe-
cific conduct," a reviewing court must interpret it consistently with any
judicial construction preferred by the jurisdiction's highest court.352 The
question, therefore, is whether the challenged statute, as well as judicial
345. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 360.
346. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497.
347. Schwartzmiller, 752 F.2d at 1346 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
348. See id. at 1348-49 (holding Idaho statute outlawing "lewd and lascivious" acts on a child
was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant where defendant's conduct involved anal
intercourse with a child and masturbation with a child).
349. See id. at 1348 (holding Idaho statute prohibiting "lewd and lascivious" acts on a child did
not impinge on or chill any constitutionally protected conduct, so that defendant convicted of this
offense could not attack statute "on its face, but only as applied to his conduct"); see also Holland v.
Tacoma, 954 P.2d 290, 293-96 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding complainant's action barring
enforcement of ordinance, which limited volume of sound projected from car sound system,
involved conduct not associated with First Amendment expression and, as such, ordinance was not
vulnerable to a facial challenge; furthermore, ordinance had "clear guidelines," in that a person of
ordinary intelligence would know what it means for sound to be "audible" at more than 50 feet away
and, therefore, was not vague as applied).
350. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (holding what constitutes a "mixture
or substance" containing LSD as proscribed in federal narcotics offense was not vague).
351. Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ga. 2000) (holding municipal
"loitering or prowling" ordinance vague as applied).
352. Schwartzmiller, 752 F.2d at 1348.
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interpretations thereof, "provided sufficient notice, under the circum-
stances of [the particular] case, [such] that a person in [the defendant's]
situation would know whether his conduct was criminal. 353 Thus, even
if the statute could be considered vague "as applied" to some activity, if
the defendant's conduct in the case at bar was clearly within the limits of
the statute, that defendant cannot sustain an "as applied" vagueness chal-
lenge.354
For example, in the case of Davis v. State,355 the Indiana Court of
Appeals considered an "as applied" challenge to a statute that prohibited
neglect of a dependent.356 The defendants were convicted of violating
this child neglect statute by abandoning their child, who was only a few
hours old, by the side of a gravel road in rural Indiana.357 The defendants
challenged the "places the dependent in a situation that may endanger his
life or limb" language, stating that the statute failed to explicitly inform
the public and law enforcement officers of the specific conduct that was
prohibited.358 They argued that the statute was so broad that it could be
said parents who allow their child to "engage in interscholastic and con-
tact sports 'may endanger' the child's life or health. 359
In reviewing the statute, the appellate court stated that it was "well
established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve
First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the
case at hand.,,360 The court noted that in a vagueness "as applied" chal-
lenge, defendants are not permitted to devise a hypothetical situation
which would demonstrate vagueness. 36' Rather, the court emphasized
that the question to be analyzed in a vagueness challenge is "whether an
individual of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that his
contemplated conduct is proscribed., 362 Here, the court held that "[n]o
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence" would have difficulty
determining that abandoning a child that is only a few hours old along
the side of a gravel road constituted a violation of a statute that
prohibited the "neglect" of a dependent.363
353. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 615.
354. See Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 130-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
355. 476 N.E.2d 127.
356. Id. at 130 n.1 ("A person having the care, custody, or control of a dependent who
knowingly or intentionally: (1) places the dependent in a situation that may endanger his life or
health; (2) abandons or cruelly confines the dependent; (3) deprives the dependent of necessary
support; or (4) deprives the dependent of education as required by law; commits neglect of a




360. Id. (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)).
361. Id. at 130-31.
362. Id. at 131 (emphasis added) (citing Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 553).
363. Id. at 130-31.
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Where an individual engages in conduct without any reasonable re-
alization that it falls within the reach of a legal prohibition, that person
may succeed with an as applied challenge.364 In Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham,365 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the convic-
tion of a defendant who had been found guilty of violating (1) a munici-
pal ordinance which made it an offense for any person who (a) was
blocking free passage on a sidewalk, or (b) was standing or loitering on a
sidewalk, to fail to heed a police request to move on;366 and (2) another
ordinance that made it an offense for any person to refuse or fail to com-
ply with a police order.367 According to the prosecution, the defendant
was observed by a police officer on a sidewalk with ten or twelve com-
panions outside a department store, whereupon the officer approached
the group and told them to clear the sidewalk.368 "After some, but not all,
of the group" dispersed, the defendant asked the officer, "You mean to
say we can't stand here on the sidewalk? ' 369 After repeating the request,
during which time everyone but the defendant began walking off, the
officer arrested defendant.37°
In its review, the Court noted that the first ordinance the defendant
had allegedly violated actually contained two strictures: one prohibiting
obstructing free passage on a sidewalk and another prohibiting standing
or loitering on a sidewalk.37t The Court found that the Alabama Court of
Appeals had given this ordinance a limiting construction in a separate
unrelated case, to-wit, that the second stricture only restricted standing or
loitering that obstructed free passage, but that such construction had been
provided only after the defendant had been charged and convicted under
the ordinance.3 72 Given the Alabama appellate court construction, while
also considering the fact that the Alabama trial judge did not have the
benefit of this judicial narrowing of the statute while deciding the defen-
dant's fate, the Court ruled, "As so construed, we cannot say that the
364. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544-46 (1971) (explaining municipal
"suspicious person" ordinance vague as applied).
365. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
366. Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 88 ("It shall be unlawful for any person or any number of
persons to so stand, loiter or walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city as to obstruct free passage
over, on or along said street or sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for any person to stand or loiter
upon any street or sidewalk of the city after having been requested by any police officer to move
on." (quoting BIRMtNGtAM, ALA., GENERAL Cry CODE § 1142 (1944))).
367. Id. ("It shall be unlawful for any person to refuse or fail to comply with any lawful order,
signal or direction of a police officer." (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CITY CODE § 1231
(1944))).
368. Id. at 89.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 90 (citing BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CrrY CODE § 1142 (1944)).
372. Id. at 91-92 (citing Middlebrooks v. City of Birmingham, 170 So. 2d 424, 426 (Ala. App.
Ct. 1964)).
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ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires no great feat of imagina-
tion to envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be unconsti-
tutionally applied. 373 Further, because the Court was "unable to say that
the Alabama courts in this case did not judge the petitioner by an uncon-
stitutional construction," the Court decided it had no choice but to re-
verse defendant's conviction on the first ordinance charge.374
As to the second count of the complaint, the Court noted that the
underlying ordinance on its face simply made it illegal "to refuse or fail
to comply with any lawful order, signal or direction of a police offi-
cer." 375 Standing alone, said the Court, "the literal terms of this ordinance
-,0376are so broad as to evoke constitutional doubts of the utmost gravity.
Nevertheless, like the first ordinance, it too had been given a limiting
instruction, namely, the refusal had to be in conjunction with a police
order directing vehicular traffic.3 77 As such, it became clear that the or-
dinance could not be applied to the defendant.378 The arresting officer
was not directing traffic when he asked the defendant to move on, and
the defendant was a pedestrian, "not in, on, or around any vehicle at the
time he was directed to move on or at the time he was arrested." 
3 79
In Watts v. United States, 380 the Court ruled that although a federal
statute that made "criminal a form of pure speech" was constitutional on
its face, it was not applicable to a defendant who had been convicted for
a violation of the statute.381 In this case, the defendant had been charged
with the felony offense of "knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any
threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of
the United States." 382 At a public rally on the grounds of the Washington
Monument, the defendant mentioned to several individuals present that
he was eligible to be drafted into the military and that he had received his
notice to report for his physical examination the following Monday
383 Tedfmorning. The defendant then added, "I am not going. If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,"
referring to then President Lyndon Johnson. 84 At trial, the defendant's
counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, while insisting the defendant's
373. Id. at 91.
374. Id. at 92.
375. Id. at 93 (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CrrY CODE § 1231 (1944)).
376. Id.
377. Id. (citing Phifer v. City of Birmingham, 160 So. 2d 898, 901 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963)).
378. Id. at 93-94.
379. Id. at 95.
380. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
381. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, 708. It is not clear if the Court was examining the statute against a
vagueness claim. See id. at 712 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds ... that this statute is
constitutional and that it is here wrongly applied.").
382. Id. at 706 (alteration in original) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1948)).
383. Id. at 705-06.
384. Id. at 706.
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comments did not amount to a threat to the life of the President.385 In its
review of the defendant's conviction, the Court first examined the statute
itself. The Court stated that this statute was "[c]ertainly" constitutional,
given the nation's "overwhelming interest in protecting the safety of its
Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without inter-
ference from threats of physical violence," but nevertheless it had to "be
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in
mind. 3 86 In the opinion of the Court, this statute could only apply to
speech if the government proved the existence of a "true 'threat. ' ' 3" 7 The
Court did "not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by
petitioner fit within that statutory term. '388 Given the "expressly condi-
tional nature of the statement," this law could not reasonably be deemed
applicable to the defendant's utterance.389
IV. APPROACHES DESIGNED TO PROVIDE NOTICE AND ENFORCEMENT
STANDARDS
There exist mechanisms that may assure the citizenry has adequate
notice of what a criminal prohibition outlaws. These will be explored at
this juncture.
A. Listing Prohibited Items and Conduct
One way to ensure that citizens are provided adequate notice of
what is proscribed by a particular statute is to provide a list of what items
or activities are prohibited. 390 This approach is typically followed in in-
stances where a statute proscribes items that may have the potential for
both legitimate and illegitimate uses. One example of the use of the list-
ing approach is the Illinois Drug Paraphernalia Control Act.3 91 The Act
defines "drug paraphernalia" as follows:
"Drug paraphernalia" means all equipment, products and materials of
any kind which are peculiar to and marketed for use in planting,
385. Id. at 706-07.
386. Id. at 707.
387. Id. at 708.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. See, e.g., United States v. Kairouz, 751 F.2d 467, 468 (1st Cir. 1985) (where defendant
claimed he did not realize he possessed heroin because he thought it was cocaine, court responded
"both cocaine and heroin are controlled substances within the meaning of schedules I and 11 of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. I
(b)(10) (listing heroin as a controlled substance)." (emphasis added)). This is not suggesting the
failure to list proscribed items or conduct invariably leads to a finding of vagueness. See, e.g., Ward
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 781 (1977) (rejecting claim that Illinois obscenity statute is necessarily
vague because it failed to include "exhaustive list" of type of sexual acts that are outlawed by the
act).
391. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 600/1-f7 (2002).
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propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, ana-
lyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, in-
jecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human
body cannabis or a controlled substance in violation of the "Cannabis
Control Act" or the "Illinois Controlled Substances Act" .... It in-
cludes, but is not limited to:
(1) Kits peculiar to and marketed for use in manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing or preparing cannabis or
a controlled substance;
(2) Isomerization devices peculiar to and marketed for use in increas-
ing the potency of any species of plant which is cannabis or a con-
trolled substance;
(3) Testing equipment peculiar to and marketed for private home use
in identifying or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of
cannabis or controlled substances;
(4) Diluents and adulterants peculiar to and marketed for cutting can-
nabis or a controlled substance by private persons;
(5) Objects peculiar to and marketed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or
otherwise introducing cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into
the human body including, where applicable, the following items:
(A) water pipes;
(B) carburetion tubes and devices;
(C) smoking and carburetion masks;






(J) ice pipes or chillers;
(6) Any item whose purpose, as announced or described by the seller,
is for use in violation of this Act.
392
392. Id. at 600/2(d).
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Following the enactment of the Illinois Drug Paraphernalia statute,
it was challenged as unconstitutionally vague in the case of Adams Apple
Distributing Co. v. Zagel.393 In Adams Apple, the Illinois Appellate Court
found that the enactment, which fully defined what constituted drug
paraphernalia "in six ways and specifically list[ed] 10 items that [had]
been determined to constitute drug paraphernalia," provided adequate
notice to those subject to the law and, as such, was not unconstitutionally
vague.
394
An example of legislation that has relied on the "listing" of activity
to avoid a vagueness attack is child pornography. New York v. Ferber,
395
discussed at length above,396 relied in part on this approach in upholding
New York's child pornography prohibition. 397 Inasmuch as any legisla-
tion outlawing distribution of visual materials, including portrayals of
children engaged in sexual activity, would have to withstand a First
Amendment challenge, it was necessary that such legislation be written
in a manner that clearly delineated that activity which was proscribed.
Realizing that a depiction, for example, of a baby in his or her birthday
suit could never be sanctioned, the New York legislature described in
precise, if not graphic, detail what was contemplated: a "sexual perform-
ance" involving a child below the age of 16 engaged in "sexual conduct,"
with the latter being defined as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-
masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals. 398 In analyzing the
legislation, the Court commented that "[t]he forbidden acts to be de-
picted are listed with sufficient precision" that one could not seriously
assert lack of notice of what activity involving children was included. 399
B. Inclusion of Mens Rea
Sometimes a statute, which may otherwise be void-for-vagueness,
may survive a vagueness challenge because of the statute's inclusion of a
mens rea element.4°° For example, in the earlier mentioned case of
393. 501 N.E.2d 302,304 (111. App. Ct. 1986).
394. Adams Apple, 501 N.E.2d at 305 (emphasis added) (referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56
1/2, para. 2102 (1985), subsequently codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 600/2 (2002)). It should be
noted that in People v. Monroe the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that while the definition section of
the statute which specified what constituted "drug paraphernalia" was satisfactory, the "penalty"
section that permitted a conviction where a person had no actual knowledge that that which he was
selling was drug paraphernalia was unconstitutional in that it lacked a necessary scienter. People v.
Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 43-45 (III. 1987).
395. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
396. See supra notes 272-93 and accompanying text.
397. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
398. Id. at 750 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00(1), 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
399. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
400. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 502
(1982) (upholding municipal drug paraphernalia ordinance); United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods.
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United States v. Gaudreau,401 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit considered the validity of a Colorado commercial bribery
statute when used as a component of a federal prosecution under the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).40 2 The Col-
Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1963) (holding federal Robinson-Patman Act making it a crime to sell
goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying or eliminating competition" was not
vague; element of "predatory intent" required by Act "provides further definition of the prohibited
conduct"); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) (holding federal
regulation requiring truckers to avoid "congested thoroughfares" and the like when transporting
explosive substances was not vague, because "statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the
Regulation"); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1945) (plurality opinion) (holding
federal law which prohibits, under color of law, the "willful" deprivation of a citizen's federal
constitutional or other legal rights was not vague given construction that the word "willful" means
government must establish accused had the specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right);
Hygrade Provision Co., Inc. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (holding that a "specific intent to
defraud," saved an otherwise vague statute which outlawed sale of meat falsely represented to be
"kosher"); United States v. Collins, 272 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding, because of scienter
requirement in federal controlled substances legislation, the defendant "bears an especially heavy
burden in raising his vagueness challenge" (quoting United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 754 (7th
Cir. 1991))); United States v. Biro, 143 F.3d 1421, 1428 (1 th Cir. 1998) (holding "[w]e are
persuaded that an ordinary person would understand" a federal statute prohibiting a person from
"selling a device to a customer designed by the manufacturer primarily for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception of communications," where the statute explicitly requires proof that
accused sent or sold such a device "knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communication"); Poole v. Wood, 45 F.3d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding Minnesota statutes
proscribing sexual contact or sexual penetration accomplished by means of a false representation
was not vague, because statutes required element of false representation and sexual contact is
defined as being "committed with sexual or aggressive intent"), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1134 (1995);
Comm. in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding statute which made it a crime to coerce, threaten, intimidate, harass, or obstruct certain
foreign officials or their guests was not vague because all proscribed acts had to be carried out
"willfully"); Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 573-74 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding Utah drug
paraphernalia law that required proof of vendors' intent to market an item they know to be drug
paraphernalia not vague); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding
Wichita ordinance outlawing promotion of sexually orientated materials to minors was not vague
where distributor must know the content of the material and its nature and character); United States
v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding federal offense of acquisition and
unlawful possession of food stamps was not vague where statute requires proof of scienter), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1983); Levas & Levas v. Antioch, 684 F.2d 446, 452-54 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding municipal drug paraphernalia ordinance was not vague in view of "intent requirement");
City of Chicago v. Powell, 735 N.E.2d 119, 130 (11. App. Ct. 2000) (holding municipal ordinance
outlawing "soliciting unlawful business" was not vague where ordinance required proof of
purposeful solicitation); Byrum v. Texas, 762 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding Texas
crime of public lewdness by sexual contact was not vague because law requires "a specific culpable
mental state, a factor which tends to defeat a vagueness challenge"); cf Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (holding Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which required physician's
preservation of life of fetus where fetus "may be viable" was vague because it subjected physician to
criminal liability without regard to fault; the ambiguous viability-determination requirement "is
aggravated by the absence of a scienter requirement").
401. 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 317-322 and accompanying text.
402. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 358 ("A person commits a class 6 felony if he solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of
fidelity to which he is subject as: (a) Agent or employee; or ... (d) Officer ... of an incorporated
association." (quoting COLO. REV. STAT § 18-5-401 (1)(a), (d) (1986))).
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rado statute at issue prohibited soliciting or accepting money "as consid-
eration for knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidel-
ity.''4°3 In this case, the defendants were indicted for violation of RICO,
which was based in part on violation of the Colorado statute for agreeing
to accept money in exchange for awarding Public Service Company of
Colorado contracts to certain suppliers. 4°4 The defendants were charged
with conspiracy to violate the statute by enticing a public service execu-
tive named Oscar Lee to violate his duty of fidelity to the public service
corporation.4°5 The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that the Colorado statute was unconstitutionally vague in regards
to what constituted a breach of a "duty of fidelity."4°6 The defendants
argued that "the statute did not give them fair notice that their conduct
was prohibited because they could have discovered that Mr. Lee's duty
of loyalty forbade him from taking bribes only by consulting cases, other
statutes and treatises. The defendants also argued that "while the stat-
ute may give notice to an ordinary lawyer, it does not give notice to an
ordinary layman. ' °8 The federal district court had held that the chal-
lenged sections of the Colorado commercial bribery statute were void for
vagueness, both facially and as applied in this case and, therefore, dis-
missed the indictments under this statute.4 9 The government then ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit, which addressed the issues of whether the
statute was both facially vague and vague as applied in this case.410 The
Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed the facial vagueness challenge as inap-
propriate. 41 1 The court noted that there are only two instances when a
facial vagueness challenge is permissible.412 The first occurs where an
enactment "threatens to chill constitutionally protected conduct," and the
second arises when the statute is being challenged in a declaratory judg-
ment action requesting pre-enforcement review.413 Neither of these situa-
tions were applicable in this instance.414 The court then turned to the
vagueness as applied challenge to the statute.415 The court determined
that the statute provided adequate notice to those who were subject to the
statute because the statute had a "scienter requirement. ' 416 The court




407. Id. at 362.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 359.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 361.
412. Id. at 360.
413. Id. at 360-61.
414. Id. at 361.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 363.
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noted that the statute prohibited "knowingly violating or agreeing to vio-
late a duty of fidelity., 417 The court held that the "type of scienter which
the prosecution must prove [was] precisely the type that overcomes the
objection that the Colorado statute may punish without fair warning to
the accused., 418 The court interpreted the statute to require that "the
prosecution . . . prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
knew his duty of fidelity and knew he was violating it."'419 Because the
defendant must have actually known of the duty of fidelity that he was
inducing another to violate, the court held that the statute provided ade-
quate notice of what was proscribed and, therefore, the statute was not
void for vagueness.4 z°
In People v. Monroe,42' the absence of a satisfactory mens rea ele-
ment spelled doom for a state drug paraphernalia prohibition.422 In this
case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Illinois drug paraphernalia
law contained two distinct sections: a "definition" provision and a "pen-
423alty" provision. The definitional language, which appears in the previ-
424ous section of this paper n, specified that "drug paraphernalia" meant
any devices or materials which are "peculiar to and marketed for use" in
connection with illicit drug activity.425 Meanwhile, the penalty language
prohibited commercial sale of such items where a vendor "knows, or
under all of the circumstances reasonably should have known" he was
marketing drug paraphernalia.426 The court observed that the language in
the definitional section was very similar to that contained in the munici-
pal drug paraphernalia ordinance that was approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Es-
42742tates, Inc., discussed earlier.428 In Flipside, the Court had ruled the
"designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs" language
in the Hoffman Estates ordinance encompassed a scienter requirement
inasmuch as "a retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a particular
use without intending that use., 429 The Illinois Supreme Court pointed
out that the Flipside decision relied heavily on the principle that scienter
417. Id. (emphasis added) (citing CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-401(1) (1986)).
418. Id. at 363.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. 515 N.E.2d42 (IIl. 1987).
422. See Monroe, 515 N.E.2d at 42.
423. Id. at 43.
424. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
425. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d at 43 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2102 (1985),
subsequently codified as 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 600/2 (2002)).
426. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2103, subsequently codified as 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 600/3 (2002)).
427. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
428. See supra notes 262-71, 323-44 and accompanying text.
429. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d at 43-44 (quoting Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 502).
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may "mitigate a law's vagueness. ' '430 Although the definitional section of
the Illinois statute posed no problem in the mind of the Illinois Court, it
was troubled by the language in the penalty section that would base a
conviction on the fact that a vendor "reasonably should have known" he
was dealing in drug paraphernalia. 43' This meant a conviction would rest
on "constructive knowledge" rather than actual knowledge, a proposi-
tion, the court concluded, which forced it to rule the penalty section un-
constitutionally vague for failing to confer "fair notice., 432 Monroe, then,
illustrates how lack of scienter may trigger a finding of vagueness.
New York v. Ferber,433 discussed earlier,434 is an illustration of the
United States Supreme Court's apparent insistence that a law that carries
the potential of somehow limiting First Amendment protections must
contain a criminal mens rea.435 In that case, the Court commented in its
review of the state child pornography stricture, "[a]s with obscenity laws,
criminal responsibility [for child pornography] may not be imposed
without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant. 436 After
noting that the statute at issue "expressly includes a scienter require-
ment," the Court ruled that the proscription passed constitutional mus-
ter.437
It must be understood that a penal enactment that does include a
mens rea element will not necessarily survive a vagueness challenge. In
Kramer v. Price,438 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit entertained a vagueness challenge to a Texas harassment statute.439
This legal dispute arose out of the defendant's mailing of a postcard to a
man with whom she previously lived, who had later married another
woman and subsequently become the father of the latter woman's
child.440 The post card read, "Baby Problem Solved," followed by an
advertisement regarding a child burial vault.441 Following the defendant's
prosecution and conviction for violation of the state harassment law, the
Fifth Circuit in a habeas corpus challenge considered the Texas statute,
430. Id. at 44 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499).
431. Id. at 44-45.
432. Id. at 45.
433. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
434. See supra notes 272-93, 395-99 and accompanying text.
435. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
436. /d. at 765.
437. Id.
438. 712 F. 2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'don other grounds on reh'g, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc).
439. Kramer, 712 F.2d at 176 ("A person commits an offense if he intentionally
communicates by telephone or in writing in vulgar, profane, obscene, or indecent language or in a
coarse and offensive manner and by this action intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly annoys or
alarms the recipient." (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 1983))).
440. Id. at 175.
441. Id.
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which made it illegal to "annoy" or "alarm" another by some written or
telephone communication, terms which the defendant claimed were
vague. 42 The State of Texas argued that the statute's requirement of in-
tent defused the vagueness assertion. 443 The Fifth Circuit first noted that
the Texas courts had never made an "attempt to construe the terms 'an-
noy' and 'alarm' in a manner which lessens their inherent vagueness.
' 4 4
Further, the Texas courts had "refused to construe the statute to indicate
whose sensibilities must be offended." 4 5 Thus, even though the statute
mandated proof of intentional annoyance or alarm, it was not clear what
"underlying conduct" was proscribed by these two words and, as such,
the statute was deemed vague.
446
V. SOURCES OF NOTICE AND ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS
As discussed above, vagueness can arise in two situations: (1) un-
certainty as to whom a statute applies and (2) uncertainty as to what con-
duct the statute proscribes, that is, whether the statute provides an ascer-
tainable standard of guilt. A reviewing court will ordinarily resort to
every reasonable construction in order to declare the statute constitu-
tional and defeat the vagueness challenge." 7 As the United States Su-
preme Court stated in Winters v. New York:
448
This Court goes far to uphold state statutes [and federal statutes] that
deal with offenses, difficult to define, when they are not entwined
with limitations on free expression .... Only a definite conviction by
a majority of this Court that the conviction violates the Fourteenth
Amendment justifies reversal of the court primarily charged with re-
sponsibility to protect persons from conviction under a vague state
statute.
449
In contrast, if a statute is ambiguous, the court will normally apply the
rule of strict construction, giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt,
to ascertain the meaning of questionable statutory language. 450 However,
442. Id. at 176.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 178.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
447. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1948).
448. 333 U.S. 507 (1948); see supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text for the earlier
discussion of this case.
449. Winters, 333 U.S. at 517.
450. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (resolving in the defendants'
favor statutory ambiguity as to whether federal Travel Act applied to defendants who ran a lottery
frequented by out-of-state visitors but where there was no showing that defendants themselves
crossed state line to commit an offense); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971)
(holding, where ambiguity existed raising questions as to whether prohibition against a felon's
receipt, possession or transportation of a firearm in interstate commerce is to be interpreted in a
manner whereby government must establish receiving and possessing as well as transporting be in
interstate commerce, rule of lenity so required such proof).
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as stated earlier, many jurisdictions reject this doctrine of strict construc-
tion, with courts often avoiding it by simply finding that the statutory
uncertainty does not involve an ambiguity. 451 Thus, the courts tend to
give considerable deference to the legislature in an effort to uphold the
laws the people have created. In order to accomplish this goal, courts
resort to various measures to declare that a statute provided notice to the
citizenry regarding what a law prohibits. In effect, the courts look to
various sources for guidance as to the meaning of various words,
phrases, and other language contained in the statutes being challenged.
These interpretive aids vary widely from referencing common law, plain
language, dictionaries, and even the Bible. The courts routinely imple-
ment various techniques to find that the citizenry enjoyed a workable
definition of what was outlawed by the stricture. In many cases, a court
will look to numerous sources to demonstrate that the defendant had
adequate notice. For example, in Muscarello v. United States, 452 the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
having a firearm in the glove box or the trunk of a car during the com-
mission of a drug offense constituted "carrying a firearm.' ' 4 5 3 The Court
looked to the plain language of the statute,454 five different dictionar-
ies,455 the Bible,456 several works of literature,457 previous decisions by
the Court using the word "carry,' '458 newspapers, 459 and legislative his-
tory460 in order to finally determine that having a gun in one's glove
451. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
452. 524 U.S. 125 (1998). This decision does not explicitly address a vagueness claim.
However, the analysis the Court used was similar to that it would have utilized had it encountered
such a challenge.
453. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997), which imposes a
five-year mandatory prison term upon anyone who "uses or carries a firearm" during an illegal drug
transaction). Since the accused was not actively using the weapon at the time, the issue was whether
he was "carrying" a weapon during the commission of the offense. Id. at 127-28.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 128 (citing 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989); WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (1986); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 319 (2d ed. 1987); BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 146 (1988);
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 148 (C. Onions ed., 1966)).
456. Id. at 129 (citing 2 Kings 9:28; Isaiah 30:6).
457. Id. (citing DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 174 (J. Crowley ed., 1972); HERMAN
MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 43 (U. Chi. Press 1952)).
458. Id. (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1991); Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 249 (1991)).
459. Id. The Court conducted a search of the New York Times database in Lexis/Nexis and the
"US News" database in Westlaw looking for articles in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and
"weapon" all appeared. Id. The Court concluded that nearly one third of the articles found used the
word "carry" to mean "the carrying of guns in a car." Id.
460. Id. at 132.
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compartment or trunk did constitute "carrying" a firearm within the
meaning of the statute.461
It is also important to note that the particular source or concern that
the reviewing court places the most emphasis on, quite often, will deter-
mine the outcome of the ruling.462 For example, in Keeler v. Superior
Court,463 the California Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
death of a fetus constitutes a murder.464 The majority opinion focused
most of its attention on the common law definition of murder and of a
"human being" in order to determine that a fetus was not a "human be-
ing" within the meaning of the statute.465 The dissent, on the other hand,
focused mainly on the purpose of the law, that is, to prevent killing.466
The dissent concluded that the purpose or "fair import" of the statute was
best fulfilled by applying the statute to all deaths, including the death of a
viable fetus.467 This smorgasbord approach to vagueness analysis con-
tributes to what some see as the reality that "courts' construction of
criminal statutes is typically ad hoc, sacrificing broader legal principles
for the sake of a desired result in a particular case." 468 In any event, the
remainder of this section will discuss the variety of those sources and
guidelines to which courts routinely look to address a void-for-vagueness
challenge, ambiguity, or other indefinite legislation. It should be noted
that in some instances, a case will be examined which did not explicitly
involve a vagueness challenge or ambiguity, but which reflects a court's
struggle as it decides the meaning of somewhat nebulous language in a
criminal law. These latter cases involving statutory uncertainty are never-
theless useful in understanding the resolution of vagueness and ambigu-
ity arguments in that the court's analysis often closely resembles the
analysis it would utilize if it was addressing such an issue.
A. Common Usage of Terms
Often, courts simply look to the common usage of terms or lan-
guage to decipher the meaning of a criminal statute.469 Judicial opinions
461. It should be noted the majority refused to apply the rule of lenity because it saw no
"grievous ambiguity." Id. at 138-39. But see id. at 148 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing statute was
sufficiently ambiguous to apply rule of lenity).
462. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 618 (Cal. 1970).
463. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618.
464. Id. at 618.
465. Id. at619-30.
466. Id. at 630 (Burke, J., dissenting).
467. Id. at 634 (Burke, J., dissenting).
468. Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-Balancing Acts, 5
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 39 (1997).
469. See, e.g, Chapman v. United States, 500 US 453, 462 (1991) (holding that the words
"mixture" and "substance" as used in federal statute outlawing distribution of a "mixture or
substance" containing LSD was not vague given "ordinary meaning" of the words); Rose v. Locke,
423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (holding the phrase "crimes against nature," as outlawed by Tennessee
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routinely state that "when a statute contains language with an ordinary
and popularly understood meaning, courts will assume that this is the
meaning intended by the legislature., '470 For example, in Bailey v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court considered the word "use" in
connection with a drug trafficking charge.472 Specifically, two different
defendants had been convicted of a federal drug offense that carried en-
hanced penalties where the perpetrator "during and in relation to any...
drug trafficking crime... use[s] or carries a firearm., 47 3 The first defen-
dant, upon his arrest following a traffic stop, was found to have a sub-
stantial amount of cocaine, as well as a loaded 9-mm. pistol in the trunk
of his car.474 The second defendant, after selling drugs in her apartment
to an undercover officer, was found to have additional drugs and a .22-
caliber pistol in a locked trunk in her bedroom. 475 Both offenders were
convicted of the more serious trafficking charges on the theory that they
had "used" their firearms "in relation" to their illicit drug activity.476
statute, was not vague in that "[tihe phrase has been in use among English-speaking people for many
centuries"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972) (holding municipal anti-noise
ordinance barring noise which "disturbs" adjacent school was not vague because the ordinance
"clearly 'delineates its reach in words of common understanding"' (quoting Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968))); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620, 624 (1954) (holding the
term "lobbying' as used in Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act "should be construed to refer only to
'lobbying in its commonly accepted sense"' and that statute satisfied constitutional requirement of
"definiteness"))); United States v Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1988) ("The statute
prohibits bribery, a concept well-understood by the ordinary person."); Comm. in Solidarity with
People of El Salvador v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding federal statute prohibiting
intentional threatening, harassing or intimidating foreign officials or their guests was not vague,
because "lilt is not necessary for the lawmaker.., to define words in common usage if the statute
use them according to their everyday meaning" (quoting Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 179 (5th
Cir. 1983))); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953, 962 (Dl. 1995) (holding state anti-stalking statute,
which prevents "following" victim plus directing threats to the victim, was not vague and "[in
absence of a statutory definition, courts will assume that statutory words have their ordinary and
popularly understood meanings"); People v. Reynolds, 689 N.E.2d 335, 342 (111. App. Ct. 1997)
(holding aggravated criminal sexual assault stricture that outlawed a person from taking advantage
of his "position of trust, authority, or supervision" by having sexual contact with a minor was not
vague; statute reliant on "plain language"); State v. Fisher, 631 P.2d 239, 246 (Kan. 1981) (holding
statute outlawing "endangering a child" was not vague considering "commonsense reading of the
statute"); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1994) (holding, after determining
the "ordinary meaning" of the word "person" is synonymous with "human being," vehicular
homicide statute was not vague because it lent itself to conclusion that a fetus was a "person" within
the vehicular homicide prohibition); City of Mankato v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W. 2d 76, 79 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding statute outlawing "lewd" and "indecent" conduct was not vague because
"[tihese terms... have a reliable and sufficiently definite meaning to the ordinary citizen").
470. People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 51 (1987) (holding phrase "bodily harm," used in
offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, was not vague).
471. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
472. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138-39.
473. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997)).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 140.
476. Id. at 139-41.
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In its review of these cases, the Court stated, "We start, as we must,
with the language of the statute. 4 77 Here, "[t]he word 'use' .. must be
given its 'ordinary or natural meaning.' '478 Noting that this word carried
definitions in earlier judicial opinions as well as ordinary dictionaries
which "imply action and implementation"479 and "connote activity be-
yond simple possession, ''480 the Court observed that neither of the defen-
dants had actively used their firearms in relation to their drug trafficking
and, as such, their convictions could not stand.48'
Another decision from the Court centered on the definition of the
482commonly used word "carry." In Muscarello v. United States, which
was mentioned earlier,483 the issue before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the phrase "'carries a firearm' is limited to the carry-
ing of firearms on the person. 484 This issue arose from two independent
cases, consolidated together for analysis. In the first case, defendant
Muscarello unlawfully sold marijuana from his truck. 85 Upon arrest, law
enforcement officers searched the defendant's truck and found a handgun
locked in the glove compartment.486 This defendant argued that the fed-
eral statute with which he was charged, which carried an enhanced pen-
alty if the drug trafficker was carrying a firearm, did not apply to his
having the gun in the glove compartment of his vehicle.487 In the second
case, two other defendants "placed several guns in a bag, put the bag in
the trunk of their car, and then... [drove] to a proposed drug-sale point,
where they intended to steal drugs from their sellers." 88 Federal agents at
the scene where the drug transaction was to occur stopped the two defen-
dants, searched the car, and found the guns and drugs.489 All three defen-
dants appealed their respective convictions, arguing that they had not
"carried" guns within the meaning of the statute.
The United States Supreme Court began its examination of the
phrase "carries a firearm" by considering the statutory language itself.
490
477. Id. at 144.
478. Id. at 145 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
479. Id.
480. Id. (quoting United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J.,
dissenting)).
481. ld. at 148-51.
482. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
483. See supra notes 452-61 and accompanying text.
484. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126.
485. Id. at 127.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 125-27; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997) (mandating a five-year prison term for
any person who "uses or carries" a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime).
488. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 126-28.
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The Court noted that the word "carry" had two meanings relevant to the
issue at hand.49'
When one uses the word in the first, or primary, meaning, one can, as
a matter of ordinary English, "carry firearms" in a wagon, car, truck,
or other vehicle that one accompanies. When one uses the word in a
different, rather special, way, to mean, for example, "bearing," or (in
slang) "packing" (as in "packing a gun"), the matter is less clear....
[W]e believe Congress intended to use the word in its primary sense
and not in this latter, special way.492
The Court deferred to the ordinary English language usage of the word
"carries," while operating on the premise that Congress intended the
word "to convey its ordinary, and not some special legal, meaning. 'A93 In
answering the "purely legal question of whether Congress intended to
use the word 'carry' in its ordinary sense, or whether it intended to limit
the scope of the phrase to instances in which a gun [was] carried 'on the
person,"' 94 the Court looked to the statute's "basic purpose," which they
surmised was to "combat the 'dangerous combination' of 'drugs and
guns. ' ' '495 The Court stated that it would not make sense for the statute:
to penalize one who walks with a gun in a bag to the site of a drug
sale, but to ignore a similar individual who ... travels to a similar site
with a similar gun in a similar bag, but instead of walking, drives
there with the gun in his car.
49 6
Thus, the Court concluded that the "'generally accepted contemporary
meaning' of the word 'carry' include[d] the carrying of a firearm in a
vehicle. 497 The Court then affirmed the lower courts' decisions that each
of the defendants' conduct fell within the scope of the enactment.498
491. Id. at 128.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 128-29 (The Court referred to various dictionaries to define the word "carry." The
Court noted that the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines carry as "convey, originally by cart or
wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship or horseback, etc." (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
919 (2d ed. 1989)). The King James Bible uses the word "carry," finding passages such as, "[H]is
Servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem." (quoting 2 Kings 9:28 (King James)). The Court also
noted the use of the word in literature including its use in ROBINSON CRUSOE: "[wlith my boat, I
carry'd away every Thing." (quoting DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 174 (J. Crowley ed.
1972)). The Court also looked to its previous decisions, acknowledging that "[tihis Court, too, has
spoken of the 'carrying' of drugs in a car or in its 'trunk."' (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 572-73 (1993); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991))).
494. Id. at 132.
495. Id. (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 240).
496. Id. at 133.
497. Id. at 139.
498. Id.
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Another example of reliance on the common usage of terms ap-
peared in United States v. Powell,499 in which the defendant challenged a
statute that made it a crime to knowingly mail "firearms capable of being
concealed on the person.,,500 Following her conviction for violation of
this offense arising out of the mailing of a sawed-off shotgun, the defen-
dant argued that the "firearms capable of being concealed on the person"
terminology was vague and therefore unconstitutional. 50 1 The [United
States] Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit questioned whether the
"person" referred to in the statute was to be "the person mailing the fire-
arm, the person receiving the firearm, or perhaps, an average person,
male or female, wearing whatever garb might be reasonably appropriate
whatever the season. 5 °2 Unclear about the statute's meaning, the Ninth
Circuit found it vague.50 3 However, the United States Supreme Court
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's ruling and instead attributed to Con-
gress the "commonsense meaning that such a person would be an aver-
age person garbed in a manner to aid, rather than hinder, concealment of
the weapons.,,504 The Court stated that "[s]uch straining to inject doubt as
to the meaning of the words where no doubt would be felt by the normal
reader is not required by the 'void for vagueness' doctrine, and we will
not indulge in it. '50 5 The Court, therefore, reversed the appellate decision
by the simple process of examining the common meaning of the statutory
language at issue.506
Coates v. City of Cincinnati,5°7 another United States Supreme
Court decision, is an example where a lack of a common meaning that
might be ascribed to a specific term undermined a particular criminal
statute. In Coates, the defendants were convicted of violating a Cincin-
nati ordinance which made it a crime "for three or more persons to as-
semble ... on any of the sidewalks... and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by. 508 The issue before the Court
was whether the statute was unconstitutional because it was unclear as to
what constituted "annoying" conduct.5°9 Prior to the Court's review, the
Ohio Supreme Court had stated that "[t]he word 'annoying' is a widely
used and well understood word; it is not necessary to guess its mean-
499. 423 U.S. 87 (1975).
500. Powell, 423 U.S. at 89 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1970)).
501. Id. at 89-90.
502. Id. at 93 (quoting United States v. Powell, 501 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 1974)).
503. Id. at 88.
504. Id. at 93.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 94.
507. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
508. Coates, 402 U.S. at 611 (quoting CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-L6
(1956)).
509. Id. at 613.
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ing." 5 '0 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance
"clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common under-
standing., 511 However, the United States Supreme Court determined that
although "annoying" was a commonly used word, the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague because it did not indicate upon "whose sensitivity a
violation does depend - the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity
of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable
man.' 51 2 The Court noted, for example, that a reading of the statute might
lead to the conclusion that where individuals might "meet together on a
sidewalk or street comer, they must conduct themselves so as not to an-
noy any police officer or other person who happens to pass by. 513 Con-
sidering this and other possible inappropriate applications, the Court
found the statute to be "unconstitutionally vague because it subjecte[d]
. .. [individuals' right to freedom] of assembly to an unascertainable
standard. 514 The Court further stated that the ordinance was vague not
because "it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no stan-
dard of conduct is specified at all. 515
Bailey, Muscarello, Powell, and Coates are illustrative of the proc-
esses courts employ in reviewing statutes that have been challenged as
being vague or uncertain. Clearly, a court presumes the validity of a state
or federal criminal statute.516 Thus, in an effort to uphold a statute, the
court will apply common understanding or commonsense usage of terms
and assume a person of common intelligence could understand the mean-
ing of the statute and the conduct it prohibits. As one court said, "It can-
not be presumed that the [legislature], in legislating, intended obscurity,
or 'to override common sense.'
517
B. Common Understanding Within a Discrete Group
Sometimes, a court in attempting to determine the precise meaning
of a statute will look to the way that a term or phrase is commonly un-
derstood in a discrete group, trade, profession, or geographical area.
518
510. Id. at 612 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Coates, 255 N.E.2d 247, 249 (Ohio 1970)).
511. Id. at 613 (quoting Coates, 255 N.E.2d at 249).
512. Id.
513. Id. at 614.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945) (plurality opinion) (presuming
validity of federal statute); see also People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 49 (II. 1987) (presuming
validity of state statute).
517. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 48 (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948)).
518. See, e.g., Connelly v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (discussing decisions
of the court that have upheld statutes as not vague which include those "rested upon the conclusion
that the employed word or phrases have a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to
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Obviously, many criminal statutes are directed at certain conduct in
which only a fraction of the general population engages and, as such,
these statutes are in reality targeted at specific groups of people. Thus,
the question becomes whether affected persons within such a group un-
derstood the meaning of certain statutory language. For example, in
Omaechevarria v. Idaho,519 the United States Supreme Court examined
such a law. Here, the territorial legislature had passed in 1875 the Two
Mile Limit Law to "avert clashes between sheep herdsmen and cattle
farmers" because the "cattle [would] not graze... [or] thrive on ranges
where sheep were allowed to graze extensively. 52° Specifically, the Two
Mile Limit Law prohibited "any person having charge of sheep from
allowing the sheep to graze on a range previously occupied by cattle. 52'
Thus, the Two Mile Limit law was enacted by the legislature to protect
the cattle farmers and their industry from the sheep herdsmen's behavior
of permitting their sheep to destroy those pastures that would otherwise
be suitable for cattle grazing.
In Omaechevarria, the criminal statute was challenged on Four-
teenth Amendment indefiniteness grounds in that it failed to identify the
particular boundaries or ranges that were off limits to the sheep herds-
men and also failed to identify a time frame for which the lands were off
limits. 52z The United States Supreme Court relied on what could be de-
scribed as the "common understanding within a discrete group" approach
in upholding the Two Mile Limit Law. The Court held that the statute
was not vague or indefinite because "men familiar with range conditions
and desirous of observing the law [would] have little difficulty in deter-
mining what is prohibited by [the statute] .,523 Here, the law pertained to
two groups of individuals, sheep herdsmen and cattle farmers. Thus, in-
dividuals involved in sheep herding or cattle farming would understand
the type of conduct prohibited by the law. The fact that
enable whose within their reach to correctly apply them"); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 502 (1982) (holding that the business co-operator's
admission that he sold "roach clips," commonly associated with cannabis consumption, belied his
argument that he had no notice of what constituted "drug paraphernalia" outlawed by municipal
ordinance); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (holding that New York
law prohibiting sale of meat falsely represented to be "kosher" was not vague because "the term
'kosher' has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply
it"); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1558 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[wihen Congress
has used technical or terms of art, the term must be given its technical or scientific meaning," and
here, what constitutes cocaine "base" is not vague). But see Winters, 333 U.S. at 519 (holding that
state "obscene prints and articles" law punishing dissemination of certain materials carried no
"technical... meaning" that might have put vendors on notice as to what law prohibited).
519. 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
520. Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 344-45.
521. Id. at 345.
522: Id. at 348.
523. Id.
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a person outside the sheep herding or cattle farming industry would not
understand the law or how it applies has no bearing as to whether the law
is constitutional because the law targets conduct of particular individuals
for a particular purpose within a particular situation. Anyone in the par-
ticular industry would commonly understand the meaning of the Two
Mile Limit Law. Furthermore, "[s]imilar expressions [that pertain to a
particular group or groups] are common in criminal statutes of other
states. 524 Therefore, the Court upheld the Two Mile Limit Law.525
Meanwhile, in Connally v. General Construction Co.,526 the United
States Supreme Court examined a criminal statute in Oklahoma that pro-
hibited a government employer from paying his or her employees "less
than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality. 527 In this case,
certain state and county officials brought an action to prevent enforce-
ment of this act on the theory that the standard specified in the statute
was vague. When the matter reached the Court, it ruled that while stat-
utes employing language having "technical or other special meaning"
would be upheld if "those within their reach" would have understood the
language at issue,528 this legislation did not meet that standard.5 29 First,
"current rate of wages" lacked an ascertainable meaning in that it was
unclear as to whether this language meant the minimum, the maximum,
or some other intermediate amount, such as the average.53° Second, it
was unclear as to what was meant by "locality. 5 31 Here, the Court lik-
ened the term of that of a "neighborhood," which carries different mean-
ings to different people.532 Thus, the absence of any special understand-
ing of the statute's terminology by those directly affected by the law re-
sulted in the Court finding the statute void for uncertainty.
C. Dictionary Definitions
Frequently, a court examining statutory vagueness, ambiguity, or
uncertainty will look to a common dictionary to determine the meaning
of words in a statute. 533 In Chapman v. United States, 534 a United States
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
527. Connally, 269 U.S. at 388 (quoting OKLA. COMP. STAT. § 7255 (1921)).
528. Id. at 391.
529. Id. at 393-95.
530. Id. at 394.
531. Id. at 394-95.
532. Id. at 395.
533. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (referring to several dictionaries to determine the
meaning of the word "carry"); Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 501 (looking to dictionary to
decipher the meaning of the word "design," as used in municipal drug paraphernalia ordinance
which outlawed devices "designed" for use in connection with consumption of illicit drugs);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (referring to the dictionary to determine what
constitutes "fighting words" while finding Georgia breach of the peace statute vague and overbroad);
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Supreme Court opinion, the defendants had been convicted in federal
court for distribution of LSD. The statute under which they were con-
victed carried enhanced penalties if the offense involved more than one
gram of a "mixture or substance containing [a] detectable amount" of
LSD.535 The defendants challenged the "mixture or substance" language
as ambiguous.5 36 They contended the "blotter paper" that was impreg-
nated with the LSD could not be included in calculating the weight of the
illicit drug.537 However, after consideration of the dictionary definition of
"mixture," 538 the Court concluded that the statutory language reached the
situation at issue in this case; namely, the blending of the chemical LSD
into the blotter or carrier paper entitled the paper to be included in the
calculated weight. 539 Thus, the dictionary proved to be a useful source in
establishing that the statutory language was neither ambiguous nor
vague. 54
Meanwhile, in some cases, referencing a dictionary may offer a
definition that belies the government's claim that a statute clearly applies
to certain conduct. For instance, in the case of State v. Blowers,5  de-
cided by the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant was charged with driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah law.542 This statute
Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1983) (considering that the dictionary definition of the
word "annoy" leads to the conclusion that the meaning of this word which appears in Texas
harassment law was so broad that it did not delineate what type of conduct was proscribed), affd on
other grounds on reh'g, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953,
962-63 (il. 1995) (referring to dictionary to determine the meaning to "follow" and "to further"
within the Illinois stalking law which was determined not to be vague); People v. Nitz, 747 N.E.2d
38, 47 (Il. App. Ct. 2001) (citing People v. La Pointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (iII. 1981) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1050 (1971), in effort to determine meaning
of "heinous" and "brutal" conduct as used in Illinois natural life imprisonment sentencing law));
People v. Selby, 698 N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (ill. App. Ct. 1998) (examining dictionary definition of
word "socializing" where defendants, Illinois Department of Correction employees, claimed "official
misconduct" charges were invalid because charges were based on allegations they had engaged in
sexual intercourse with inmates contrary to prison regulation barring employee socializing with
inmates); People v. Reynolds, 689 N.E.2d 335, 340-42 (Dll. App. Ct. 1997) (referring to dictionary to
determine the proper meaning of "trust," "authority," and "supervision," where aggravated criminal
assault conviction was predicated on defendant's taking advantage of his superior position with
minor); People v. Higginbotham, 686 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (looking to the dictionary
in order to determine whether the defendant's conduct amounting to illegally "touching" as outlawed
in aggravated criminal sexual abuse statute); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 130 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (referring to the dictionary in order to determine meaning of "endanger" contained in child
neglect statute).
534. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
535. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 456-57 (quoting 21 U. S. C. § 841 (b)(1) (1988)).
536. Id. at 458.
537. Id. at 456.
538. Id. at 462 (referring to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 921 (2d. ed.
1989)).
539. Id. at 462-63.
540. Id. at 461-68.
541. 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).
542. Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1322 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(1) (1953)).
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provided that "it is unlawful... for any person with a blood alcohol con-
tent of .08% or greater ... to drive or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within the state. 543 In this particular case, when the defendant
was arrested, he was not driving a motor vehicle, instead, he was riding a
horse.544 Therefore, the issue in this case was whether a horse could be
considered a "vehicle" as defined in another Utah statute. "Vehicle" was
defined in another Utah statute as "every device in, upon, or by which
any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a high-
way, 545 After examining that definition, the question the court asked
was whether a horse could be considered a "device" as it was meant in
the statute.5 46 The court noted that "[n]o dictionary we have examined
defines 'device' to encompass an animal. 547 As such, the court con-
cluded that the due process requirement of fair notice precluded the court
from torturing the definition of a "vehicle" to include a horse.
5 48
In some instances, the courts may resort to numerous dictionaries in
an attempt to ascertain a consensus of meanings. 549 This was the case in
Lanzetta v. New Jersey,550 where the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a statute making it illegal to be a "gang-
ster., 551 A New Jersey statute stated as follows:
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime in this or in any other State, is declared
to be a gangster.
552
The defendant had been charged with violating this statute and, upon
conviction, he challenged the conviction by arguing that the statute vio-
lated his right to due process because it was vague and uncertain.553 Spe-
cifically, the defendant challenged the usage of the word "gang" in the
statute.554 In attempting to determine the meaning of the word gang, the
Court looked to several dictionaries.555 Indeed, the Court studied the
definitions of the word "gang" from no less than five different dictionar-
543. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1) (1953)).
544. Id.




549. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (examining five dictionaries in an effort to define
"carrying a firearm").
550. 306U.S. 451 (1939).
551. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 452.
552. Id. (quoting N. J. REV. STAT. 1937, 2:136-4, ch.155, Law (1934)).
553. Id.
554. Id. at 453-54.
555. Id. at 454.
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ies. 6 The Court concluded that no clear meaning of the word "gang"
could be ascertained from a review of the various dictionaries that were
consulted because their definitions varied so widely. 7 In addition, the
Court looked to other potential sources, such as common law and various
historical and sociological writings; however, these were also not helpful
as to the meaning of the term.558 The Court concluded that the term
"gang," as used in the New Jersey statute, was vague and, therefore, the
defendant's conviction was deemed a violation of due process. 9
D. Common Law
Another source that the courts will look to in order to determine the
meaning of a particular statute is the common law. 560 For instance, in
People v. Haywood,561 the Illinois Supreme Court examined a vagueness
claim arising out of a newly enacted "criminal sexual assault" prohibition
that had replaced the jurisdiction's "rape" and "deviate sexual assault"
legislation. Specifically, this new offense specified that any sexual pene-
tration accomplished by "force" or the threat of "force" was criminal.562
The defendants asserted that the word "force," as it appeared in this en-
actment, could "be construed in its broadest sense possible and include
every notion of force imaginable. 5 63 As such, they argued that the stat-
556. Id. at n.3 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d. ed.); FUNK &
WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1915); CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA (1903);
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933); WYLD'S UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1932)).
557. Id. at 454.
558. Id. at 454-55.
559. Id. at 458.
560. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (looking to the common law and
specifically to 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216, for an understanding of what
constitutes a "crime against nature"); Lanzetta, 306 U.S. 451 (discussing how common law reflected
no definition of what constitutes a "gang," which contributed to defendant's successful vagueness
claim); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (looking to the common law to determine
what constituted a "conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade" contrary to federal Sherman
Act); Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 362 (referring to the common law to determine the meaning of the
phrase "duty of fidelity" within the Colorado commercial bribery statute); People v. Haywood, 515
N.E.2d 45, 48 (111. 1987) (looking to the common law offense of rape to determine the meaning of
the word "force" within the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute); People v. Greer, 402 NE.2d
203, 207 (111. 980) (looking to the common law to determine whether an eight and one-half-month
old fetus constituted an "individual" within the state murder prohibition (citing 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *50; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30; 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 433 (London, T. Payne 1800))); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985) (utilizing
common law rules of construction to determine whether an unborn fetus constituted a "human
being" under the Minnesota vehicular homicide statute); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324,
1326 (Mass. 1984) (looking to the common law to determine whether a fetus can be considered a
victim of homicide and concluding that it could; therefore, viable fetus was considered a "person"
for purposes of vehicular homicide statute).
561. 515 N.E.2d 45 (111. 1987).
562. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 47 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-12(d), 12-13(a)(1)
(1985)).
563. Id. at 48.
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ute contained no standard whatsoever in deciphering what constitutes
"force" and, consequently, that the legislation had to be ruled vague.
564
However, the Illinois Supreme Court noted the criminal sexual assault
measure was designed to replace the offenses of "rape" and "deviant
sexual assault," both of which outlawed forcible sexual acts.565 More-
over, the common law of Illinois had developed a clear understanding of
what constituted "force" for purposes of these earlier offenses and, in the
case at hand, it was quite reasonable to assume the legislature in enacting
the new law intended to adopt the earlier meaning of the term unless the
legislation indicated otherwise.566 The court stated, "It is an axiom of
statutory construction that a statute alleged to be in derogation of the
common law should not be construed as changing the common law be-
yond what is expressed by the words in the statute or is necessarily im-
plied from it."'567 Here, there was nothing in the language of the act
which indicated a new definition of "force" was intended and, thus, the
"common law definition of force found in both of the repealed offenses"
governed the definition in the new law.568 Thus, the defendants' claim of
vagueness failed.569
Meanwhile, the common law may act as a barometer for courts,
providing a reading that translates into a conclusion that a criminal
charge, given existing legislation, is unwarranted. For example, in Keeler
v. Superior Court of Amador County,570 the California Supreme Court
considered whether an eight and a-half month fetus constituted a "human
being" within the meaning of the California statute defining murder.57' In
this case, the defendant attacked and physically assaulted his wife while
a final divorce decree was pending. Realizing she was visibly pregnant
by another man, he kneed her in the stomach, while saying, "I'm going to
stomp it out of you. '572 Her fetus was later delivered stillborn. 573 There-
after, the defendant was charged with the murder of the fetus.57 4 Prior to
trial, the defendant sought a writ of prohibition seeking to have the
charge of murder dismissed on the theory that the death of a fetus did not
constitute the death of a "human being" and, as such, could not give rise
to murder.575 A pathologist testified at a preliminary examination that the
564. Id.
565. Id. at 49 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1, 11-3 (1983) (repealed)).
566. Id. at 48-49.
567. Id. at 49.
568. Id. at 50.
569. Id.
570. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
571. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970)).
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 619.
575. Id.
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cause of death of the fetus was a skull fracture and cerebral hemorrhag-
ing resulting from "force applied to the mother's abdomen., 576 In review-
ing the defendant's petition for a writ of prohibition, the California Su-
preme Court looked to the history of California's murder statute and de-
termined that it contained the same language as did the original Califor-
nia statute defining murder in 1850, when California first became a
state.577 The court noted that the legislature in 1850 enacted its murder
statute containing the same language as was typical of common law
murder prohibitions.578 After concluding that the 1850 murder statute
should be interpreted consistently with the state of the common law at
that time, it found that the common law understanding of murder was
that an infant could not be the subject of homicide unless it had been
born alive.579 Also, the court pointed out that various other states had
made it an offense to kill a fetus; however, these offenses were classified
as either "feticide," "abortion," or "manslaughter," but not "murder.,
580
The court then concluded that murder in California was to be defined the
same way as it was at common law.581 As such, the court held that the
defendant had been provided no notice that the killing of a fetus, which
was not born alive, was contrary to the California statute defining murder
and, furthermore, that a judicial enlargement interpreting the statute
broadly would be violative of due process.582
In contrast, in Winters v. New York,583 a United States Supreme
Court decision that was discussed in an earlier section,58 the lack of
common law interpretation or definition of certain language in a criminal
enactment contributed to the Court's determination that the act was
vague. In that case, a New York statute barred dissemination of "obscene
prints and articles," which included materials "principally made up of
criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures,
or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime., 585 The New York Court
of Appeals had given this enactment a narrowing construction, namely,
that the act only restricted such materials that were "so massed as to be-
come vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the per-
576. Id. at 618.
577. Id. at 619.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 620. The court looked to Lord Coke's Third Institutes, which asserted that abortion
was "murder only if the [fetus] is (1) quickened, (2) bom alive, (3) lives for a brief interval, and (4)
then dies." Id (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *58 (1648)). The court also cited Blackstone
and Hale to reiterate Coke's position. Id. at n.6 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*129-30; 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 433 (London, T. Payne 1778)).
580. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 621.
581. Id. at 622-24.
582. Id. at 630.
583. 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
584. See supra notes 63-74, 448-49 and accompanying text.
585. Winters, 333 U. S. at 508 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW, CONSOL. LAWS, ch. 40, § 1141(2)
(McKinney 1945)).
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son." 586 Notwithstanding this judicial gloss designed to save the statute
from a claim of vagueness, the United States Supreme Court ruled the
reach of the statute was "too uncertain and indefinite to justify the con-
viction of this petitioner. 587 Among other concerns articulated by the
Court, this criminal ban carried no "common law meaning" or history
from which it might be possible to glean a more precise understanding of
(1) what was forbidden and (2) if it avoided unconstitutional restrictions
on First Amendment rights.588 Here, the Court was limited to examining
the language of the statute itself and the single New York judicial con-
struction of it, which standing alone was insufficient to survive the peti-
tioner's challenge.
E. Obvious Policy Considerations
Often, a reviewing court will consider the obvious policy behind a
statute in order to determine the meaning of a particular portion of a stat-
ute.589 As one court observed, a "court should consider not only the lan-
guage of the statute but also the reason and necessity for the law, the
evils to be remedied and the objects and purposes to be obtained. '590 For
example, in the case of McLaughlin v. United States,591 the United States
586. Id. at 518-519 (quoting People v. Winters, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100 (N.Y. 1945)).
587. Id. at519.
588. Id.
589. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975) (holding statute proscribing the
mailing of pistols, revolvers and "other firearms capable of being concealed on the person" was not
vague as applied to a 22-inch sawed-off shotgun; "[t]o narrow the meaning of the language Congress
used so as to limit it only to those weapons which could be concealed as readily as pistols or
revolvers would not comport with [the] . . . purpose" of making "it more difficult for criminals to
obtain concealable weapons"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (deciding that
municipal anti-noise ordinance that restricts noise which has the capacity to "disturb" adjacent
school not vague because "it is apparent from the statute's announced purpose that the [scope of] the
measure is [limited to] whether normal school activity has been or is about to be disrupted"); People
v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953, 960-61 (111. 1995) (holding that anti-stalking laws not vague for failure to
include language that perpetrator ,"without lawful authority" (1) followed or placed victim under
surveillance and (2) made threats against victim; here, proscription could not be said to encompass
innocent conduct inasmuch as purpose of the statutory scheme was limited to "goal of protecting
possible victims of stalking and aggravated stalking"); Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 49 (explaining that
inasmuch as "the central purpose of the [newly enacted Criminal Sexual Assault Act] was to
recodify the sexual offenses into a comprehensive statute with uniform statutory elements that would
criminalize all sexual assaults without distinguishing between the sex of the offender or the victim
and the type of sexual act proscribed," it was obvious the meaning of the word "force" in the Act
should be interpreted in the same manner as it was in the now repealed "rape" and "deviant sexual
assault" measures and, as such, the meaning of "force" is not vague); State v. Fisher, 631 P.2d 239,
245-46 (Kan. 1981) (holding that child endangerment statute not vague in scope where "purpose" of
Act is to "protect children, and to prevent their being placed where it is reasonably certain injury will
result").
590. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 49 (citing People v. Steppan, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (1985)); see
also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) ("We consider not only the bare meaning of
the word [in a statute] but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.").
591. 476 U.S. 16 (1986).
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Supreme Court considered whether an unloaded gun was a "dangerous
weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute.592 The
defendant and his companion entered a bank in Baltimore wearing gloves
and stocking masks.59 While displaying a handgun, defendant ordered
everyone at the bank to put their hands up and not to move.594 Mean-
while, the defendant's companion "vaulted the counter and placed about
$3,400 in a brown paper bag. 595 As the two left the bank they were ap-
prehended by police, who determined that the defendant's gun was not
loaded.596 Following his prosecution and conviction, the defendant ap-
pealed, arguing that an unloaded gun could not be considered "a danger-
ous weapon. 597 However, the United States Supreme Court cited three
reasons why an unloaded gun could be considered a dangerous weapon:
First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically danger-
ous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one,
and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always
dangerous even though it may not be armed at a particular time or
place. In addition, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citi-
zen; as a consequence, it creates an immediate danger that a violent
response will ensue. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a
bludgeon.
598
Based on these considerations, the Court ruled that an unloaded gun is a
"dangerous weapon" for purpose of this statute.
599
McLaughlin represents an excellent example of a strong policy con-
sideration that resolves the meaning of somewhat nebulous statutory
language. Central to law enforcement concerns is the aspect of deter-
rence. In connection with a robbery, it is certainly appropriate to penalize
the unlawful taking of property of another through threat of force-the
robbery-and to punish to an even greater extent a robbery with a dan-
gerous weapon. Obviously, McLaughlin recognized that the introduction
of what appears to be a dangerous weapon will make the robbery victim
more compliant with the robber's demands and invite a greater level of
possible danger to innocent persons, such as where a bank security guard
feels clearly justified in using deadly force against the gun-wielding as-
sailant, with the unhappy result that an innocent bank patron is shot in-
stead. Then, of course, there is the possibility of a robbery victim being
"pistol whipped." Obviously the robbery brings its own danger-the
apparent weapon even more. Finally, to rule otherwise would place the





597. Id. at 17.
598. Id. at 17-18.
599. Id. at 18.
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law in the strange position of having allowed the robber to instill real
fear in his victim, thereby creating for himself a greater prospect of suc-
cess in his criminal enterprise, while simultaneously immunizing him
from liability for the greater offense.
Another example of a court considering the obvious policy rationale
behind a statute in order to determine the meaning of a particular portion
of a statute is Commonwealth v. Sexton,600 where the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts considered whether concrete pavement could
constitute a "dangerous weapon" to support a charge of "assault and bat-
tery with a dangerous weapon."' ° In this case, the defendant was
charged with "assault and battery with a dangerous weapon" on a joint
venture theory after he and his brother attacked a man after leaving a
bar.602 During the attack, the defendant's brother slammed the victim's
head against the pavement several times.603 After being convicted of "as-
sault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon," the defendant ap-
pealed his conviction.604 The appeals court reversed the defendant's con-
viction holding that a dangerous weapon could only include an object a
person could "wield" or "arm" himself with and, as such, "concrete
pavement," being a stationary object, could not be a "dangerous
weapon.,65 The government, thereafter, appealed the reversal to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.6°6 The court noted that the legis-
lative policy behind the statute was an intent to "invoke greater penalties
for assaults which threaten serious injury because an actor chose to em-
ploy a dangerous weapon." 6 7 While some weapons may be per se dan-
gerous--devices that are designed and constructed to kill or create great
bodily harm-other "innocuous items" may be dangerous based on how
they are used in a particular case.60 8 The court asserted that if an object,
including a stationary one, can be used in a way to inflict serious bodily
injury, then the object could qualify as a dangerous weapon.6°9 The court
further reasoned that had the defendant used a broken slab of concrete to
bludgeon his victim, that would have been, without question, defined as a
dangerous weapon. 610 The court observed that the fact that the concrete
was not a broken slab but rather a "fixed thing" did not affect the dan-
600. 680 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1997).




605. Id. at 24-25 (citing Commonwealth v. Sexton, 672 N.E.2d 991 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)).
606. Id. at 24.
607. Id. at 25.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 27.
610. id. at 26.
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gerousness of the instrumentality. 61' The court concluded that "an item's
dangerous propensities 'often depend[] entirely on its use,' and not its
mobility, for '[w]hether the pitcher hits the stone or the stone hits the
pitcher, it will be bad for the pitcher."' 6 2 Thus, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that a person who uses concrete pavement
to intentionally inflict injury on another could be found guilty of assault
and battery by means of a "dangerous weapon."
613
As with McLaughlin, the Sexton decision correctly focused on the
general purpose behind the Massachusetts proscription against assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon in concluding the perpetrator had
fair notice. Here, the clear policy behind assault and battery strictures is
dissuading individuals from injuring or attempting to inflict injury upon
another. Introduction of an object that has the capacity to cause even
greater injury to an assault victim's life or limb is clearly an element of
aggravation. Whether that object was stationary or not is beside the
point. Here, the obvious purpose behind the Massachusetts law at issue
was discouraging assailants from using an object to create more carnage
than would have been the case without it.
Similarly, in People v. Johnson,614 the Court of Appeals of the First
District of California had to determine whether transmitting herpes dur-
ing a rape constituted the infliction of "great bodily injury" upon the vic-
tim.615 In this case, the defendant entered the car the victim was driving
"and forced her at knife point to drive" to a deserted street.616 There, the
defendant forced the victim to "kiss him and orally copulate him., 617 The
defendant then forcibly removed the victim's pants and raped her.618 Five
days later, the victim was diagnosed with herpes simplex 11.619 At the
defendant's trial on charges of kidnapping, rape, oral copulation by
force, robbery, and false imprisonment,620 the jury found the defendant
guilty of inflicting "great bodily injury" upon the victim because he had
transmitted the herpes virus to the victim. 62 1 The effect of such a finding
resulted in the enhancement of the defendant's sentence. 622 In its review,
the California Court of Appeals noted that "great bodily injury" had been
defined as a "serious impairment of physical condition" or a "protracted
611. Id.
612. Id. at 27 (citing State v. Reed, 790 P.2d 551, 552 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting MIGUEL DE
CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE, Part 11, ch. 43 (John Ormsby trans., William Benton 1952))).
613. Id.
614. 225 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Cal, App. 1986).
615. Johnson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 253.





621. Id. at 253.
622. Id. at 252.
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impairment of function of any portion of [the] body., 623 The court
pointed out that an expert had testified at the defendant's trial that herpes
is a venereal disease that cannot be cured by known means.624 When ac-
tive, herpes,
[m]anifests itself in the form of vesicles or tiny blisters in the vaginal
area. The principal symptom is intense itching and/or pain, but vari-
ous complications may arise. These include possible blindness if the
virus is accidentally transmitted to the eye and if it gets into the
bloodstream, a potential for serious infection involving meningitis,
which could result in death.
625
The expert further testified that the victim was likely to carry the herpes
virus for the rest of her life.626 The court held, therefore, that the trans-
mission of herpes during the rape inflicted "great bodily injury" upon the
victim and upheld the jury's decision in that regard.6 7 Here, then, this
court was considering the obvious policy behind the law, namely, if a
perpetrator hurts his victim in any significant manner, he ought not be
able to avoid liability based on a claim that the nature or type of substan-
tial physical harm he inflicted was not tantamount to great bodily injury.
F. Legislative Intent
Frequently, courts interpret a statute by looking to the legislative
intent in enacting the particular statute.628 The court may ascertain this
623. Id. at 253 (quoting People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274, 290 (Cal. 1978), overruled on other





628. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132-34 (holding that legislative intent makes clear that
language "carries a firearm" is not limited to carrying a firearm on one's person); United States v.
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975) (looking to the legislative intent to determine whether a statute which
prohibits mailing "firearms capable of being concealed on the person" prohibited mailing sawed off
shotguns); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620-21 (1954) (looking to the legislative history
behind the Federal Lobbying Act to determine precisely to whom the statute applies); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1945) (plurality opinion) (looking to legislative intent behind
federal statute penalizing willful deprivation, under color of law, of an individual's federal right was
intended to provide affected citizens broad protection); Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282,
283-84 (1945) (looking to the "scant legislative history" behind a portion of the kidnapping statute
that stated that the death sentence shall not be imposed on a person convicted of this offense, which
provided that the "kidnapped person has been liberated unharmed," to determine if this proviso
applied to the kidnapper who was convicted in the instant case); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.
76, 95 (1820) (examining the legislative history behind federal law to determine if a homicide that
occurred on a river about a half mile wide in the interior of a country constituted "manslaughter at
high sea"); Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.
1985) ("[The legislative history of the statute" which makes it a federal offense to coerce, threaten,
intimidate, harass or obstruct certain foreign officials and their guests "makes clear Congress'
concern for, and desire to protect rights guaranteed by the First Amendment."); People v. Bailey,
657 N.E.2d 953, 960 (Il1. 1995) (holding claim that state anti-stalking statutes reached innocent
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intent by looking to the legislature's exact word selection, in particular
the words the legislature chose to use in preference to alternative possi-
bilities,629 or by looking to the legislative record and the debates that took
place when the statute was being considered.63°
First, a court may simply look at a legislative body's word selection
to ascertain congressional intent. For example, in Bailey v. United
63163States, which was discussed earlier,632 the United States Supreme
Court considered a federal statute that imposed a five-year minimum
term of imprisonment upon a person who "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime .. .uses or caries a fire-
arm.' ' 6 33 The question posed to the Court was "whether evidence of the
proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is
alone sufficient to support a conviction for 'use' of a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking offense" under the statute.634
In this case, the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and
when he was asked to step out of the car, the police observed him stuff
something between the seat and the front console.63 5 A search of the pas-
senger compartment of the car revealed one round of ammunition and 27
plastic bags containing a total of 30 grams of cocaine.636 After the defen-
dant's arrest, a search of the trunk of the car revealed a gun and a large
amount of cash.637 The defendant was charged with several counts, one
of which was drug trafficking while using and carrying a firearm in vio-
lation of federal law.638 At the defendant's trial, an expert testified that
drug dealers frequently carry a firearm to protect their drugs and
money.639 Following the defendant's conviction, and on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the defendant argued that "use" in the stat-
ute signified active employment of a firearm.64° The government insisted
conduct because statutes did not contain language that proscribed conduct must be "without lawful
authority" which does not accord "with the legislature's intent in enacting the statutes to prevent
violent attacks by allowing the police to act before the victim was actually injured and to prevent the
terror produced by harassing actions"); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (111. 1980) (looking to
the legislative history of the murder statute to determine whether an eight and one-half-month old
fetus constitutes an "individual" within the meaning of the statute); Sexton, 680 N.E.2d at 25
(interpreting "dangerous weapons" to include stationary objects, such as concrete pavement, does
not contravene intent of legislature).
629. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995).
630. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11 th Cir. 1987).
631. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
632. See supra notes 471-81 and accompanying text.
633, Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997)).
634. Id. at 138-39.
635. Id. at 139.
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997)).
639. Id.
640. Id. at 143.
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that "use" in the statute should be interpreted to mean availing oneself of
a gun.64' The government argued that an individual violates the statute by
putting or keeping the gun in a particular place from which it can be ac-
cessed if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime.642 The Court looked
to the word choice used by Congress when it enacted this law to decipher
the intent of Congress, concluding that "use" was meant to connote
something more than simple possession of a gun.643 The Court stated that
if Congress had "intended possession alone to trigger liability under [the
statute], it easily could have so provided."64 The Court noted that in
many other gun-related statutes, Congress had used the term "possess,"
therefore, the fact that Congress chose to employ the word "use" rather
than "possess" in this instance was significant. 645 The Court concluded
that a broad definition of the word "use," which could be "satisfied in
almost every case by evidence of mere possession[,] does not adhere to
the obvious congressional intent to require more than possession to trig-
ger the statute's application.,
646
Second, beyond simply focusing on the legislature's word choice,
which itself may reflect the legislature's intent, a court may be required
to dig deeper and look to the legislative history behind the statute to de-
termine its meaning. For example, in United States v. Hernandez-
Salazar,647 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
considered an amendment to a federal statute that dealt with currency
reporting violations. 48 Specifically, this amendment expanded the au-
thority of U.S. Customs officers to search persons and property entering
and departing the United States for currency reporting violations where
an officer had "reasonable cause to believe" a currency violation had
occurred. 649 In this case, the defendant was apprehended in the Miami
International Airport while attempting to smuggle large amounts of
money to Columbia.6 0 The defendant challenged the search of his bag-
641. Id. at 141.
642. Id. (referring to United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
643. Id. at 143.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 144.
647. 813 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1987), superceded by 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (amended 1986).
648. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1128, 1132 n.23. As amended in 1984, 31 U.S.C. §
5317(b) provided:
A customs officer may stop and search, without a search warrant, a vehicle, vessel,
aircraft, or other conveyance, envelope or other container, or person entering or
departing from the United States with respect to which or whom the officer has
reasonable cause to believe there is a monetary instrument being transported in
violation of [federal currency reporting requirements] of this title.
31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (1984).
649. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1132 n.23.
650. Id. at 1131.
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gage as an illegal search contrary to the Fourth Amendment and also
challenged the "reasonable cause to believe" language as void-for-
vagueness.
651
In order to rule on the issue regarding the legitimacy of the search,
the Eleventh Circuit had to first determine the meaning of "reasonable
cause." 652 The defendant claimed that the statute was unconstitutional
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine because the statute amounted to an
unrestricted delegation of power to Customs officers.653 In addition, the
defendant argued that the phrase "reasonable cause" did not provide a
reasonable person with notice of the precise standard of suspicion that
authorities needed to conduct the search.654 Upon review, the court
looked to the "legislative history" behind the amendment to determine
the meaning of this phrase.655 The court stated that the legislative history
indicated that the section clearly intended to authorize searches on the
basis of less than probable cause.656 Likewise, the court believed that
Congress wanted to give Customs officers the ability to perform these
warrantless searches in a manner consistent with United States Supreme
Court precedent that suggested that "new" Fourth Amendment standards
other than "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" were disfa-
vored.657 In doing so, the court deduced that Congress must have in-
tended that the "reasonable cause to believe" standard only required
"reasonable suspicion" for such a search because Congress had explicitly, ,,658
stated the standard was to be less than "probable cause. Thus, the
"reasonable cause" language was not vague.659 Furthermore, the statute
did authorize a search based on reasonable suspicion, rather than prob-
able cause, and because the officers had reasonable suspicion to search
the defendant in this instance, the defendant's additional challenge that
the search was violative of the Fourth Amendment was denied.66°
651. Id. at 1132.
652. Id. at 1133.
653. Id. at 1132.
654. Id.
655. Id. at 1133.
656. Id. at 1133 n.28. The court discussed S. REP. No. 98-225, at 303 (1983), which declared:
[section 5317(b)'s] on the spot authority of the Customs Service would significantly
enhance the effectiveness in monitoring and apprehending persons reasonably
believed, to be violating the currency reporting provisions of the law. The
Committee is fully convinced that such authority is not only needed, but
constitutional, under the line of cases holding that warrantless "border searches" are
reasonable even without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 303 (1983) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
657. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1133 n.29 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
658. Id. at 1133 n.30 (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541).
659. Id. at 1133.
660. Id. at 1136-39.
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G. Prior Judicial Decisions
To determine the meaning of terms in a statute, reviewing courts
routinely look to the way the terms have been interpreted in earlier judi-
cial decisions. 66' For example, in CISPES v. FBI,662 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the validity of a statute,
designed to protect foreign dignitaries and officials, which held crimi-
nally liable anyone who "intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a
foreign official or an official guest or obstructs a foreign official in the
performance of his duties. 663 The Committee in Solidarity with the Peo-
ple of El Salvador ("CISPES") challenged this statute as both vague and
overbroad, arguing that the terms "intimidate," "harass," "coerce,"
"threaten," and "obstruct" did not sufficiently identify what conduct was
prohibited and that it permitted undue discretion on the part of enforcing
authorities.6 64
In order to determine the proper meaning of the challenged terms
and to decide whether the terms were unconstitutionally vague, the court
considered other cases that had upheld those terms against vagueness
challenges. First, the court looked to International Society for Krishna
Consciousness v. Eaves,665 an earlier decision from the circuit, wherein it
had ruled that the terms "coerce" and "obstruct" were not unconstitution-
ally vague.666 Next, the court examined Cameron v. Johnson,667 an earlier
opinion from the United States Supreme Court, which reflected the
proposition that the term "obstruct" as used in a statute prohibiting
"picketing. . . in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere
with free ingress or egress to or from any ... courthouse" was not un-
661. See, e.g., United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 787-88 (4th Cir. 1995) (looking to prior
judicial decisions to determine whether an HIV positive inmate's teeth used to bite correctional
officers constitute a "deadly weapon"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 833 (1995); Schwartzmiller v.
Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1984) (looking to prior judicial decisions to determine
whether the defendant's conduct constituted a "lewd" and "lascivious" sexual acts on a child);
People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 49, 51 (f11. 1987) (looking to prior judicial decisions to
determine the meaning of "force" and "bodily harm" for purposes of state criminal sexual assault
prohibitions); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1994) (looking to prior
judicial decisions to determine whether a fetus constitutes a "person" within the vehicular homicide
statute); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Minn. 1985) (looking to prior judicial decisions to
determine whether an eight and one-half-month old fetus was a "human being" within the vehicular
homicide statute); People v. McCullum, 706 N.Y.S. 2d 616, 617-19 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000) (looking
to prior judicial decisions involving inoperable guns to determine whether a can of mace not proved
operable could constitute a "dangerous weapon").
662. 770 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1985).
663. Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador, 770 F.2d at 470-71 n.2 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 112(b)(1) (1982)). 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2) contained similar language which was challenged.
664. Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador, 770 F.2d at 475.
665. Id. at 476 (citing International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809
(5th Cir. 1979)).
666. Id. (quoting Eaves, 601 F.2d at 831).
667. Id. (citing Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)).
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constitutionally vague.668 Next, the court looked to Watts v. United
States,669 another decision from the United States Supreme Court, in
which the Court ruled that the term "threaten," as used in a statute out-
lawing threatening the United States President, was not void for vague-
ness.670 Finally, the court considered Youngdahl v. Rainfair,67' wherein
the United States Supreme Court had upheld a law prohibiting "intimi-
672dating" and "threatening" activities by striking employees. Based on
this line of cases, the court determined that the statute as applied to
CISPES was not void for vagueness.
673
In Greshman v. Peterson,6 74 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reviewed an Indianapolis city ordinance that barred
"aggressive panhandling, ' 675 which was defined as including any solici-
tation of money or other gratuity "in an aggressive manner," including
where the panhandling involves (1) "touching" the solicited person, (2)
approaching a person waiting in line to be admitted into a commercial
establishment, (3) blocking a person's path, (4) following a person, (5)
using profane language or a gesture which would cause a reasonable
person fear, or (6) a group of two or more panhandlers.676 The plaintiff, a
homeless person, brought an action claiming the ordinance was violative
of his First Amendment rights and unconstitutionally vague in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.677 After rejecting the First Amendment
argument, 678 the Seventh Circuit analyzed the vagueness claim. 679 The
court noted that Indiana case law had upheld the state anti-stalking law
that bars repeated "harassment" that causes another person to feel threat-
ened.68° It pointed out its own prior decisions had upheld proscriptions
against "threats, extortion, blackmail and the like, 'despite the fact that
they criminalize utterances because of their expressive content.' ''681 The
Seventh Circuit cited as additional authority a United States Supreme
Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a law against "threats"
directed at the United States President,682 followed by another case where
668. Id. (quoting Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616).
669. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1966)).
670. Id. (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).
671. Id. (citing Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 335 U.S. 131 (1957)).
672. Id. (quoting Youngdahl, 335 U.S. at 139).
673. Id. at 477.
674. 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000).
675. Gresham, 225 F.3d at 901.
676. Id. at 901-02 (quoting INDIANAPOLIS CrrY-CouNTY, IND., ORDINANCE No. 78 (1999);
REV. CODE OF INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY § 407-102 (1999)).
677. Id. at 901.
678. Id. at 903-07.
679. Id. at 907-09.
680. Id. at 908-09 (citing Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).
681. Id. at 909 (quoting United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1259 (7th Cir. 1993) (Flaum,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1004 (1994)).
682. Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).
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the Seventh Circuit itself held that "threats of physical violence" are not
protected by the First Amendment.683 Finally, the court noted another
case, decided by the United States Supreme Court, wherein a concurring
opinion quoted a law review article stating, "Although the First Amend-
ment broadly protects 'speech,' it does not protect the right to 'fix prices,
breach contracts, make false warranties, place bets with bookies, threaten
[or] extort.'''684 Here, the Indianapolis measure could be construed to
prohibit any word or gesture that "makes a reasonable person feel they
face danger if they refuse to donate" and, as such, could not be enjoined
from enforcement.685
H. Definitions in Other Statutes Within the Jurisdiction
Sometimes the meaning of a statute can be interpreted by reference
or comparison to another statute.686 First, a court may look to criminal
offenses that have previously appeared in the jurisdiction's penal code
for instruction as to the meaning of language that is retained in later en-
687actments. Next, a reviewing court may look to other sections of its
current criminal code to determine the proper meaning of a term as it is
used throughout the code.688 At other times, a court may look to a statute
within the same Jurisdiction but outside the penal code to interpret a
criminal statute.
683. Id. (citing United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1021 (1986))).
684. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 270 (1981))).
685. Id.
686. See, e.g., Muscarelio, 524 U.S. at 134-39 (examining other federal statutes dealing with
guns, including those that refer to "use" of firearm and others that refer to "transporting" a firearm,
suggesting Congress intended that language "carries" a firearm in particular federal statute mean not
merely carrying on one's person but also in one's automobile); Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143 (superceded
by statute) (drawing on federal offenses that express themselves in terms of "possesses" guns to
conclude that "use" of a gun in federal law connotes active employment and not mere possession);
Comm. in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, 770 F.2d at 476-77 (ruling a federal statute
outlawing threatening, harassing and intimidating foreign officials not vague; "similar terms have
been used and applied in numerous United States statutes"); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209
(Ill. 1980) (superceded by statute) (discussing a statement in Illinois Abortion law, "killing of a fetus
aborted alive may be punished as murder," suggests that killing unborn fetus is not murder).
687. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 622-24 (Cal. 1970)
(superceded by statute) (finding definition of "human being" in current California statute enacted in
1872 was same as prior murder statute enacted in 1850).
688. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 766 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. 2002) (referring to Illinois Air Rifle
Act within Criminal Offenses Chapter for definition of "Air Rifle" so as to determine if a pellet gun,
which is considered an air rifle under Act, is also a "dangerous weapon" within meaning of Illinois
armed violence prohibition).
689. See, e.g., People v. Spencer, 731 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (referring to
Family Law Code definition of "harassment," used for purpose of determining if individual violated
an "order of protection," in determining if defendant committed offense of telephone harassment).
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In People v. Haywood,6 90 discussed earlier,69 1 the Illinois Supreme
Court entertained a vagueness claim directed at certain language con-
tained in prohibitions outlawing criminal sexual assault and aggravated
criminal sexual assault, offenses that had replaced Illinois' earlier rape
and deviate sexual assault legislation. 692 Specifically, the defendants, in
this consolidated appeal, had challenged the word "force" as used in the
criminal sexual assault statute and the phrase "bodily harm" as employed
in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute.693 Regarding the word
"force," the court assumed the legislature intended to define the term in
essentially the same manner that it had in connection with the recently
repealed rape/deviate sexual assault prohibitions that were supplanted by
the new, more sophisticated Criminal Sexual Act legislation.694 Thus, for
one to claim lack of notice regarding the meaning of the word "force"
was contrary to the "common sense" conclusion that a legislative body,
in enacting a new law that relies on existing legal nomenclature, would
not be intent on the "creation of a new definition" or "obscurity" of exist-
ing language.695
Meanwhile, regarding the defendants' claim in Haywood that the
language "bodily harm," as used in the aggravated criminal sexual as-
sault legislation, was vague, the court responded that the phrase "has a
well-known legal meaning, and when a statute contains language with an
ordinary and popularly understood meaning, courts will assume that that
is the meaning intended by the legislature.' 696 Here the words "bodily
harm" had been earlier defined by the Illinois Supreme Court in the con-
text of the Illinois crime of battery as "some sort of physical pain or
damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether tem-
porary or permanent." 697 Thus, because this language carried a clear
meaning elsewhere in the existing Illinois Criminal Code, the defendants
could not assert lack of fair notice.698
As occurred in Haywood, reviewing courts routinely look to other
sections of the same statutory scheme to determine the meaning of a par-
ticular statute.6 99 For example, in People v. Aguilar,7 °° the Illinois Appel-
690. 515 N.E.2d45 (Ill. 1987).
691. See supra notes 561-69 and accompanying text.
692. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 46.
693. Id. at 47-48, 51 (referring to language in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13, 12-14
(1985)).
694. Id. at 49.
695. Id. at 48.
696. Id. at 51.
697. Id. (quoting People v. Mays, 437 N.E.2d 633, 635-36 (111. 1982)).
698. Id. at 51-52.
699. See, e.g., Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146-47 (superceded by statute) (looking to other parts of the
statute leads to the conclusion that "carrying" a firearm does not constitute "use" of a firearm);
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 94-105 (1820) (looking to the construction of the "whole
act" criminalizing felonies on the "high seas" leads to conclusion that homicide on a foreign
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late Court looked to the Illinois robbery statute for guidance as it deter-
mined the reach of the more recently enacted Illinois "vehicular hijack-
ing" prohibition.0 1 In this case, the driver of an automobile stepped out
of his van after the defendant hit the driver's van with his foot. "2 After
the driver exited his van, the defendant punched the driver in his jaw
while defendant's companions threw bottles at him.70 3 At this point, the
driver fled the scene.7° When the driver abandoned his van, the defen-
dant and his companions entered the driver's van and drove it away.705
Following the defendant's apprehension, he was prosecuted and con-
victed of "vehicular hijacking," which was defined as any taking of a
motor vehicle "from the person or the immediate presence of another by
the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force. 70 6 On ap-
peal, defendant argued the vehicle was not taken by force inasmuch as
the driver had exited his automobile of his own accord.707 Also, he
claimed the beating of the driver and the bottle-throwing, which precipi-
tated the flight of the driver, were unrelated to any intent to take the ve-
hicle.70 8 However, the appellate court noted the vehicular hijacking stat-
ute contained language identical in most respects to "robbery," which is
defined in Illinois as the taking of property "from the person or presence
of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of
force.' 70 9 Moreover, the robbery statute had been previously interpreted
as only requiring "some concurrence between the defendant's threat of
force and the taking of the victim's property., 710 In other words, the force
or threat of force for purposes of robbery need not immediately precede
the taking.711 To convict one of robbery, it is not necessary to show the
force was exerted for the purpose of taking another's property or that the
perpetrator formed the intention to take another's property before the
force or threat of force occurred.712 Extrapolating from the robbery stric-
country's river does not amount to "manslaughter on the high seas"); Columbia Natural Resources v.
Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1106-09 (6th Cir. 1995) (consulting the entire federal RICO statute leads to
conclusion that the meaning of a "pattern of racketeering activity" is not vague), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1158 (1996); People v. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 43-46 (IIl. 1987) (holding that mens rea
provision which appeared in penalty section that conflicts with mens rea provision in definitional
section of Illinois drug paraphernalia statute renders it vague).
700. 676 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
701. Aguilar, 676 N.E.2d at 327.
702. Id. at 325-26.
703. Id. at 326.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-3(a) (1994)).
707. Id.
708. Id.
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ture, the court concluded there existed a concurrence between the defen-
dant's taking of the driver's vehicle and the use of force against him and,
as such, the defendant was properly convicted of vehicular hijacking.7 3
As stated, sometimes courts will search outside the jurisdiction's
penal code and find a statutory definition of a word or phrase elsewhere
in the jurisdiction's laws in order to demonstrate that the citizenry were
sufficiently apprised of the meaning of certain language appearing within
the penal code.7 14 This occurred in People v. Calvert,715 an Illinois Ap-
pellate Court opinion involving a defendant who had been convicted of
the offense of "harassment of a witness." 71 6 The defendant was charged
with this Illinois offense after verbally berating a witness in an earlier
trial with "language... rife with profanity and invective," which caused
the witness to cry continuously and to be intimidated and physically
shaken.717 A violation of this offense occurs where a person, "with intent
to harass or annoy" another person who had been a witness, defined as a
person who had testified in a legal proceeding, "communicates" with
such other person "in such manner as to produce mental anguish or emo-
tional distress" or conveys a threat of injury or damage to the individ-
ual's person or property.718 The defendant claimed the evidence was in-
sufficient to establish that he had the requisite intent to harass or annoy
719and that the statute was overbroad and vague. In its review, the Illinois
Appellate Court conceded that the term "harassment" was not defined in
the Illinois penal code.720 However, the court noted that there existed a
definition of "harassment" in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of
1986,721 which is part of the Family Law chapter of the Illinois code, that
was "instructive. 722 Specifically, this definition stated that harassment
is: "Knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose
that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable
person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress ....
Accordingly, the court concluded that harassment could arise as "the
713. Id.
714. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 998 P.2d 544, 549 (Mont. 2000) (referring to MONT. ADMIN. R.
23-7-301 (2002) (Uniform Fire Code) in order to decipher what constitutes possession of
"explosive").
715. 629 N.E.2d 1154 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
716. Calvert, 629 N.E. at 1155 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-4a (1991), subsequently
codified as 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-4a (1993)).
717. Id. at 1156.
718. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-4a (1991), subsequently codified as 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/32-4a (1993)).
719. Id. at 1159.
720. Id. at 1157.
721. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2311-3(6) (1991), subsequently codified as 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 60/101 (2002)).
722. Id.
723. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2311-3(6) (1991), subsequently codified as 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (1999)).
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result of intentional acts which cause another person to be worried, anx-
ious, or uncomfortable and therefore can occur even if there is no overt
act of violence. 724 Here, defendant's verbal diatribe, which caused an
intense emotional reaction in the victim, and caused her to fear that some
type of repercussions might be forthcoming in the future, precluded the
defendant's assertion that he had not "harassed" the witness. 725 Thus, the
defendant's claims, including his assertion that the entire criminal statute
was vague, were rejected and his conviction was affirmed.726
L Definitions From Other Jurisdictions
Yet another source courts facing vagueness claims may look to for
guidance are definitions of terms in the law of other jurisdictions.727 In
Rose v. Locke,728 a United States Supreme Court opinion, a defendant
had been convicted under a Tennessee statute for committing a "crime
against nature., 729  In this case, the defendant entered his female
neighbor's apartment on the pretext of using her telephone.73° Once in-
side, the defendant produced a knife, forced her to partially undress, "and
compelled her to submit to his twice performing cunnilingus upon
her.",731 Following the State's successful prosecution of the defendant,
the Tennessee trial court sentenced the defendant to five to seven years'
724. Id.
725. Id. at 1157-59.
726. Id. at 1159-60.
727. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (111. 1980) ("After considering the status of
the unborn in the common law, the uniform decisions of the court of last resort in our sister States,
and the attitude toward the unborn reflected in our abortion statute, we conclude that taking the life
of a fetus is not murder under our current statute unless the fetus is born alive and subsequently
expires as a result of the injuries inflicted." (emphasis added)); State v. Fisher, 631 P.2d 239, 242-45
(Kan. 1981) (deciphering that state statute which outlawed "endangering" a child was not vague by
examining similar child endangerment laws and their interpretation in Colorado, California, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Minn. 1985) (holding vehicular
homicide statute interpreted as not applicable to killing a fetus. "We have been informed ... that of
25 jurisdictions in the United States which have considered the issue... 23 have adopted the 'born
alive' rule. From the foregoing it is clear that the common law 'born alive' rule is now well-
established in the great majority of jurisdictions."); cf Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 1701
(2001) (explaining that where defendant contended that he had no "fair warning" of the judicial
abolition of Tennessee's common law "year and a day rule," which precluded a prosecution for
murder where an assault victim died more than a year after he suffered the infliction of wounds
caused by a perpetrator, because "the year and a day rule has been legislatively or judicially
abolished in the vast majority of jurisdictions recently to have addressed the issue," the rule had
clearly outlived its usefulness and no longer existed so that where defendant's victim had died one
and a half years after his attack, the Tennessee Supreme Courts' retroactive abolition was not
unexpected or indefensible).
728. 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam).
729. Rose, 423 U.S. at 48 ("Crimes against nature, either with mankind or any beast, are
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than five (5) years nor more than fifteen (15)
years." (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955))).
730. id. at 48.
731. Id.
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imprisonment.732 "The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the conviction, rejecting [the defendant's] claim that the Tennessee stat-
ute's proscription of 'crimes against nature' did not encompass cunnilin-
gus, as well as his contention that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague. 733 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit accepted the defendant's constitutional challenge, determining
that the term "'crimes against nature' could not 'in and of itself withstand
a charge of unconstitutional vagueness.' 734 The Sixth Circuit reasoned
that cunnilingus was not encompassed in the Tennessee statute because it
could not find any previous Tennessee opinion stating that the statute
applied to such sexual activity.735 Therefore, this court held that the stat-
ute failed to give the defendant "fair warning" and, on those grounds,
sustained the defendant's constitutional challenge.736
In its review, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
whether under the Tennessee statute "crime[s] against nature" was to be
"narrowly applied to only those acts constituting the common-law of-
fense of sodomy, or [was it] to be broadly interpreted to encompass addi-
tional forms of sexual aberration. 737 In addressing this issue, the Court
first pointed out that a "substantial number of jurisdictions" maintain the
common law proscription of "crimes against nature. ,738 The Court first
referenced State v. Crawford,739 wherein the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a claim that "its crime-against-nature statute was so devoid of
definition as to be unconstitutional, pointing out that its provision was
derived from early English law and broadly embraced sodomy, bestiality,
buggery, fellatio, and cunnilingus within its terms.,,740 The Court next
looked to Wainwright v. Stone,74 1 in which the Court previously held that
a Florida statute "proscribing 'the abominable and detestable crime
against nature' was not unconstitutionally vague, despite the fact that the
[Florida] State Supreme Court had recently changed its mind about the
statute's permissible scope. 7 42 Additionally, the Court pointed out that
in Fisher v. State,743 the Tennessee Supreme Court had previously re-
jected a claim that "'crime against nature' did not cover fellatio, repudi-
ating those jurisdictions which had taken a 'narrow restrictive definition
732. Id.
733. Id. at 48-49.
734. Id. (quoting Locke v. Rose, 514 F.2d 570, 571 (6th Cir. 1975)).
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. at 50-51.
738. Id. at 50.
739. 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1972).
740. Rose, 423 U.S. at 51 (citing Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314).
741. 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
742. Rose, 423 U.S. at 51 (citing Wainwright, 414 U.S. at 22).
743. 277 S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. 1955).
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of the offense. '"'744 After Fisher, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in
Sherrill v. State,745 reiterated the fact that the Tennessee "crimes against
nature" statute encompassed the broader meaning and declared that "the
prohibition brings all unnatural copulation with mankind or a beast, in-
cluding sodomy, within its scope. 746 The United States Supreme Court
then noted that a similar Maine statute, which the Tennessee court in
Sherrill had cited with approval, "had been applied to cunnilingus before
either Tennessee decision. 74 7 Finally, the Court stated that "[o]ther ju-
risdictions had already reasonably construed identical statutory language
to apply to such acts. And given the Tennessee court's clear pronounce-
ments that its statute was intended to effect broad coverage, there was
nothing to indicate, clearly or otherwise, that respondent's acts were out-
side the scope of [the Tennessee enactment]. 748 Thus, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit's finding of vagueness.
Another example of a judicial opinion that studied decisions from
other jurisdictions in order to determine the meaning of a statute is
Commonwealth v. Sexton.749 In Sexton, discussed in an earlier section,75°
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether con-
crete pavement could constitute a "dangerous weapon" to support a
charge of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.751 In this case,
the defendant was charged with assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon on a joint venture theory after he and his brother attacked a man
after leaving a bar. During the attack, the defendant's brother slammed
the victim's head against the pavement several times. After being con-
victed of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the Mas-
sachusetts appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that a dangerous weapon could only include an object a person could
"wield" or "arm" himself with and, as such, "concrete pavement," being
,,752a stationary object, could not be a "dangerous weapon.
In deciding this issue of first impression, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts first looked to its former decisions,753 as well as to de-
cisions of other jurisdictions, which had found "otherwise innocent items
to fit this classification when used in a way which endangers another's
744. Rose, 423 U.S. at 52 (citing Fisher, 277 S.W.2d 340).
745. 321 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1959).
746. Rose, 423 U.S. at 52 (citing Sherrill, 321 S.W.2d at 812 (quoting from State v. Cyr, 198 A.
743 (Me. 1938))).
747. Id.
748. Id. at 53.
749. 680 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1997).
750. See supra notes 600-13 and accompanying text.
751. Sexton, 680 N.E.2d at 24 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 15A (West 2000)).
752. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sexton, 672 N.E.2d 991,993 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)).
753. Id. at 25.
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safety. 754 The court observed that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had ruled that a walking stick used to strike someone
was a "dangerous weapon. 755 Meanwhile, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that a chair "brought down upon
a victim's head" was a "dangerous weapon. 7 56 The California Court of
Appeals had determined that a rock was a "dangerous weapon. ' 7  The
Maryland Supreme Court had held that a "microphone cord wrapped
,,758around a victim's neck" was a "dangerous weapon. Additionally, the
Michigan Court of Appeals had stated in dictum that an "automobile,
broomstick, flashlight, and lighter fluid" could all constitute "dangerous
weapons.'759
The court next considered the fact that "a number of other jurisdic-
tions" had held that the "stationary character" of an object did not pre-
vent it from being used as a "dangerous weapon., 760 For instance, the
court pointed out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
55761Circuit had determined that steel cell bars were a "dangerous weapon.
Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court had determined that cell
,,762bars and floors were "dangerous weapons. ' 2 Moreover, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, had held that cell bars7 6 3 and, in an-
other case, a plate glass window constituted "dangerous weapons.'
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals and the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals had both held that a sidewalk was a "dangerous weapon. ''765 While
the Massachusetts court recognized that some other jurisdictions had
taken a contrary position, it held that a person who deliberately uses con-
crete pavement as a means of inflicting serious injury could be found
guilty of assault and battery by means of a "dangerous weapon.
' 766
Beyond the above approaches to discerning notice, it is conceivable
that a particular political subdivision may gain interpretative guidance
from another governmental unit within the same jurisdiction. In City of
Chicago v. Powell,767 an Illinois Appellate Court decision, definitional
754. Id.
755. Id. at 25-26 (citing United States v. Loman, 551 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 912 (1977)).
756. Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Johnson, 324 F.2d 264, 266 (4th. Cir. 1963)).
757. Id. (citing People v. White, 212 Cal. App. 2d 464, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)).
758. Id. (citing Bennett v. State, 205 A.2d 393, 395 (Md. 1964)).
759. Id. (citing People v. Buford, 244 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (dictum)).
760. Id.
761. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1135 (1995)).
762. Id. (citing State v. Brinson, 448 S.E.2d 822 (N.C. 1994)).
763. Id. (citing People v. O'Hagan, 574 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
764. Id. (citing People v. Coe, 564 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
765. Id. (citing People v. Galvin, 481 N.E.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Reed, 790 P.2d
551, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)).
766. Id. at 27.
767. 735 N.E.2d 119 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
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guidance regarding the scope of a municipal ordinance was extracted
from state legislation. In that case, a Chicago municipal ordinance pro-
hibiting "soliciting unlawful business" was used to prosecute a defendant
who was soliciting prospective purchasers of heroin in public.768 Other
defendants were prosecuted for soliciting for purposes of prostitution,
and yet another for soliciting the sale of false identification cards. 69
These defendants claimed the municipal law in question was vague in
regards to what constituted "solicitation" and "unlawful business.' 77 °
After a trial court granted one of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
City appealed.771 The appellate court reversed the trial court's vagueness
findings after concluding the words "solicitation" and "unlawful busi-
ness" carried a clear meaning.772 As to "solicitation," the appellate court
pointed out that this term was defined in the Illinois Criminal Code as "to
command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to commit
an offense. 773 In addition, the Illinois penal law contained a specific
prohibition outlawing criminal "solicitation" which occurs when one is
"commanding, encouraging, or requesting another to commit a particular
offense with the intent that the offense be committed. 77 4 Moreover,
Black's Law Dictionary contained a definition,775 as did caselaw that had
upheld charges of illicit "solicitation of professional patronage,, 776 while
other caselaw had upheld a statute prohibiting "solicitation of the sale of
residential real estate once a property owner gave an agent notice that he
did not intend to sell the property. 777 Regarding the meaning of "unlaw-
ful business," the appellate court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court
778
had previously upheld very similar language.
As observed previous sections, the fact that certain language in a
specific criminal law has not been provided some definitional clarifica-
tion may contribute to a court's finding of vagueness. In Winters v. New
77 780
York,779 discussed in several previous sections, which involved exami-
nation of a prohibition criminalizing dissemination of "[o]bscene prints
and articles," the United States Supreme Court found the measure vague
768. Powell, 735 N.E.2d at 122-23 (quoting CHICAGO, IL., MUN. CODE § 10-8-515(a) (1998)).
769. Id. at 125.
770. Id. at 122-25.
771. Id. at 123.
772. Id. at 128-30.
773. Id. at 128 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-20 (1998)).
774. Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1 (1998)).
775. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (6th ed. 1990)).
776. Id. (citing Desnick v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1361 (Ill. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 965 (1996)).
777. Id. at 129 (citing Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1305 (7th Cir. 1988)).
778. Id. at 130 (citing People v. Williams, 551 N.E.2d 631,633 (fl. 1990)).
779. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
780. See supra notes 63-74, 448-49, 583-88 and accompanying text.
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in part due to the absence of interpretative aids in other jurisdictions.78'
The Court pointed out that "[o]nly two other state courts, whose reports
are printed appear to have construed language in their laws [dealing with
depictions of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime in some type of periodi-
call similar to that here involved. 782
J. Treatises
Courts will often resort to consulting treatises when reviewing al-
leged statutory indefiniteness. 783 In United States v. Gadreau,784 dis-
cussed in earlier sections,785 the defendant raised a vagueness claim in a
federal Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
786
prosecution where a Colorado commercial bribery statute that was used
as a predicate offense was challenged on due process grounds.787 Here,
the defendants were alleged to have conspired to engage in a violation of
the state commercial bribery statute by giving money to an executive in a
public service company in order to have him award contracts to a supply
company in which they had a legal interest.788 This Colorado statute pro-
vided that a violation occurs whenever a person "solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or
agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as... [a]gent
,,789or employee.., or... [o]fficer. . . of an incorporated association.
After being charged under RICO790 in federal district court, the defen-
dants argued the "knowing[ly] violat[ing] ... a duty of fidelity" language
in the Colorado statute was void for vagueness. 79' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed.792 The Tenth Circuit
stated that the "authorities are unanimous that an officer or agent
breaches his duty of loyalty to his corporation or principal by accepting
bribes to compromise his principal's interests. 793 After examining pas-
781. Winters, 333 U.S. at 511.
782. Id.
783. See, e.g., Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 362 (consulting treatise to ascertain agent's duty toward
principal); cf. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464-67 (2001) (discussing that common law
murder required victim's death to occur within a year and a day (citing FRANCIS WHARTON, LAW OF
HOMICIDE § 18, at 19-20 (3d ed. 1907)); however, this "year and a day" rule is no longer valid and
defendant could not claim lack of notice regarding change in Tennessee law).
784. 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988).
785. See supra notes 317-22, 401-20 and accompanying text.
786. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1986).
787. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 358.
788. Id. at 358-59.
789. Id. at 359 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-401 (1986)).
790. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1986) (making it illegal to engage in a "pattern of
racketeering" to benefit an "enterprise" with which one is "associated")).
791. Id.at358.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 362.
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sages from Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
794
and the Restatement (Second) of Agency,795 the court of appeals ruled that
the language in question carried a clear meaning.796 Here, the defendants
had conspired with the public service official to engage in a "pattern of
commercial bribery," for which they were properly charged.
797
As with other potential sources of "notice," it may turn out that ex-
amination of a respected treatise supports a vagueness claim. 798 In Bouie
v. City of Columbia,799 a United States Supreme Court decision, two
black college students conducted a "sit in" demonstration at a drug store
lunch counter in Columbia, South Carolina.8°° At first, no one ap-
proached the students to take their food order. 80 1 Then, a store employee
placed a "no trespassing" sign in the area where they were seated.80 2 Lo-
cal police were called by the store manager and asked the two students to
leave.803 When the students refused, they were arrested for several of-
fenses, including "criminal trespass.,, 8°4 This South Carolina offense was
defined as an "entry upon the lands of another ... after notice from the
owner or tenant prohibiting such entry., 80 5 Following their convictions, a
794. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 884, at 348, 351-52 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002)).
795. Id. at 363 n.15 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1958)).
796. Id. at 362-63.
797. Id. at 359, 362-63.
798. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 n.4, 162 (1972) (noting
that "vagrancy" laws were a remnant of archaic feudal laws designed to discourage movement of
workers from their home area in search of improved work conditions (citing 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 203, 206, 266-75 (London, MacMillan 1883); 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169) (municipal vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally
vague)); Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 620 nn. 4,6, & 7, 629 (Cal. 1970)
(finding common law required murder victim be born alive and not merely a fetus (citing 3 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES *58, HENRY DE BRACrON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, III, ii, 4
(np. nd.); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 32 (London,
MacMillan 1883); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129-30; 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 433 (London, T. Payne 1778); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 31,
§ 16 (London, Eliz. Nut 4th ed. 1762)) (defendant lacked notice murder statute included killing a
fetus)); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203 (DIl. 1980) (determining the common law meaning of
murder and that it had not included the killing of a fetus (referring to 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES
*50; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129-30; 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
433 (London, T. Payne 1800))); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628, 630 (Minn. 1985) (common
law insisted that victim of homicide be a person "born alive" and not a fetus (citing WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCoTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 530-32 (1972); 2 CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 114, at 95-96 (1979); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 2(b) (1944))
(accused had no notice vehicular homicide statute encompassed death of fetus)).
799. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).




804. Id. at 349 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (Law. Co-op. 1960)). The other arrests either
did not result in convictions or resulted in convictions reversed on appeal. Id. at 348-49.
805. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (Law. Co-op. 1960)).
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due process vagueness challenge was advanced on the ground that the
two students lacked notice.80 6 These petitioners emphasized that they
received no "notice ... prohibiting such entry" either before they entered
the drug store or before they sat in the restaurant booth. 8 7 However, the
South Carolina Supreme Court ruled the statute not only covered the act
of entry after notice not to enter was given, but also the act of remaining
on the premises following notice to leave.80 8 In its review, the United
States Supreme Court stated that the two students had not been provided
with notice that the statute encompassed remaining on another's property
after being asked to leave.809 The Court noted that the South Carolina
law-which predated the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation
of the trespass statute, holding that remaining on another's premises was
prohibited-provided "petitioners no warning whatever that this criminal
statute would be [so] construed." 8'0 Indeed, the "clear language and con-
sistent judicial interpretation to the contrary .... incorporating a doctrine
found only in civil trespass cases" belied the government's contention
that fair notice had been provided in advance.8 1 In support of its conclu-
sion that these petitioners at best had notice that their conduct amounted
to civil trespass, but certainly not criminal trespass, the Court not only
referred Clark and Marshall's On the Law of Crimes812 in the text of their
opinion, but also cited to Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure and
Hochheimer's Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure.8" 3 The Court
concluded these petitioners could not be held to have notice of the South
Carolina Supreme Court's post-conviction "unforeseeable and retroactive
judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language" reflected in
the criminal trespass statute and, as such, the decisions of the lower
courts were reversed.814
K. Literature/Periodicals
Courts will even look to literature in order to determine the meaning
of a particular phrase or a word in a statute.815 An opinion illustrating the
806. Id. at 349-50.
807. Id. at 350.
808. Id.
809. Id. at 360-63.
810. Id. at 359.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 358 (citing WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CRIMES 607 (5th ed. 1952)).
813. Id. at n.6 (citing 2 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 868, at 735 (1957); LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, THE LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
INCLUDING FORMS AND PRECEDENTS §§ 360-63 (2d ed. 1904)).
814. Id. at 352, 355, 363.
815. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (referring to Walt
Whitman, Song of the Open Road, available at http://www.bartleby.com/142/82.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2003); Vachel Lindsay, I want to Go Wandering, available at http://dlib.-
stanford.edu:6520/text/ampo.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2003); HENRY DAVID THOREAU,
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use of literature for interpretative guidance is Muscarello v. United
States,8 16 a decision that was discussed in several earlier sections. 8 7 In
this case, the United States Supreme Court consolidated two cases81 8 in
order to address the question of whether the words "carries a firearm" as
it appears in the federal criminal code is limited to the carrying of fire-
arms on the person.819
In the first of these two cases, defendant Muscarello was arrested
for selling marijuana, which he had carried in his truck to the location of
the sale.82° When police officers searched his truck, they found a hand-
gun locked in the glove compartment. 821 The defendant admitted during
plea provisions that he carried a gun for protection.822 However, later the
defendant retracted his statement and insisted that, in any event, having a
handgun in the truck's glove compartment did not constitute the "carry-
ing" of a firearm within the statutory meaning of the word "carries." 823 In
the second case, defendants Cleveland and Gray-Santana placed several
guns in a bag and then put the bag in the trunk of their ca824 They then
drove the car to a potential drug-selling location where they hoped to
steal drugs from drug dealers.825 At the scene, federal agents appre-
hended the two individuals and searched their car.826 The agents discov-
ered the guns and arrested the defendants.827 All of these defendants were
convicted of trafficking in illicit drugs while carrying a firearm contrary
to federal law, whereupon they appealed.828
Two different United States Courts of Appeals concluded that the
defendants were guilty of violating the federal criminal code because
they had "'carrie[d]' guns during and in relation to a drug trafficking
EXCURSIONS 251-53 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1893), while ruling municipal vagrancy ordinance
vague); Commonwealth v. Sexton, 680 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Mass. 1997) (quoting State v. Reed, 790 P.2d
551, 552 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting CERVANTES, supra note 612), while determining concrete
pavement could constitute a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of assault and battery with a
dangerous weapon and proscribed by state law).
816. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
817. See supra notes 452-61, 482-99 and accompanying text.
818. United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cleveland, 106
F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997).
819. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126-27. The provision of the federal criminal code, which
defendants challenged, imposes a five year mandatory incarceration term upon an individual who
"uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime." 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1) (2000).
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offense." 82 9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine "whether the fact that the guns were found in the locked glove
compartment, or the trunk, of a car" constituted "carrying" a firearm
under the federal statute.8 3 °
Among other considerations in its analysis, the Court looked to the
use of the word "carry" in literature to determine its meaning under the
statute. 83' The Court stated:
The greatest of writers have used the word [to include conveyance in
a vehicle]. See, e.g., the King James Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 ("[H]is ser-
vants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem"); id., Isaiah 30:6 ("[T]hey
will carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses"). Robinson
Crusoe says "[w]ith my boat, I carry'd away every Thing." D. Defoe,
Robinson Crusoe 174 (J. Crowely ed. 1972). And the owners of Que-
equeg's ship, Melville writes, "had lent him a [wheelbarrow], in
which to carry his heavy chest to his boarding-house." H. Melville,
Moby Dick 43 (U. Chicago 1952). This Court, too, has spoken [in our
written opinions] of the "carrying" of drugs in a car or in its
"trunk."
832
The Court further acknowledged:
These examples do not speak directly about carrying guns. But there
is nothing linguistically special about the fact that weapons, rather
than drugs, are being carried. Robinson Crusoe might have carried a
gun in his boat; Queequeg might have borrowed a wheelbarrow in
which to carry not a chest, but a harpoon. And, to make certain that
there is no special ordinary English restriction (unmentioned in dic-
tionaries) upon the use of "carry" in respect to guns, we have sur-
veyed modem press usage, albeit crudely, by searching computerized
newspaper databases-both the New York Times data base in
Lexis/Nexis, and the "US News" data base in Westlaw. We looked
for sentences in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and "weapon"
(or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of such sen-
tences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps more than
one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at issue here, i.e.,
the carrying of guns in a car.833
829. Id.
830. Id. The Court acknowledged that there were two different meanings of the word "carry"
that might be applicable in this case. Id. at 128. One meaning used the word as to "'carry' firearms in
a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies." Id. The second way the word "carry"
can be used is in a specialized way, for example, "'bearing' or (in slang) 'packing' (as in 'packing a
gun')." Id. The Court declared that the first meaning was the primary meaning of the word "carry"
and concluded that Congress intended for the statute to use that meaning. Id.
831. ld. at 128-29.
832. Id. at 129 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1991); Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991)).
833. Id.
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The Court then turned to ordinary newspaper usage:
The New York Times, for example, writes about "an ex-con" who
"arrives home driving a stolen car and carrying a load of handguns,"
and an "official peace officer who carries a shotgun in his boat[.]"
The Boston Globe refers to the arrest of a professional baseball player
"for carrying a semiloaded automatic weapon in his car." The Colo-
rado Springs Gazette Telegraph speaks of one "Russell" who "carries
a gun hidden in his car." The Arkansas Gazette refers to a "house"
that was "searched" in an effort to find "items that could be carried in
a car, such as ... guns." The San Diego Union-Tribune asks, "What,
do they carry guns aboard these boats now?"
834
The Court conceded that the word 'carry' had several meanings but de-
termined that the uses of the word 'carry' in the aforementioned literary
examples were the primary uses of the word "carry., 835 The Court con-
cluded that "the relevant linguistic facts are that the word 'carry' in its
ordinary sense includes carrying in a car and that the word, used in its
ordinary sense, keeps the same meaning whether one carries a gun, a
suitcase, or a banana.,
836
Another example of a court turning to literature to emphasize or
determine the meaning of a statutory word or phrase is State v. Reed,837
decided by the Oregon Court of Appeals. In this case, the defendant hit
his girlfriend using his fists, the force of which knocked her down onto
the sidewalk.838 The defendant then repeatedly hit her head against the
concrete. 839 The defendant was thereafter indicted for "unlawfully and
knowingly [causing] physical injury to [the victim] by means of a dan-
gerous weapon, to wit: concrete, by banging her head repeatedly against
the concrete., 840 After the trial court found the defendant guilty, the de-
fendant appealed. 841 The defendant argued on appeal that the concrete
sidewalk, a stationary object, could not be considered a "dangerous
weapon.842 The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that the Oregon weap-
ons statute contained a definition of "dangerous weapon" that used lan-
834. Id. at 129-30 (internal citations omitted) (noting that THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF
STYLE AND USAGE restricts "[t]imes journalists and editors to the use of proper English"); see
Foreword to THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF STYLE AND USAGE, A DESK BOOK OF GUIDELINES
FOR WRITERS AND EDITORS (L. Jordan rev. ed., 1976).
835. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 130-31.
836. Id. at 131.
837. 790 P.2d 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).




842. Id. However, the defendant conceded that if he had taken a piece of concrete in his hand
and used that piece of concrete to hit his girlfriend on her head, then the concrete would be
considered a dangerous weapon. Id.
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guage referring to any object which had the capacity to kill or cause seri-
ous bodily injury. 84 3 The court reasoned that "no matter how harmless
[the concrete sidewalk] may appear when used for its customary pur-
poses, [it] becomes a dangerous weapon when used in a manner that ren-
ders it capable of causing serious physical injury."844 In this connection,
the court considered language from Cervantes' famous literary work Don
Quixote-"[w]hether the pitcher hits the stone or the stone hits the
pitcher, it will be bad for the pitcher."845 Based on this reasoning,
namely, that the key issue was whether the object in question had the
capacity to hurt another human being, the court upheld the trial court's
decision.
846
V1. OTHER RULES OF THUMB
Frequently, a court will uphold a statute against a vagueness chal-
lenge based not on the fact that the court can refer to a particular source
to hold that the defendant had adequate notice, but more on the fact that
the statute survives scrutiny when examined under the lens of what may
be described as a judicial rule of thumb. These rules of thumb include
considerations such as whether the statute proscribes an activity which is
malum in se or malum prohibitum,847 whether the statute carries the po-
tential of intruding upon a constitutional right,848 whether the defendant
enjoyed a more circumspect alternative to engaging in conduct that
treaded near the borderline of a criminal law, 849 and whether the statute
somehow punished a person because of the person's status rather than
because of the person's conduct.
850
A. Malum Prohibitum/Malum in Se?
Occasionally, courts will refer to the distinction between "malum in
se" offenses and "malum prohibitum" offenses in assessing whether a
statute is vague.851 A criminal act is considered malum in se where the
underlying conduct is inherently wrong by its very nature, based on
common morality and natural law principles.852 A malum prohibitum
stricture is "an act not inherently immoral but which becomes an offense
843. Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.015(1) (1989), which defines a dangerous weapon as
"any instrument, article or substance which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to
be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury").
844. Id. at 551-52.
845. Id. at 552 (quoting CERVANTES, supra note 612).
846. Id.
847. See infra notes 851-70 and accompanying text.
848. See infra notes 871-92 and accompanying text.
849. See infra notes 892-919 and accompanying text.
850. See infra notes 920-47 and accompanying text.
851. See, e.g., United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 976 (1992).
852. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 270 (1978).
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because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law. '853 This
distinction is useful in the arena of vagueness inquiries in that if a law is
malum in se or, in plain language, a law that proscribes as illegal conduct
any right-minded individual should realize is wrong, the law need not be
as precise in its terms as would be the case where the law is malum pro-
hibitum in nature. A simple illustration might be in order. All must agree
murder is clearly wrong. As such, a murder statute can be cast in rather
general terms: the intentional, knowing, or grossly reckless unjustified
taking of the life of another human being. However, there is nothing in-
trinsically wrong with being in possession of an item that turns out to be
drug paraphernalia, such as a small pipe or syringe that might be useable
to smoke or inject a controlled substance. It is the association with illicit
drug use that causes a legislative body to criminalize the unauthorized
possession of the device. However, inasmuch as there is little, if any,
inherent wrongfulness involved in regards to possessing the device itself,
it is less likely the average citizen realizes possession of such a device is
wrong and, as such, more precision will be required in defining exactly
what devices are allowed and what ones are forbidden.
In United States v. Donahue,854 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit looked to this rule of thumb, which tolerates less
precise definitional language where the underlying conduct is malum in
se.855 Here, a defendant had been convicted of "bank robbery" in viola-
tion of federal law.856 The defendant argued on appeal that the bank rob-
bery statute, which read "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimi-
dation, takes ... from the person or presence of another ... any...
money.., belonging to... any bank [commits this offense]," was vague
because it did not require proof of intent.857 The Eighth Circuit quickly
responded, stating that "[o]ne does not have to be a rocket scientist to
know that bank robbery is a crime; and the statute merely makes malum
prohibitum (and punishable in federal court) that which already is malum
in se.'858 Here, because the underlying conduct was malum in se, the
Eighth Circuit was able to dispose of the defendant's vagueness claim in
a single sentence.
859
853. People v. Wilkinson, 674 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Il. App. Ct. 1996) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979)). Indictments alleging a violation of Illinois "official misconduct"
prohibition, being malum prohibitum, must be cast in precise terms so as to place the accused on
notice before trial as to exactly what conduct amounted to a violation. Id. at 797 (citing People v.
Kleffman, 412 N.E.2d 1057, 1061 (111. App. Ct. 1980)).
854. 948 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1991).
855. Donahue, 948 F.2d at 441.
856. Id. at 440 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1988)).
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Meanwhile, People v. Heller,860 a New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion, illustrates the greater degree of clarity a reviewing court demands
when it encounters a vagueness claim lodged against a malum prohibi-
turn measure. In that case, the defendants were convicted of violating
New York's "obscenity" law. 86' The New York law defined "obscene" as
any "material or performance" which (1) "considered as a whole, its pre-
dominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, excretion, sadism or masochism," (2) "goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in describing or presenting such matters," and
(3) lacks "redeeming social value. 86 2 The defendants claimed a motion
picture, Blue Movie, and a magazine, Screw, were not obscene as the
State had alleged and, in any event, that the New York obscenity law was
vague. 863 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed.864 The court stated
that the obscenity statute "sufficiently describes the conduct sought to be
prohibited., 86' The court added:
It takes no dictionary reference to understand what the words 'nu-
dity', 'sex', 'excretion', 'sadism' or 'masochism' mean. The last three
terms, which are descriptive of certain kinds of conduct whether por-
trayed live, printed or photographically, can be considered Malum in
se in terms of Commercial exploitation. It is ludicrous and preposter-
ous to suppose that a person dealing in such material would not un-
derstand the prohibitions here. The terms 'nudity' and 'sex' are only
Malum prohibitum, of course, since each, to varying extents, could be
commercially exploited for valid artistic, scientific, or literary ends.
But surely, applying the sense of [the obscenity statute] as a whole,
there can be no doubt as to the narrow area sought to be prohibited.
When sex and nudity, and other sorts of prohibited conduct for that
matter, are exploited substantially beyond customary limits of candor
and would, as the average man views it, be the predominant element
in the material so as to appeal, again predominantly, to lascivious
cravings, then there can be no doubt as to what is prohibited. What
we are talking about is hard-core pornography.
866
Obviously, the fact that the legislature not only carefully defined "ob-
scenity" consistent with language previously endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court8 67 but also defined other terms including "mate-
rial" and "performance 868 removed the statute from the reach of the
860. 307 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 944 (1974).
861. Heller, 307 N.E.2d at 807-08 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.00, 235.05 (McKinney
1967)).
862. Id. at 811 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1967)).
863. Id. at 807, 812-13.
864. Id. at 812-13, 815.
865. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
866. Id. at 812-13 (emphasis added).
867. Id. at 808-11 (discussing at length Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
868. Id. at 811 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(2)-(3) (McKinney 1967)).
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void-for-vagueness doctrine.869 The court concluded that "our obscenity
statute is sufficiently specific" to withstand constitutional challenge.87°
Donahue and Heller offer additional instruction on analyzing a
vagueness claim. Thus, rule of thumb number one: if a penal measure is
in the nature of malum in se, courts tend to tolerate more general lan-
guage than in the case where the law is of the malum prohibitum cate-
gory, where more detailed, narrow language is likely to be expected.
B. Constitutional Rights Involved?
Although this point was made, or alluded to, in several earlier sec-
tions, there is no question but that courts are more demanding of speci-
ficity of language in connection with laws that may touch on constitu-
tional rights compared with statutes that carry no such possibility.871 In-
deed, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[P]erhaps the most
important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a
law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free
speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should ap-
ply. 872 Additionally, the Court has noted that "precision must be the
touchstone of legislation.., affecting basic freedoms. 873
In Cox v. Louisiana,874 the United States Supreme Court considered
charges brought against a defendant who had led a group of students who
wanted to protest segregation, discrimination, and the arrests of fellow
students. This group had assembled at the Louisiana State Capitol and
869. Id. at 814.
870. Id. (emphasis added).
871. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979) (Insistence on "fair notice" and
avoidance of "arbitrary and erratic" enforcement "appears to be especially true where the uncertainty
induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Here,
certain provisions restricting availability of abortions found to be vague. (citations omitted)); Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state
court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [void-
for-vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts." Here, flag
misuse statute vague.); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) ("Standards of permissible
statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression." Here, state proscription against advising
prospective litigants to seek assistance of particular attorneys violates First Amendment.); see also
Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 75 (1960) (noting "the doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the
Supreme Court almost invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at
the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms").
872. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982)
(citing as examples Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy statute
violates due process); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance
challenged on First Amendment grounds not vague although the claim of unconstitutionality
"question is [a] close" one)).
873. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964) (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
874. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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marched to a courthouse where "they sang, prayed and listened" to the
defendant's speech. 875 For his efforts, the defendant was arrested on sev-
eral charges including "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public
,,876passages.' 6 Following his conviction, the United States Supreme Court
found both charges were contrary to the defendant's First Amendment
rights of free speech and assembly.877 When the Court addressed the
"disturbing the peace" charge, it not only saw First Amendment prob-
lems but also vague legislation.878 The Court noted this offense contained
two elements: "(1) congregating with others 'with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the
peace may be occasioned,' and (2) a refusal to move on after having been
ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer."879 Acknowledging that
the second element was "narrow and specific," the Court pointed out that
the Louisiana Supreme Court had interpreted the "breach of the peace"
language as meaning "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to mo-
lest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet.' 880 This statute, said the Court,
"as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is uncon-
stitutionally vague in its overly broad scope., 88' The Court explained:
Maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion is a basic
tenet of our constitutional democracy. "A statute which upon its face,
and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to per-
mit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to
the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment."
882
Thus, the fact that someone might be disturbed or "agitated" by the de-
fendant's unpopular speech was clearly not a sufficient warrant for impo-
sition of the bite of the criminal law.883
Crimes which carry no potential for restriction of basic freedoms are
less likely to encounter vagueness problems due to lack of narrow and
specific language. 884 United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.885 is
875. Cox, 379 U.S. at 536.
876. Id. at 544-45, 553 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103.1 (West 1962) (disturbing the
peace); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:100.1 (West 1962) (obstructing public passages)).
877. Id. at 552, 558,
878. Id. at 551.
879. Id.
880. Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 156 So. 2d 448, 455 (1963)).
881. Id.
882. Id. at 552 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
883. Id. at 551-52.
884. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495-96 (municipal drug paraphernalia
ordinance "does not restrict speech as such, but simply regulates the commercial marketing of items
that the labels reveal may be used for an illicit purpose. The scope of the ordinance therefore does
not embrace commercial speech"); see also Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 221, 258 n.177 (1996) (The "due process vagueness doctrine is relatively
forgiving when no First Amendment rights are at stake.").
885. 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
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an example of this point. The defendants were charged with violating a
provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, which made it a crime to sell
goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competi-
tion or eliminating a competitor. ' 886 The defendants claimed that the
language "unreasonably low prices" was unconstitutionally vague.887 The
federal district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on this
ground, but the United States Supreme Court saw otherwise.888 The
Court began its analysis with the familiar refrain that a "strong presump-
tive validity ... attaches to an Act of Congress." 889 Here, the law merely
restricted "sales made below cost without [a] legitimate commercial ob-
jective and with specific intent to destroy competition." 89 The Court
added:
In this connection we also note that the approach to "vagueness" gov-
erning a case like this is different from that followed in cases arising
under the First Amendment. There we are concerned with the vague-
ness of the statute "on its face" because such vagueness may in itself
deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. No
such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at con-
duct designed to destroy competition, activity which is neither consti-
tutionally protected nor socially desirable.
89t
Thus, the vagueness claim failed.892
The cases in this section illustrate rule of thumb number two: where
an offense carries the possibility of inhibiting constitutional freedoms,
precision in language is the watchword; where the stricture in question
has no such potential, more general language is tolerated.
C. Circumspect Alternative Available to the Defendant?
Aside from caselaw where precision of language is a must because
of the possibility that the statute may be stepping on basic constitutional
rights, there appear questions in judicial opinions which essentially ask
whether there existed a more circumspect alternative available to the
defendant beyond engaging in questionable conduct which formed the
basis for the criminal prosecution. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent in Win-
893ters v. New York, insisted, "it is not violative of due process of law for
a legislature in framing its criminal law to cast upon the public the duty
886. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 29 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13a (1958)).
887. Id. at 31.
888. Id. at 30.
889. Id. at 32.
890. Id. at 37.
891. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
892. id.
893. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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of care and even of caution, provided that there is sufficient warning to
one bent on obedience that he comes near the proscribed area.
8 94
In Nash v. United States, 95 the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed two convictions arising out of violations of the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act, namely, conspiracy in restraint of trade and conspiracy to
monopolize trade.896 Defendants were involved in marketing turpentine
in a manner allegedly designed to destroy competition. 897 The antitrust
law had been previously interpreted as prohibiting "only such contracts
and combinations .... by reason of intent or the inherent nature of the
contemplated acts, [that] prejudice the public interests by unduly restrict-
ing competition or unduly obstructingthe course of trade.",898 The defen-
dants argued "that the crime thus defined by the statute contains in its
definition an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with
the result that a man might find himself in prison because his honest
judgment"899 was deemed wrong "by a jury of less competent men.'9°°
However, the Court disagreed.9°' Justice Holmes, writing for the major-
ity, in his oft-quoted passage, said, "[T]he law is full of instances where a
man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subse-
quently estimates it, some matter of degree." 902 He then declared, 'The
criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would,
under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct."903
In other words, Justice Holmes was insisting that where defendants were
engaging in a variety of tactics to manipulate and control the marketing
of this product, perhaps consideration should have been given to pro-
ceeding a bit more cautiously by perhaps making inquiry of the official-
dom to assess the propriety of their business schemes, rather than push
their behavior to the edge of what the law permits thereby risking falling
off the edge into the realm of criminal prosecution.9°4
In Boyce v. United States, °5 the defendant was charged with violat-
ing Interstate Commerce Commission regulations that required "[d]rivers
of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, in-
flammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas [to] avoid, so far as practi-
cable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or
894. Winters, 333 U.S. at 539 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
895. 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
896. Nash, 229 U.S. at 374 (citing "act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 Stat at L. 209, U.S.
Comp Stat. 1901, p. 3200").
897. Id, at 375-76.
898. Id. at 376 (citing United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911)).
899. Id.
900. Id.
901. Id. at 377-80.
902. Id. at 377.
903. Id. (emphasis added).
904. Id. at 377-80.
905. 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
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through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled,
street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings."906 The de-
fendant successfully moved in the federal district court to dismiss the
indictments after arguing the "so far as practicable and where feasible"
terminology was unconstitutionally vague.907 However, the United States
Court of Appeals reversed the order to dismiss and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate ruling.90 8 The Court noted:
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the
required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide
the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged
with its violation. But few words possess the precision of mathemati-
cal symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen
variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of dis-
charging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity
with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it
unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an
area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line.
909
Thus, the Boyce Court followed the teachings of Justice Holmes and
ruled that the defendant's void-for-vagueness claim had no basis.
Finally, in Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum,9 10 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denoted similar reasoning in
a civil RICO case.911 Here, oil and gas lessees brought an action against
oil drillers alleging that the drillers had engaged in "claim-jumping
schemes," which amounted to federal wire fraud, mail fraud, and Travel
Act violations.91 2 The plaintiffs' civil RICO claims were predicated on
these alleged federal criminal violations that were said to constitute a
"pattern of racketeering activity" violative of RICO. 913 However, the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the theory that what con-
stitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity" under federal RICO was
vague.914 The Sixth Circuit saw the matter differently; pointing out that
simply focusing on the language at issue without looking at "the rest of
the statute" was inappropriate.915 The court noted that federal RICO ex-
plicitly states that a "pattern" arises where a defendant has engaged in
906. Boyce, 342 U.S. at 338-39 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1946)).
907. Id. at 340.
908. Id.
909. Id. (emphasis added).
910. 58 F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 1995).
911. Columbia Natural Res., 58 F.3d at 1101.
912. Id. at 1103.
913. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994)).
914. Id. at 1104.
915. Id. at 1106.
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two predicate offenses within the last 10 years and that the offenses that
would qualify as predicate offenses were specified within the RICO stat-
ute.916 The court, in rather stinging remarks, proceeded to dismantle the
defendants' claim of vagueness.
9 17
[T]here is a clear standard of conduct initially proscribed by the pat-
tern requirement of RICO. Here the statute clearly has a core; to
avoid any possibility of falling under RICO's admittedly broad um-
brella, one need only avoid committing an enumerated crime twice
within ten years. If one can take the time to avoid committing mail or
wire fraud, or extortion, or murder, or any of the other enumerated
predicate offenses, all of which are federal or state criminal offenses
in their own right, than one can sleep safe in the knowledge that he
will not be found to have violated RICO.
The issue, bluntly and simply framed, is whether a person of or-
dinary intelligence would know that committing dozens if not hun-
dreds of acts of wire and mail fraud, over the course of almost a dec-
ade against the same victim, might constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity. Since, by its terms it only takes a minimum of two acts, it is
simply implausible for a party to claim that it was not aware that
committing numerous predicate acts would expose it to potential
RICO liability. The statute need not be exact just as price discrimina-
tion statutes and antitrust statutes are not exact. The statute must sim-
ply put the party on notice that it is entering a potentially forbidden
918
zone.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit in effect said the defendants' assertion, that they
were essentially clueless about what might constitute "a pattern of rack-
eteering activity" was preposterous. They had not inadvertently slipped
over the edge; rather, they had deliberately crossed it on numerous occa-
sions.
Hence, rule of thumb number three: if a person is determined to
walk the edge of the divide between criminal behavior and legitimate
activity, it is fair to ask as to whether this individual's decision to place
himself precariously close to the edge makes him a deserving candidate
for the bite of the criminal law. Such a person's claim of lack of notice
may be countered by a judicial response that questions that person's
judgment in choosing to put himself at the edge in the first instance.
916. Id. at 1106-08.
917. Id. at 1108-09.
918. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Status Criminality?
Criminal statutes that punish a person because of the personal
condition9 19 or status920 of an individual rather than for one's conduct 92'
are patently unconstitutional. In the seminal case addressing status
criminality, Robinson v. California,92 2 the United States Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional a California statute which punished "being
addicted" to narcotics. 923 The Court ruled that punishing a person for
being an addict was akin to punishing "a person for being mentally ill,
suffering leprosy or being afflicted with venereal disease"-matters over
which an individual has little or no control.924
925 2In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, discussed earlier,926 a statute was ruled
unconstitutionally vague contrary to due process in circumstances where
the stricture in question could be described as essentially penalizing little
more than one's status. 927 In this pre-Robinson ruling, the United States
Supreme Court examined a state law that made it an offense to be a
"gangster. ' '92s Specifically, the statute provided that a person "not en-
gaged in any lawful occupation" who was "known to be a member of a
gang" and had either been convicted of (1) being a disorderly person
three or more times, or (2) any crime anywhere in the United States, "is
declared to be a gangster."929 In its ruling, the Court found the meaning
of the words "gang" and "gangster" to be vague.930 In that connection,
the Court observed that "[t]he challenged provision condemns no act or
omission. ' 931 Obviously, then, this measure's criminalization, at least in
part, of a person's status contributed to the Court's finding that the stat-
ute was void for vagueness.
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
932 also discussed earlier,933
the United States Supreme Court's ruling finding a municipal "vagrancy"
919. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661 n.1, 666 (1962) (ruling that a statute prohibiting
being addicted to narcotics constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment).
920. Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp 529, 530, 533 (N.D. IIl. 1975) (holding an ordinance
prohibiting "known prostitute's" from loitering unconstitutional).
921. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-37 (1968) (distinguishing Robinson, 370 U.S. 660,
in a case where chronic alcoholic convicted of public drunkenness, a matter involving individual
behavior and not merely punishing status).
922. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660.
923. Id. at 661 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1955)).
924. Id. at 666.
925. 306U.S. 451 (1939).
926. See supra notes 550-59 and accompanying text.
927. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458.
928. Id. at 452.
929. Id. (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:136-5 (1937)).
930. Id. at 456-58.
931. Id. at 458.
932. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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ordinance unconstitutionally vague likewise reflected status criminality
overtones.934 The statute in question explicitly stated that the likes of
"rogues and vagabonds,". "common gamblers," "common drunkards,"
"habitual loafers," and those "habitually living upon the earnings of their
wives or minor children" were to be "deemed vagrants." 935 In the opinion
of the Court, "[t]hose generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the
ordinance -- poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers -- may be
required to comport themselves according to the life style deemed appro-
priate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. 9 36 This, said the Court,
was constitutionally intolerable.
937
In a case involving a Chicago municipal ordinance, Farber v.
938Rochford, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois offered a clear illustration of how due process protections con-
tained in the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to successfully attack
the constitutionality of a stricture that made it unlawful for a person who
was "known to be a narcotics addict" or "known to be a prostitute" or
previously convicted of prostitution to, among other things, either "con-
gregate" with others of the same class in a public place or "loaf or loiter"
in or about premises where alcoholic beverages were sold.939 The court
struck down the statute as being unconstitutional in the face of due proc-
ess considerations on the theory that a person's "reputation" was the ba-
sis for being subjected to criminal prosecution, rather than the person's
acts.94 Specifically, the court stated this statute "and other ordinances of
its ilk ... suffer from the basic infirmity that they look towards the status
of the suspect rather than his conduct as the determinative factor of
guilt." 941 In response to the municipality's claim that the statute was ac-
tually directed at the act of "congregating" or "loitering by these per-
sons," the court said, "There is no actus reus at all required by the ordi-
nance, only [innocent] conduct which, while occasionally an 'adjunct' to
illicit behavior, is of itself perfectly defensible. 942 Additionally, that
portion of the ordinance that outlawed known narcotics addicts or known
prostitutes from congregating was found to be contrary to the constitu-
tional right to assemble.943 As such, the ordinance was considered uncon-
stitutional on its face.944
933. See supra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
934. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
935. Id. at 157 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57)).
936. Id. at 170.
937. Id. at 171.
938. 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. 111. 1975).
939. Farber, 407 F. Supp. at 530 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 192-6).
940. Id. at 532.
941. Id. at 533.
942. Id.
943. Id. at 534.
944. Id. at 535.
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Another Chicago municipal ordinance was found to unconstitution-
ally focus on the status of the party. City of Chicago v. Youkhana,945 de-
cided by the Illinois Appellate Court, involved the previously discussed
Chicago ordinance that prohibited street gang members from loitering in
a public place.946 The appellate court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tional because, among other reasons, it punished a person due to his or
her status as a member of a gang, instead of for the action of illegal loi-
tering.947 The Illinois Supreme Court, in the consolidated decision of City
of Chicago v. Morales, agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional
although it did not reach the status issue.949 Likewise, the United States
Supreme Court found the loitering stricture-"to remain in one place
with no apparent purpose"-to be unconstitutionally vague without ad-
dressing the status claim.95°
In any event, the cases in this section reflect rule of thumb number
four: where a measure is challenged on vagueness grounds, if it is largely
directed at a person's status rather than the person's conduct, that may
well tilt the balance in favor of a void for vagueness finding.
CONCLUSION
In this time in American history when the focal point of discussion
is accounting and criminal law-Enron, Arthur Andersen Accounting,
WorldCom, and even the FBI and CIA in regards to their overlooking
evidence of the impending "9/11 "-I thought I would bring this review
of vagueness, ambiguity, and other uncertainty in American criminal law
to a conclusion by momentarily examining the word accounting. My
rather dated American Heritage Dictionary defines "accounting" as
"[tihe bookkeeping methods involved in making a financial record of
business transactions and in the preparation of statements concerning the
assets, liabilities, and operating results of a business" and "account" as,
among other things, "a precise list or enumeration of monetary transac-
tions. 951 Interestingly, we now find an "accounting," (the noun) or "ac-
counting" (the verb) means many things to many people. In my brief
undergraduate excursion into the study of accounting, I was left with the
notion that accounting connoted something on the order of mathematical
certainty. Now my reading of the newspapers (as well as the vacillating
945. 660 N.E.2d 34 (I11. App. Ct.), affd sub nom., City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53
(I1. 1995), afjd, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
946. See supra notes 134-159 and accompanying text.
947. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 42.
948. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 53 (I11. 995).
949. Id. at 59.
950. Morales, 527 U.S. at 65.
951. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (M. Morris, ed.,
New College ed. 1981).
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worth of my stock portfolio) suggests an accounting is whatever the ac-
countant says it is.
So too, with words and phrases in American criminal law. They
mean whatever the courts say they mean.952 Sometimes the statutory lan-
guage is seen as precise and clear and, at other times, the words being
examined are said to be vague, ambiguous, or uncertain. My effort in all
of this is to remind those studying this subject that there are never totally
clear statutory definitions-hardly any great revelation-but that these
are a smorgasbord of general principles and guidelines, interpretative
sources, and rules of thumb that appear in the caselaw from which courts
can pick and choose to uphold or strike down criminal law legislation as
they see fit.
Judicial review of criminal law is not an exact science and it never
will be. Oftentimes the debates over the meaning of the criminal law may
be contentious and, yes, sometimes the judicial outcomes unpredictable.
But these exercises, in the end, demonstrate that resolutions of these mat-
ters, however imperfect, in American society can and do occur. In an
uncertain world where resolution is often sought by terrorist bombings,
military invasions, and brutish force, thankfully we arrive at resolution of
the meaning of our law peaceably in a court of law.
952. Almost fifteen years ago, Professor Francis Allen pointed out the demise of true adherence
of the principle of legality. See generally Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American
Criminal Justice: Some Latter Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARiZ. L. REV. 385
(1987). He attributed this to "fear of, and outrage over, [rising] crime rates;" id. at 400, the
assignment of the criminal law to "more difficult and complex functions," such as "organized
crime," "white-collar" crime and economic regulation; id. at 402, and a misguided legislative
movement to legislate morality, id. at 406, 410-11. Recent events, within this country and outside,
can only exacerbate the situation.
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DAVID G. OWEN'
INTRODUCTION
Products liability litigation, involving the inner workings of science
and technology, often resolves into a "battle of the experts."' Proof of
defectiveness and causation often requires engineers, toxicologists, epi-
demiologists, and other technical experts to explain the relevant science
and engineering of product safety and accidents to a lay jury and the
court.2 Understanding the various aspects of the design, manufacture, and
labeling of products normally involves a host of complex, technical con-
siderations requiring specialized expertise. Thus, mechanical, chemical,
and materials engineers, chemists, physicists, pharmacologists, epidemi-
ologists, and other technical specialists are often necessary to provide the
fact finder with a comprehensive understanding of the manufacturing of
a product, how it operates, whether and how it may have malfunctioned
or otherwise caused an accident, and how a different design could have
avoided similar accidents.
As products liability law spread its tentacles over the nation during
the last third of the twentieth century, the expert witness business was
born, grew up, and flourished. Tormented by a mounting plague of sup-
posed "experts" testifying to "junk science" in courtrooms across the
nation, manufacturers increasingly complained about the unfairness and
illogic of basing outcomes in major products liability litigation on such
f Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A later version of
this article will appear as part of a chapter in DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
(forthcoming 2004). Thanks to Nikki Lee for research assistance. To shield him from the rigors of a
Daubert challenge, I did not seek advice from Dr. Hubbard. Copyright © 2002 David G. Owen &
Westgroup.
1. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ruling
that conflicting expert conclusions result in a "classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury
must decide the victor"); Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1971) ("It all
boils down to a battle of experts."). This simple fact of products liability litigation has long been
true. See generally DAVID PECK, DECISION AT LAW 40-64 (1961) (detailing expert testimony on
nature of break, of hickory grain of spoke, and of tests and inspections of broken automobile wheel
involved in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Il1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
2. See, e.g., Bruno v. Toyotomi U.S.A., Inc., 203 F.R.D. 77, 80 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to produce qualified and reliable expert
testimony on defectiveness and causation); Mozes v. Medtronic, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128 (D.
Minn. 1998) (granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to produce qualified
and reliable expert testimony on defectiveness and causation); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills
Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1981) ("Ordinarily, expert testimony is required" in cases
based on strict products liability in tort.).
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slender, defective reeds. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court joined
issue with the problem in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
3
A decade now has passed, and it is time for a review of the use and abuse
of expert testimony in products liability litigation.
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimony has special significance in products liability litiga-
tion for several reasons. Most fundamentally, judges and juries in most
products liability cases use this testimony as the primary tool in deciding
whether a particular product was defective and whether that defect
caused the plaintiffs injury. Some products, and the causes of some
product failures, are quite simple to understand, such as the explosion of
a thermos bottle4 or the presence of a cockroach in a sandwich.5 In such
cases, expert testimony is unnecessary for there is little "beyond the ken"
of the judge or jury.6 But the mechanisms of most product failures are
more complex. In such cases, judges and juries generally are dependent
on the information and opinions provided by scientific and technical spe-
cialists on the complex issues that typically lie at the heart of a products
liability case. In this respect, judges and juries, who impliedly are inca-
pable of understanding the technical aspects of such a case, are at the
mercy of the experts. In addition, the law of evidence gives experts espe-
cially wide latitude to offer opinions not available to ordinary witnesses.7
For these reasons, expert testimony can be particularly powerful guid-
ance, and it has a particular power to mislead.8 While the rules governing
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. See Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Service Corp., 484 A.2d 652, 656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(implosion).
5. See Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In Rest., Inc., 736 So. 936, 938 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (chili
dog).
6. Virgil, 484 A.2d at 656 ("The general rule is well established that expert testimony is only
required when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science or profession
that it is beyond the ken of the average layman."); see Faryniarz v. Nike, Inc., No. 00 Civ.
2623(NRB), 2002 WL 530997, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2002) (finding that expert testimony was
unnecessary for jury to find running shoes were defectively designed because of excessively long
laces that could get caught on pull-tab).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702, 703, 705 and similar state evidentiary rules. See generally
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) ("Federal Rules of Evidence, not
Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.").
8. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("Judge Weinstein has explained: 'Expert evidence can be
both powerful and misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it."' (citation omitted)); Bert
Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge,
72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 789 (1994) ("[M]ost commentators believe ostensibly scientific testimony may
sway a jury even when as science it is palpably wrong. Science can be greatly distorted by the
pressures of litigation, but once it is admitted into evidence, it has an imprimatur of legitimacy and
validity, and cross-examination often will not expose its flaws."); see also Adina Schwartz, A
"Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to
Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 196-98
(1997).
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the admissibility of expert testimony on science and technology are
treated extensively elsewhere,9 the topic is so centrally important to
products liability litigation that it deserves special treatment in this con-
text.
Expert testimony is often necessary to establish defectiveness in
manufacture, design, and warnings and instructions. As mentioned ear-
lier, juries normally need the guidance of expert testimony to understand
the technical aspects of both defectiveness and causation. Without such
testimony, juries would be left to surmise, conjecture, and speculation on
these central elements of every case and cause. Thus, a products liability
9. See generally D. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW-STANDARDS, STATISTICS &
RESEARCH ISSUES (2002) (giving an in-depth coverage of admissibility, nature of expertise, ethical
issues, scientific method, statistical proof, survey research, epidemiology, and toxicology); Louis
FRUMER & MELVIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.06 (2001); MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 27:8 to :9 (3d ed. 2000); CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON
EVIDENCE §§ 13-19. (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("General scientific acceptance is a proper
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence."); REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994);
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE ch. 702 (2d ed. 2002). There are hundreds of law review and
practice articles on the topic. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Substance & Form in Scientific Evidence:
What Daubert Didn't Do, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 234, 242-46 (Larry Kramer
ed., 1996); Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539
(1996); Sarah Brew, Where the Rubber Hits the Road: Steering the Trial Court Through a Post-
Kumho Tire Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 467 (2000); Daniel J.
Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699 (1998); Marjan Damaska, Truth In Adjudication, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 289 (1997); David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and
Ruminations on the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
661 (2000); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1996); Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament:
Determining "Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000); Michael Green, Expert
Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange
and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 643, 661 (1992); Sara K. Ledford, The Implications of
Kumho Tire: Applying Daubert Analysis to Warning Label Testimony in Products Liability Cases,
76 IND. L.J. 465 (2001) (discussing the difficulties in attempting to apply Daubert criteria to warning
label testimony); Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1314 (1999); Xavier Pena, The Effective Evaluation of Expert Reliability, 20 REV.
LITIG. 743 (2001); Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS 229 (2000); Schwartz, supra note 8; Richard T. Stilwell, Kumho Tire:
The Battle of the Experts Continues, 19 REV. LITIG, 193 (2000); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000)
(examining causation study by National Science Panel); see also Brett B. Baber, The Necessity for
Expert Testimony to Sustain the Plaintiff's Burden of Proof in Negligence and Strict Liability
Actions, 15 ME. B.J. 174 (2000); Patricia A. Krebs & Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 34 TORT & INS. L.
J. 989 (1999); D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What Hath Daubert-Joiner-Kumho
Wrought?, 29 PROD. SAF. & LIAB. REP. 329 (2001); Charles D. Weller, The Litigator's Guide to the
Daubert Quartet: The Use of Experts After Daubert, 1 EXPERT EVID. REP. 62 (2001); Larry E.
Coben, The Daubert Decision: Gatekeeper or Executioner?, TRIAL, Aug. 1996, at 52. The BNA
Expert Evidence Report reports recent cases.
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case usually will fail without proof of defect and cause by expert testi-
mony.'
0
Manufacturing defects are sometimes so self-evident that expert
proof may not be required, but expert testimony ordinarily will be neces-
sary to establish that an accident product deviated from the manufac-
turer's design specifications." And while reliance on the malfunction
doctrine can sometimes assist a plaintiff when the precise cause of a
product failure cannot be shown,12 expert proof is often necessary, even
under this theory of recovery, to rule out other possible causes of the
accident. 13
Simple warnings issues sometimes are entirely comprehensible by a
jury and thus may not necessitate expert testimony.1 4 But the science of
how to communicate danger and safety information most effectively is
evolving in sophistication such that expert testimony on warnings and
instructions is often helpful, and sometimes mandatory, as in many cases
involving the labeling of dangerous machinery,
5 pharmaceutical drugs, 16
and in other specialized labeling situations.1
7
10. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Weber-Stephen Prod. Co., 2002 WL 1370671, at *2 (4th Cir. 2002)
(applying Md. law and granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to provide
expert testimony on why gas grill exploded; without such testimony "[a] jury could only infer the
presence of a defect in the grill by engaging in 'surmise, conjecture, or speculation' (quoting Jensen
v. Am. Motors Corp. 437 A.2d 242, 245 (Md. 1981))); Hochen v. Bobst Group, Inc., 290 F.3d 446,
450-51 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying Mass. law and affirming summary judgment against plaintiff who
failed to designate expert under FED.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) in complex case involving allegedly defective
design and manufacture of printing press); Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 100 F.
Supp. 2d 489, 492-93 (W.D. Mich. 2000) ("Without expert evidence comparing a striker plate with a
flat-ending to one with a rolling-ball ending, Mr. Moisenko cannot meet the risk-utility test, and thus
cannot establish a design defect .... As to the manufacturing defect claim, it is well-settled that such
a claim cannot be proven without expert testimony." Defendant's motion for summary judgment was
granted.); Lessard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 737 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ("The court
properly granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, given the inability of plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of design defect in the absence of expert testimony."); Brooks v. Colonial
Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Ala. 1991) ("Because of the complex and technical
nature of the product and in order to present evidence from which a lay jury may reasonably infer
that a defective condition of the product was the cause of the product's failure and the cause of the
resultant injury to the plaintiff, expert testimony is usually essential and, therefore, usually
required."); see also MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 27.9 (discussing Weisgram v. Marley Co.,
528 U.S. 440 (2000)).
11. See MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 7.11.
12. Seeid. §7.12.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting issue).
15. For a description of a sophisticated system, see PRODUCT SAFETY SIGN AND LABEL
SYSTEM (1993).
16. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Am. Pharmaceutical Assoc. ed., 13th
ed. 2002); PATIENT INFORMATION IN MEDICINE (Ronald Mann ed., 1991).
17. See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 9; Ledford, supra note 9, at 465
(applying Daubert to warning-label testimony).
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Most jurisdictions define design defectiveness in terms of risk-
utility analysis, an analytical approach that requires an evaluation of the
feasibility, costs, and benefits of altering a design to avoid an injury.'
8
Such claims almost always require expert proof, sometimes on the
mechanisms of how the accident occurred and almost always on how the
accident feasibly could have been designed away.' 9 However, if design
defectiveness is defined purely in consumer expectation terms, 20 the ap-
propriateness of expert testimony may depend upon the type of product
whose design is under scrutiny. A jury might well need expert guidance
on the safety expectations of users of industrial, professional, or other
products designed for use by specialists in a field. But consumer goods,
particularly simple ones, are another matter. It is difficult to see how the
opinion of a technical or other expert on ordinary consumer expectations
about the safety of a simple consumer product could assist a jury, which
would seem to preclude expert testimony on defectiveness in such
cases. 2' Even design cases may be simple, however, in which case expert
22testimony is unnecessary.
Regardless of the type of defect, expert testimony often is necessary
to prove causation, the link that connects the product defect to the plain-
tiffs harm.23 Causation is most typically in issue in toxic substance
cases, where expert testimony on causation (and defectiveness) almost
invariably is necessary. 24 Even in cases involving durable goods, where
proofs of defectiveness and causation are often linked together closely,
expert testimony on how the defect caused the harm is usually necessary
to the plaintiff's case.25
18. See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 8.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Expert witnesses normally cannot assist the jury in determining consumer expectations.
See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) ("[W]here the minimum safety
of a product is within the common knowledge of lay jurors, expert witnesses may not be used to
demonstrate what an ordinary consumer would or should expect. Use of expert testimony for that
purpose would invade the jury's function .... "); Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233
(Cal. 1982) ("[O]ne can hardly imagine what credentials a witness must possess before he can be
certified as an expert on the issue of ordinary consumer expectations." (quoting G. Schwartz,
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435,480 (1979))).
22. See Faryniarz, 2002 WL 530997, at *2.
23. See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 12.
24. See, e.g., Rutigliano v. Valley Business Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996)
(granting summary judgment claim of "formaldehyde sensitization" from exposure to chemical in
carbonless carbon paper); see generally David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and Into the Fire:
The Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117, 119-23 (1990) (examining
expert witness problems in toxic substance cases). Causation in toxic substance litigation is treated
generally in MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 12.5.
25. See, e.g., Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(regarding a fire allegedly caused by toaster oven).
2002]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
To give but a few examples, judges and juries surely will need ex-
pert tutelage on defectiveness if the issue in dispute is whether the speed
control mechanism for a paver should have been in the form of a lever
rather than a rotary dial;26 whether a sport utility vehicle should have
been equipped with a barrier between the front seats and cargo area, to-
gether with a warning, to make it safe for occupants in the rear;
27
whether and how the steering gearbox in a vehicle may have been im-
properly assembled or designed;2 8 whether the operator compartment on
a forklift should have been equipped with a door
29 or wire mesh;30
whether cigarettes could have been made safer; 31 or whether a hay baler
should have had a guard.32 Similarly, on causation, the fact finder will
almost certainly need expert testimony if the parties disagree on whether
a causal link exists between a plaintiff s ingestion of Viagra and his heart
attack;33 an allegedly defective product and a house fire that starts
nearby; 34 the absence of a kill switch on an outboard motor and injuries
to the plaintiff's hand;35 an anti-depressant drug taken by a teenager and
his suicide; 36 a spinal rod implanted in the plaintiff's back to eliminate a
painful condition and his quite similar post-operative pain; 37 or exposure
to various chemical substances and many illnesses and diseases.38 In
short, experts are crucial to both the prosecution and defense of a prod-
ucts liability case.
26. See Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 2001).
27. See Bowersfield v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 151 F. Supp. 2d 625,630 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
28. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2000).
29. See, e.g., Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 865 (7th Cir. 2001); Berry v.
Crown Equip. Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
30. See Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2000).
31. See LaBelle v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 2-98-3235-23 (D.S.C. July 5, 2001), available at
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/DOCS/Pmd/LABELLE.pdf 11-13.
32. See Masters v. Hesston Corp., No. 99-C50279, 2001 WL 567736, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23,
2001).
33. See Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 596, 601 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
34. See, e.g., Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 440 (heater); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 569 (6th
Cir. 2000) (cigarette lighter); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 150 F. Supp. 2d 360,
362 (D. Conn. 2001) (clothes dryers); Booth, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (fire allegedly caused by toaster
oven); Pappas v. Sony Elec., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 413, 415 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (television).
35. See Brooks v. Outboard Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89,92 (2d Cir. 2000).
36. See Miller v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1118 (D. Kan. 2002) (discussing Zoloft
and excluding the testimony of plaintiffs expert, a psychologist and psychopharmacologist, on
specific and general causation).
37. See Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314 (N.D. Okla. 2000).
38. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (determining
whether inhaling talcum powder lubricant on gaskets aggravated sinus condition); Heller v..Shaw
Indus., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (determining whether carpet caused respiratory illnesses); Mattis
v. Carlon Elec. Prod., 114 F. Supp. 2d 888, 890 (D.S.D. 2000) (determining whether vapors from
PVC cement caused reactive airways dysfunction syndrome).
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11. QUALIFICATIONS AND SOURCES OF EXPERT WITNESSES
To serve as an expert witness, an individual must first be quali-
fied-"by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"39-to
offer opinions on the particular specialized matter before the court.40 The
bulk of experienced and otherwise qualified specialists in most fields of
product design, manufacturing, and labeling are employed by private
industry-by the very manufacturing enterprises who constitute the de-
fendants in products liability litigation. Thus, because such persons are
already in its employ, a manufacturer usually has little difficulty finding
appropriate engineering and other experts to help defend a products li-
ability case. Indeed, such experts may include the very persons who de-
signed the accident product, advised on appropriate warnings, and de-
signed and supervised the assembly process. Plaintiffs' lawyers, on the
other hand, generally are limited to two principal resource pools for ex-
pert witness talent: universities and private consulting expert firms.41
I1. THE RISE OF THE "PROFESSIONAL" EXPERT WITNESS AND
THE PROBLEM OF "JUNK SCIENCE"
As products liability litigation began to mushroom in the late 1960s
and the 1970s, so too did the plaintiff s need for experts to battle a manu-
facturer's engineers and other experts over issues of product defective-
ness and causation-in expert reports, depositions, and ultimately at trial.
Straining the pool of then-existing technical talent, a surge in demand for
expert testimony in the 1970s and 1980s spawned a whole new industry
of "professional" expert engineers and other consulting specialists who
mostly, but not exclusively, 42 supported the plaintiffs bar. Many such
39. See FED. R. EviD. 702.
40. See, e.g., Goodwin v. MTD Prod., Inc., 232 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing a case
involving a lawn mower that discharged a wing nut into plaintiff's eye; engineer was not qualified to
give expert opinion on nature, scope, or cause of eye injury); Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905
(8th Cir. 1998) (discussing the explosion of a ceramic grinding wheel; ceramics engineer was not
qualified to testify on adequacy of warnings); Polaino v. Bayer Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.
Mass. 2000) (ruling that the chemist was not qualified to testify on defectiveness of x-ray chemical
mixer); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (N.D. Okla. 2000) ("The
simple possession of a medical degree is insufficient to qualify a physician to testify as to the
advantages of a spinal fixation device, the medical causation of spine-related ailments, or the
mechanical functioning of an orthopedic implantation device."); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP,
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 833-35 (Wis. 2001) (ruling that a chemist not qualified to testify on whether
latex gloves caused allergic reaction).
41. Sources for the latter include H. PHILO ET AL., LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE: TECHNICAL
SOURCES FOR CONDUCTING A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION (9th ed. 2001), the ATLA Products
Liability Exchange, at http://www.altanet.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2002), and Technical Advisory
Service for Attorneys ("TASA"), an expert referral service, at http://www.tasanet.com (last visited
Oct. 31, 2002). Among the many engineering and other expert consulting firms are Engineering
Design & Testing Corp., at http://www.edtengineers.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2002), and Triodyne
Inc., at http://www.infoserve@triodyne.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
42. While manufacturers substantially rely on their own in-house technical experts, they
frequently use outside consultants for accident reconstruction and the development of other proofs
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experts were of course entirely competent to testify on the issues they
agreed to evaluate. But others advertised a willingness to testify, for a
fee, on the defectiveness (and even the appropriateness of punitive dam-
ages) of just about anything,
43 "from toys to airplanes. '44
The very idea of a professional expert witness is- problematic.
"Expertise" in any field requires substantial time to accumulate and to
stay abreast of current developments-by reading, experimenting,
writing, perhaps teaching, and otherwise pursuing knowledge in the
specialized field of study. The problem is that much of a professional
expert's time is spent in courtrooms and preparing for trial rather than
pursuing expertise. Moreover, because most professional experts are
economically dependent on being retained by lawyers to testify that
particular products were (or were not) defective and caused (or did not
cause) particular injuries, they have a natural bias to arrive at conclusions
that favor their employers. Without a steady moral compass-grounded
in a personal reservoir of knowledge, judgment, and professional
conviction-a professional witness will be tempted to tell the employing
lawyer what the expert thinks the lawyer wants to hear, rather than what
he or she needs to hear. Whether working for the plaintiff or defense, this
temptation for professional witnesses to mold their findings and conclu-
sions to make the case for their employer is persistent and strong; and it
is insidious, in part because they may hide weaknesses in their testimony
from their own employer.
The kind of twisted testimony45 that too easily results from a hired
expert's natural bias provides one explanation of why professional wit-
nesses sometimes contradict themselves in different cases, a strategic
Achilles heel which an opposing attorney may discover by diligent re-
search. If the opposing attorney does not reveal such conflicting testi-
mony until the trial, both the expert and the employing attorney will find
themselves in the dreadful predicament of trying to explain the contradic-
for trial. One such firm of engineering and scientific consultants drawn upon by defendants, at least
in automotive products liability litigation, is Exponent.com, at http://www.Exponent.com (last
visited Oct. 31, 2002).
43. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985) ("[A] Ph.D. can be found to swear
to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish."); see generally Bernstein, supra
note 24, at 119-23 (examining the seamy side of the expert witness business).
44. One "system safety and human factors enginee[r]," listed in a technical expert directory, is
said to have testified "in over 100 cases with products ranging from toys to airplanes." See
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND TRANSPORTATION DIRECTORY 196 (1983). For problems with
professional expert witnesses, see generally Douglas R. Richmond, The "Professional Expert"
Witness: Doctor Lichtor, I Presume?, 17 J. PROD. & Toxics LtAB. 197, 223 (1995) (arguing for a
"cause of action for expert witness malpractice").
45. For one expert's primer on how to mislead a jury, see Sanchez v. Black Bros. Co., 423
N.E.2d 1309, 1320 (Il. App. Ct. 1981) (excerpting a speech given by defendant's witness to
engineering group on how to manipulate juries and obfuscate answers on cross examination).
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tion on the spot. On occasion, professional witnesses knowingly provide
false, perjurious testimony, which, if discovered, will likely devastate the
party's entire case.46
The explosion of expert testimony in products liability litigation
during the 1970s and 1980s, fueled by an expanding plaintiffs' bar fed by
contingent fees, quite naturally led to a rather rapid increase of products
liability lawsuits based on novel, untested, abstract, and occasionally
quite fantastic theories of science and technology, propounded by "ex-
perts" who sometimes were dubiously qualified to testify on issues on
which they claimed expertise. As products liability litigation during this
period marched along, courts 47 and commentators, 48 always skeptical of
this form of witness,49 increasingly decried a perceived growth in abuses
of expert testimony-of "junk science" run amok.50
46. See, e.g., Harre v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversing and
remanding judgment for defendant because verdict based in part on perjured testimony by defense
expert); see also Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 399 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that trial
court properly excluded evidence that one of plaintiffs experts was under indictment for perjury);
see generally Richmond, supra note 44, at 223.
47. See, e.g., Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 576 P.2d 426, 435 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(Andersen, J., dissenting), affid, 588 P.2d 1346 (Wash. 1979).
48. The "junk science" concept was promoted and popularized by Peter W. Huber who
worked for the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think-tank. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991) [hereinafter HUBER, GAILILEO'S
REVENGE]; PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985). For a powerful rebuttal, see Kenneth J. Chesebro,
Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).
49. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Hubbel, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (N.Y. 1884) (stating that the expert
witnesses' "opinions cannot fail generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in which
they are enlisted"); Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J.
247, 249 (1910) (noting "a constant complaining and mistrust on the part of judges, juries and
lawyers of the expert witness").
50. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 48, at 3.
Junk science cuts across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and engineering
.... It is a catalog of every conceivable kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking,
truculent dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud.
On the legal side ... [is] a speculative theory that expects lawyers, judges, and juries
to search for causes at the far fringes of science and beyond. The legal establishment has
adjusted rules of evidence accordingly, so that almost any self-styled scientist, no matter
how strange or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify in court. The same
scientific questions are litigated again and again, in one courtroom after the next, so that
error is almost inevitable.
Junk science is impelled through our courts by a mix of opportunity and incentive.
"Let-it-all-in" legal theory creates the opportunity. The incentive is money: the prospect
that the Midas-like touch of a credulous jury will now and again transform scientific dust
into gold.
Id.; see generally Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595,
597-98 & nn. 1-3 (1988) (arguing that the problems historically posed by scientific evidence are
becoming increasingly difficult because an "expert witness can be found to support almost any
decision").
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IV. EARLY LIMITATIONS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
At early common law,5' the only real limitation on expert testimony
was that the person proffered as an expert be qualified as an expert in the
field. The courts generally allowed such experts to provide relevant tes-
timony about technical matters as a matter of course: once a person was
qualified as an expert, the judge simply admitted into evidence his or her
relevant opinion testimony. 2 This liberal approach to expert testimony
reflected the thought that the market from which an expert made a living
had reliably tested the quality of that expertise.53 While the marketplace
test generally may have worked satisfactorily to permit expert determina-
tions on whether a carriage maker or pharmacist acted with reasonable
care in making a carriage or mixing a medicine, this test was unhelpful
when applied to expert opinions about new science or technology, where
an established market for such expertise did not yet exist.
This was the situation the Supreme Court faced in Frye v. United
States,54 in which the defendant in a murder case offered the results of an
early polygraph test to show his innocence. In passing on the merits of a
new form of science or technology, ruled the Court, the test is whether it
is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs. ' 55 Shifting the fulcrum of decision from
the expert to the expertise,56 the Frye "general acceptance" test tended to
exclude testimony on cutting-edge science and technology since new
ideas become accepted wisdom only over time. During the next half cen-
tury, Frye's general acceptance standard, although increasingly criti-
51. On early expert testimony, see John M. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB.
L.J. 365 (1880); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1901); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 9; David L. Faigman
et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding
the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 1799,
1803-09 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman et al., Crystal Balfl(concluding that a rigorous and thorough
analysis of scientific data should be undertaken before admission into court); Stephan Landsman, Of
Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 131, 133 (1995) (understanding that Daubert represents a step towards greater
judicial control, yet raises questions about "the evenhandedness of heightened judicial scrutiny of
proffered expert testimony").
52. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 3-5.
53. "The assurance of expertise was implied by the expert's success in an occupation or
profession that embraced that knowledge .... In effect, the marketplace determined whether valid
knowledge existed by endowing it with commercial value." Id. at 4.
54. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
55. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
56. See generally Faigman et al., Crystal Ball, supra note 51, at 1805-09.
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cized,57 evolved into the prevailing test for admissibility of expert testi-
mony.58
As modem products liability and other technical litigation expanded
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, coincident with the debate over the
Federal Rules of Evidence then under consideration, the Frye test sud-
denly became quite "trendy. 59 In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence
were adopted, including Rule 702, which provided for the admission of
scientific and technical evidence by a qualified expert if such testimony
would "assist the trier of fact" (i.e., if it is helpful to the jury),6° and Rule
703, which allowed an expert to rely upon facts and data "reasonably
relied upon by experts" in the field.6' Neither Rule 702 nor the Advisory
Committee's comment on it made any reference to the Frye test, but
most jurisdictions interpreted this rule to incorporate Frye's general ac-
ceptance standard.62
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the logic and fairness of Frye's
general acceptance test came under increasing scrutiny as courts increas-
ingly debated whether and to what extent this test might be consistent
with Rule 702.63 During this period, the courts struggled to find a balance
between the need to open courtrooms to new science, on the one hand,
with the problems from allowing experts to propound bad science, on the
other. Increasingly, courts began to strike this balance by at least par-
tially shifting the focus away from whether the science was "generally
57. Criticisms often centered on its conservatism and its vagueness. See, e.g., FAIGMAN ET
AL., supra note 9, at 7-10 (examining criticisms of the Frye test).
58. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1980); Gerard Harrison, Comment,
Liars, Damn Liars, and Expert Witnesses, Unhelpful Approaches to Unreliable Scientific Testimony
in the Third and Fifth Circuits, 29 Hous. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (1992).
59. See Harrison, supra note 58, at 1034-35. But not all courts and commentators approved of
the general acceptance test of admissibility. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 874-75 ("General
scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a
suitable criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.").
60. At the time, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provided: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702 (2000). Rule 702 was
amended in 2000 to reflect the holding in Daubert.
61. Federal Rule of Evidence 703, prior to the Dec. 1, 2000 amendments, provided: "The facts
or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible evidence." FED. R. EvID. 703 (2000).
62. See Faigman et al., Crystal Ball, supra note 51, at 1803-09.
63. See generally Harrison, supra note 58, at 1057 (arguing that proper interpretation of Rules
702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides courts with adequate tools "to regulate the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence," thus making the Frye test unnecessary).
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accepted," the Frye approach, to an evaluation of the methodology by
which the expert reached his or her conclusion. 64
V. DA UBERT AND ITS PROGENY
A. Daubert
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,65 after several years of
avoiding the issue, 66 the Supreme Court in 1993 finally decided to exam-
ine the admissibility of expert testimony on novel scientific theories and
the relationship of the Frye test to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Daubert involved the drug Bendectin, an anti-nausea medicine
that, from 1956 until 1983, physicians widely prescribed to pregnant
women for morning sickness.67 From the first Bendectin case filed in
1979, which claimed that the drug had caused the plaintiff's missing and
malformed fingers, nearly 2000 similar cases eventually were filed
claiming damages for birth defects from the drug.68 In Daubert, filed late
in the life cycle of the litigation, the plaintiffs claimed that Benedictin
administered to their mothers during pregnancy caused their birth de-
fects.69 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that no
causal link existed between Bendectin and birth defects.7° In affidavits
from its expert scientists, the defendant showed that none of the thirty-
eight epidemiological studies of Bendectin published to date had found a
64. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (stating that in order for an expert's scientific conclusions to be admissible, they must, inter
alia, be based on "a well-founded methodology"); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307,
310 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that difficult questions such as whether Bendectin caused birth defects
compel courts to "critically evaluate the reasoning process by which the experts connect data to their
conclusions in order... to consistently and rationally resolve the disputes before them"), modified,
884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); see
generally Harrison, supra note 58, at 1057 (arguing that examining an expert's methodology would
make the Frye test unnecessary).
65. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
66. See, for example, Justice White's dissents to the denial of certiorari in Mustafa v. United
States, 479 U.S. 953, 953-54 (1986), and Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 503 U.S. 912, 912
(1992). Prior to Daubert, the Frye test, which had been used almost exclusively in criminal cases,
was increasingly subject to criticism. See Gross, supra note 9, at 242-46.
67. See Green, supra note 9, at 661 (indicating that Bendectin was prescribed during the 1960s
and 1970s to upwards of 25% of all pregnant women in the U.S.). On the Bendectin litigation, see
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS
TORT LITIGATION (1998); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation
in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Sanders, From Science to Evidence];
Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992); Gross, supra note 9, at 243-44 (summarizing the Bendectin litigation).
68. See Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 67, at 4.
69. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
70. Id.
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causal connection between birth defects and the drug.71 In opposition, the
plaintiffs offered affidavits from eight witnesses who concluded--on the
basis of chemical structure analysis, in vitro (test tube) studies of animal
cells, in vivo (live) animal studies, and a "reanalysis" of the previous
epidemiological studies-that Bendectin could in fact cause birth de-
fects.72 Concluding that the plaintiffs' proffered expert evidence did not
meet Frye's "general acceptance" standard of admissibility, the district
court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed."
In the Supreme Court, the petitioning plaintiffs argued that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence had superseded the Frye "general acceptance"
standard.7 4 Vacating and remanding, the Supreme Court agreed that the
Rules do not allow a court to use the degree of acceptance of a subject of
scientific testimony as the sole determinant of admissibility.75 Because
Rule 702 allows qualified experts to testify about "scientific ... knowl-
edge," the Court reasoned that a trial judge must determine that proposed
expert testimony is both "scientific" and "knowledge"-that the subject
of the testimony is "ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of sci-
ence," that it is "derived by the scientific method. 76 An expert's pro-
posed testimony must be "supported by appropriate validation - i.e.,
'good grounds."' 77 In short, expert testimony must be reliable.78 In addi-
tion to requiring expert testimony be reliable, the Court further reasoned
that Rule 702 requires that such testimony be relevant, since the rule
demands that expert scientific or technical testimony "assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.,,7 9 This is
the "helpfulness" requirement of Rule 702, requiring that expert testi-
mony be sufficiently related to disputed facts to help the jury resolve
facts or issues in dispute, a requirement that may be simply described as
71. There are four common types of scientific studies used to determine the toxicity of a
substance:
[1] analyses of the chemical structure of the compound that focus on similarities between it
and known toxins; [21 in vitro tests that examine its effects on human or animal cells that are
cultivated in the laboratory for this purpose; [3] in vivo studies that test its effects on
laboratory animals; and [4] epidemiological studies that examine its effects on human beings.
Gross, supra note 66, at 238. Epidemiological studies on large populations of humans are widely
considered the most informative measure of toxic consequences of the substance. Id. at 238-39.
"Ihere is general agreement that epidemiological studies are the best and most informative, since
only they provide direct evidence on the occurrence of pathologies in people." Id.
72. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
73. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), affig 727 F. Supp.
570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
74. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
75. See id. at 587-89.
76. Id. at 589-90.
77. Id. at 590.
78. See id. at 589-90.
79. Id. at 591.
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"fit. '80 Thus, when a party proffers expert scientific testimony, the trial
court must make a preliminary determination of both the (1) reliability
(or validity), and (2) relevance (or fit) of the expert's reasoning or meth-
odology underlying the testimony proposed.81
Among the factors a court may usefully employ in assessing the va-
lidity of an expert's proffered testimony on scientific evidence, the Court
noted five:
(1) Testability: whether the theory or technique is testable and has
been tested - its ability to withstand objective, verifiable challenge
and scientific trial;
82
(2) Peer review: whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication;
(3) Error rate: whether it has an acceptable known or potential rate of
error;
(4) Control standards: whether its operation has been subjected to
appropriate standards of control; and
(5) General acceptance: whether it is widely accepted in the relevantS83
scientific community.
These are Daubert's now-familiar reliability factors. In determining the
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, the Court emphasized
that the inquiry into pertinent reliability considerations should be flexi-
ble, and that the focus of inquiry "must be solely on principles and meth-
odology, not on the conclusions that they generate." 84 Because the lower
courts had based their decisions in this case almost exclusively on Frye's
general acceptance standard, rather than on the broader reliability and fit
80. See id. at 591-92.
81. Id. at 592-93. Thus, "a trial judge must evaluate the proffered testimony to assure that it is
at least minimally reliable; concerns about expert testimony cannot simply be referred to the jury as
a question of weight." Capra, supra note 9, at 701-02.
82. The Advisory Committee's version of this factor is more prolix: "whether the expert's
technique or theory can be or has been tested - that is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged
in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RuLES 152 (2d ed. Supp. 2002).
83. See id. at 593-94. Although the Court lumps factors (3) and (4) together, which has led
most observers to a four-factor count, the separation of these two different considerations clarifies
analysis. The five-factor list is adapted from Capra, supra note 9, at 702, which is the basis for the
formulation in FED. R. EviD. 702, advisory committee's note (2000 amendment).
84. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
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requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Supreme Court re-
manded the judgment to the Court of Appeals.85
B. Supreme Court Progeny
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has revisited the expert testi-
mony issue a number of times. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,86 a dis-
trict court applied Daubert to exclude expert testimony that purported to
link the plaintiffs exposure to PCBs to his lung cancer, and the court of
appeals reversed.87 Reinstating the district court's ruling, the Supreme
Court emphasized that federal trial courts have wide discretion to ex-
clude expert testimony, holding that such determinations are only subject
to a permissive "abuse of discretion" standard of review.88 The Court
further noted that Daubert's direction that courts focus on the expert's
methodology in no way precluded a trial judge from scrutinizing the
quality of the expert's conclusions.89
Next came Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,90 a tire blowout case in-
volving a worn tire containing at least two punctures that previously had
been inadequately repaired. In a suit against the tire manufacturer, the
plaintiffs claimed, on the basis of deposition testimony of an expert in
tire failure analysis, that the cause of the blowout was a defect in the tire
rather than abuse.9' Although the expert's testimony might have been
viewed as "technical" rather than "scientific," the trial court applied the
gatekeeping principles of Daubert, closely scrutinizing the reliability of
the expert's hypotheses, methodology, and conclusions.92 Concluding
that they failed each of the Daubert factors, and that their reliability had
not been established on any other ground, the district court excluded the
expert's testimony and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.93 The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Daubert applied
85. On remand, applying the Daubert analysis, the Ninth Circuit ruled again that the district
court had properly excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony, concluding that the testimony of one of
the plaintiffs' experts was not reliable and that the testimony of the others was not relevant because
they would only testify that Bendectin is "capable of causing" birth defects, not that the drug in fact
(more likely than not) caused the plaintiffs' birth defects. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43
F.3d 1311, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1995).
86. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
87. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140-41.
88. Id. at 141.
89. The Court remarked:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained
experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence, which is
connected, to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion preferred.
Id. at 146.
90. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
91. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.
92. See id. at 145.
93. Id.
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only to experts relying on "scientific" principles rather than on the kind
of skill- or experience-based observation of the type relied upon by the
plaintiff's expert.94 Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
held that Rule 702's broad reference to expert testimony on "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge" means that the Daubert gate-
keeping principles apply to all expert testimony. 95 Further, the Court
reaffirmed the flexibility of the reliability inquiry and noted that the trial
court has wide latitude, subject only to review for abuse of discretion, to
determine what reliability factors are appropriate to the particular expert
96testimony under examination.
The final Supreme Court decision to date on expert testimony is
Weisgram v. Marley C0.,97 a wrongful death action against the manufac-
turer of a heater arising out of a house fire. On testimony by three experts
that the heater was defective and that the defect caused the fire, the plain-
tiffs obtained a judgment on a jury verdict, over the defendant's objec-
tion that the testimony was unreliable and therefore inadmissible under
Rule 702 and Daubert.98 The court of appeals reversed, agreeing with the
defendant that the plaintiffs' expert testimony offered mere speculation
as to the heater's defectiveness, making it scientifically unsound.99
Rather than remanding for a retrial, and reasoning that the plaintiffs had
had a fair opportunity to prove their claim and so did not deserve a sec-
ond chance, the court of appeals directed judgment for the defendant
manufacturer. 1°° The Supreme Court affirmed.' 0' Rejecting an argument
that a plaintiff might hold certain expert testimony in reserve to shore up
the claim if the proffered expert testimony were to be found insufficient,
the Court noted that Daubert put parties relying on expert evidence on
notice of "the exacting standards of reliability" demanded of such evi-
dence. 10 2 "It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, that parties will
initially present less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of
a second chance should their first try fail.' 0 3 Reminding parties (usually
plaintiffs) that they may well not get a second chance, Weisgram under-
scores Daubert's basic message: parties bear responsibility for presenting
expert testimony rigorously grounded in good science and technology
and relevant to the particular issues in the case.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 147-49.
96. See id. at 149-53.
97. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
98. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455-56.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 446.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 455.
103. ld.
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C. Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
In 2000,1°4 the Supreme Court approved certain amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence on opinion evidence and expert testimony to
conform them to the principles of Daubert and its progeny. 105 In addition
to making certain minor changes to Rules 701 and 703, the amendments
added an important proviso to Rule 702 that permits expert testimony
only if such testimony is grounded on "sufficient facts and data" and is
the result of "reliable principles and methods" which are themselves re-
liably applied to the facts of the case. 106 The Advisory Committee's help-
ful Note to the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 observes that the amend-
ment requires only that the data, principles, and methods used by an ex-
pert are reliable and reliably applied, 10 7 and that the quality of expert
testimony still largely remains tested by cross-examination and the other
safeguards of the adversary system. 0 8 Observing that "[a] review of the
case law after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the
exception rather than the rule,"' 9 the Committee Note adds that the
amendment "is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic chal-
lenge to the testimony of every expert."" 0
As for Daubert's reliability factors, the Advisory Committee's Note
reiterates Daubert's five-factor list set forth above and further enumer-
ates several additional factors courts have found useful in varying con-
texts:
(1) Whether experts are "proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independ-
ent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions
expressly for purposes of testifying."
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an ac-
cepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alterna-
tive explanations.
104. The amendments were effective Dec. 1, 2000, a quarter century after the Rules were first
adopted in 1975.
105. See generally FED. R. EviD. 702 avisory committee's note (2000 amendment).
106. With the amended language italicized, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now provides in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EviD. 702.
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(4) Whether the expert "is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting."
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to
reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give.1II
While recognizing the importance of these and the original Daubert fac-
tors, the Advisory Committee observed that the amendment makes no
attempt to "codify" the factors, which the Supreme Court has empha-
sized are not exclusive.11 2 Instead, the new standards added to Rule 702
are "broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the specific
Daubert factors where appropriate."' 3 In sum, the amendment (including
the Committee Note) to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 does not provide a
conclusive roadmap for each specific aspect of expert testimony, but it
does provide helpful guidance on the fundamental Daubert reliability
principles.
14
D. Daubert in the Lower Federal Courts
Daubert has, as intended, forced courts to examine expert testimony
more closely. Post-Daubert, the federal district courts, exercising their
newly appointed "gatekeeper" function, have scrutinized expert testi-
mony more closely, often holding rigorous pre-trial "Daubert hear-
ings"-that are often outcome determinative-to determine the admissi-
bility of proffered expert testimony. 11 5 But heightened judicial scrutiny of
expert testimony does not mean that a court will necessarily exclude a
plaintiffs expert testimony, even if it is unusual: the circuit courts some-
times affirm plaintiff verdicts in novel contexts in which the traditional
scientific indicia of defectiveness or causation is marginal at best,1 6 and
they will reverse a district court for excluding a plaintiffs expert testi-
111. Id. (internal citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Pointing to the Supreme Court's admonition that Daubert's reliability factors are not
exclusive, the Advisory Committee's Note observes that the amendments do not attempt to "codify"
the factors but instead set forth standards that are "broad enough to require consideration of any or
all of the specific Daubert factors where appropriate." Id.
115. See, e.g., Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 n.12 (N.D. Ala.
2001); see also Rudlin, supra note 9, at 336.
[T]he Daubert hearing and ruling have effectively become virtually as case outcome
determinative as a class certification hearing and ruling: once decided, a case either
shrivels up and goes away, or becomes more dangerous to try. Daubert hearings are often
every bit as case dispositive, practically speaking, as a summary judgment hearing. Thus,
practitioners whose cases rely in any material way on expert testimony must ...be
prepared for a full-blown "trial within a trial" that the Daubert hearing often becomes.
Id.
116. See, e.g., Bonner v. ISP Tech., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 927-28 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming an
award for an assembly line worker, who exposed to defendant's organic solvent, suffered
psychological injuries, cognitive impairment, and Parkinsonian symptoms).
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mony with excessive zeal. 17 But Daubert decisions frequently go the
other way, excluding a plaintiff's expert testimony as unreliable or ir-
relevant. Thus, the lower federal courts have disallowed expert testimony
on Daubert grounds because the expert proposed to testify on a novel
causal theory, not generally accepted or subjected to peer review, that
was developed only for the litigation;1 8 relied too heavily on the tempo-
ral proximity of harm to its alleged cause; 119 failed sufficiently to inspect
or test the accident product or a proposed alternative design;12 failed
117. See, e.g., Lauzon v. Senco Prod., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 691 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
only three published articles supported expert's theory that bottom-fire pneumatic nailers are
defective, but ruling that limited peer review is not fatal because such nailers are new product);
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 720-21 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting expert testimony on single
ground of lack of peer review is abuse of discretion; no single factor is conclusive in determining
reliability of expert's methodology); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.
1998) (ruling that the trial court failed properly to consider the reasoning and methodology of
plaintiff's expert).
118. See, e.g., Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1313 (ruling, on remand, that testimony of plaintiffs
experts, on link between Bendectin and birth defects, was not reliable or relevant); Grant v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000) (ruling that the conclusions of
plaintiff's experts-that silicone breast implants cause various systemic diseases-was developed
for the litigation, had not gained acceptance in the relevant scientific community, and that their
scientific methods were not practiced by a recognized minority in the field); Nelson v. Am. Home
Prod. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d 954, 972 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (ruling that none of plaintiffs experts had
conducted independent research, outside context of litigation, on whether defendant's heart
medication caused damage to optic nerve and vision).
119. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (ruling causation
testimony unreliable when symptoms did not appear for two weeks after carpet was installed and
remained after it was removed); Polaino v. Bayer Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D. Mass. 2000)
(ruling that expert's hypothesis, resting on temporal proximity rather than scientific principles, was
classic illustration of fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc); Wynacht v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding that expert opinion on causation based solely
on temporal relationship was unreliable, given complex nature of facts and expert's failure to
identify biochemical, medical, or toxicological basis for opinion). But the immediacy of acute
symptoms to exposure may buttress the reliability of an expert's causation hypothesis. See, e.g.,
Bonner, 259 F.3d at 931 (ruling strong temporal connection is sometimes powerful evidence of
causation).
120. See, e.g., Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2001) ("hands-on
testing is not an absolute prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony, but the theory here easily
lends itself to testing and substantiation by this method, such that conclusions based only on personal
opinion and experience do not suffice"); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (noticing
that defendant's expert subjected cigarette lighter that allegedly malfunctioned to replicable
laboratory tests, but plaintiffs experts did not); Brooks v. Outboard Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89, 91,
92 (2d Cir. 2000) (ruling that plaintiffs expert failed to test his theory that lanyard-activated kill
switch would have disengaged motor boat engine under circumstances of accident to user's hand:
"The failure to test a theory of causation can justify a trial court's exclusion of the expert's
testimony."); Shanks v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-383, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22468, at *7
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2001) (finding examination, but no testing, of ladder for load-bearing capacity);
Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 215, 215 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Berry v. Crown Equip.
Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 754 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("courts interpreting Daubert have considered
testability of the expert's theory to be the most important of the four factors, and this is especially
true in cases involving allegations of defect in product design"); Polaino, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69;
LaBelle v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 2-98-3235-23 (D.S.C. July 5, 2001), at *11-13 (regarding no
testing of supposedly safer cigarette design). But see Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
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faithfully to reconstruct the circumstances of the accident;' 2 1 failed to
provide a theory of causation supported by sufficient confirmatory stud-
ies; 122 failed to conduct a differential diagnosis to rule out alternative
potential causes, 123 or applied such an approach improperly; 124 failed to
show the relevance ("fit") of accepted principles to the plaintiffs case;
125
or otherwise failed to proffer reliable and relevant testimony-supported
by reliable data, methods, or conclusions-that was likely to aid the trier
of fact. 126 Quite often, an expert's testimony will fail Daubert scrutiny
for many of these reasons.
127
150 F. Supp. 2d 360, 366, 367 (D. Conn. 2001) (ruling that although theory was not tested, it was
capable of being tested; testimony admitted).
121. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001);
Brooks, 234 F.3d at 92.
122. See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001) (ruling
that proposed expert testimony was insufficient to show that Parlodel can cause intracerebral
hemorrhages); Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000) (ruling that the
expert's differential diagnosis identified condition, not the cause); Wynacht, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1209
(ruling that the treating clinical physician failed to explain in a scientifically reliable manner how
wastewater discharge from lab analyzer caused plaintiff's respiratory, neurological, digestive,
cardiovascular, and urinary problems that followed the discharge).
123. See, e.g., Turner, 229 F.3d at 1208 (ruling that the expert made no attempt to exclude
possible causes of respiratory problems, allegedly caused by accidental discharge of substance from
fire suppression equipment, until only one remained); see also Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631
N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001) (applying Frye test to facts, but adopting Daubert prospectively).
124. See, e.g., Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 989 (ruling that although differential diagnosis is
presumptively admissible, experts lacked basis for "ruling in" Parlodel, drug for suppressing
postpartum lactation, as cause of stroke); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316
(N.D. Okla. 2000) (ruling that expert's failure to explain why he eliminated other possible causes
rendered methodology unreliable); see also Katherine R. Latimer, A Good Bedside Manner Wouldn't
Be Enough, Either: Differential Diagnosis Under Daubert, 1 EXPERT EVID. REP., 33 (2001); Joseph
Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove
Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 120-22 (2001).
125. See, e.g., Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321-22 (affirming, on remand, summary judgment for
defendant in Bendectin birth defect case because plaintiff's experts could not testify that relative risk
was more than the 2.0 necessary to show probability of causal connection); Cipollone v. Yale Indus.
Prod., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 380 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that expert's testimony on dangerously narrow
gap between fixed and moving handrail of loading dock lift was based on supposition that person's
hand was widened by holding object, but plaintiff was holding nothing when accident occurred);
Rapp v. Singh, 152 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (recognizing that crashworthiness experts
rigorously analyzed how plaintiffs car was propelled under defendant's tractor trailer, but data was
insufficient on how absence of vertical attachment to bumper made design defective); Groome v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., No. 92-CV-3073, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4082, at *4-5, *7-8
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (ruling that where plaintiffs expert had to loosen safety switches to get
microwave to operate with door open, his testimony that "it would be a 'very easy mistake' to install
them improperly" did not "fit" because there was no factual basis for his opinion).
126. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp. Inc., 243 F.3d at 441 (excluding testimony on crash theory by
accident reconstructionist, based on photographs alone and dubious testimony of expert
"foamologist"); Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 779 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling on chemicals
that allegedly caused leukemia); Cacciola v. Selco Balers, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181-83
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (ruling that, having neither inspected machine itself nor interviewed injured
worker, the engineer's deposition testimony that machine's safety interlock switch was too
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It may well be that the experts in each case in which the testimony
was excluded propounded bad science, or perhaps the plaintiffs' attor-
neys simply failed to adequately prepare their experts on the Daubert
requirements before the trial, or perhaps they failed at trial (or at a
Daubert hearing) to provide the court with a sufficient offer of proof.
Yet, the cases show that Daubert provides federal trial judges with a
powerful operating manual for excluding expert testimony that, in the
court's sound discretion, fails to meet current criteria for "good sci-
ence." 128 There is indeed some logic to the view, suggested by the Su-
preme Court itself in Daubert,129 that its ruling is balanced in its effect-
that, while closing the door to testimony based on unreliable theories and
methodologies, it opens the door to expert testimony on cutting-edge
science and technology. 30 But the fact remains that only infrequently do
courts invoke Daubert to exclude expert testimony proffered by defen-
dants.'13 Instead, courts almost always apply Daubert principles (often
with good reason) to exclude a plaintiffs experts and, hence, to bar the
plaintiff's claim.1
32
accessible, based on photographs alone, "rests upon unsubstantiated generalizations, speculative
hypotheses and subjective evaluation that are based neither upon any professional study or
experience-based observation").
127. See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 156-58 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling that the
"haphazard, intuitive inquiry" of plaintiffs expert engineer, who conducted no tests nor calculated
forces involved in vehicle accident, failed each of eight reliability factors); Milanowicz v. Raymond
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525, 537, 540 (D.N.J. 2001) (ruling that the testimony of consulting engineer
on forklift truck design failed each of nine reliability indicia court reconfigured from Daubert for
engineering dases).
128. See, e.g., Brooks, 234 F.3d at 90, 92 (ruling expert testimony that outboard motor,
propeller which injured plaintiffs hand should have been equipped with kill switch inadmissible
because plaintiffs expert had never seen the boat or motor, either in person or in photographs; did
not know boat's configuration or dimensions; had not spoken to boys involved in accident nor
otherwise knew precisely how accident happened; nor attempted to reconstruct the accident to test
his theory that a lanyard-activated kill switch would have disengaged motor under circumstances of
accident); Berry, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (ruling that even if proffered expert witness had been
qualified to testify on forklift design safety, his opinions were "quite simply unsupported by any
reasonable measure of technical data or foundation and are wholly unreliable"); cf. Brasher, 160 F.
Supp. 2d at 1295 n.12 (noting a busy trial court's natural temptation to apply Daubert "heavy-
handedly" to reduce a heavy caseload).
129. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-97.
130. See, e.g., Bonner, 259 F.3d at 928 (arguing that "[tihe first several victims of a new toxic
tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply because the medical literature, which
will eventually show the connection between the victim's condition and the toxic substance, has not
yet been completed" (quoting Turner, 229 F.3d at 1209)).
131. See, e.g., Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 801-02, 804 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant, granted on basis of affidavits of defendant's expert
witnesses; on remand, proposed testimony of defendant's experts should be subjected to Daubert
scrutiny); Edwards v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (excluding
defendant's and plaintiffs experts alike).
132. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CRIM. JUST., CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMfrrING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT
DECISION 62 (2001) (summarized at http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB9037 (last visited Feb.
23, 2003)).
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Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc.'33 provides an example of a court ap-
plying Daubert to exclude a plaintiffs expert testimony. The case in-
volved claims of defective manufacture and design against the manufac-
turer of a toaster oven for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict li-
ability in tort for fire damage to the plaintiffs' house.' 34 Although the
Fire Marshall determined that the fire was caused by a recently-repaired
microwave that had been used shortly before the fire, the plaintiffs ex-
pert, 135 Thomas, determined that the fire originated in the defendant's
toaster oven located in the same portion of the kitchen. 136 The defendant
moved for summary judgment, which hinged on the admissibility of
plaintiffs' expert testimony that the toaster oven was defective and
caused the fire. 1
37
The court held a two-day Daubert hearing on Thomas' qualifica-
tions and the reliability of his opinion that the toaster oven was defective
and caused the fire. 138 The court first concluded that Thomas was quali-
fied to offer expert testimony on the electrical aspects of consumer appli-
ances, including toaster ovens, and that he was qualified to interpret the
results of a scanning electron microscope examination he had conducted
on the oven. 139 On the issues of manufacturing defect and causation,
Thomas hypothesized that while someone was operating the toaster oven,
its power contacts spontaneously welded together, causing the toaster
oven to overheat and catch fire.140 Attempting to confirm this hypothesis,
Thomas testified that he used an electron microscope to examine the
contacts, which showed indications of melting and scoring, suggesting to
him that the surfaces had welded together.141 The toaster oven was defec-
tively designed, in Thomas' view, for two reasons: (1) because it lacked
a thermal cut-off device, to cut off power when the oven reached a cer-
tain temperature, to prevent it from overheating, and (2) because it con-
tained an excessive amount of plastic with a low melting point.
142
Applying the Third Circuit's version of the Daubert factors, 143 the
court ruled that the evidence failed to establish the reliability of Thomas'
133. 166 F. Supp. 2d 215 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
134. Booth, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
i35. Id. at 222.
136. Id. at 217.
137. Id. at 216.
138. Id. at 217.
139. Id.
140. Id. at219.
141. Id. at 218.
142. Id.
143. See Oddi, 234 F.3d at 145 (listing eight factors: the traditional five Daubert factors, plus
"(6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the
qualifications of the expert witness... ; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been
put").
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methodology. 44 Thomas' manufacturing defect theory was testable, but
he had not attempted to get the power contacts of a similar toaster to
weld together. 145 While his microscopic investigation was a form of test,
he failed to adequately explain why indications of melting and scoring
mean that welding has occurred, nor did he offer any other basis for his
conclusion other than his personal experience and "broad and circular
assertions that such markings simply are what happens when welding
occurs." 6 Thomas asserted that his fire investigation methods were gen-
erally used by others in the field, but he failed to produce persuasive ob-
jective evidence to this effect. 147 Prompted by defense counsel, Thomas
claimed that he followed the fire investigation guidelines of the National
Fire Protection Association, but he did not point to any specific proce-
dures in the guidelines that he had followed. 48 Nor did any credible evi-
dence exist to establish that Thomas' examination method "was subject
to peer review, had a known or potential rate of error, could be measured
by existing standards, or was generally accepted."'149 In short, because
Thomas "did not take sufficient care in supporting the credibility or reli-
ability of the methodology he applied, despite the best efforts of counsel
to elicit it," his testimony that the toaster contained a manufacturing de-
fect was inadmissible. 150 Similarly, Thomas' design defectiveness theo-
ries, on which he offered no methodology whatsoever, were equally defi-
cient: he neither sketched nor produced an example of the kind of ther-
mal cut-off device he recommended, nor did he install one on an exem-
plar oven to test its ability to prevent overheating. 15' While he claimed
that Black and Decker used such a device on an oven sold in Canada, he
failed to produce the Canadian model. 52 As for his theory of excessive
plastic materials, Thomas never explained how the plastic might have
caused or affected the fire.
53
Thus, whether or not Thomas in fact conducted a reasonable inves-
tigation into the cause of the fire, he failed to provide the court with
"enough basic, objective information" on the reliability of the investiga-
tion and his opinions based thereon.
154
Thomas performed no tests of his own to determine whether his hy-
potheses were indeed true; he merely examined the toaster oven and
144. See Booth, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
145. Id.
146. Id.




151. Id. at 221.
152. ld.
153. Id. at219n.4.
154. Id. at 221-22.
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concluded it could have been safer. His testimony ... seemed wholly
based on his own training and experience, and he provided the Court
with no objective anchor for his conclusions.
1 55
Based on a review of Thomas' expert reports, deposition testimony, and
testimony during the Daubert hearing, the court found his causation in-
quiry to be "intuitive and haphazard, his methodology to be unreliable,
and, consequently, his conclusions to be suspect.' 56 Since the plaintiffs
had failed to meet their burden of establishing the reliability of Thomas'
testimony under the principles of Rule 702, Daubert, and Kumho Tire,
Thomas' expert testimony on causation was inadmissible.157 Because the
plaintiffs had no other evidence to establish that a defect in the toaster
oven probably caused the fire, the court granted summary judgment for
the defendant.5 8
But Daubert seeks to exclude only invalid or irrelevant evidence,
and even a rigorous application of its principles does not compel the
exclusion of expert testimony that is merely inconclusive or otherwise
only marginally helpful to the trier of fact. Many product accidents leave
few and ambiguous clues of accident causation, especially if the product
is severely damaged in the accident or lost thereafter,1 59 and the issue of
design defectiveness is by nature vague and indeterminate. 16 In such
cases, courts should allow plausible expert hypotheses, provided they are
based on sound methodology and reasoning, that attempt to reconstruct
the origins of the accident and how it might have been prevented.
Rudd v. General Motors Corp.16' is an example of a case that al-
lowed a plaintiff's expert testimony after rigorous Daubert scrutiny. The
plaintiff was injured when a fan blade on his pickup truck broke lose and
struck him while he stood in front of the truck's open hood twisting the
distributor housing to adjust the engine's timing.162 Plaintiff sued the
vehicle manufacturer, claiming that the fan blade had been made of de-
fective metal, a claim based largely on the testimony of his expert,
Edmondson, a mechanical engineer with extensive experience in failure
155. Id.at221.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 222.
158. Id. at 223. Nor would the malfunction theory help the plaintiffs, since even that theory
required reasonable inferences that the particular product had malfunctioned and caused the harm.
Because of the multiple possible causes of the fire in this case, expert testimony on causation was
necessary on the malfunction theory, too. id. at 220 n.5.
159. On the malfunction theory, see MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 7.12.
160. On design defectiveness, see generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 8.
161. 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
162. Rudd, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1332, 1340.
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analysis. 63 GM moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff
had offered no admissible evidence of a manufacturing defect.
64
Choosing not to hold a Daubert hearing,' 65 the court ruled on the
admissibility of Edmondson's testimony on the basis of his expert report
and deposition testimony. 66 Edmondson found no direct evidence of a
physical flaw in the fan blade, but arrived at his conclusion circumstan-
tially by excluding other possible explanations of how the fan blade
might have broken. 67 In particular, he first determined that the plaintiff's
use of the vehicle at the time the fan blade broke was entirely proper: the
plaintiff's technique in adjusting the timing, while running the engine at
1200 to 1500 rpms, was entirely normal and specifically recommended
by GM's tune-up manuals. 168 Next, based on Edmondson's visual ex-
amination, his "total indicator reading" measurements of the accident fan
and fan assembly, and his background reading, he determined that prior
to the accident the fan blade had not been bent, at the site of the fracture
origin or elsewhere, and that no visible damage to the blade existed that
might have caused the fatigue fracture and break. 169 Had the fan blade
been subjected to a sudden trauma during operation, Edmondson testified
that it would have left physical indicia of the trauma, such as broken
paint, scarring, or denting, none of which were visible. 170 The absence of
any indications that the fan had encountered abnormal forces during op-
eration led him to conclude that a microscopic manufacturing defect,
such as a scratch, grind mark, gas bubble, or an inclusion caused a metal-
fatigue fracture.' 7' The court concluded that Edmondson's systematic
elimination of alternative causes led to circumstantial proof of defective-
ness that was relevant to a jury's determination of that issue.
72
Although the reliability of the Edmondson's expert evidence was a
closer question, the court concluded that it met each of the three specific
reliability standards of new Rule 702-that it was based on (1) sufficient
163. Id. at 1332, 1338.
164. Id. at 1339.
165. Normally, the decision whether to hold a Daubert hearing is entirely discretionary with the
trial court. There may be no need for such a hearing if the parties have developed an extensive
evidentiary record, including expert reports, depositions, and the literature that supports the expert
opinions, and assuming that the issues are well briefed. Id. at 1334 n.3 (citing authorities); see
Nelson, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 967; Schafersman, 631 N.W.2d at 877. As with any discretionary matter,
however, a trial court's failure to hold a Daubert hearing in particular circumstances, whether or not
requested by the losing party, may be an abuse of discretion, particularly if the admissibility issue
turns on factual issues and will be determinative of summary judgment. See Padillas v. Stork-
Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412,418 (3d Cir. 1999).
166. See Rudd, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
167. Id. at 1342.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1340.
170. Id. at 1341.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 1342.
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data, (2) reliable principles and methods, and (3) reliable application of
the methods to the facts. 73 First, the factual basis of Edmondson's testi-
mony was sufficient-based on his visual inspection of the accident fan
blade and other fans, his account of the use history of the truck and fan
blade, his "total indicator reading" measurements, his reliance on two
failure-analysis publications (which included a case study of a car fan
fatigue fracture) and GM tune-up manuals, and his background and train-
ing analyzing metal fractures, 174 including automotive fan fatigue frac-
tures. 75 Second, the court ascertained that Edmondson's method for de-
termining the cause of the fatigue fracture-by eliminating ("ruling out")
other possible causes-was a well-established and reliable scientific
method for determining causation. 76 Moreover, because a specialty pub-
lication had employed the process-of-elimination method in a failure
analysis model, which included a case history of a fatigue fracture in an
automobile fan, this method further satisfied Daubert's reliability factors
on publication and acceptance within a relevant community of experts.
77
Third, and finally, the court found that Edmondson reliably applied this
method to the accident fan-by determining that the fan's history did not
include improper operation and by closely inspecting the fan blade metal
for physical indicia of other causes. 178 Noting that Edmondson could not
fairly be expected to assign a particular error rate to his techniques, 179 the
court concluded that his testimony was reliable, and hence admissible,
"because he provide[d] a step-by-step and transparent account" of "rea-
soning processes and data sources" on which he relied, "the physical
indicia he associate[d] with each possible alternative cause, and his rea-
sons for excluding each of the alternative causes. ' 8 By fully revealing
the basis of his opinions, Edmondson's testimony thus supplied the de-
fendant with a fair basis to challenge his opinions by cross-examination
173. Id.
174. The court quoted the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 702 to the effect that an expert's
experience (alone or "in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education") may
provide a sufficient foundation for the expert's testimony if the witness explains "how that
experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion,
and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts." Id. at 1336.
175. Id. at 1342-43.
176. Id. at 1343. In the medical context, experts quite often apply this well-accepted method for
determining causation, called "differential diagnosis" (or "differential etiology"). See generally
Brew, supra note 9, at 482-83 (stating that differential diagnosis, the process of "eliminating other
possible causes, is an essential methodological component in establishing specific causation");
Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 124 (focusing on "one of the more difficult causal issues in
torts: the proof of specific causation in toxic tort suits ... through a process the courts have called
differential diagnosis").
177. See Rudd, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
178. id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1344.
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and the presentation of contrary evidence, the basic tools of the adversary
process. 181
E. Daubert in the State Courts
Because Daubert interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 702, it applies
by its terms only to the federal courts. For this and other reasons, quite a
few state courts, still trusting in Frye and other conventional rules gov-
erning the admissibility of expert testimony, have refused to adopt the
Daubert principles. 182 Yet, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert in 1993,183 many courts had already adopted reliability princi-
ples quite similar to Daubert' s, and since that time an increasing number
of states have rejected Frye and swung over to the Daubert point of
view. 84 In addition, a large majority of states have adopted codes of evi-
dence patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702
upon which Daubert is based. 85 Moreover, to the extent that Daubert's
precepts are grounded in reasoned principles of logic and fair play for
adjudicating disputes involving principles of science and technology,
those precepts have a certain logical and moral power that is difficult for
state courts to ignore. For these reasons, a growing number of state
courts, very possibly a majority, have now adopted the Daubert princi-
ples of reliability and relevance for expert testimony.'
8 6
181. Id.
182. As of 2002, roughly fifteen states still purport to follow Frye. Recent reaffirmations of
Frye and rejections of Daubert include: Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 134 (Ariz. 2000) (en
banc, 3 2 decision); Byrum v. Super. Ct., No. B153001, LEXIS 3809, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20,
2002); Donaldson v. Cent. 111. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 323 (Il. 2002); Kuhn v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1178 (Kan. 2000); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 798
So. 2d 374, 382 (Miss. 2001); Krause, Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 566, 569 (Nev. 2001); Blum v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 2000). See generally Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement
from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 208 (1998) (stating that
"by 1992 after the Frye heyday had passed states were poised for a new test," and as such, only four
years later, "28 states either have adopted the Daubert standard, explicitly assimilated it as similar to
a test already in place, or maintained a Daubert-like test without mentioning Daubert"); States Move
to Daubert, Even When They Say They're Stuck on Frye, 2 EXPERT EVID. REP. 161 (2002) (noting
that nineteen states and the District of Columbia still adhere to Frye) [hereinafter States Move to
Daubert].
183. See Hamilton, supra note 182, at 209 (summing that "thirty-three states have adopted
Daubert since the Supreme Court decided the case, while seventeen states continue to employ the
Frye standard").
184. As of 1998, Hamilton counted thirty-three states that had adopted Daubert, to which tally
at least two additional states must be added. See People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)
(replacing Frye test with Daubert reliability standards); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d
862, 867 (Neb. 2001) (same).
185. Hamilton reported that, as of 1998, only Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and
Pennsylvania had not adopted Rule 702, and noted that Massachusetts had adopted Daubert
judicially. Hamilton, supra note 182, at 209. Note, however, that few, if any, states have yet adopted
the December 2000 amendment to Rule 702 that explicitly incorporates the Daubert principles.
186. The counts of states vary wildly. Compare Hamilton, supra note 182, at 209 (counting
thirty-three states embracing Daubert principles), with States Move to Daubert, supra note 182, at
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CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF DAUBERT
In Daubert and its progeny, the Supreme Court attempted to bridge
the yawning gap between how reality is perceived and described, and
how problems are resolved, in science and the law. 87 In particular, the
Court sought to improve the legitimacy of judicial determinations involv-
ing science and technology by forcing courts to rigorously scrutinize the
foundations of an expert's scientific or technological opinions. This is a
messy task that requires both courts and lawyers to do the kind of rigor-
ous science they may have entered law to avoid. 188 By abandoning Frye's
"general acceptance" standard, which was based on the precept that
courts should defer to scientific communities to decide for themselves
whether a particular type of scientific approach should be recognized as
useful, Daubert switched the basic responsibility for making such deci-
sions to the courts, which on balance appears to make good sense. It is
hard to gainsay the Court's decision that trial judges should serve as
"gatekeepers" for expert testimony, as preliminary decision-makers of
whether a qualified expert witness has devoted as much rigor, and has
applied the same exacting methodologies, to the matter before the court
as the expert devotes to his or her own professional projects.
189
Daubert requires trial courts to look seriously at the quality of the
science or technology of a witness proferred as an expert. Courts can no
longer simply pass along to juries the principal task of determining the
validity of expert testimony on difficult questions at the margin of estab-
lished science. As door-closing rules governing the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, the Daubert principles are capable of being applied op-
pressively to smother the judicial airing of legitimate disputes. 190 Instead,
the courts need to apply the principles even-handedly--excluding expert
16l (counting twenty-six), with FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 12 n.8 (counting twenty-one). See
generally Joseph G. Eaton, Special Report: Frye/Daubert in the 50 States, 30 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB.
REP. 333, 338 (2002) (listing standards in every state).
187. For a smattering of cerebration on the perplexing borderland between law and science, see,
for example, ARIEL PORAT & ALEx STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2001), Troyen
A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-
Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 472 (1988), and Heidi Li Feldman, Science and
Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995).
188. See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer
for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563 (2000) (questioning courts' ability to comprehend
genuine scientific inquiry).
189. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); FED. R. EviD. 702
advisory committee's note, supplemental reliability factor (4).
190. See generally Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 873-74 (Neb. 2001) (noting
that while Daubert may be more lenient in that it allows more novel science into evidence, the test
"can also require a more exacting, expensive, and time consuming foundation"); Capra, supra note
9, at 705 (noting that "despite all the focus on aggressive gatekeeping, the practical impact of
Daubert is open to question"); Michael H. Graham, The Daubert Dilemma: At Last A Viable
Solution?, 179 F.R.D. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that the "Supreme Court sought to encourage liberal
admissibility by abolishing a strict Frye test").
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testimony insufficiently grounded in sound methodology, while allowing
such testimony that reasonably if boldly reaches into uncharted waters of
evolving knowledge.' 9' By requiring experts to provide reasoned bases
for their opinions, and by requiring that such opinions be relevant to the
legal issues in the case and grounded in reliable methodology, the reli-
ability and relevancy principles of Daubert, used properly, provide a firm
foundation for the fair and rational resolution of the scientific and tech-
nological issues which lie at the heart of products liability adjudication.
191. Moreover, trial judges must conduct their Daubert duties impartially and avoid giving an
appearance that they disbelieve a party's expert witnesses. See, e.g., Price v. Blood Bank of Del.,
Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1210 (Del. 2002).
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BIG BROTHER AT THE DOOR:
BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY WITH PRIVACY UNDER
THE USA PATRIOT ACT
PATRICIA MELLt
INTRODUCTION
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound
that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be
picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of
vision which the metal plaque commanded, he would be seen as well
as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment.
-from 1984, by George Orwell, originally published in 1949'
In the futuristic world created by George Orwell, there is no per-
sonal privacy. Citizens are watched and tracked every minute of the day
by the government.2 They are told that such surveillance is necessary to
keep them safe from the enemies of the state.3 The citizens are led to
believe that the uncertainties and insecurities of an open democracy war-
rants protection of their physical security and freedom from military ag-
gression by the ever present and ever watchful eye of Big Brother-the
government.4 In this futuristic world, homogeneity of thought and action
are safe.5 Divergent views or attitudes are quickly squelched by the gov-
ernment and declared a threat to the security of the state.6 This futuristic
f Professor of Law, Michigan State University - Detroit College of Law; A.B. with Honors,
Wellesley College, 1975; J.D., Case Western Reserve University Law School, 1978; Chair, Privacy
and Defamation Section, American Association of Law Schools, 2002-2003. The author wishes to
express her appreciation to those individuals that gave their assistance, technical and otherwise, to
this project. Individuals deserving of special thanks include the author's mother, Thelma W. Mell, a
constant source of support and inspiration, and her husband, Dr. Michael Ragland, MD. In addition,
thanks are extended to Professor Jose Anderson of the University of Baltimore Law School; Remona
Green and Carol Parker, Reference Librarians, Michigan State University - Detroit College of Law;
and Aretha Asamoah, the author's research assistant.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992) (1949).
2. See id. at 3, 26.
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world created by George Orwell has been dismissed by some as "science
fiction."7
Advances in computer and surveillance technology, as well as the
growth of Internet use, have combined to make the constant surveillance
of Orwell's novel a possibility. Many street intersections sport video
cameras in the attempt to monitor traffic violators.8 Thermal imaging 9
and spy satellites make it possible to observe the interior happenings of
the home. Telephone, e-mail, Internet activity, and all other manners of
electronic communication can be monitored.' ° Biometrics methods can
be used to identify and track an individual's movement in society." In
addition, it has been suggested that a National Identification Card be
instituted as a means of monitoring travel patterns.12 Many of these
methods can be used without an individual's knowledge.13 Today's tech-
nology has the potential to eliminate the area in which an individual can
legitimately declare privacy from the intrusion of the government. If
allowed to do so, the very fabric of our democratic society will change.
7. In the 1998 movie Enemy of the State, the surveillance techniques of Orwell's world were
shown to be science fact. ENEMY OF THE STATE (Touchstone Pictures 1998). In that movie, a
"Winston-like" character, played by Will Smith, discovered how little privacy the individual had at
the hands of unscrupulous government figures. Id.
8. In August 2001, Congress debated the constitutionality of cameras designed to catch
traffic offenders. 2001 Burrelle's Information Services, CBS News Transcripts, CBS Morning News
(CBS television broadcast, Aug. 1, 2001). At that time, only fifty cities in the United States had
installed surveillance cameras at traffic intersections. Id.
9. See id.
10. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act was a 1986 amendment to Title Iii of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which governed wiretaps. See 18 U.S.C. §§
2511-20 (2000). The amendment extended the protections of Title 111 to the Internet and other
digital technologies. See id. The following statement appears in the legislative history of the bill:
If Congress does not act to protect the privacy of our citizens, we may see the gradual
erosion of a precious right. Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection,
or it will gradually erode as technology advances. Additional legal protection is necessary
to ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment.
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-19 (1986).
11. Dana Hawkins, Body of Evidence, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Feb. 18,2002, at 60.
The new technologies establish a person's identity based on distinctive physical features.
Most include a scanner or camera and software for analyzing the images extracting key
features and digitizing the information. The system can then check the digital biometrics
against a database to verify identity. Some features such as the iris are distinctive enough
to allow a system to pick out one person among millions. Others such as hand proportions
are less powerful but still useful for verifying identity.
Id. Each method has benefits and failings. Id. The methods include: digital finger scan, hand scan,
face scan, iris scan, and signature and voice scan. Id.
12. See Mike France et al., Privacy in an Age of Terror, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 82.
13. See David Banisar, Big Brother Goes High-Tech, COVERT ACTION Q., available at
http:lmediafilter.orglcaq/CAQ56brother.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
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The United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the
right to privacy.' 4 However, the framers of the Constitution created the
Fourth Amendment to be the guardian of American civil liberties.' 5 By
ensuring freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion, the Bill' of
Rights guaranteed core principles.' 6 In combination with the First and
Fifth Amendments, "the Fourth Amendment safeguard[s] not only pri-
vacy and protection against self-incrimination, but [also] conscience and
human dignity and freedom of expression as well."' 7 Supported by a
range of procedural and substantive guidelines, the balance was main-
tained between the government's authority to regulate activity and the
individual's freedom of thought and action.
8
The weakening of the Fourth Amendment threatens these funda-
mental values. Unfortunately, recent circumstances have made it neces-
14. In addition to the Fourth Amendment, there are several federal statutes that protect the
privacy of the individual in specific contexts. These include the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §
552a (2000) (giving individuals the right to request access to records about themselves and to
prevent agency disclosure of personal information to third parties without consent); the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (2000) (amending the Privacy Act
to limit the collection of information from individuals and providing guidelines for matching data
about the same individual between agencies); the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §
2000aa(b) (2000) (establishing guidelines for the police in obtaining information from newspapers);
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (FPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000) (regulating the
manner that the government gains access to bank records about individuals; FPA was amended by
the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act], Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505b, 115 Stat.
272, 365 (2001)); the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. §
1232g (2000) (limiting disclosure of student records to third parties without the subject's permission;
FERPA was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115 Stat. 272, 367);
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681v (2000) (limiting the
disclosure of consumer reports, or investigative consumer reports, to third parties (e.g. government
or other users) by consumer reporting agencies; FCRA was also amended by the USA PATRIOT
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505c, 115 Stat. 272, 365); and the Video Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(2000) (preventing videotape service providers from disclosing personally identifiable information
concerning an individual's tape selection to third parties). For a discussion of these statutes and the
nature of the privacy interests protected, see Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual
Sunlight, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1 (1996).
15. "Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to
protect 'domestic security."' United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 314
(1972).
16. In this article, privacy will be used to describe freedom from governmental intrusion as
protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. "[T]he Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and
often have nothing to do with privacy at all." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
17. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, .J., dissenting). The Court, on
numerous occasions, has recognized the historical interdependence between the rights that are
protected in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482-86
(1965); Marcus v. Search Wan-ants of Property at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S.
717, 724-29 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18. See discussion infra Section L, and text accompanying notes 33-145.
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sary for us as a nation to critically assess our resolve to maintain these
values. On September 11, 2001, we witnessed in horror the terrorist at-
tacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The crash of the plane in
Pennsylvania still causes doubt as to the alleged target. On the ground, in
the air, and in the aftermath of these acts, thousands of people lost their
lives. t9 Along with the loss in human life, this nation lost its sense of
safety and security within its borders.
The government reacted quickly to the crisis with the passage of a
comprehensive act designed to assist law enforcement officials in detect-
ing terrorists. 20 The legislation is known as the Uniting and Strengthen-
ing America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act" or "PATRIOT
Act").2 ' On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the
PATRIOT Act into law.22
The PATRIOT Act is unprecedented in its amendment to provisions
that had previously checked the ability of the government to observe
everyday activities and obtain personal information about citizens.23 The
19. One year after the terrorist attack, the death toll was reported at 2,823. Brian Reade, 9/11:
Stats and Quotes, THE MIRROR, Sept. 11, 2002.
20. The USA PATRIOT Act was passed within seven weeks of the terrorist attacks. Thomas
Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http:thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). On October 2, 2001, the House introduced H.R. 2975, the
Uniting and Strengthening America ("USA Act") Act of 2001. Id. The Senate introduced companion
anti-terrorism legislation on October 4th-S. 1510, the Uniting and Strengthening ("USA Act") Act
of 2001. Id. On October 11 th, the Senate passed its anti-terrorism bill, followed by House passage of
its version on October 12th. On October 23rd, H.R. 3162, the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA
PATRIOT Act") was introduced in the House, which incorporated provisions of both the House and
Senate passed anti-terrorism bills. Id. On October 24th, the USA PATRIOT ACT passed both houses
of Congress by an overwhelming majority: in the House by a vote of 357-66, and in the Senate by a
vote of 98-1. Id. The President signed it into law two days later on October 26th. Id.
21. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272, 272-75. The 116 pages of the
USA PATRIOT Act are divided into ten sections designated as titles. Each title deals with the
enhancement of a different set of criminal and civil law enforcement. Title I - Enhancing Domestic
Security Against Terrorism; Title II - Enhanced Surveillance Procedures; Title III - International
Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001; Title IV - Protecting the
Border; Title V - Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism; Title VI - Providing for Victims
of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and Their Families; Title VII - Increased Information Sharing
for Critical Infrastructure Protection; Title VIII - Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against
Terrorism; Title IX - Improved Intelligence; Title X - Miscellaneous. Despite its title, several of the
provisions of the Act are not restricted to curtailing terrorism. Instead, many provisions are
permanent changes to the criminal justice system in the United States. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 371c, 115 Stat. 272, 337 (creating a criminal offense called "bulk cash
smuggling").
22. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
23. The USA PATRIOT Act does make some changes needed to keep law enforcement
techniques current with changes in technology; however, these changes have little to do with
terrorism. See id. § 816, 115 Stat. 272, 385 (establishing cybersecurity forensic training for law
enforcement).
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fact that it does so in such a potentially oppressive manner has not quite
hit the consciousness of the American people.24 Privacy, in the sense of
freedom from governmental intrusion, is a necessary foundation for the
free exercise of democracy. However, privacy remains an abstract con-
cept for the majority of Americans.25
By contrast, the horror of watching airplanes ramming into the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon was concrete. Thus, Americans
perceived that drastic measures were needed to prevent new attacks and
restore the sense of security rocked by September 11 th. The government
responded to this perceived need with the PATRIOT Act."
The PATRIOT Act attacks the balance between the government and
the individual by a systematic circumvention of established doctrine and
procedures guarding against unreasonable governmental intrusion. 27 It
expands the realm of foreign surveillance into the domestic arena.28 It
removes many instances of judicial oversight from the system and threat-
ens basic notions of freedom. It supersedes federal privacy protection
laws and creates new crimes that may impact the Bill of Rights.29 In
many ways, it has repealed traditional notions of checks and balances
between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the govern-
ment.30 This new standard of executive branch license, combined with a
24. Several of the provisions of the Act were challenged by a coalition of right and left wing
Congressmen and special interest groups. Attorney General Ashcroft derided them in his testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001. Dep't of Justice Oversight: Preserving
our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States).
He stated, "to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They
give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to America's friends." Id. The statement has the
unfortunate effect of giving credence to civil libertarians who value free speech.
25. Members of various minority groups may disagree, pointing to obsessive use of police
power in such things as traffic stops on less than probable cause, i.e. "driving while black." See
Adero S. Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW AND PSYCHOL. REV.
127 (2000). Even in these instances, however, there are procedures that redress the government's
abuses. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (granting a motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to the traffic stops of seventeen African-American males stopped
for minor traffic offenses; the court found prima facie evidence of racial discrimination on the part of
the state police).
26. The stated purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act is "[tlo deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
purposes." USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (introductory text).
27. See generally USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
28. See discussion infra note 32 on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
29. See id.
30. Although expressing some reservations, the pressing nature of the terrorist attacks may
have made some members of Congress less willing to object to some of the provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act. Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) was heard to complain that by naming the bill the
USA PATRIOT Act, members of Congress were being subtly coerced into voting for it or risk being
branded unpatriotic. Heather Forsgren Weaver, Balance Sways Between Privacy, Security Concerns,
RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Feb. 4, 2002, available at http://rcrnews.com/cgi-bin/search.pl.
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Fourth Amendment weakened by advances in surveillance technology,
could extinguish privacy under the Fourth Amendment and dramatically
change the nation.31
This article is an assessment of some provisions of the PATRIOT
Act and its severe retrenchment of the privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment. It reviews some of the established protections that balanced
the government's ability to intrude into the individual's sphere of pri-
vacy. This article also compares the traditional distinctions made be-
tween the heightened privacy protection standard under the Fourth
Amendment for domestic criminal investigations with the lowered stan-
dards accepted for investigations performed for the collection of foreign
intelligence under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
which figures so prominently in the PATRIOT Act. 32 Finally, this article
examines some provisions of the PATRIOT Act as they impact these
privacy protections.
I. THE PRE-PATRIOT ACT SCHEME OF CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
A. The Legitimacy of the Individual's Subjective Expectation of Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
33
While the Constitution does not specifically designate a right to pri-
vacy, the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment has been to "safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
31. See generally ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). A warning concerning the
effects of technology on the Fourth Amendment was given in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 465-66 (1928).
32. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") was enacted to provide guidelines to
the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") for the collection of intelligence on the activities of foreign
powers. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000). FISA was the Congressional response to a Senate report
documenting the flagrant unconstitutional surveillance perpetrated by governmental agencies on
domestic organizations critical to the administration. See discussion on Church Committee Report,
infra note 284. Before its amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA allowed surveillance
pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause that the purpose of the surveillance was the gathering
of foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-05. There were very narrowly proscribed
circumstances for domestic surveillance. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971 (2001). Special courts were established to hear applications
for FISA surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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governmental officials." 34 It has balanced the government's exercise of
its police power with the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
intrusions by the government. 35 The Fourth Amendment did not abolish
the government's power to conduct searches of private residences or to
seize papers found within. Instead, it imposed a reasonableness require-
ment upon governmental searches.36 Requiring a warrant, as a condition
precedent to a search, added judicial supervision to the government's
37exercise of its prerogative to intrude into the individual's private areas.
The probable cause standard gave judges a measure by which to decide
the appropriateness of the warrant and provided additional insurance that
groundless searches would not be allowed.38
The framers of the Constitution took great pains to provide a system
of checks against governmental action because of their own experiences
with the unreasonable and arbitrary searches performed by the English
colonial government's officials. 39 Through the writ of a general warrant
and writs of assistance, the English government had the power to search
anyplace for any thing.4n The use and abuse of such writs by the English
militia in colonial America was at the basis of the Fourth Amendment's
broad grant of protection to the people.4'
Both the warrant clause and reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment acted as buffers between the government and the individ-
ual.42 However, the Framers did not mean for the individual's privacy to
be absolute.43 The individual's private realm would suffer shifting bor-
34. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See supra note 14 for a list of some of
the federal statutory protections afforded to individuals.
35. "The Warrant Clause has stood as a barrier against intrusions by officialdom into the
privacies of life." United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 332 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
36. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
37. The requirement that the warrant be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate has its
basis in English common law. "[W]here practical, a governmental search and seizure should
represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the
magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises
or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a 'neutral and detached
magistrate."' U.S. Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 316.
38. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94, 95 n.61 (1937).
39. In Colonial America, the British would search the colonists' homes for evidence of
contraband and treason against the crown. See generally I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (1 st ed. 1978).
40. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1886).
41. See LASSON, supra note 38, at 80; see also Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, 1034 (1765) (describing the search of plaintiff's house under a general warrant).
42. See LAFAVE, supra note 39, §§ 1.1, 3.1 for a discussion on the operation of these clauses
of the Fourth Amendment.
43. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. It was later suggested that the states might be better able to
develop more expansive protections of individual privacy. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1977) ("State
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ders as the courts reinterpreted the permissible sphere of privacy before
society's varying needs. Advances in technology combined to shrink the
shield of the Fourth Amendment as a protector of privacy. With each
advance in surveillance technology, the Supreme Court adjusted its
analysis to reflect what it considered to be the legitimate sphere of pri-
vacy acceptable to society. 44 Determining the appropriate balance be-
tween the individual's privacy and the government's power to intrude
upon said privacy is one of the most litigated concepts under the Consti-
tution.45
B. Surveillance and Fourth Amendment Protection Before the PATRIOT
Act
Boyd v. United States46 was the first case to assess the modern pa-
rameters of the Fourth Amendment. It reflected the nineteenth century
notion of a very broad sphere of personal privacy.47 The United States
Supreme Court held the manner of intrusion to be irrelevant to the pri-
vacy being protected.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property,. . . it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and
constitutes the essence of [the Fourth Amendment] .48
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those
required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of
state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed."); cf Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (upholding a warrantless search by a city building inspector
acting under a city ordinance); Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the
Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 720, 726
(1988) (discussing whether a warrant requirement would impair the state's "special interests" by
interfering with the state's probation system).
44. A thorough review of the changing analysis of Fourth Amendment cases by the Supreme
Court is beyond the scope of this article. For that review, see Nadine Strossen, The Fourth
Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative
Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1175-76; Silas J. Wassertrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988).
45. "[lIt is beyond question that the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of more litigation
than any other provision in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, I would be willing to wager ... that...
lawyers and judges have spilled more words over the Fourth Amendment than all of the rest of the
Bill of Rights taken together." LAFAVE, supra note 39, at v; see also Jeffrey J. Skelton, Infrared
Imaging Technology: Threatening to See Through the Fourth Amendment, 29 IND. L. REV. 231, 234
n.23 (1995).
46. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
47. See LASSON, supra note 38, at 107-10.
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
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Boyd also fixed the outer perimeter of modem Fourth Amendment analy-
sis.49 It established the principle that the Fourth Amendment applied to
"all invasions on the part of the government and its employees [and was
not limited to] a man's home, [but encompassed all the] privacies of
life." 50 It is not surprising that the broad scope of Fourth Amendment
protection granted in Boyd was to be restricted in the face of the prob-
lems of fighting crime.5'
Olmstead v. United States52 was a severe retrenchment of privacy
protection under the Fourth Amendment. The case ushered in a balancing
approach of individual privacy versus society's need to fight crime using
the new technology of wiretaps.53 In Olmstead, the majority determined
that the Fourth Amendment protection against governmental intrusion
could only be based upon a physical intrusion into the allegedly private
space and applied to "material things - the person, the house, his papers,
or his effects. 54 Since the wiretap and "capture" of the telephone con-
versations were not physical evidence, "[t]here was no searching[,]
[t]here was no seizure... , [t]here was no entry of the houses or offices
of the defendants., 55 Thus, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to gov-
ernment wiretaps.
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis predicted the wave of technological
advancement and its encroachment upon the individual's right to pri-
56vacy. As one of the first defenders of the right to privacy, Brandeis
viewed the Fourth Amendment as giving citizens protection against
49. See id. at 622-38; see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (holding that
evidence of unlawful seizure is not admissible); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309, 311-12
(1921) (holding that property seizure in a lawful manner may be admissible); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (concluding that evidence obtained in an improper
way is not admissible and shall not be used); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 398 (1914)
(holding that the trial court erred in admitting and using evidence that was illegally obtained by a
United States marshal).
50. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
51. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Present and Future Fourth Amendment, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 111 (1995) (discussing judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by the United
States Supreme Court); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1977) (analyzing the broad shifts
in legal thought affecting the United States Supreme Court's view on individual rights and how
those shifts have affected the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); The Life and Times of Boyd v. United
States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977-78) (discussing changing societal and judicial
notions of property and privacy since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Boyd).
52. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
53. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 464-71.
54. Id. at 464.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it possible
for the government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure
in court of what is whispered in the closet.").
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every "unjustifiable intrusion by the government . . . .whatever the
means employed.
' 57
In delivering the majority opinion in Olmstead, Justice Taft was not
without concern for the protection of the individual's privacy in the face
of government surveillance.5 8 He suggested that the lack of Fourth
Amendment protection could be remedied by legislative enactment.59
Congress responded with the enactment of the Federal Communications
Act. 
60
In the years after Olmstead, the privacy protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment continued to narrow. In the 1940s and 1950s, the
Supreme Court maintained its restrictive application of Fourth Amend-
ment protection to telephone wiretapping61 and declined to apply it to a
variety of types of government surveillance activities based solely on the
lack of a physical intrusion into the area sought to be held private.62 This
physical presence requirement promulgated by the Court and integrated
into its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was laid to rest in Katz v.
United States.
63
Katz is important on a number of fronts. Most importantly, it
changed the nature of Fourth Amendment analysis from a trespass model
to one based on the protection of people, not places.6 In Katz, the defen-
dant was under investigation for violations of a federal statute that pro-
57. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis was the co-author of one of the first
studies of privacy in the modem age. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 (1890).
58. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66.
59. Id.
60. In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act, formerly Title VI, § 605, 48
Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1969)). Currently, section 605 reads in pertinent
part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person .. . .No person having received any
intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof)
knowing that such communication was intercepted shall divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part
thereof), or use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000).
61. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1942).
62. See id.; see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (per curiam) (finding
listening device implanted into a party-wall did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1961) (holding § 605 of the Federal Communications Act
inapplicable to conversations heard by virtue of a foot long spike mike); Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 749, 751 (1952) (holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable to conversation from wire
placed on the body of an individual).
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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hibited knowingly transmitting wagering information in interstate com-
merce, a domestic crime.65 A creature of habit, the defendant tended to
use a particular public telephone booth to place calls.6 6 The police cor-
rectly anticipated that the defendant would use the same telephone on a
particular day and at a particular time.67 The government attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone
booth, allowing agents to monitor and record the defendant's half of sev-
eral conversations.6 s These conversations confirmed that he was taking
and placing illegal wagers from the telephone.69 Over the defendant's
objection, the government introduced evidence of the telephone conver-
sations at trial.7°
The government's argument to admit the conversations was based
on the trespass model of Fourth Amendment analysis.71 Pursuant to this
view, the interception of the conversation did not constitute a search
since a search could only occur if there had been a physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area.72 If the Court followed precedent and
accepted the government's argument, then the surveillance would have
successfully met the constitutional challenge.73 Instead, the Court repudi-
ated that view and held that the defendant had a justifiable expectation of
privacy while using the telephone booth.74 Consequently, the interception
of the conversation constituted a search and seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment and the evidence should be suppressed.75
In reaching its determination, the Court returned to the broad, gen-
eral scope of Fourth Amendment protection developed in Boyd. Accord-
ing to the Court,
[Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
76
65. Id. at 354.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 352-53.
72. Id. at 353.
73. Id. at 352-53 (citing Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-36 (1942); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464,
466).
74. Id. at 353 ("We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling.").
75. See id. at 359.
76. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
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This broader view of privacy did not make the Fourth Amendment into a
general constitutional right of privacy.77 It did, however, reestablish the
Fourth Amendment as the individual's guardian against unreasonable
government intrusion.
By itself, the majority opinion changed the direction of Fourth
Amendment analysis, but it is for Justice Harlan's concurrence that Katz
is best known. 78 Justice Harlan established the current two-step analysis
of Fourth Amendment issues.79 Under this model, the subject of the
search must first have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, the individual's expectation of privacy must be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable., 80 The benchmark of
the protection became the sphere of privacy recognized by society as
being legitimate under the circumstances. 8' Since Katz, the bifurcated
inquiry has been used with each new technological advance in surveil-
lance techniques.
82
A less familiar part of the Katz decision foreshadows issues that
may arise concerning the government's use of its expanded surveillance
powers under the PATRIOT Act-the warrant requirement. After deter-
mining that the Fourth Amendment applied to the facts presented in Katz,
the Court's final issue was whether the search and seizure conducted by
the government, without a warrant, complied with constitutional stan-
dards.83 Since the surveillance was conducted without a warrant, it either
had to fit one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement or be ad-
judged unreasonable. 84 The government tried to establish the reasonable-
ness of its surveillance and described the actions of its agents as being
very limited in both scope and duration.85 In fact, on the one occasion
77. Id. at 350.
78. See id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
82. The Fourth Amendment has been held to cover searches other than those of homes.
Among the government actions deemed to constitute a Fourth Amendment search are: searches
conducted of cars, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), telephones through the use of
listening devices, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), and other electronic means such
as pen registers, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979), electronic monitoring devices,
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1985), aerial surveillance, Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986), and thermal imaging devices, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34-35 (2001). However, the subject of the search was not always successful in asserting Fourth
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162; Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46; Karo, 468
U.S. at 706; and Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-59.
84. See id. at 357 & n.19 ("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
85. See id. at 354.
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that the agents intercepted the statements of another person, "the agents
refrained from listening to them.,
86
Rather than grant the retroactive validity requested by the govern-
ment, the Court recognized that the facts supported the conclusion that
had a warrant been applied for, it could have been granted by a duly au-
thorized magistrate.87 The Court decided that a judicial order could have
accommodated the legitimate needs of law enforcement by authorizing
the carefully limited use of surveillance. Such an order would have pro-
tected the individual's privacy by allowing "no greater invasion of pri-
vacy than was necessary under the circumstances. 8
While recognizing that the essence of electronic surveillance rested
on a lack of notice to the subject under investigation, the Court refused to
create an exception to the warrant requirement for the police.89
Omission of such authorization 'bypasses the safeguards provided by
an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes in-
stead the far less reliable procedure of an after the event justification
for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar
shortcomings of hindsight judgment.' And bypassing a neutral prede-
termination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from
Fourth Amendment violations 'only in the discretion of the police.'
90
Notwithstanding the limited nature of the search conducted by the offi-
cials in Katz, the Court decided that by pursuing the wiretap without first
securing a warrant, the government had "ignored the procedure of ante-
cedent justification.., that is central to the Fourth Amendment, a proce-
dure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of elec-
tronic surveillance involved in this case." 9'
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has recognized instances in which
a warrant is not a necessary condition precedent to a valid domestic
[The agents] did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the
petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone
in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other states in violation of
federal law .... The agents confined their surveillance to brief periods during which he
used the telephone booth, and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of
the petitioner himself.
Id.
86. Id. at 354 n. 15.
87. Id. at 356-57.
88. Id. at 355-56 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967)). In an earlier case, the
Court had held that an "order authorizing the use of the electronic device in Osborn afforded similar
protections to those of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence." Id. at
355-56 (citing Berger, 388 U.S. at 57) (internal quotations omitted).
89. Id. at 358.
90. Id. at 358-59 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379'U.S. 89, 95, 97 (1964)).
91. Id. at 359; see also discussion infra Section I. and notes 246-403, concerning warrant
requirements and surveillance done for the protection of national security.
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search.92 The circumstances include searches incident to arrest,93 "stop
and frisk" searches, 94 automobile searches,95 searches at immigration
ports of entry to the United States,96 and searches of closed containers in
automobiles that have been lawfully stopped.97
Since Katz, the Court has been consistent in holding that if the gov-
ernment intrusion is a search, the person invoking the protection of the
Fourth Amendment will only be successful if he can claim a legitimate
98and justifiable expectation of privacy from the government's intrusion.
As opposed to this precept lending strength to privacy protection under
the Fourth Amendment, subsequent cases would constrict the situations
in which a justifiable expectation of privacy is found.99 In many of these
92. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (extending the automobile exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to closed containers found in lawfully stopped and
searched vehicles); see also Lewis R. Katz, Criminal Law: United States v. Ross: Evolving
Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172 (1983) (examining
implications to areas relating to the Fourth Amendment after the Supreme Court's decision in Ross).
93. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."); Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (holding that where police in the course of station-house questioning took
samples from the respondent's fingernails there was not an improper search under the Fourth
Amendment); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (explaining exigent circumstances);
see generally Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (expanding police authority to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles carrying contained containers); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759, 762-63 (1969)
(discussing that searches incident to arrest are limited and, when at all possible, police must attempt
to obtain judicial approval through warrant procedure).
94. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-31 (1968) (discussing that police officer's conduct of
stop and frisk cannot automatically be considered outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment, but
rather must be reviewed under a reasonableness standard).
95. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147-49, 151-
53 (establishing that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile may be
searched without a search warrant).
96. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (discussing searches upon entering
the United States); see also United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussing searches upon leaving the United States).
97. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 798 (finding a warrantless search of closed containers in
automobiles valid); see also Katz, supra note 92, at 172 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court extended the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to closed containers found in
lawfully stopped and searched vehicles.").
98. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding an automobile has a different
expectation of privacy than a dwelling); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (ruling the
Fourth Amendment protects people from government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (explaining that a court will examine
documents to.see if contents were within defendant's expectation of privacy); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding compelled execution of voice and handwriting samples not
to be within defendant's expectation of privacy); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973) (ruling no expectation of protected privacy in situation where an accountant is obligated to
disclose information); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 ("[W]here an individual may harbor a reasonable
expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.").
99. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (allowing use of sense-enhancing technology in use generally by
the public); Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (holding an unmonitored beeper to not violate anyone's privacy
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cases, the governmental intrusion was aided by enhanced surveillance
technology. °° With each new surveillance technique, the Supreme Court
attempted to refine the notion of privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment. ' As, a result, the parameters of privacy rights that may be pro-
tected are in flux. The fluidity of this situation makes the warrant re-
quirement a lynchpin for the protection of privacy.
1. Thermal Imaging' °2
In most cases addressing the use of a "new technology" by law en-
forcement officers to conduct a search, courts have to consider the ques-
tion of whether use of the new technology constitutes a search. Initially,
the determination of whether the electronic surveillance can be character-
ized as being a search depends on whether the technology is intrusive
into the target area. 10 3 If the method is not intrusive, it is not a search
requiring the protection of the Fourth Amendment and the failure to ob-
tain a warrant will not defeat the use of the evidence found in the target
area. 104
In United States v. Penny-Feeney,0 5 for instance, a "non-intrusive"
Forward Looking Infrared Device ("FLIR") was used in a fly-over of a
suspect's residence. 10 6 An officer used a FLIR to detect the existence of
surface waste heat, which can be the incidental by-product of energy
sources used to cultivate marijuana. 0 7 Based on the results from the
FLIR flyover, police obtained a search warrant for the defendants' resi-
dence. 0 8 In the search, they discovered evidence of marijuana produc-
tion. 1 9 In denying the defendants' motion to suppress, the district court
held that the defendants did not manifest an actual expectation of privacy
interests); Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (ruling people have no reasonable expectation of privacy when
dialing phone numbers); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991)
(finding no expectation of privacy in heat voluntarily vented from garage).
100. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35 (using a thermal imaging device to detect heat from heat
lamps used to grow marijuana).
101. See id. at 34 (allowing use of sense-enhancing technology in use generally by the public);
Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (holding an unmonitored beeper to not violate anyone's privacy interests);
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (ruling people have no reasonable expectation of privacy when dialing phone
numbers); Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226 (finding no expectation of privacy in heat voluntarily
vented from garage).
102. "Thermal imaging is a passive, non-intrusive instrument which detects differences in
temperature on the surface of objects being observed. It does not send any beams of rays into the
area on which it is fixed or in any way penetrate structures within that area." Penny-Feeney, 773 F.
Supp. at 223.
103. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463-64.
104. See id. at 464-65.
105. 773 F. Supp. 220.
106. Id. at 223-24.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 224.
109. Id.
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in the heat waste since they voluntarily vented it outside the garage
where it would be exposed to the public and in no way attempted to im-
pede its escape or exercise dominion over it. 1° Likening the heat waste
to garbage left on the street, the district court made it clear that even if
the defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not one
that society was prepared to recognize as legitimate."'
Considering the validity of warrantless thermal imaging surveillance
in Kyllo v. United States,"2 the Court determined that the use of sense-
enhancing technology to gather any information regarding the interior of
a home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into constitutionally protected areas constituted a search." 13 The
lower courts had held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of privacy
"because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his
home.... [E]ven if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because the imager did not expose any intimate details of
Kyllo's life, only amorphous hotspots on the roof and exterior wall. ' " 4
However, the Supreme Court held that the use of thermal imaging to
measure heat emanating from a home was a search, at least where the
technology in question was not in general public use." 5 As such, the
search was presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.
In making its decision, the Court tried to preserve some measure of
privacy against governmental intrusion that existed at the inception of the
Fourth Amendment in the eighteenth century. 116 When promulgated, the
Fourth Amendment protected the interior of the home.' 7 Using that ba-
sis, the Court secured for the home a minimal and reasonable expectation
of privacy."18
To withdraw protection of this minimal expectation would be to per-
mit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. [Thus,] obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
110. Id. at 226.
11. See id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1987)).
112. 533 U.S. 27. Kyllo's facts are substantially similar to those of Peeny-Feeney. In Kyllo, the
police suspected that the target was growing marijuana in his home and used a thermal imaging
device to determine if the heat emanating from it was consistent with that which would be created by
the high energy lamps required for marijuana growth. Id. at 29. The scan did show significantly
higher heat emanations coming from the target's home as compared to those of his neighbors. Id. at
30. Based in part on the thermal imaging, a judge issued a search warrant for Kyllo's home where
agents found marijuana growing. Id. Kyllo was indicted on federal drug charges and moved,
unsuccessfully, to suppress the seized evidence. Id. at 29-30.
113. Id. at 40.
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information regarding the interior of the home that could not other-
wise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area constitutes a search--at least where . . . the
technology in question is not in general public use.l9
2. Electronic Beepers
120
In United States v. Karo,121 the police 'bugged' a can of ether with
an electronic beeper and monitored its movement through a series of
private houses and privately rented storage facilities without a warrant.
12 2
Using evidence from both the beeper and actual observation of sites, the
police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the target's premises
and found cocaine, allowing the suspects to be arrested. 23 The district
court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the seized evidence,
charging that the initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid. 124 This
illegal conduct by the government tainted the resulting seizure.1
25
The Supreme Court decided that the original installation of the
beeper did not violate anyone's Fourth Amendment rights, but cautioned
against the use of such techniques without a warrant.
126
Despite this holding, warrants for the installation and monitoring of a
beeper will obviously be desirable since it may be useful, even criti-
cal, to monitor the beeper to determine that it is actually located in a
place not open to visual surveillance.... [S]uch monitoring without a
warrant may violate the Fourth Amendment.1
27
The Court then addressed the privacy concerns raised by the monitoring
of a beeper in a private residence in a location not open to visual surveil-
lance. 128 The Court determined this to be a violation of the justifiable
119. Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
120. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that
can be picked up by a radio receiver." Karo, 468 U.S. at 707 n.l (citing United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 277 (1983)).
121. 468 U.S. 705. Karo is distinguishable from Knotts by the fact that although a beeper had
been placed in a 5-gallon can of chloroform, the movements of the car and the arrival of the can at
the cabin could have been observed by the naked eye. Id. at 707. As such, no Fourth Amendment
violation was committed by monitoring the beeper during the trip to the cabin. Id.
122. Id. at 708. Through an informant, police learned that the targets had bought a number of




125. Id. The government appealed and the decision was affirmed on slightly different grounds
by the court of appeals. Id.
126. Id. at 713. There was no violation because the informant who consented to the addition of
the beeper owned the ether cans. Id. at 711.
127. Id. at 713 n.3.
128. Id. at 714.
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interest in privacy held by the members of the residence. 129 "Indiscrimi-
nate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view
would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to
escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight."'130 Despite
this, the monitoring of the beeper revealed nothing about the contents of
the rented locker where the ether was stored and, as such, the use of the
beeper was not a search of the locker. 13' The specific locker containing
the ether was detected by its distinctive smell, 32 and the police subse-
quently observed the can of ether being moved from that locker to the
home. 33 All of these activities were in plain view and constituted no
Fourth Amendment violations. 134 As such, the Court reversed the sup-
pression of the evidence. 1
35
3. Aerial Surveillance
The Court has not been willing to extend the individual's legitimate
sphere of privacy beyond the confines of the home to include the home's
backyard. 136 In California v. Ciraolo,137 the Court determined that a na-
ked eye police inspection of an individual's backyard from a fixed wing
aircraft at one thousand feet was not a search. 138 Even though the area
was within the curtilage of the home, that fact alone did not bar police
observation. 139 Likewise, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States,140
the Supreme Court held that the use of aerial photography to conduct a
site inspection under the Clean Air Act was not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.'
4
As a result of these cases, the individual's sphere of protection from
unreasonable governmental intrusion has been progressively whittled
129. Id.
130. Id. at716.





136. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
137. 476 U.S. 207.
138. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (citing Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239); see also Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (holding that aerial surveillance from a helicopter in public
navigable airspace was non-intrusive and did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
139. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83
(1984).
140. 476 U.S. 227.
141. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239. The intimate activities associated with family privacy
and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures
and buildings of a manufacturing plant. Id. For purposes of aerial surveillance, the open area of an
industrial complex is more comparable to an "open field" in which an individual may not
legitimately demand privacy. id.
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away. 142 It has been diminished even under circumstances in which the
subject of the surveillance took steps to secure the area from prying eyes
and in situations in which the government used increasingly circumspect
methods of surveillance.14 3 The juggling of the sphere's parameters has
resulted in uncertain standards for the individual's privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. 144
While it may not be clear what the parameters are, the Supreme
Court has attempted to fashion protections based upon its sense of the
framers' intent. However, the PATRIOT Act has redrawn the lines of the
individual's privacy by expanding the type of information susceptible to
government acquisition. 145 This expansion reduces the realm in which the
individual can have an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment, which impacts other civil liberties.
II. RESTRICTION OF THE LEGITIMATE SPHERE OF PRIVACY BY THE
PATRIOT ACT'S AMENDMENT OF PRIVACY PROTECTION LAWS
A. Disclosure of Sensitive Information Under the PATRIOT Act
Current laws shape the parameters of the individual's sphere of pri-
vacy by declaring that certain information is not to be disclosed to third
parties, including the government, except under specified extraordinary
circumstances. 146 The PATRIOT Act makes the disclosure of highly sen-
sitive information routine between a large number of law enforcement
agencies and other government personnel. 147 The broad dissemination of
information collected for different reasons, some under standards requir-
ing much less than probable cause, could negatively impact the individ-
ual's ability to exercise guaranteed civil liberties.
Provisions of the PATRIOT Act eliminate prevailing privacy pro-
tection laws, further diminishing the individual's sphere of privacy.1
48
Section 505 of the Act amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act,149 the Fi-
nancial Right to Privacy Act, 50 and the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act, 151 to allow government access to personal information upon
142. See LaFave, supra note 51, at 121.
143. Seeid. at 112-14.
144. Id. at 121. Furthermore, none of the aerial surveillance cases dealt with the propriety of
spy satellite surveillance that would be possible for regular law enforcement through the expansion
of CIA authority under FISA. Id. at 113.
145. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365-66 (2001).
146. See supra note 14 for a list of federal statutes limiting the disclosure of personal
information.
147. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504, 115 Stat. 272, 364.
148. See, e.g., id. § 217, 115 Stat. 272, 291 ("Interception of Computer Trespasser
Communications").
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (2000).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2000).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2000).
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"certification" by an FBI agent that the records are relevant to "an inves-
tigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelli-
gence activities."1 52 Before the amendment, each of those sections spe-
cifically provided government access to the records but, in addition to
relevance, also required the government to show that the target of the
investigation was "an agent of a foreign power."'' 53 Section 505 removes
the "agent of a foreign power" requirement, and as such, greatly expands
government access to a multitude of private records without significant
judicial review. 54 In combination with the government's newly enlarged
domestic surveillance powers under FISA, Section 505 gives the gov-
ernment unprecedented ability to compile dossiers on private citizens.
1 55
In addition to the amendment of these three privacy statutes, the
PATRIOT Act also amends the Family Education Rights and Privacy
Act ("FERPA") 5 6 to allow nonconsensual disclosure of student re-
cords. 57 FERPA previously limited the disclosure of student records to
third parties without the consent of the student or parents. 58 Section 507
amends FERPA to permit access to these educational records in the in-
vestigation of domestic or international terrorism, or national security. 1
59
To secure these records, the government only has to certify that the re-
cords are relevant to such an investigation. 60 The application is heard ex
parte, which precludes the target from contesting disclosure of the in-
formation.' 6' There is no meaningful review by a court, since the court
must issue the order as long as the application contains the certifica-
tion. 62 Section 507 does say that an investigation of a "United States
person" may not be pursued "solely on the basis of activities protected by
the First Amendment," but such a statement is not required to be in the
certification to the court.1 63 Without meaningful judicial oversight, this
provision could be used to chill First Amendment speech.
152. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365.
153. Id. §§ 505(a)(2), 505(b), 505(c), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681u, 12 U.S.C. §
3414(a)(5)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)).
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
157. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115 Stat. 272, 368 (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1232g).
158. 20 U.S.C § 1232g(a)(l). The records protected include information concerning both
students' and parents' finances, confidential letters of recommendation, and students' educational
records, including records of students in primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational
programs. Id.




163. See id. § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365.
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In several sections, the PATRIOT Act expands the scope of infor-
mation subject to disclosure to the government. 64 In many instances,
these invasions of the individual's privacy are not subject to judicial re-
view.165
B. Expanded Scope of Subpoenas for Records of Electronic Communica-
tions
Section 2703 of Title 18 of the United States Code governs law en-
forcement's access to records concerning electronic communications
services.' 66 Under a prior subsection of this provision, a service provider
was required to disclose to a government entity "the name, address, local
and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or
other subscriber number or identity and length of service of a subscriber
and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized., 167 Section
210 of the PATRIOT Act removes access to the "the types of services
the subscriber utilized," but expands the type of information that a pro-
vider must disclose to include "records of sessions times and durations,"
"any temporarily assigned network address," and any means or source of
payment, "including any credit card or bank account number."' 168 As op-
posed to narrowing the scope of information subject to disclosure, the
new categories potentially expose more personal information about the
target than was previously available. 69 This could have a negative im-
pact on the privacy of all subscribers since it applies to all government
investigations, not just investigations of suspected terrorist activity.
70
The potentially negative impact on privacy is compounded by the fact
that this broader range of information is available to the government
merely through the use of a subpoena.1 71
The PATRIOT Act's reduction of the individual's sphere of privacy
makes the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause even more
important to the'protection of the individual's privacy. Any enactment
that increases the scope of information subject to government access, but
which reduces judicial oversight of the government's efforts at collec-
tion, depresses privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment even
further. Several provisions of the PATRIOT Act have that effect by al-
lowing electronic surveillance to be performed by law enforcement
164. See id. §§ 505, 507, 115 Stat. 272, 365, 367.
165. See id.
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (approved Oct. 21, 2002).





171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(B)(i); see also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 210,
115 Stat. 272, 283.
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agencies not subject to the warrant and probable cause requirements un-
der FISA. 1
72
C. Probable Cause as Protection of Privacy
The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment
demands that the showing of justification match the degree of intru-
sion. By its very nature electronic eavesdropping for a 60-day period,
even of a specified office, involves a broad invasion of a constitution-
ally protected area. Only the most precise and rigorous standard of
probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort. 
173
Probable cause is the foundation upon which a search warrant may
issue. 74 It does not prevent the government from searching private areas;
rather, it establishes the constitutional standard that must be met for gov-
ernmental intrusion to be valid.175 Probable cause is based upon evidence
that establishes more than "a mere suspicion" that a crime is about to be
committed by the target of the investigation.176 It exists where "the facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is
being committed."
' 177
It is not an inflexible rule; it is a "non-technical conception of af-
fording compromise accommodating opposing interests of citizens who
are to be safeguarded from unreasonable interferences with privacy and
of officers who are charged with enforcing the law."' 7 8 The probable
cause required for warrantless searches has fluctuated based upon the
perceived intrusiveness of the search, although a uniform standard is
viewed as a preferable guide to the police. 179 Due to the highly intrusive
172. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 210, 115 Stat. 272, 283; see also
discussion on FISA supra note 32.
173. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
174. Berger, 388 U.S. at 49.
175. Id. at 64 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
176. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
177. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
178. See id. at 176. In this case, the search was of an automobile moving on a public highway
and was made without a warrant by federal officers enforcing the liquor laws. Id. at 165. The
warrantless search and seizure was the result of months of investigative work in which the targets
had offered to sell illicit liquor to undercover police officers. Id. at 164. The car and license plate
used by the targets had been linked to the targets and they had been observed driving on the most
used route for the introduction of illicit liquor in the United States. Id. All of these facts constituted
the probable cause necessary to stop and search the car without a warrant. Id.
179. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1968) (allowing probable cause to be
based upon "reasonable legislative or administrative standards of conducting an area inspection
which are satisfied with respect to a particular building"). However, the Court declined to adopt a
more extended use of this balancing process. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14
(1979) ("A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time
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nature of electronic surveillance, the probable cause standard should be
maintained.180
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Berger v. New York foreshadowed
the adoption of Title IH of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 and the extensive probable cause requirements required for
electronic surveillance.'
8'
I also join the opinion because it condemns electronic surveillance,
for its similarity to the general warrants out of which our Revolution
sprang and allows a discreet surveillance only on a showing of 'prob-
able cause.' These safeguards are minimal if we are to live under a
regime of wiretapping and other electronic surveillance.
... [E]ven though it is limited in time, it is the greatest of all
invasions of privacy. It places the government agent in the bedroom,
in the business conference, in the social hour, in the lawyer's office--
everywhere and anywhere a 'bug' can be placed.
182
D. The Warrant Requirement as a Protection of Privacy
The warrant requirement is based in the Fourth Amendment as a
condition precedent to a lawful search by the government.' 83 A variety of
statutes established procedural guidelines to law enforcement officials
executing warrants to search areas within the individual's putative sphere
of privacy.184 One of the statutory requirements was that prior to the en-
try of the target's premises, the officer must have given notice to the tar-
get of the search, of the officer's authority, and of the purpose to enter
the premises.' 85 The notice requirement served several purposes, not the
least of which was to protect privacy by minimizing the chance of entry
of the wrong premises. Even when there was no mistake, notice allowed
those within a brief time to prepare for the police entry.
86
The rule was not inflexible. 87 While it did require federal officers to
serve the subject of the search with a copy of the warrant and a receipt
and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.").
180. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 62-63.
181. See id. at 64-68 (Douglas, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 64-65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3101 (approved Oct. 11, 2002)).
185. Id.
186. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 172. Other purposes include: (i) decreasing the potential for
violence, as an unannounced entry could lead an individual to believe his safety was in peril and
cause him to take defensive measures; and (ii) preventing the physical destruction of property by
giving the occupant an opportunity to admit the officer. Id.
187. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that Rule 41(d)
does not impose "an inflexible requirement of prior notice" (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 355 n.16 (1967)).
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that described the material obtained, it did not require that the notice be
given before the search took place. 88 This approach recognized that
there were circumstances under which prior or even contemporaneous
notification to the target of the execution of the search might compro-
mise an ongoing investigation. 189 In those cases, a delayed notice excep-
tion was recognized for reasonable cause shown if the officers searched
the premises but did not seize any property.' 90 The officers then had to
demonstrate a good reason for the delay and had to provide the notice
within a reasonable period after the search, generally no more than seven
days. 191 In addition, if the search took place when the owner of the prem-
ises was not present, the owner would receive notice that the premises
had been lawfully searched pursuant to a warrant, rather than burglar-
ized. 192 "The mere thought of strangers walking through and visually
examining the center of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our pas-
sion for freedom as does nothing else. That passion, the true source of
the Fourth Amendment, demands that surreptitious entries be closely
circumscribed."'
193
E. The Warrant Requirement and "Sneak and Peek'' 194 Authority Under
the PATRIOT Act
Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act amends the warrant provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3103a in several respects. 195 It allows delayed notice for rea-
sonable cause in concert with existing precedent, but allows for the sei-
zure of property for "reasonable necessity," a vague standard under exist-
ing law. 196 The most serious problem with section 213, however, is a
188. See Nordelli v. United States, 24 F.2d 665, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1928).
189. See Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1336 (holding that the "Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per
se a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging
equipment" (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979))); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 355
n.16 ("[O]fficers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search
if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical
evidence.").
190. See Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (citing Dalia, 441 U.S. at 248; Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16).
Searches without seizures are "less intrusive than a conventional search with physical seizure
because the latter deprives the owner not only of privacy but also of the use of his property." Id.
"The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in
the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
191. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (citing United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.
1986)).
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3101 (approved Oct. 11, 2002)).
193. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456.
194. Kevin Corr, Sneaky But Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek Search Warrants, 43 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1103 (1995).
195. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 286.
196. See Field Guidance on New Authorities (Redacted) Enacted in 2001, Anti Terrorism
Legislation, at § 213, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorismi/DOJ-guidance.pdf (last
visited Oct. 28, 2002) (citing Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337; United States v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121,
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reflection of the uncertain meaning of "reasonable period after the
search.' ' 197 Recognizing that the requirement of notice within a reason-
able period must be based upon the circumstances of each case, the juris-
dictions range from seven to forty-five days as being reasonable and
therefore constitutional. 98 Some authority suggests that a reasonable
period could be even longer. 1
99
The PATRIOT Act could have used this opportunity to clarify an
existing problem in the law. However, section 213 essentially allows the
government to delay the notice indefinitely, since the reasonable post-
search notification period may be extended by the court for "good cause
shown., 200 This broadening of the exception is not limited to investiga-
tions of suspected terrorist activity. 20 The expansion includes searches of
areas that contain material constituting evidence of any criminal offenses
in violation of the laws of the United States.20 2 This provision is not sub-
ject to the sunset provision of section 224 and is therefore a permanent
feature of the federal criminal code.20 3
F. Pen Registers
2 °4
A warrant supported by probable cause is generally required when
the government intends to intercept the content of the target's mes-
sages.20 5 When they first became available with ordinary line telephone
126 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Ibarra, 725 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (D. Wyo. 1989))
[hereinafter Anti Terrorism Legislation Field Guidance].
197. See id.
198. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337 (stating that the initial delay should be seven days and only
extended with good cause, and relying on the argument that the Constitution itself required prompt
notice and that "[sluch time should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of
necessity" (citing Freitas, 800 F. 2d at 1456)). But see United States v. Pangbum, 983 F.2d 449,
454-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the notice requirement found in Rule 41(d) is not required by the
Fourth Amendment and stating that the court, in Villegas, did not determine that a warrant was
unconstitutional for failure to provide proper notice); United States v. Simons, 206 F. 3d 392, 403
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 45 day delay in notice of execution of warrant does not render search
unconstitutional); see also Anti Terrorism Legislation Field Guidance, supra note 196, § 213.
199. See Anti Terrorism Legislation Field Guidance, supra note 196, § 209 (citing Simons, 206
F.3d at 403).




204. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (stating that Pre-PATRIOT
Act, a pen register was defined as "a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It
did not overhear oral communications and did not indicate whether calls are actually completed.").
This was not the content of the conversations themselves. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
205. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 68 (Stewart, J., concurring). The interception of content in
messages for extended periods of time is "a broad invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Only
the most precise and rigorous standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort." Id.
(Stewart, J., concurring). This view is reflected in the elaborate system of probable cause required
for wiretaps under Title III. See id. at 64-66 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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systems, pen registers did not capture content; they only caught the tele-
phone numbers dialed by the target from a particular telephone. 2 6 For
this reason, a court would grant the order to install and use a pen register
on the government's certification "that the information [was] likely to be
obtained by such installation and use [was] relevant to an ongoing crimi-
nal investigation. 2 7 The statute required the court to issue the order
upon seeing the certification and did not permit judicial review of the
government's judgment. 20 8 A judge in the telephone service provider's
jurisdiction could issue the order.2°
In Smith v. Maryland,21° the Supreme Court determined that the in-
dividual did not have a legitimate privacy interest in the telephone num-
bers he dialed.211 There, the police chose a suspected burglar as a target
for surveillance. 2 After the burglary, the target made a series of harass-
ing calls to the victim and drove by her home.1 3 Pursuant to her descrip-
tion of the car and man, police spotted the target and recorded his license
plate number.1 4 After identifying Michael Lee Smith as the registered
owner of the car, the police requested that the telephone company "in-
stall[] a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed
from the telephone in [Smith's] home.,,215 The pen register confirmed
that Smith had called the victim's telephone number from his home.21 6
Admitting the pen register tape into evidence, the trial court convicted
Smith, "holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.,
21 7
Despite the fact that Smith used his home telephone, the Supreme
Court found that he had "no actual expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not 'le-
206. See N.Y Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161 n..
207. 8 U.S.C. § 3123 (2000) (amended 2001). This statute lacks "almost all of the significant
privacy protections found in Title III, the statute governing the interception of the actual 'content' of
a communication (e.g., a phone conversation or the text of an e-mail message)." Electronic Privacy
Info. Ctr., Analysis of Provisions of the Proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 Affecting the Privacy
of Communications and Personal Information (Sept. 24, 2001), at www.epic.org/privacy/-
terrorism/ataanalysis.html [hereinafter EPIC].
208. See EPIC, supra note 207.
209. See Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section, Dep't of Justice, Field Guidance on
New Authorities that Relate to Computer Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot
Act of 2001 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crminal/cybercrime/PatriotAct.htm [hereinafter
Computer Crime Field Guidance].
210. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
211. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
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gitimate. ' ' 21 8 Such an expectation "[was] 'not one that society [was] pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable. ' ' 21 9 Consequently, the Court affirmed
220Smith's conviction.
Traditionally, the Court extended a great deal of protection to activi-
ties occurring inside the home.22' Telephone conversations, regardless of
their site of origin, enjoyed a modicum of Fourth Amendment protec-
222tion. In finding the site of the telephone call immaterial, the Court
added limits to the individual's sphere of privacy from electronic tele-
phonic surveillance.223 Since the pen register did not intercept the content
of the conversation, perhaps the Court felt comfortable denying the indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy, even without the order, based on the
relevance standard.
Despite the technological changes in telephony, Congress had not
amended the pen register statute since its 1984 enactment. Lower courts
compensated for the apparent failing by simply applying the pen register
statute to computer communications without legislative guidance.224 As a
result, various parties challenged the application of the statute to "elec-
tronic communications based' on the statute's telephone-specific lan-
guage. 225 Under the PATRIOT Act, the recognition of changes in the
technology of pen registers and the maintenance of the relevance stan-
dard combine to reduce the ability of targets to challenge government
overreaching.
G. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Under the PATRIOT Act
Under section 216 of the PATRIOT Act, the pen register/trap and
trace statutes now apply to the collection of "communications on the
218. Id. at 745.
219. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)); cf United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records
because they contain information voluntarily exposed to a third party).
220. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
221. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (emphasizing "the overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic").
222. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate
the application of [the] Fourth Amendment." (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
223. See id. at 743. The Court likened the phone numbers dialed by Smith from his home
telephone to information voluntarily turned over to a third person. Id. at 743-44 (citing Miller, 425
U.S. at 442-43; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 438 (1963)). Smith assumed the risk that the telephone company could divulge the
telephone numbers, and no expectation of privacy could reside with such information. See Smith,
442 U.S. at 744.
224. See Computer Crime Field Guidance, supra note 209.
225. See id.
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Internet and other computer networks. 226 Accepting that the statute
needed an update to reflect current communications practices, the
amendments did not take into account how these changes would impact
privacy. The Act adds the terms "routing" and "addressing" to the list of
items that can be authorized for interception, 227 but does not define them.
These terms give rise to privacy concerns because of the peculiarities of
Internet operation. Calling a telephone number on an ordinary telephone
line reveals little information other than the number itself. When a call
goes through a computer, the uniform resource locators ("URLs") carry
information about the target beyond a simple address.228 Pen registers
"attached" to computers would inform the observer what Web sites had
been visited, "which is like giving law enforcement the power -- based
only on its own certification--to require the librarian to report on the
books you had perused while visiting the public library. '229 This poten-
tially infringes upon rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.2 '0 The
probable cause standard provides a more appropriate test of the legiti-
macy of the government's application for disclosure of the information.
Section 216 tries to avoid violations of the individual's privacy by
requiring the government to use reasonably available technology "so as
not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications. 23'
The statute does allow for the interception of "routing," "addressing,"
and "signaling." While the government's interpretations of this provision
say that this limits the interception to the "To" and "From" information
226. See id. Section 216 amends 18 U.S.C §§ 3121, 3123, 3124, and 3127. Id. This means that
these devices can now target such facilities as cellular telephone numbers, specific cellular
telephones, Internet user accounts or email addresses, Internet protocol addresses, and port numbers.
Id. The amendment also allows an applicant for a pen/trap order "to submit a description of the
communications to be traced using any of these or other identifiers." Id.
227. See id.
228. David W. Baker, A Guide to URLs, at http://www.netspace.org/users/dwb/url-
guide.html#what (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). Unlike a telephone number,
[a] URL is like your complete mailing address: it specifies all the information necessary
for someone to address an envelope to you. However, they are much more than that, since
URLs can refer to a variety of very different types of resources. A more fitting analogy
would be a system for specifying your mailing address, your phone number, or the
location of the book you just read from the public library, all in the same format.
Id. In June 2000, the FBI advised Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that
pen register devices "capture all electronic impulses transmitted by the facility on which they are
attached, including such impulses transmitted after a phone call is connected to the called party." See
147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). "The impulses
made after the call is connected could reflect the electronic banking transactions a caller makes...
or the electronic ordering of a prescription drug." Id.
229. Am. Civil Liberties Union, USA Patriot Act Boosts Government Powers While Cutting
Back on Traditional Checks and Balances, An ACLU Legislative Analysis, at http://archive.aclu.org-
/congress/l 110101a.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
230. See Am. Library Ass'n, Library Community Statement on Proposed Anti-terrorism
Measures, at http:llwww.ala.orglwashoff/terrorism.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
231. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272,288.
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contained in an e-mail header,232 the e-mail header also includes the
"subject line," which could be considered to be content.
The courts must clarify this contradiction. In essence, section 216
allows for the collection of personal information without the privacy
protection provided by the judicial probable cause review under the es-
tablished wiretap law. It retains this provision's relaxed standard of rele-
vance, expanding the scope of potentially discoverable private informa-
tion. Section 216 exacerbates this lowered standard of legitimacy by au-
thorizing pen register/trap and trace orders with nationwide effect.
233
The practical realities of multi-jurisdictional Internet communica-
tions make it clear why the government would want this ability in its
arsenal. An order for this type of surveillance could previously be
granted only "within the jurisdiction of the court.''234 A single communi-
cation could pass through several different carriers in a range of jurisdic-
tions.235 In order to follow the communication to its source, prior law
required that the government seek the support of a prosecutor in each
successive jurisdiction to obtain an order in that jurisdiction.236 This
slowed down the investigation.237
The government's practical solution imposes a burden on any car-
rier seeking to challenge the installation of the pen register/trap and trace
device for legal or procedural defects. Section 216 removes another legal
safeguard from the system by requiring carriers to travel to the distant
court that issued the order. 238 "The burden would be particularly acute
for smaller providers -- precisely those, for instance, who are most likely
(according to the FBI) to be served with orders requiring the installation
of the Carnivore system.,
239
The expansion of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace devices to the
Internet opens the door to the FBI's use of Carnivore without significant
court review. 240 Carnivore raises controversial issues because it "pro-
232. Leonard Bailey, Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section Department of
Justice, International Terrorism, the Internet, and the USA Patriot Act, at www.usdoj.gov/usao-
/eousa/foia_reading-room/usab5003.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
233. See id.




238. See EPIC, supra note 207.
239. Id.
240. According to the FBI:
The Carnivore device provides the FBI with a "surgical" ability to intercept and collect
the communications which are the subject of the lawful order while ignoring those
communications which they are not authorized to intercept.... The Carnivore device
works much like commercial "sniffers" and other network diagnostic tools used by ISPs
every day, except that it provides the FBI with a unique ability to distinguish between
communications which may be lawfully intercepted and those which may not. For
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vides the FBI with access to the communications of all subscribers of a
monitored Internet Service provider [("ISP"),] . . . not just those of the
court-designated target.",24' Section 216 provides that if the communica-
tions provider cannot carry out the court order, the government may in-
stall a device of its own.242
Essentially, Section 216 allows the judge, operating under a rele-
vance standard, to issue a blank warrant to a succession of communica-
tions carriers.24 3 This fails to meet the Fourth Amendment requirement of
specifying the place to be searched. 244 It also deprives the judge of the
ability to monitor the extent to which government officials utilize the
order to access information about Internet communications.245
Section 216 expands the scope of information subject to government
surveillance, but does not provide any of the privacy protections of prior
law. It also allows access to items containing content without any inde-
pendent judicial review. These provisions, as well as the nationwide ser-
vice, all reduce the individual's privacy from governmental intrusion.
This impacts both Fourth Amendment protections and First Amendment
rights. Since Congress did not subject Section 216 to the sunset provi-
sions of Section 224 of. the PATRIOT Act, it represents a permanent
change to the federal criminal code.
example, if a court order provides for the lawful interception of one type of
communication (e.g., e-mail), but excludes all other communications (e.g., online
shopping) the Carnivore tool can be configured to intercept only those e-mails being
transmitted either to or from the named subject.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, at www.fbi.gov.hqlab/camivore/-
carnivore2.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
241. EPIC, supra note 207. In response to the FBI's introduction of Carnivore in July 2000,
some members of Congress expressed their "intent to examine the issues and draft appropriate
legislation." Id.
242. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 289. Under these
circumstances,
[slection 216 require[s] the law enforcement agency to provide the following information
to the court under seal within 30 days: (1) the identity of the officers who installed or
accessed the device; (2) the date and time the device was installed, accessed, and
uninstalled; (3) the configuration of the device at installation and any modifications to
that configuration; and (4) information collected by the device.
See Computer Crime Field Guidance, supra note 209. The government may use devices such as
Etherpeek or DCS 1000 (a.k.a. Carnivore). See id.
243. The section does require that the issuing court have jurisdiction over the particular crime
being investigated. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272,290.
244. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part, "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
245. The certification of probable cause by a neutral magistrate protects the privacy of the
subject of a proposed search from the over-zealousness of the police in their attempt to discover
evidence of a crime. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (discussing the importance
of the magistrate's informed decisions on probable cause); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) (discussing the warrant as a guard against govemmental eagerness to search apparently
private areas).
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I1. THE PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANSION OF FISA TO
DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS
Law enforcement officials often pursue intelligence surveillance by
the use of wiretapping technologies. Consequently, the PATRIOT Act
closely links the federal wiretapping statute and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA"). The divergent histories of these two statutes
provide the most compelling arguments for retracting the extensive
grants of authority given to the executive branch under the PATRIOT
Act. Without the reestablishment of traditional checks and balances on
the government's ability to conduct domestic clandestine surveillance,
the history of the government's flagrant violations of the individual's
exercise of First Amendment freedom could become this nation's pro-
logue.
A. Intelligence Surveillance and Wiretapping
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government - how-
ever benevolent and benign its motives - to view with suspicion those
who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protec-
tions become the more necessary when the targets of official surveil-
lance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjec-
tion to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unau-
thorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and dis-
cussion of Government action in private conversation. For private
dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free so-
ciety.246
Through its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has narrowed the legitimate sphere of the individual's privacy in
the attempt to balance the government's need to regulate activity and the
citizens' right to live free from government involvement.247 The inevita-
ble conflict between these two imperatives becomes tenser when the
government performs surveillance to protect national security.248 In its
amendments to FISA, the PATRIOT Act abandons a long held taboo and
extends domestic surveillance authority to the Central Intelligence
246. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
247. While the Fourth Amendment "protects ... against certain kinds of governmental
intrusion .... its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all," while other
aspects of privacy are protected by different provisions of the Constitution or left to state law. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, 350-51 (1967).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 292-301 concerning the prior restraints on foreign
intelligence surveillance under FISA. See generally William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana,
Warrantless Physical Searches For Foreign Intelligence Purposes, Executive Order 12,333 and The
Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97 (1985) (describing the use of warrantless physical
searches, and judicial exceptions and parameters for intelligence gathering).
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Agency ("CIA"). 249 This action eliminates a long recognized distinction
between acceptable warrantless electronic surveillance performed in the
name of national security and surveillance supported by probable cause
necessary for the prosecution of ordinary criminal matters.
Governmental surveillance for the protection of national security
emphasizes the interdependency of the First Amendment's freedom of
speech and of association and the Fourth Amendment's freedom from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.25' Neither value can "exist without
the other. Abuse of the governmental prerogative to institute surveil-
lance without judicial oversight has been demonstrated to negatively
253impact the other freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
B. The Traditional Prohibition of Domestic Authority for Intelligence
Collection
The government has used clandestine electronic surveillance de-
vices for many years.2 54 Olmstead v. United States2 55 supported the use of
these techniques by excluding governmental wiretapping from the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment.256 Enacted shortly after the Olmstead deci-
sion, the Federal Communications Act ("FCA") of 1934 protected citi-
zens from the unauthorized disclosure of information obtained through
electronic surveillance and from the use of the fruits of government wire-
taps. 57 It did not, however, stop the practice of clandestine surveillance.
Despite the enactment of the FCA, the government continued to
employ warrantless electronic surveillance in cases involving national
security or threats to human life. 8 Congress perceived this ability as so
threatening to democracy that it limited the CIA to the investigation of
249. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 901, 115 Stat. 272, 387 (2001).
250. Aware of the potential for abuse, Congress "was unwilling to make [the CIA] a policeman
at home, or to create conflict between the CIA and the FBI." Weissman v. CIA, 565 F. 2d 692, 695
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see generally Sherri J. Conrad, Executive Order 12,333: Unleashing The CIA
Violates the Leash Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 968 (1985).
251. See RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 193 (West 1999).
252. Id. at 194.
253. See id.
254. See Intelligence Activities: The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong. 84, 87 (1975) (statement of Att'y Gen. Edward H. Levi) [hereinafter
Intelligence Activities]; Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role
in National Security Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1116 (1980).
255. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and
Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
256. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
257. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380-82 (1937).
258. Intelligence Activities, supra note 254, at 85-87.
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non-domestic issues.259 Congress later construed this to mean that the
CIA could also conduct clandestine intelligence gathering and surveil-
lance abroad.26
From the beginning, congressional leaders recognized the potential
for abuse by an organization with authority to pursue clandestine surveil-
lance.
[The C]entral [Ilntelligence agency is supposed to collect military in-
telligence abroad: but we want to be sure it cannot strike down into
the lives of our own people here. So we put in a provision that the
agency shall have no police, subp[o]ena, law-enforcement powers, or
internal-security functions.
26 1
Congress, therefore, limited the CIA's activities to foreign intelligence
gathering because of the potential for abuse inherent in making the CIA
"a policeman at home. 262 Administration officials reemphasized the
primacy of the law barring the CIA from domestic intelligence collection
263activities.
In Weisman v. CIA, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated that the National Security Act of 1947 "was intended, at the
very least, to prohibit the CIA from conducting secret investigations of
United States citizens, in this country, who have no connection with the
Agency. ''264 The court noted:
259. The CIA succeeded the Office of Strategic services ("OSS"), which President Roosevelt
created to gather and analyze wartime strategic information. COMM'N ON CIA ACTivITIES WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 45 (1975) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER
COMMISSION]; see generally H. RANSOM, THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT (1970). Disbanded
in 1945, the OSS had no domestic surveillance authority. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra, at 46.
Two years later, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group ("CIG") to operate abroad.
See generally Michael Warner, Salvage and Liquidate: the Creation of the Central Intelligence
Agency, at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/salvage.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
Finally, the National Security Act of 1947 replaced the CIG with the CIA and again restricted the
agency's activities to overseas intelligence activities. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
253, § 102, 61 Stat. 495, 498 (1947).
260. S. REP. No. 94-755, bk.l, at 128 (1976).
261. Conrad, supra note 250, at 974-75 (alteration in original).
262. Weissman, 565 F.2d at 695.
263. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 975. In 1947, Central Intelligence Group Director
Vandenberg told Congress that the "prohibition against police powers or internal security functions
will assure that the Central Intelligence Group [predecessor of Central Intelligence Agency] can
never become a Gestapo or Security Police." Id. (quoting Hearing on S. 758 Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong. 497 (1947) (statement of Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director,
Central Intelligence Group)). Dr. Vannevar Bush echoed this theme when he testified before
Congress that the CIA posed "no danger" of becoming a Gestapo because "the bill provides clearly
that it is... not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs." See National Security Act of 1947:
Hearings on H.R. 2319 Before the House Comm. on Expenditures in the Exec. Departments, 80th
Cong. 559 (1947) (testimony of Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Joint Research and Development
Board, War and Navy Departments).
264. Weissman, 565 F.2d at 695.
2002]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Congress wisely sought from the outset to make sure that when it re-
leased the CIA genie from the lamp, the Agency would be prevented
from using its enormous resources and broad delegation of power to
place United States citizens living at home under surveillance and
scrutiny. It denied the Agency police or internal-security functions to
obviate the possibility that overzealous representatives of the CIA
might pry into the lives and thoughts of citizens whose conduct or
words might seem unconventional or subversive.
265
When an investigation targeted "an agent of a foreign power," however,
the intelligence community continued to pursue warrantless surveillance
on the assumption that an exemption to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement authorized such activity.
266
The Supreme Court reserved judgment on the issue as it related to
national security, but the justices did not unanimously support that posi-
tion. In a footnote to the Katz decision, the majority stated that they had
not been asked to determine "whether safeguards other than prior au-
thorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a
situation involving the national security., 267 The Court inferred that in
matters of national security, the executive branch's determination of ne-
cessity would alleviate the need for government agents to comply with
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment.268
Granting such deference to the executive branch prompted a concur-
ring opinion from Justice Douglas. Justice Douglas decried it as a
"wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to
electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive
Branch itself labels 'national security' matters., 269 Justice Douglas ob-
served that in matters of national security the President and the Attorney
General could not be "neutral and disinterested," but rather they must act
as interested parties-adversaries protecting the nation's interests.270 If
the executive branch tried to simultaneously wear both hats, Douglas
speculated that the individual's freedom, as protected by the Fourth
Amendment, would suffer.27'
265. Id.; see also Bimbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 329-32 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing
the authority of the CIA).
266. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 979; see generally David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order
12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.
611 (1983) (arguing the national security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is
unconstitutional).
267. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
268. It is peculiar that the Court would make such a statement outside of the issues raised. It
could be that the Court made the statement in reference to Congressional discussion of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, enacted the following year.
269. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring).
270. See id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
271. See id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers .... I cannot agree that
where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights is assured where the President and Attorney Gen-
eral assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and
disinterested, neutral magistrate.
272
Justice Douglas observed that the framers of the Constitution did not
distinguish between types of crimes in considering the application of the
Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure.273
As such, the judiciary should maintain its oversight of the executive
branch's exercise of surveillance, even under circumstances of national
emergency. The rules should "not [be] improvise[d] because a particular
crime seems particularly heinous. 274
Likewise, in United States v. United States District Court, the Court
declined to address whether the Fourth Amendment applied to foreign
intelligence surveillance.275 It also rejected the government's claim of a
national security exemption from the Fourth Amendment for domestic
matters because of the impact such license could have on civil liber-
ties .276
The PATRIOT Act's creation of the crimes of "domestic terrorism"
and "harboring a terrorist '277 could negatively impact the exercise of
unpopular political ideas, just as the Court warned in these prior cases.
Section 802 of the PATRIOT Act defines domestic terrorism as activities
that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, as-
sassination or kidnapping; and
272. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
273. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring). Here, Justice Douglas noted that Article III, section 3 of
the U.S. Constitution gave treason a limited definition, but it did not receive special status under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
274. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
275. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 321-22 ("We have not addressed, and express no
opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their
agents.").
276. See id. at 320.
277. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 802-03, 115 Stat. 272, 376.
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(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.27
Section 803 of the PATRIOT Act makes the act of harboring or conceal-
ing any person known or reasonably believed to have committed one of
several named offenses a crime punishable by fine, imprisonment, or
both.279 If section 802 clearly defined the crime of domestic terrorism,
section 803 would be less problematic. Section 802, however, could be
subject to constitutional challenge as being both vague and overbroad.
Under the language of section 803, the government could classify as do-
mestic terrorism any activity it found unpopular, including such legiti-
mate activist actions as labor union strikes and protests concerning abor-
tion rights, animal rights, civil rights, the environment, or the G-4. A
comprehensive provision such as section 803 invites government over-
reaching.
Protests that arouse the emotions of a large crowd could become
dangerous to human life. By their terms, protests intend to "intimidate or
coerce a civilian population" and/or to "influence the policy of a gov-
ernment., 280 The government may also disfavor protests challenging its
policies. Provisions such as sections 802 and 803 could make any such
group or participating individual a target of governmental surveillance.
Unfortunately, this concern is not a speculative one. Less than 30
years ago, the government of the United States was found by a Senate
committee to have violated the civil liberties of American citizens who
challenged governmental policies.2sl In one case, the government repeat-
edly conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of an organization's
lawful contacts with citizens of Soviet Russia.282 Attorney John Mitchell
authorized several surveillance requests to provide the FBI with advance
knowledge of any activities that could cause international embarrassment
278. Id. § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 375. "International Terrorism" is defined, in part, as "activities
that... occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)
(2000).
279. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 803, 115 Stat. 272, 376-77.
280. Id. § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 375.
281. In 1975, the United States Senate established a committee to "conduct an investigation of
governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which illegal,
improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government." S. Res.
21, 94th Cong. § 1 (1975). Under the leadership of Sen. Frank Church, the Committee made the
following statement in its report: "The Committee's investigation has .... confirmed substantial
wrongdoing. And it had demonstrated that intelligence activities have not generally been governed
and controlled in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of
government." S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976). "United States intelligence agencies have investigated a
vast number of American citizens and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters alone has developed
over 500,000 domestic intelligence files." Id. at 6.
282. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 608-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Jewish Defense
League contacted Soviet citizens concerning that country's restrictive emigration policies. Id.
[Vol. 80:2410
2002] BIG BROTHER AT THE DOOR
to the United States.283 Several other vast investigations occurred even
when the citizens concerned had no ties to foreign powers.284
In several instances, the government used collected information to
actively disrupt protest organizations.285 To discredit the leaders of activ-
ist organizations, the government selectively leaked negative information
about the individuals to third parties.286 Through its COINTELPRO pro-
gram, the FBI selectively shared "information from its investigations to
deny people employment and to smear their reputations. 287 The Church
Committee Report documented the FBI's attempt to discredit Dr. Martin
Luther King.288 The FBI justified its continued political surveillance of
Dr. King by saying "that some of [his] advisors were Communists," i.e.,
a threat to national security.289 It then disclosed derogatory information
about Dr. King to the "media and other private organizations" in an ef-
fort to block his selection as a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.2 90 The
FBI also resorted to the intimidation and harassment of Dr. King. In one
instance, the FBI sent a prepared composite tape recording to Dr. King
apparently inviting him to commit suicide.291 The government took these
actions under a system that provided little or no oversight of its intelli-
gence collection activities.
283. Id. at 610.
284. Due to allegations of improper surveillance, President Ford formed the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States under the leadership of then Vice President Rockefeller. See
Exec. Order No. 11,828, 40 Fed. Reg. 1219 (1975). The Commission's investigation confirmed that
the Agency collected information on several individuals, many of whom were civil rights and anti-
war activists. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, supra note 259. The Agency had intercepted, opened,
and photographed first class letters, and indexed and computerized the names of alleged domestic
political dissidents. Id. The Church Committee Report described how Project MERRIMAC
"expanded into a general collection effort whose results were made available to other components in
the CIA, and... the FBI." See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 725 (1976).
285. 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).,
286. See id.
287. Id.
Beginning with Communist and socialist groups, the FBI's COINTELPRO operations
spread in the 1960s to the Klan, the "new left," and black militants. Elements of the civil
rights and antiwar movements were targeted for disruption because of suspicion that they
were "influenced" by communists; others because of their strident rhetoric. When some
targets were suspected of engaging in violence, the FBI's tactics went so far as to place
lives in jeopardy by passing false allegations that individuals were government
informants.
Id.
288. See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 11 (1976).
289. 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02, S10993 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
290. Id.
291. Id.
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C. Intelligence Surveillance Under FISA
292
Concerns over the domestic abuse of surveillance gave rise to FISA,
which instituted a set of procedures for the electronic collection of for-
eign intelligence and counterintelligence.293 Significantly, FISA allowed
the government a higher degree of governmental intrusion with a signifi-
cantly lowered standard of review in certain instances when seeking for-
294eign intelligence information. When applying for an order, FISA re-
quired the government to identify the target of the surveillance, list the
information relied on by the government to demonstrate that the target
represented "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power," and certify
that the order sought to obtain "foreign intelligence information. 295
FISA's provisions established a scheme of surveillance oversight that
purportedly protected the individual's privacy.296
Since the government could authorize foreign intelligence surveil-
lance under less than a probable cause standard, the government could
use it at trial only with the Attorney General's advance authorization and
after giving notice to the "aggrieved person. 297 This notice gave rise to
the aggrieved person's opportunity to suppress the information based on
298the illegality of the surveillance. However, reviewing courts consid-
292. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978).
293. See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3974.
294. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92
Stat. 1783, 1786. Otherwise, FISA maintains the requirement of a court order authorizing foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance. The order requirements under FISA are similar to those for
obtaining an order under Title Ill. After obtaining the Attorney General's approval, the federal
officer must make application for the order to one of seven U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("USFISC") judges. See id. §§ 103-104, 92 Stat. 1783, 1788-90.
295. See id. § 102(b), 92 Stat. 1783, 1787. FISA also required that the application list the
evidence showing that the foreign power or its agent used or planned to use the site of the
surveillance; state the type of surveillance the government planned to use; and list the government's
proposed minimization procedures. See id. Under FISA, the USFISC judge must make a specific
finding that each element of the application is supported by probable cause and that the proposed
minimization procedures are proper. Id. § 105, 92 Stat. 1783, 1790-93. One of FISA's most
important judicial oversight provisions states that the government cannot classify a 'United States
person' as "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment." Id. § 105(a)(3)(A), 92 Stat. 1783, 1790.
296. See Helene E. Schwartz, Oversight of. Minimization Compliance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing Their Job, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 414-
33 (1981). The executive branch of government, through its Attorney General, established
minimization procedures as well as internal review procedures and supervision of warrantless
surveillance. Id. The judiciary could impact the surveillance at three stages: passing on applications,
assessing the legality of the surveillance, and imposing civil or criminal liability for violations. Id. at
433-72. Finally, reports concerning surveillance pursued under this section had to be submitted to
Congress. Id. at 472-83.
297. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 106(c), 92
Stat. 1783, 1793.
298. Id. § 106(e), 92 Stat. 1783, 1794.
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ered an Attorney General's wiretap order presumptively valid, making it
299
difficult for an individual to challenge the legality of the surveillance.
In addition, a motion to suppress did not guarantee disclosure of the in-
formation to the aggrieved person. 300 The court could disclose the infor-
mation "only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate
determination of the legality of the surveillance.30
1
D. The Collision of Title III Evidence Collection and Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance
Several provisions of the PATRIOT Act ignore the distinction be-
tween the collection of information for domestic criminal investigations
and foreign intelligence collection. This destroys the traditional balance
between the government and the individual under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Before the PATRIOT Act, in cases assessing motions to suppress
or requesting disclosure of FISA-collected information, the courts em-
phasized the distinction between cases of surveillance under FISA and
those under Title 111.302
In United States v. Belfield, °3 the government charged the defen-
dants with "conspiracy to murder, accessory after the fact, grand larceny,
unauthorized use of a vehicle, and perjury in connection with [an] assas-
sination. ' ' °  The defendants "requested disclosure of any electronic
surveillance" concerning them.30 5 The government admitted overhearing
each of the defendants during electronic surveillance authorized under
FISA.306
Pursuant to the statute, the district court judge made an ex parte de-
termination of the legality of the surveillance after examining the rele-
vant evidence in camera.30 7 The defendants challenged the procedures on
both statutory and procedural grounds. 30 8 The defendants asserted that
the mandatory disclosure provisions of Title HI "must be read into FISA
299. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 979 (approving electronic surveillance of illegal
bookmaking suspects (citing United States v. Feldman, 535 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1976));
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1975) (approving interception of wire
communications of alleged narcotics conspirators).
300. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 106(f),
92 Stat. 1783, 1794. By filing an affidavit under oath that the disclosure of the information would
harm the national security of the United States, the Attorney General may request an ex parte
determination of the legality of the surveillance based upon an in camera examination of the relevant
materials. Id.
301. Id.
302. See United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
303. 692 F.2d 141, 143.
304. See id. at 143.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 144.
308. See id.
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to save it from constitutional infirmity. ' 309 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating:
Appellants ... completely ignore the nature of the national interests
implicated in matters involving a foreign power or its agents. [Title
III] covers domestic, criminal surveillance. FISA is concerned with
foreign intelligence surveillance. In the former, Congress emphasized
the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. In the latter, Congress recognized
the need for the Executive to engage in and employ the fruits of clan-
destine surveillance without being constantly hamstrung by disclo-
sure requirements.
3 10
The statutory scheme under FISA "center[ed] on an expanded con-
ception of minimization that differs from that which governs law-
enforcement surveillance. '" 311 Pursuant to FISA, the court merely deter-
mines whether the application and order comply with the statutory re-
quirements: "No further judicial procedures are necessary to adequately
safeguard appellants' rights." 312 This differs from the standard of checks
and balances that characterizes domestic criminal law.
Perhaps because of this, the courts have tended to condemn domes-
tic warrantless electronic surveillance, even if the target posed a "domes-
tic threat[] to the national security." 313 By contrast, when the circum-
stances involved surveillance of foreign nationals, the lower courts gen-
erally upheld the surveillance.3t 4 When the surveillance had both domes-
tic criminal investigative and foreign intelligence purposes, however, the
lower courts upheld the warrantless electronic surveillance of American
citizens despite its impact on the rights of the accused.31 5
309. See id. at 148. The defendants relied on section 2518 of Title I, which provides that "the
contents of an intercepted communication may not be used in any proceeding unless the aggrieved
person is first furnished with a copy of the application and the court order authorizing the
interception." See id. at 184 n.3 1.
310. Id. at 148.
311. See id. (citing Helene E. Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance Under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing Their Job, 12 RUTGERs L.J.
405, 408 (1981)).
312. See id. at 149.
313. See, e.g., United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 320, 322, 323-24.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914-15 (4th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). The government sought to use the results of wiretaps in its case
against Muhammad Ali, then known as Cassius Clay, for violating the Selective Service Act. Clay,
430 F.2d at 166. While ordering disclosure of four of the five conversations, the court of appeals
upheld the district court's conclusion that the fifth wiretapped conversation resulted from "lawful
surveillance by the FBI pursuant to the Attorney General's authorization of a wiretap for the purpose
of gathering foreign intelligence," and therefore would not be disclosed to Clay. See id. at 166, 171;
see also United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming the President's power
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The information-sharing agreements enjoyed by the various intelli-
gence groups and the FBI partly made possible the abuses of the 1970s.
The Church Committee Report documented a CIA-FBI agreement that
improved the intelligence coordination between the two agencies. "[T]he
policies embodied in that agreement clearly involved the CIA in the per-
formance of internal security functions. 3 6 In essence, requiring the FBI
and the CIA to cooperate in intelligence collection circumvented the Na-
tional Security Act's prohibition against the CIA's participation in do-
mestic intelligence gathering.31 7 The CIA's partnership with the FBI did
not make this practice legitimate. 1 8
E. Broadened Scope of FISA Surveillance on the Domestic Front Under
the PATRIOTAct
Congress enacted FISA to curtail these abuses, but President
Reagan reintroduced the CIA-FBI partnership model in Executive Order
12,333. 3'9 The PATRIOT Act augments this type of partnership on an
unprecedented scale. It also magnifies the potential for government vio-
lation of the individual's privacy. Section 905 of the PATRIOT Act re-
quires that other agencies share with the Director of the CIA any "foreign
intelligence" collected in the course of federal criminal law investiga-
tions, unless the Attorney General makes exceptions.
320
Under section 203, sensitive personal, political, and business infor-
mation about any individual or company collected in the course of a
grand jury, domestic law enforcement wiretap, or any other criminal in-
vestigation must now be disclosed to any intelligence, defense, and na-
tional security agency if the information involves foreign intelligence.321
to "authorize warrantless wiretaps" to gather foreign intelligence in circumstances where the
government incidentally overheard an American citizen's conversations).
316. Conrad, supra note 250, at 971; see also S. REP. No. 94-755, at 97 (1976).
317. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 973-74 (discussing the CIA's exclusion from domestic
operations).
318. See id. at 981-82 (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,3333 and other agreements that sought to
improve the coordination between the CIA and the FBI).
319. See id. President Regan promulgated Executive Order 12,333 in 1981. Exec. Order No.
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). The order delegated to the Attorney General the power
to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States
person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law
enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Id.
320. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 905(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 389.
321. See id. § 203, 115 Stat. 272, 279-81. Foreign intelligence is defined as "information
relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof,
foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities." 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2)
(2000). Foreign intelligence information includes "information about a United States person that
concerns a foreign power or foreign territory and 'that relates to the national defense or the security
of the United States."' See 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
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Americans have generally felt free to conduct business and personal
relationships with foreign governments or nationals and to express per-
sonal opinions about governmental policy without recourse. These com-
munications could be entirely legal, but they could also fit the definition
of foreign intelligence information. As such, the PATRIOT Act makes
these communications eligible for broad dissemination to any govern-
ment official.322
While prior law allowed information sharing between grand juries,
the court supervised the disclosure of such information. 323 Section 203
does not provide such oversight of these information-sharing activities
and does not limit the purposes for which the information can be dis-
closed. Section 203 creates a fundamental change in the existing criminal
justice system, as Congress did not limit its scope to investigations about
terrorism.
The indiscriminant sharing of information ignores the radically dif-
ferent purposes of the domestic criminal law system and that of foreign
intelligence gathering.324 Unlike domestic criminal law investigations,
foreign intelligence surveillance may not consider the ultimate truth of
the information collected as an objective. A disclosure of innuendo and
inference may significantly harm an individual's reputation. A system
that lacks checks and balances will likely disclose inaccurate or incom-
plete information.
In the course of an ordinary criminal investigation, the government
may collect information on individuals not involved in any illegal activ-
ity. The lack of guidelines for using this information exacerbates the po-
tential for misuse during any information-sharing activities.
Many individuals are investigated and later cleared. Many cases are
investigated and never prosecuted. Many witnesses are interviewed
whose testimony never surfaces at trial. Immunity is granted to com-
pel testimony before grand juries about people who are never in-
dicted. Wiretaps and microphone "bugs" and computer communica-
tions intercepts pick up extensive information about activities and
322. See 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
323. Id. at S11005-06.
324. See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12-13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3973, 3981.
The criminal laws are enacted to establish standards for arrest and conviction; and they
supply guidance for investigations conducted to collect evidence for prosecution. Foreign
counterintelligence investigations have different objectives. They succeed when the
United States can insure that an intelligence network is not obtaining vital information.
. . . Prosecution is a useful deterrent, but only where the advantages outweigh the
sacrifice of other interests. Therefore, procedures appropriate in regular criminal
investigations need modification to fit the counterintelligence context.
Id.; see also Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 248, at 133.
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opinions and personal lives that have no relevance to the criminal ac-
tivity they are authorized to detect or monitor. 325
The standard for the collection of this information requires only that in-
vestigators consider it "relevant to an investigation. '326 Despite this, sec-
tion 203 allows broad disclosure within the law enforcement community
of information falling under the heading of foreign intelligence or foreign
intelligence information, further detaching it from its original relevance.
The government could use information collected under FISA's relevance
standard in a domestic criminal law investigation employing a probable
cause standard. This would violate the rights of the individual. Without
limitations on its retention, this information collection could lead to the
return of the abuses of the 1970s with development of secret dossiers on
individuals.
Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act amends the definition of the term
"foreign intelligence information," 327 which compounds the concerns
over the broad dissemination of information about individuals under sec-
tion 203. FISA provided a lowered standard for foreign intelligence sur-
veillance, but restricted its use to circumstances where obtaining foreign
intelligence data represented the sole or primary purpose of the investiga-
tion.328 Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA to apply in situa-
tions where foreign intelligence collection represents only a "significant
purpose" of the investigation.329
The amendment further blurs the lines between acceptable foreign
intelligence gathering on a reasonableness standard and the probable
cause requirements of domestic criminal investigations. If the govern-
ment conducts surveillance by wiretap for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation relevant to both a domestic criminal investigation and foreign
intelligence activities, the government could avoid the probable cause
requirements of Title III. The individual would lose vital privacy protec-
tion as a result. This "would be a significant alteration to the delicate
constitutional balance that is reflected in the current legal regime govern-
ing electronic surveillance."
330
F. Broad Access to Records and Other Items Under FISA
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA by giving the gov-
ernment the authority to require the production of "any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an
325. 147 CONG. REC. S 10990-02, S 10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
326. See id.
327. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272,291.
328. See EPIC, supra note 207.
329. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291.
330. See EPIC, supra note 207 (discussing a similar provision of a predecessor bill).
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investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine in-
telligence activities." 331 Although narrowly circumscribed on its face,
section 215 provides that the government conduct such investigations
"under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive
Order No. 12,333. ' '332 This has potentially serious consequences for pri-
vacy.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,333, "Agencies are not au-
thorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented
physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring
devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the
head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. 333
The fact that the procedures established by the Attorney General are
themselves "not subject to review ... by any public body" raises con-
cerns. 334 The Order allows the Attorney General to authorize "any tech-
nique for which a warrant would [ordinarily] be required ... [upon a
unilateral judgment] that the technique is directed against a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power., 335 The lack of a definition for the
term "agent of a foreign power" means that the characterization of the
target falls exclusively within the discretion of the Attorney General as
well.336
While the FBI must apply for an order to the special FISA court, the
court will grant the order on less than probable cause.337 The government
need only certify that it seeks the records for an authorized investigation
conducted pursuant to the Attorney General's procedures, and that the
investigation intends to obtain foreign intelligence information, a very
broadly defined term.338 Since the Attorney General has the sole discre-
tion to define the parameters of the investigation, the government obtains
access to a broad range of private records in potential violation of the
individual's privacy.
Section 905 of the PATRIOT Act further reduces the individual's
sphere of privacy by requiring law enforcement agencies to share sensi-
tive "foreign intelligence information" about Americans with intelligence
agencies through the Director of the CIA, unless the Attorney General
331. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287.
332. See id. President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,333, which greatly
expanded the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct domestic intelligence
operations. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
333. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, § 2.4.
334. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 977.
335. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, § 2.5.
336. See Conrad, supra note 250, at 979.
337. See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of FISA.
338. See definition of "foreign intelligence information," supra note 321.
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makes exceptions. 339 As history has shown, such arrangements increase
the potential for governmental overreaching.
Despite their descriptive titles, "foreign intelligence" and "foreign
intelligence information" could include sensitive information about an
individual's lawful business transactions, political relationships, and per-
sonal opinions concerning members of a foreign government. 340 The First
and Fifth Amendments by virtue of the Fourth Amendment currently
protect these activities. However, a legislative enactment that removes
them from constitutional protection implies that society no longer recog-
nizes the individual's subjective expectation of privacy in these records
as legitimate.
Over the years, various Executive Orders have modified the express
bar to domestic authority, but it would seem that any further extension to
the CIA's domestic surveillance power would contravene its charter un-
der the National Security Act.34'
Section 506 of the PATRIOT Act gives concurrent jurisdiction to
the Secret Service to investigate certain computer-related offenses under
18 U.S.C. § 1030.342 This returns the Secret Service to the full authority
it had before 1996 to investigate any and all violations of section 1 0 3 0 .
343
Ostensibly, this extension of authority allows the Secret Service to pro-
tect critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks. 344 Like many other pro-
visions of the PATRIOT Act, Congress did not limit this change by the
terms of the Act, and it becomes a permanent feature of our criminal
laws.
339. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 905(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 389; see supra text
accompanying note 32; see also 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02, S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
340. See definition of "foreign intelligence," supra note 321.
341. For instance, President Carter's Executive Order No. 12,036 prohibited surveillance
against United States persons abroad. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, § 2-202 (Jan. 24,
1978). President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,333, however, allows such surveillance "even if
the CIA has no reason to believe the target is ... an 'agent of a foreign power."' See Conrad, supra
note 250, at 978.
342. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 506(a), 115 Stat. 272, 367. In 1995, the Secret
Service created the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force ("NYECTF"). See 147 CONG. REC.
S10990-02, S10998 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001). This group includes members from industry law
enforcement and academia and "has successfully investigated a range of financial and electronic
crimes." Id. Section 105 of the PATRIOT Act authorizes the Secret Service to create similar task
forces in other parts of the country. Id.
343. See 147 CONG. REc. S10990-02, S10998 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001). The 1996 amendments
to section 1030 concentrated the authority of the Secret Service on specific sections of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. Id. Section 506 of the PATRIOT Act permits the Justice and Treasury
Departments to work out the parameters of the new concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
344. Id.
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G. Privacy Protection Under Title III (Wiretap Statute)
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have be-
come available to the government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.
345
When first confronted with the issue of whether wiretaP4ing vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that wiretapping did not constitute a search.347 How-
ever, even the majority recognized the danger of permitting unrestrained
governmental surveillance and suggested a practical limitation to guard
against governmental overreaching. The Court noted, "Congress may of
course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials. 34 8 The
Court ultimately overturned the Olmstead decision in Katz v. United
States.
3 49
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 ("FCA")35° did not ex-
plicitly adopt the Court's suggestion for the protection of privacy. How-
ever, some interpreted certain language in the FCA as statutory authority
for the existence of the Olmstead exclusionary rule. Section 605 of the
FCA provided, "no person not being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communica-
tion to any person., 35' The Court interpreted section 605 to prevent tes-
timony concerning the contents of wiretapped conversations in court
because "to recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court
[would be] to divulge the message. 3 52 The Court later held the exclu-
345. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
346. 277 U.S. 438.
347. Id. at 466. The Court provided two bases for its decision. First, there had been no entry of
the premises that would give rise to a search. Id. Second, while the agents "captured" the content of
the conversations, they had not acquired any physical objects that would constitute a seizure. Id. This
trespass model was followed by the Court in a number of decisions, including Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (placing a detectaphone against a wall of an adjoining office where the
police were lawfully present did not constitute a trespass), and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (incriminating information from bug planted on an acquaintance of target by consent).
348. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
349. 389 U.S. 347, 353.
350. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). The FCA was the
first federal statute to establish procedural protections against electronic surveillance by the
government.
351. Id. § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1068.
352. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379.
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sionary rule applicable to derivative evidence,353 to intrastate communi-
cations,354 and to the actions of state officers.355
Section 605 frustrated both law enforcement and privacy advocates.
It allowed private citizens and public officials to ignore its prohibitions,
but banned the use of electronic surveillance in police investigations for
even the most serious of federal offenses.356 Since the FCA did not pre-
empt state law, state criminal prosecutors could admit wiretaps that did
not meet section 605's standards. 357 Finally, section 605 did not bar intel-
ligence surveillance. 358 The government continued to use wiretaps to
collect foreign intelligence for national security purposes. 359 The gov-
ernment supported this continued use with the rationale that it could law-
fully "intercept" communications, but not "divulge" them. 360 Further, the
government contended that it did not divulge information in its internal
communications, but only if it released the information to an outside
party.361 Foreign intelligence surveillance rarely resulted in prosecution,
leaving little chance that the government would divulge an intercepted
communication.
Since no legislature had codified the Olmstead exclusionary rule,
courts did not have to follow it. The sphere of the individual's privacy
received uneven treatment in courts called upon to determine whether to
admit or exclude evidence produced from wiretaps. 362 Recognizing the
need for substantive restraint against police action, the courts ultimately
upheld the validity of the exclusion. In Lee v. Florida,3 63 the Court stated
that the exclusionary rule was "counseled by experience. ''364 The Court's
research of section 605 violations had "failed to uncover a single re-
ported prosecution of a law enforcement officer for a violation of
s[ection] 605 since the statute was enacted., 365 The Court "concluded...
that nothing short of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence [would]
353. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
354. See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).
355. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957).
356. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 261 (3d ed. 2000).
357. See JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECrRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.4(a) (2d ed. 1989).
358. See Herbert Brownell, Jr., The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195,
197-99 (1954); John F. Decker & Joel Handler, Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions and
Remedies, 12 CAL W. L. REV. 60, 63-64 (1975).
359. See Brownell, supra note 358, at 199.
360. See id. at 197.
361. See Decker & Handler, supra note 358, at 64.
362. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1968) (evidence excluded); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (evidence excluded); Benanti, 355 U. S. at 105-06 (evidence excluded);
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952) (evidence admitted), overruled by Lee, 392 U.S. at
386-87; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (evidence admitted), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S.
at 660.
363. 392 U.S. 378.
364. Lee, 392 U.S. at 386,
365. Id.
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compel respect for the federal law 'in the only effectively available way -
- by removing the incentive to disregard it.'
' 366
In addition to these failings, it became clear that section 605 could
not keep pace with the advances in surveillance technology. 367 In order to
balance law enforcement's need to use the latest technology with the
individual's right to some degree of privacy, Congress enacted Title
111.368 Congress intended Title III to protect privacy by defining a uni-
form procedure for the "interception of wire and oral communica-
tions. 369 Only a "court of competent jurisdiction" could authorize such
interception.37° In this manner, the statute safeguarded the privacy of
innocent persons who had not consented to the interception of their wire
or oral communications. 37' As additional protection, Congress required
that the interception remain under the control and supervision of the au-
372thorizing court.
Section 2518 provided a template for obtaining court-approved in-
terception and listed the contents of a valid application for court ordered
surveillance.373 It also restricted the scope and duration of the surveil-
lance.374 Title III provided several layers of privacy protection. A court
would issue a warrant for the interception if the government met the pro-
vision's detailed probable cause requirements.375 The standard under
Title III required probable cause to believe that "an individual [was]
committing, ha[d] committed, or [was] about to commit" one of the
enumerated offenses, and that "particular communications concerning
that offense [would] be obtained through such interception. 376 It re-
quired that the order state with specificity the target's identity, the loca-
tion of the interception, the identity of the agency authorized to intercept,
366. Id. at 386-87 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
367. See LAFAVE, supra note 356, at 260.
368. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000)). Title 1HI was part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Congress noted that "there [had] been
extensive wiretapping carried on without legal sanctions, and without the consent of any of the





373. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 261-62.
374. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 263.
375. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 262. Under Title Ili, a judge could order a wiretap if he
determined, among other things, that probable cause existed to believe "that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit" one of the enumerated offenses and "the
facilities from which, or the place where, the . . . communications are to be intercepted are being
used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to,
listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person." Id.
376. Id.
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and the identity of the person authorizing the interception. 377 It also re-
quired a statement of whether the interception must cease immediately
upon obtaining the communication described in the application.378 Strict
duration requirements also attached.379
This heightened probable cause requirement reflected the height-
ened privacy intrusion presented by wiretaps.38 ° Wiretaps differ from
physical search warrants in that the orders allow continuing surveillance
for up to 30 days with possible extensions. 381 The government could
overhear all conversations transpiring during that period without regard
to relevancy. 382 "Only the most precise and rigorous standard of probable
cause should justify an intrusion of this sort. 383 The failure to obtain an
order would result in the invalidation of even narrowly tailored surveil-
lance.
However, Title III carved out an exemption for wiretapping per-
formed in the pursuit of foreign intelligence gathering.385 It did not limit
the constitutional power of the President to "obtain[ing] foreign intelli-
gence information deemed essential to the security of the United States,
or to protect[ing] national security information against foreign intelli-
,386gence activities." Restrictions on the executive's use at trial of infor-
mation obtained pursuant to this section provided additional privacy pro-
tection. The government could use the information only if the "intercep-
tion was reasonable," and it could not otherwise disclose the information
except as necessary for the executive to implement his power to protect
the nation.387
Over the years, Congress added three additional sections, 2511,
2515, and 2520, to provide remedies for violations of Title III. These
sections provided for criminal sanctions, 388 injunctive relief,389 Civil
remedies, 39 and the right to exclude the contents of the illegally obtained
377. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 263.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-63.
381. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-35 1, § 802, 82 Stat.
197,263.
382. But see discussion on Carnivore, supra note 240.
383. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 69 (Stewart, J., concurring).
384. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 ("surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate. ... clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government
asserts in fact took place").
385. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
197, 257. This exemption has particular significance to some of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (2000).
389. Id. § 2511(5).
390. Id. § 2520.
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communications from evidence. 391 According to the U.S. Attorney statis-
tics, these remedies have not hindered the government's surveillance
ability.392
H. Expansion of Government Ability to Intercept Communication Under
FISA
Title III provided several layers of privacy protection to the individ-
ual because of the intrusive nature of electronic surveillance. Before the
PATRIOT Act, FISA did not significantly deter government surveillance
if the information sought fell under the heading of foreign intelligence.
The PATRIOT Act's amendments to FISA weaken even those restric-
tions.
FISA required the government to certify that the targeted communi-
cation came from an individual engaging in international terrorism or an
agent of a foreign power.393 Section 214 of the PATRIOT Act eliminates
this requirement.39 This means that the government could justify surveil-
lance with a pen register/trap and trace device by alleging that it intended
to use the device in "any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation, 395 a much more lax standard. This circumvents FISA's lim-
ited protection against governmental intrusions and undercuts the reasons
for a lowered standard for governmental surveillance.396 This amendment
allows the government to perform searches for customary purposes, but
without the protection of the probable cause requirement in regular
criminal investigations.
I. Multi Point (Roving Wiretap) Authority
Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA to include "roving"
wiretap authority. Roving wiretaps for domestic criminal law investiga-
tions require third parties "'specified in court-ordered surveillance' to
provide assistance ... to accomplish the surveillance" on a communica-
391. Id. § 2515. This section codifies the Olmstead exclusionary rule. See Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 468, overruled in part by Berger, 388 U.S. 41 and Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
392. As stated by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Olmstead, "[I]t [is] a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." See Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
393. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3) (2000).
394. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 214, 115 Stat. 272, 286.
395. Id.
396. Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorismlfisa/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2002) [hereinafter EPIC FISA].
That laxity is premised on the assumption Congress and the courts should not unduly
restrain the Executive branch, in pursuit of its national security responsibilities to monitor
the activities of foreign powers and their agents. The removal of the "foreign power"
predicate for pen register/trap and trace surveillance upsets that delicate balance.
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tion as it moves through a succession of carriers and devices, i.e.,
roves.397 Pursuant to section 206 of the PATRIOT Act, the FISA roving
wiretap order need not identify the third party if the "[c]ourt finds that
the actions of the target ... may have the effect of thwarting the identifi-
cation of a specified person. 398 The proposed change would extend the
obligation to assist the government "to unnamed and unspecified third
parties., 399 Upon the discovery of a new carrier, the government would
present it with a generic wiretap order and "effect FISA coverage as soon
as technically feasible.' '4° The PATRIOT Act has very little of the pro-
tections afforded under Title III.
The PATRIOT Act particularly threatens the privacy of individuals
who access the Internet through public facilities, such as libraries and
university computer labs. 40 1 "Upon the suspicion that an intelligence tar-
get might use such a facility, the FBI [could] ... monitor all communica-
tions transmitted at the facility. ''4 2 There exists a high probability that
the government could intercept "the private communications of law-
abiding ...citizens" since "the recipient of the assistance order ...
would be prohibited from disclosing the fact that monitoring is occur-
ring. 4 °3
CONCLUSION
Surveillance technology will invariably advance and terrorists will
invariably use those advancements. No one would suggest that the gov-
ernment should not use the most current technology to prevent tragedy.
However, protection does not mean that we should abandon traditional
notions of privacy. As a society, we may choose to cede more of our civil
liberties so as to prevent another 9/11, but we should not make this deci-
sion lightly or without fully understanding what we put at risk.
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment to cover both physical and non-
physical governmental intrusions, the courts balanced the government's
need to search purportedly private areas with the individual's need to
prevent government intrusion.4°4 The complex system of safeguards de-
397. See EPIC, supra note 207.
398. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282.
399. EPIC, supra note 207.
400. Id.
401. See EPIC FISA, supra note 396.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that sense-enhancing
surveillance technology intrudes upon minimum expectation of privacy protected under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (placing unmonitored surveillance device
to track use of drug extracting equipment did not violate Fourth Amendment because it did not
intrude on reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding
that defendant justifiably relied on privacy of public telephone booth and that it would be free from
unwarranted electronic surveillance by government); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
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veloped to support the Fourth Amendment provides evidence of the na-
tion's resolve to maintain that balance. Judicial oversight balanced the
needs of the government with the privacy interests of citizens by enforc-
ing the requirement for warrants and by assessing the reasonableness of
searches performed. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 established the procedural guidelines for the use of
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by law enforcement agen-
cies.4 °5 Exclusionary rules created an incentive for law enforcement offi-
cials to obey these constraints by precluding the suppression of evidence
properly obtained through the use of warrants.40 6 The Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act gave procedures for obtaining access to stored
electronic communications (e-mail).4°7
Removal of the checks and balances on governmental action by the
PATRIOT Act could diminish the already waning protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment. By increasing the scope of information subject
to government access and reducing the independent judicial review of the
government's actions, the PATRIOT Act lowered the threshold for le-
gitimate governmental intrusion into the individual's privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.
[I]f the government were suddenly to announce on nationwide televi-
sion that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expecta-
tion or [sic] privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects .... In
such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations
had been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could




Without Congressional oversight, the PATRIOT Act could render the
Fourth Amendment impotent as a guardian of civil liberty in domestic
criminal law investigations. In the words of Ben Franklin, one of the
(holding that the government must show probable cause to seize vehicles for transport of liquor in
the absence of a warrant to protect motorist's freedom from seizure under Fourth Amendment).
405. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000)). The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 amended Title III by including such electronic
communications as digitally transmitted conversations, electronic mail, cellular telephones and pen
registers. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
406. FED. R. CRN. P. 41.
407. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. IV 1987).
408. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
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founding fathers of this nation, "They that can give up essential liberty to
obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." 4°9
409. Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 310 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
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REGULATING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN THE
WAKE OF ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, with its decision in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition,' rejected cries from proponents of the regulation
of virtual child pornography and held two provisions of the Child Por-
nography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA")2 unconstitutional. 3 Refusing
to incorporate the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography under either
the Miller v. California4 or New York v. Ferber5 standards, the Court left
open the status of virtual child pornography as constitutionally protected
speech under the First Amendment. 6 In response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Free Speech Coalition, Representative Mark Foley claimed
that the Supreme Court "sided with pedophiles over children. 7 While
Representative Foley's statement may grossly overstate the decision,
8
some serious questions remain as to the government's ability to regulate
virtual child pornography in the wake of Free Speech Coalition.9
Rather than questioning the propriety of the Court's decision in
Free Speech Coalition, this comment will focus on the future of virtual
child pornography legislation in the aftermath of the Court's ruling. Part
I will examine the legal framework the Supreme Court used to decide
Free Speech Coalition. Part II will focus on the Court's decision in Free
Speech Coalition, highlighting the problem with fitting virtual child por-
nography into the rubric of Ferber. Finally, Part III will critically exam-
ine Congress's response to the Court's decision and will propose possi-
bilities for redrafting a statute to comply with the precedents set in both
Free Speech Coalition and Miller.
1. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
2. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2251, 2252, 2252A,
2256 (1996) & 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1996). For the purposes of this paper, citations will be to CPPA,
18 U.S.C.
3. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258 (The Court found two of the CPPA's provisions
unconstitutional: 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)'s prohibition of material that "appears to be" of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct and 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)'s prohibition of sexually explicit
material that "conveys the impression" that it is of a minor engaged in sex).
4. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
5. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
6. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.
7. See John Schwartz, Swift, Passionate Reaction to a Pornography Ruling, N.Y. TtMES,
Apr. 17, 2002, at A18.
8. See Stephen V. Treglia, Lawyers and Technology: After Ashcroft Is Virtual Child Porn A
Crime?, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002), available at WESTLAW ALLNEWS library (claiming that reading
Free Speech Coalition to hold that virtual child pornography is now an area of protected speech is
misguided).
9. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment demands that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech."' 0 Unless speech falls into one of
the categories accepted as being outside the First Amendment's veil of
protection, that speech is presumed to be protected." The government
may constitutionally regulate speech that does not fit within the defined
categories deserving of First Amendment protection.12 To do so, the gov-
ernment must show a compelling government interest making the legisla-
tion necessary and demonstrate that the statute is narrowly tailored to
achieving that interest. 13 Finally, even if a statute is narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling government interest, the statute may still be
unconstitutional if it is overbroad, thus proscribing a substantial amount
of protected speech. 14
Free Speech Coalition questions whether virtual child pornography
fits into one of the categories outside of First Amendment protection,
namely, child pornography.' 5 The Court's analysis focused on whether
Congress narrowly tailored the CPPA to accomplish the goal of protect-
ing children. 16 Overbreadth was also addressed in the Court's interpreta-
tion of the CPPA in Free Speech Coalition.'7 The Court's decision in
Free Speech Coalition demonstrates the judicial struggle and competing
interests involved in reconciling regulation of pornography within the
bounds of the First Amendment. In evaluating the CPPA's prohibition of
virtual child pornography, the Court squarely faced the problem of fitting
virtual child pornography into existing First Amendment law.'
8
This section will examine the Court's most notable attempt at defin-
ing obscenity law in Miller v. California,9 as well as the Court's efforts
to carve out a separate category of unprotected speech for child pornog-
raphy in New York v. Ferber.20 Following the discussion of the cases, this
section will also outline the CPPA provisions at issue in Free Speech
10. U.S. CONST. amend. L
11. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) ("The freedom of
speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.").
12. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 245-46.
13. Content-based speech is judged under strict scrutiny. Some commentators have argued that
the appropriate standard of review in Free Speech Coalition should be the balancing of interests test.
This inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment. For more information, see Wade T. Anderson,
Comment, Criminalizing "Virtual" Child Pornography Under the Child Pornography Prevention
Act: Is It Really What It "Appears to Be?," 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 393,418-20 (2001).
14. See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612 (1973).
15. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240.
16. Id. at 252-54.
17. Id. at 255-57.
18. Id. at 239-40.
19. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
[Vol. 80:2
2002] REGULATING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 431
Coalition. Finally, this section will briefly summarize the circuit courts'
struggles in interpreting the CPPA and the disparate results that led to the
Court's decision to grant certiorari.
A. Miller v. California
2 1
In Roth v. United States,22 the Supreme Court held that obscenity, as
a category of speech, falls outside the boundaries of First Amendment
23protection. Between Roth, in 1957, and the Court's decision in Miller v.
California, in 1973, the Court struggled to define obscenity and develop
a workable standard for identifying obscene speech.24 In fact, before the
Miller decision, even members of the Court expressed difficulty defining
obscenity. In his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio,25 Justice Stew-
art wrote, "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it. ,,26 The struggle over the definition of obscenity con-
tinued for nearly a decade without any clear standard for identifying un-
protected obscenity.
Miller v. California marked the culmination of the Supreme Court's
attempts to determine the boundary between speech worthy of First
Amendment protection and unprotected obscenity.27 Miller delineates the
current standard of acceptable regulation of what Justice Harlan called
"the intractable obscenity problem." 28 In that case, the State of California
charged the defendant, Miller, with a misdemeanor for knowingly dis-
tributing obscene materials in violation of California law.29 Miller was
21. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85 (The Court found that "implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." Thus, the
Court concluded that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.").
24. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966).
25. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
26. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
28. Id. at 16 (citing Interstate Circuit Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
29. Id. at 16-18. The defendant was charged under a California statute that provided in
relevant part:
§ 311.2. Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing, exhibiting,
distributing or possessing within state:
(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings or
causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state
prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has
in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute,
any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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charged after he allegedly sent an unsolicited brochure containing ex-
plicit pictures and drawings of men and women engaging in sexual ac-
tivities to a restaurant owner and his mother.30 Finding that the State had
a legitimate interest in prohibiting distribution of obscene material, the
Court concluded that a state may constitutionally regulate obscenity
without violating the First Amendment.3 '
The Court limited the scope and definition of obscenity to apply
only to material depicting or describing sexual conduct.32 The Court also
found that for a regulation to be constitutional it must be "specifically
defined" in the statute.33 Finally, if the material challenged fits within
these guidelines, then the reviewing court would examine under the fol-
lowing test, which required that "[a] state offense must also be limited to
works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value." 34 This test for obscenity, outlined in Miller, remains the con-
stitutional standard required of all obscenity statutes. However, almost a
decade later, the Court determined that obscenity laws were insufficient
to regulate some types of indecent material, namely child pornography.35
B. New York v. Ferber
36
Paul Ferber was criminally charged under a New York obscenity
statute after he sold pornographic films showing young boys masturbat-
ing to an undercover police officer.37 The statute prohibited the knowing
promotion of sexual performances by minors by distribution of material
depicting such performances. 38 The New York Court of Appeals found
§ 311. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(a) 'Obscene' means that to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters and is matter which is utterly without redeeming
social importance.
Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (1968)).
30. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
31. Id. at 18-20.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
36. 458 U.S. 747.
37. Id. at 751-52.
38. Id. at 751. At issue in Ferber was New York Penal Law § 263.15. In relevant part, the
statute read: "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the
character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes
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the statute unconstitutional because it failed to delineate the Miller re-
quirements for obscenity.3 9 However, in 1982, the Supreme Court re-
versed, deciding that the First Amendment did not protect child pornog-
raphy, and that a state could regulate the distribution of child pornogra-
phy wholly apart from the Miller obscenity standard. 4°
Upholding New York's regulation of child pornography, the Court
focused primarily on the harm to children created by the production of
child pornography. 41 The Court adopted five justifications for allowing
states greater latitude in regulating child pornography.42 First, the Court
found that the production of child pornography was intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children.43 Second, the Court determined that
sexually explicit material using children created a permanent record of
the abuse, which would harm the participants each time it was distrib-
uted.44 In addition, the Court concluded that the State's interest in pro-
tecting children from sexual exploitation in the creation of child pornog-
raphy could only be controlled by prohibiting the distribution of porno-
graphic materials produced using children.45 Third, the Court recognized
that the sale and distribution of child pornography sustained the market
for these kinds of materials and continued the exploitation of children in
production of pornography. 46 Fourth, the Court defended the statute's
proscription of speech on the ground that child pornography was of only
de minimis value. 47 Importantly, the Court noted that the First Amend-
ment protects the use of adult simulation if the depiction of children en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct is necessary to add literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value to a work.48 And fifth, the Court found that
the earlier precedent did not preclude the exclusion of child pornography
as an unprotected category of speech.49
The Court concluded that states could constitutionally regulate child
pornography without regard to the Miller obscenity requirements because
of the harm to children intrinsic in the production of child pornography.5°
Justice White wrote, "The Miller standard, like all general definitions of
what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the State's particular
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." "'Promote' means to procure, manufacture,
issue, sell." Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263 (1977)).
39. New York v. Ferber, 422 N.E. 2d 523, 525-26 (N.Y. 1981).
40. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
41. Id. at 759-60.
42. Id. at 756-64.
43. Id. at 756.
44. Id. at 759.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 761-62.
47. Id. at 762.
48. Id. at 762-63.
49. Id. at 763.
50. Id. at 756.
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and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sex-
ual exploitation of children.",51 Thus, the Court upheld the New York
statute as constitutional, and in doing so, created a new category of
speech beyond the bounds of First Amendment protection.52 Federal laws
passed in the wake of Ferber's ban on child pornography were largely
useful in combating child pornography. However, with the dawn of the
Internet and technological advances that led to the increasing availability
of child pornography in cyberspace, existing federal laws have become
increasingly impotent in dealing with the new technology.53
C. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
Before the enactment of the CPPA in 1996, Congress attempted to
regulate child pornography under a variety of statutes.54 However, with
advances in computer technology, the existing law left loopholes for
computer-generated images of children engaging in sexual acts, now
commonly known as virtual child pornography.55 Congress addressed the
growth of virtual child pornography in 1996 by enacting the CPPA, in-
cluding thirteen legislative findings regarding the ills of virtual pornog-
raphy, in an attempt to fill the void left by existing laws.56
To combat virtual child pornography, Congress amended the defini-
tion of "child pornography" to include computer-generated images of
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.57 With regard to virtual
images specifically, the CPPA defined child pornography inter alia as:
any visual depiction, including any.., computer-generated image...
where--
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct...
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
51. Id. at 761.
52. Id. at 773-74.
53. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 402.
54. See id. at 396-98 (discussing legislative attempts at regulating child pornography since the
1970s).
55. Id. at 402 (Existing laws covered only pornography produced using real children, thus
leaving a loophole for virtual child pornography. Furthermore, prosecutors had a difficult task in
convicting pornographers because the defendant could always provide reasonable doubt by
suggesting the material was produced using only virtual children.).
56. Id. at 403.
57. CPPA, 18 U.S.C § 2256(8) (1996).
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impression that the material is or contains a visual depic-
tion of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
58
The "appears to be" clause and the "conveys the impression" clause are
the provisions that were specifically at issue in Free Speech Coalition.
59
D. Circuit Courts' Interpretation of the CPPA
Since the CPPA's enactment in 1996, five cases, including Free
Speech Coalition, have made their way to federal appellate courts. 60 The
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits upheld the constitutionality of
the CPPA.61 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno,62 found that the CPPA failed to serve a compelling government
interest and was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.63
Each of the four circuits that upheld the CPPA's constitutionality
did so, in part, by extending the rationale of Ferber and its progeny.
64
These courts concluded that the secondary harm associated with virtual
child pornography was sufficient justification for limiting virtual im-
ages. 65 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to accept that there was a
"nexus" 66 between virtual child pornography and harm to children. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit declined to enlarge Ferber to include a constitutional
prohibition on virtual child pornography.67
As written, the CPPA does not fit neatly within the Miller obscenity
standard. Nor does the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography follow
directly from the holding and rationale in Ferber. With the lower courts
diametrically opposed on the constitutionality of the CPPA, the time was
ripe for a final decision on congressional ventures into regulating virtual
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241-42. Section 2256(8)(C) was not challenged by the
Coalition, but the majority opinion notes that it will likely fall under the Ferber standard since there
is harm to actual children in the distribution of morphed images. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 404
(Section 2252 was also amended to incorporate the definitions of § 2256 in criminalizing the "use of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.").
60. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d
912 (4th Cir. 2000); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
61. See Fox, 248 F.3d 394; Mento, 231 F.3d 912; Acheson, 195 F.3d 645; Hilton, 167 F.3d 61.
62. 198 F.3d 1083.
63. Id. at 1096.
64. See Fox, 248 F.3d at 401; Mento, 231 F.3d at 919-20; Acheson, 195 F.3d at 650; Hilton,
167 F.3d at 69-71. The circuits were split not only as to the statute's constitutionality, but also as to
an appropriate standard of review. This inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be
addressed.
65. Fox, 248 F.3d 394; Mento, 231 F.3d at 912; Acheson, 195 F.3d at 645; Hilton, 167 F.3d at
61.
66. See Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1094.
67. Id. at 1092.
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child pornography. Thus, the Court granted certiorari to Free Speech
68Coalition to quiet the debate.
II. ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION 69
A. Facts
The Free Speech Coalition ("the Coalition"), a California trade or-
ganization consisting of businesses in the adult entertainment industry,
artists, and authors, brought this facial challenge to the CPPA.70 Though
none of the groups or individuals who challenged the statute had been
charged, the Coalition feared their "adult-oriented" work might fall under
the prohibitions on virtual child pornography as defined by the CPPA.71
Thus, the Coalition brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
on the ground that the CPPA was vague and overbroad.72
The respondents brought the case, originally captioned as Free73 i
Speech Coalition v. Reno, in federal court in California. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. 74 In 1999,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that
the CPPA was an unconstitutional ban on free speech protected under the
First Amendment.75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2001.76
B. The Majority Opinion
With the split among the circuit courts, Free Speech Coalition pre-
sented the Court with an opportunity to settle the question over the
proper placement of virtual child pornography within the rubric estab-
lished by Miller, Ferber, and their progeny. Faced with this challenge,
the Court refused to equate the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography
with the constitutionally permissible prohibition on real child pornogra-
phy under Ferber or obscenity under Miller.78 Moreover, the majority
rejected the government's assertion of any compelling interest justifying
68.. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S. 844 (2001).
69. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
70. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 234.
71. Id.
72. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
73. No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997).
74. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 WL 487758, at *7.
75. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
76. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 531 U.S. 844 (2001).
77. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute criminalizing
possession of child pornography by extending Ferber to include limiting the market for child
pornography and protecting victims from ongoing showing of pornography); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
78. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240.
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regulation of virtual child pornography under the CPPA. 79 Finally, the
Court ruled that the CPPA, as written, was overbroad and thus unconsti-
tutional, as a substantial amount of protected speech could be chilled
under the statute. 80
First, the Court found that the CPPA could not be interpreted as a
supplement to the constitutional proscription of obscenity under Miller.
81
The Court found that the CPPA failed to include any connection between
the prohibited work and community standards of offensiveness. 82 In ad-
dition, the Court determined that the CPPA did not act as a supplement to
existing obscenity standards because it failed to account for the work's
literary, scientific, artistic, or political value.
83
Second, the Court refused to extend Ferber's ban on pornography
produced using real children to include the CPPA's prohibition on all
virtual child pornography. 84 As discussed above, constitutionally permis-
sible regulation of real child pornography under the Ferber line of cases
was originally justified because of the primary harm to children affected
during the production of child pornography.85 In the words of Justice
Kennedy, "The production of the work, not its content, was the target of
the statute. 86
Interpreting the Ferber holding and rationale narrowly, the Court
concluded that the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography was not
simply an augmentation of Ferber necessitated by technological ad-
vances. Rather, the Court determined that, unlike Ferber, "the harm"
from virtual child pornography "does not necessarily follow from the
speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent
criminal acts.",87 This reasoning suggests that the Court will likely be
unwilling to accept the constitutionality of any legislative attempt to limit
virtual child pornography under Ferber and its progeny.
79. Id. at 251-55.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 251 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24) (Under the Miller obscenity test, the government
must show that, taken as a whole, the work in question: 1) appeals to the prurient interest; 2) is
patently offensive in ight of community standards; and 3) lacks any serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.).
82. Id. at 246.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 251.
85. The Ferber Court grounded its ruling to permit regulation of child pornography beyond
the confines of Miller because of the intrinsic harm to children in the productio'n of child
pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. Conversely, in virtual child pornography, the impact on
children is secondary, i.e., child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles or may be used by a
pedophile as an aid to lure children. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 242.
86. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249.
87. Id. at 250.
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After concluding that the CPPA did not fit within any of the consti-
tutional categories of per se unprotected speech, the Court rejected the
government's assertions that the CPPA was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest.88 The government presented four arguments aimed
at convincing the Court that the CPPA should be upheld. Though the
reasoning is somewhat intertwined, the Court rejected each of these
claims, finding that two of the assertions failed strict scrutiny and two
suffered from overbreadth by prohibiting a substantial amount of pro-
tected speech. 89
The government argued that the CPPA was necessary to prevent
pedophiles from using virtual child pornography to seduce children. 90
The Court found this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the
Court concluded that a pedophile might use many things, including video
games and candy, to seduce children. 9' Second, the Court found that
other laws, such as those that prohibit unlawful solicitation of a minor,
more closely regulate the unsavory use of virtual pornography. 92 Thus,
according to the majority, the CPPA was not narrowly tailored because
the protection of children from pedophiles might be accomplished
through less restrictive means.93
In addition to being needlessly restrictive, the Court also found that
the CPPA failed to serve the government's compelling interest of
protecting children from pedophiles. 94 Justice Kennedy wrote, "The evil
in question depends upon the actor's unlawful conduct, conduct defined
as criminal quite apart from any link to the speech in question. '95 The
Court similarly rejected the government's argument that virtual child
pornography "whets the appetites of pedophiles." 96 Again citing the
apparent disconnect between pornography and conduct, the Court con-
cluded that a tendency to cause illegal conduct was an insufficient
justification for limiting speech. 97 The majority's rejection of the gov-
ernment's asserted interests in protecting children from pedophiles high-
lights the Court's wariness to accept the causal connection between
virtual child pornography and harm to children.
98
88. See id. at 252.
89. Id. at 256.
90. Jd. at 251.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 251-52.
93. Id. at 252.
94. Id. at 253.
95. Id. at 252.
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 253-54.
98. Id. at 244-46.
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In addition to repudiating arguments based on the assumption that
virtual child pornography enhances the likelihood of pedophilia, the
Court also rejected the government's assertions that the CPPA was
needed to enforce existing laws regulating child pornography.99 The gov-
ernment made two arguments, both rejected, aimed at convincing the
Court of the CPPA's necessity to ensure enforcement of Ferber's ban on
child pornography.' °° Both arguments centered on the premise that vir-
tual child pornography is indistinguishable from pornography using real
children. 10
First, the government claimed that because virtual child pornogra-
phy and actual child pornography are part of the same market, the Court
should extend the Ferber and Osborne rationales to include virtual child
pornography. 02 This would allow the government to better enforce the
existing ban on real child pornography by eliminating the market. 0 3 The
Court found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning that if the two were
truly indistinguishable, there would be no market for real child pornog-
raphy, as potential offenders could avoid prosecution by simply using
virtual images.104
Additionally, the government argued that technological advances
have made real and virtual pornography indistinguishable, in turn making
prosecution of real child pornographers impossible.' 05 In answer to both
of the enforcement arguments, the Court found that "[t]he Government
may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful
speech. ' °6 Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,"°7 the Court concluded that
the CPPA was overbroad because it regulated a substantial amount of
constitutionally permissible speech.
108
Though the government asserted the statute's inclusion of an
affirmative defense as a remedy to the overbreadth problem, the Court
found that the affirmative defense proved incomplete. °9 The defense
allowed a defendant to escape prosecution if he could prove that the ma-
terials were produced using adults and that they were not distributed in a
way that conveyed the impression that the material showed real chil-
dren. 10 The Court found, however, that since the statute only permitted
99. Id. at 254.
100. See id. at 249-54.
101. Id. at 249, 254.




106. Id. at 255.
107. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
108. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255-56 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612).
109. Id. at 256.
110. Id. at 255.
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such a defense for distributors, but not possessors, a significant amount
of protected speech would be restricted in the CPPA's attempt to distin-
guish real from virtual child pornography."l'
In addition to the "appears to be" clause of the CPPA, the Coalition
also challenged the "conveys the impression" clause.' 12 Like the "appears
to be" language of the CPPA, the Court also found that the "conveys the
impression" portion served no compelling government interest." 3 The
majority found the government's evidence insufficient to show any harm
in material merely pandered as containing child pornography.' l 4 Fur-
thermore, the majority found that the "conveys the impression" language
was overbroad because the statute prohibited the mere possession of ma-
terials that were pandered as child pornography." 5 In sum, the Court
concluded that the challenged portions of the CPPA were overbroad and
unconstitutional. 1 6 As such, the Court did not address the Coalition's
vagueness challenge.!
7
C. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Though Justice Thomas concurred with the majority, finding the
CPPA unconstitutional, he wrote separately to assert his view that the
prosecution rationale might serve a compelling government interest in
the future. 1 8 Justice Thomas noted that the government failed to produce
evidence that prosecution of real child pornographers was made impossi-
ble with the existence of virtual child pornography. 119 However, he ar-
gued that if technological advances caused such a result, the govern-
ment's interest in prosecuting offenders might justify increased regula-
tion of virtual child pornography.
120
D. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the
majority's holding that the CPPA was unconstitutional.'12 First, Chief
111. See id. at 256.
112. Id. This clause prohibits depictions of sexually explicit conduct that are "advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that convey the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." CPPA,
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (1996).
113. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256-57.
114. Id. at 257.
115. Id. at 257-58.
116. d. at 258.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. See id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia joined in the dissent except as to
the paragraph outlining the legislative history, at pp. 271-72 n.2).
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Justice Rehnquist deferred to the legislative findings, contending that the
government had demonstrated a compelling interest in securing the abil-
ity to enforce child pornography regulations. 22 Second, Chief Justice
Rehnquist objected to the majority's judgment that the CPPA was over-
broad.123 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, the Court should inter-
pret the definitions of the CPPA narrowly to apply only to "the sort of
'hard core of child pornography' that we found without protection in
Ferber."'
24
In arguing to limit the CPPA's scope, the Chief Justice contended
that the statute's definition of "sexually explicit conduct" should be lim-
ited to images that are "virtually indistinguishable" from pornography
using real children.1 25 In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued to limit
the CPPA's prohibition against possession or distribution of work that
"conveys the impression" that it contains minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct to materials pandered as child pornography. 126 Further-
more, the Chief Justice concluded that the CPPA's "conveys the impres-
sion" language should be interpreted as limited to the "knowing" posses-
sion of materials containing depictions of real minors engaged in sexu-
ally explicit conduct or depictions that are virtually indistinguishable
from real children. 127 According to the Chief Justice, this narrow inter-
pretation of the "conveys the impression" clause would ensure that the
CPPA could only apply to those who pander child pornography or know-
ingly possess images of real child pornography. 128 Moreover, the narrow
interpretation of the CPPA in general would limit its application to only
"hard core" pornography.
1 29
E. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in Part/Dissent in Part
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's finding that the
"conveys the impression" provision of the CPPA was unconstitutional. 30
However, she opined that the "appears to be" clause should be held con-
122. Id. at 270-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a finding of overbreadth should
only be reserved for extreme cases where the statute in question cannot be remedied by a limiting
instruction (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613)).
124. Id. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 271-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that this limitation
would not limit possession of materials that contain only suggestive depictions of youthful looking
actors.).
128. See id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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stitutional as applied to virtual child pornography. 3' Justice O'Connor
argued that the government has a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren by regulating both actual and virtual child pornography. 32 Like
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor also deferred to the legislative
findings that virtual child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles
and makes prosecution of child pornographers impossible.
33
Additionally, Justice O'Connor found the CPPA to be narrowly tai-
lored. 34 Rather than finding the CPPA unconstitutionally broad in its
sweep, Justice O'Connor argued that the statute should be interpreted to
apply only to those virtual images that are "virtually indistinguishable"
from pornography produced using real children. 35 Reading the CPPA's
"appears to be" clause closely, Justice O'Connor concluded that the stat-
ute was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and
was not overbroad. 136 Thus, Justice O'Connor concurred with the major-
ity's finding that the "conveys the impression" clause was overbroad, but
concluded that the "appears to be" provision was constitutional as ap-




Taking the CPPA as a whole, the Court refused to find a sufficient
connection between the possession or distribution of virtual child por-
nography and the crime of child abuse. 138 Given the Free Speech Coali-
tion opinion, the issue of whether virtual child pornography can ever be
prohibited under the same justification and with the same force as Ferber
is questionable at best. Though the Court may not have eliminated the
possibility that an affirmative defense might save the statute,139 it seems
unlikely, given the current makeup of the Court, that five justices will
ever find a statute like the CPPA constitutional. 140 Thus, if the legislative
findings on the ills of virtual child pornography are correct, the chal-
lenge, at least for the government, then becomes finding a constitutional
means to regulate virtual child pornography.
131. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
prohibition on youthful adult pornography is unconstitutional and suggests that the provision be
stricken rather than finding the CPPA as a whole overbroad).
132. Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. See id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. See id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002).
139. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255-56.
140. But see id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (implying that the prosecution problem, if
proven, might be a compelling enough interest).
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Within weeks of the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Free
Speech Coalition, Congress responded with its first attempt to address
the Court's ruling and began work on the Child Obscenity and Pornogra-
phy Prevention Act of 2002 ("COPPA").1 41 In keeping with Congress's
swift action following the Free Speech Coalition decision, COPPA
worked its way through the legislative process and the House passed the
bill on June 25, 2002 by a vote of 413-8.142 However, neither the Senate
companion bill, S. 2511,143 nor the House-passed measure 44 were taken-
up by the Senate before it adjourned sine die on November 20, 2002 for
the 2nd Session of the 107th Congress. 145 Given the rapidity of congres-
sional action in the wake of Free Speech Coalition, as well as the over-
whelming bipartisan support for COPPA, it is clear that the Court's rul-
ing touched a nerve, at least in the 107th Congress.
This comment will evaluate COPPA as a proposal for constitutional
regulation of virtual child pornography. After examining the constitu-
tional obstacles inherent in COPPA following Free Speech Coalition, I
will address the potential political obstacles to regulating virtual child
pornography constitutionally, and Congress's historical unwillingness to
consider the constitutionality of pending legislation. Finally, I will pro-
pose what I believe to be a constitutional solution for regulating virtual
child pornography under a Miller statute, demonstrating that enforcement
141. Representative Lamar Smith (R-Tex), Chair of the House Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, introduced the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act
of 2002 ("COPPA"), H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter COPPA], on April 30, 2002, two
weeks after the Court announced its ruling in Free Speech Coalition. Rep. Smith was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1986. He is a graduate of Yale University and Southern Methodist
University College of Law.
142. 148 CONG. REc. H3913 (daily ed. June 25, 2002).
143. Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2511, 107th Cong. (2002);
see Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.-
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SN02511:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 1, 2003). The
Senate companion bill was introduced by Senator Jean Carnahan (D-Mo) on May 14, 2002. See
Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.-
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107- :SN0251 1: (last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
144. See Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 107:HR04623: @ @ @L&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 1,
2003).
145. 148 CONG. REC. S11,801 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002). However, the Senate Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on child pornography on October 2, 2002, addressing legislation
confronting this problem. See Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the
Constitution: Hearing on S.R. 2520 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing]. In addition, the Senate introduced its own child pornography
legislation, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Agtainst Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2002 ("PROTECT'), S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter PROTECT], sponsored by Senators
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), which passed the Senate on November 14, 2002.
See 148 CONG. REC. S11,153 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002). No House action, however, was taken on
the PROTECT Act. See Thomas Legislative Service, Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress,
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/- bdquerylD?d107: 1 :./temp/-bd3pMf:@ @ @XVbss/dlO7query.html
(last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
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of existing obscenity regulation will likely catch and punish at least the
worst cases of even virtual child pornography.
A. The Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002
At a May 9, 2002 hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 146 Associate Deputy Attorney
General Daniel Collins outlined the task of revising the CPPA within the
confines of Free Speech Coalition.147 He said, "[W]e believe that the
Court's decision and the Constitution leave the Congress with ample
authority to enact a new, more narrowly focused statute that will allow
the government to accomplish its legitimate and compelling objectives
without interfering with First Amendment freedoms.' 48 In essence, the
goal of this new legislation was to formulate a congressional response to
the Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition. COPPA marked a con-
tinuation of Congress's attempt to bring virtual child pornography within
the rubric of Ferber's prohibition of pornography produced using real
children.4 9 :
In COPPA, the House honed in on some of the questions left unan-
swered after Free Speech Coalition. Following the lead of Justice Tho-
mas's concurrence, 150 Congress revised the stated purpose of the CPPA
with greater particularity. Moreover, COPPA also sought to capitalize on
the loopholes left after Free Speech Coalition by narrowing definitions
and supplementing its affirmative defense. 51 Ostensibly, this legislation
complied with the rules established for regulating virtual child pornogra-
phy by Free Speech Coalition.
COPPA purportedly sought to refine and narrow the scope of the
unconstitutional "appears to be" language of the CPPA in three ways.
52
Specifically, COPPA: 1) localized its stated purpose to enforcement of
146. Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002 and the Sex Tourism
Prohibition Improvement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4623 and H.R. 4477 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. Collins, on behalf of the Dept. of
Justice) [hereinafter House Hearing].
147. Id. at 3-9 (statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. Collins, on behalf of
the Dept. of Justice).
148. Id. at 6.
149. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2 (2002); see also Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249-56
(The Government argued specifically that the virtual child pornography prohibited by the CPPA
should be treated the same as child pornography and thus is subject to regulation without regard to
value under Ferber and its progeny.).
150. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tiechnology may
evolve to the point where it becomes impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws ... [and]
in the event this occurs, the Government should not be foreclosed from enacting a regulation of
virtual child pornography.").
151. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3.
152. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, preamble; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4-5.
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existing child pornography law, 2) redefined the scope of what consti-
tutes virtual child pornography, and 3) exploited the possibility that an
affirmative defense might save an otherwise overbroad statute. 5 In addi-
tion, COPPA attempted to address the Court's criticisms of the "conveys
the impression" language of the CPPA by devising a pandering provision
that would pass constitutional muster. 154 Thus, the recurring question of
whether the government can constitutionally proscribe virtual child por-
nography is focused on whether COPPA narrows the arena of affected
speech sufficiently to permit constitutional regulation.
First, COPPA concentrated its focus by limiting its stated purpose,
or government interest, to the enforcement of existing laws prohibiting
actual child pornography. 55 Congress found that enforcing existing law
is becoming increasing difficult because of the existence of virtual child
pornography. 56 As discussed at length in Part II, the government in Free
Speech Coalition advanced a number of theories for equating the CPPA's
ban on virtual child pornography with Ferber. With the majority unwill-
ing to accept these arguments, the government alternatively argued, inter
alia, that advances in technology were making it increasingly difficult to
prosecute purveyors of real child pornography due to the automatic de-
fense that the material was virtual, and thus not produced using actual
children.' 57 Though not ultimately accepted by the majority, Justice
Thomas's concurrence highlights the possibility that this "prosecution
problem" may someday justify the prohibition of virtual child pornogra-
phy. 58 Moreover, the dissenting justices in Free Speech Coalition also
descri be this narrow focus of the CPPA as a compelling government
interest sufficient to permit proscription of virtual child pornography. 159
COPPA outlined its stated focus in the Congressional Findings that
accompany the new amendments. 60 In his hearing testimony, Associate
Deputy Attorney General Collins claimed:
153. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4-5.
154. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5. COPPA's amended
pandering provisions will be outlined below. However, the attention of this Comment will be
directed at analysis of COPPA's amendments to the definition of child pornography and the scope of
COPPA.
155. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
156. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2.
157. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254.
158. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Congress has a compelling interest in ensuring
the ability to enforce prohibitions of actual child pornography.").
160. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2. Congress found the following:
(1) Obscenity and child pornography are not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity), or New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography) and thus may be
prohibited.;
445
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:2
(2) The Government has a compelling state interest in protecting children from
those who sexually exploit them, including both child molesters and child
pornographers. 'The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance,' New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (emphasis added), and this interest extends to stamping
out the vice of child pornography at all levels in the distribution chain. Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).;
(3) The Government thus has a compelling interest in ensuring that the criminal
prohibitions against child pornography remain enforceable and effective. '[T]he
most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry
up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.' Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.;
(4) In 1982, when the Supreme Court decided Ferber, the technology did not exist
to: (A) create depictions of virtual children that are indistinguishable from
depictions of real children; (B) create depictions of virtual children using
compositions of real children to create an unidentifiable child; or (C) disguise
pictures of real children being abused by making the image look computer
generated.;
(5) Evidence submitted to the Congress, including from the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrates that technology already exists to
disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and to make
depictions of real children appear computer generated. The technology will soon
exist, if it does not already, to make depictions of virtual children look real.;
(6) The vast majority of child pornography prosecutions today involve images
contained on computer hard drives, computer disks, and/or related media.;
(7) There is no substantial evidence that any of the child pornography images being
trafficked today were made other than by the abuse of real children. Nevertheless,
technological advances since Ferber have led many criminal defendants to suggest
that the images of child pornography they possess are not those of real children,
insisting that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the images are
not computer-generated. Such challenges will likely increase after the Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition decision.;
(8) Child pornography circulating on the Internet has, by definition, been digitally
uploaded or scanned into computers and has been transferred over the Internet,
often in different file formats, from trafficker to trafficker. An image seized from a
collector of child pornography is rarely a first-generation product, and the
retransmission of images can alter the image so as to make it difficult for even an
expert conclusively to opine that a particular image depicts a real child. If the
original image has been scanned from a paper version into a digital format, this task
can be even harder since proper forensic delineation may depend on the quality of
the image scanned and the tools used to scan it.;
(9) The impact on the government's ability to prosecute child pornography
offenders is already evident. The Ninth Circuit has seen a significant adverse effect
on prosecutions since the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Free
Speech Coalition. After that decision, prosecutions generally have been brought in
the Ninth Circuit only in the most clear-cut cases in which the government can
specifically identify the child in the depiction or otherwise identify the origin of the
image. This is a fraction of meritorious child pornography cases. The National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children testified that, in light of the Supreme
Court's affirmation of the Ninth Circuit decision, prosecutors in various parts of the
country have expressed concern about the continued viability of previously indicted
cases as well as declined potentially meritorious prosecutions.;
(10) In the absence of congressional action, this problem will continue to grow
increasingly worse. The mere prospect that the technology exists to create computer
or computer-generated depictions that are indistinguishable from depictions of real
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Already, defendants contend that there is reasonable doubt as to
whether a given computer image-and most prosecutions involve
materials stored and exchanged on computers-was produced with an
actual child or as a result of some other process. There are experts
who are willing to testify to the same effect on defendants' behalf.
Moreover, as computer technology continues its rapid evolution, this
problem will only grow increasingly worse. Trials will increasingly
devolve into jury-confusing battles of experts arguing over the
method of generating an image that, to all appearances, looks like it is
the real thing. 161
In recognition of this dilemma, Collins contended that COPPA effec-
tively narrowed its scope to only the compelling government interest of
ensuring that purveyors of real child pornography could be successfully
prosecuted. 162 According to Collins, the government could achieve this
circumscribed goal by prohibiting virtual child pornography that is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from pornography produced using real children.'
63
To address this more limited government interest, COPPA restricted
the definition of "child pornography" that the Supreme Court found con-
stitutionally suspect in Free Speech Coalition. 64 In addition, COPPA
attempted to remedy the affirmative defense attacked by the Free Speech
Coalition majority. 65 According to proponents of the bill, the compres-
sion of the definitions of what constitutes child pornography, coupled
children will allow defendants who possess images of real children to escape
prosecution, for it threatens to create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer
images even when a real child was abused. This threatens to render child
pornography laws that protect real children unenforceable.;
(11) To avoid this grave threat to the Government's unquestioned compelling
interest in effective enforcement of the child pornography laws that protect real
children, a statute must be adopted that prohibits a narrowly-defined subcategory of
images.;
(12) The Supreme Court's 1982 Ferber v. New York decision holding that child
pornography was not protected drove child pornography off the shelves of adult
bookstores. Congressional action is necessary to ensure that open and notorious
trafficking in such materials does not reappear.
Id.
161. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. The CPPA provided definitions for what constitutes "child pornography." CPPA, 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8). See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256, where the majority found the
challenged "appears to be" provision of the CPPA constitutionally overbroad. COPPA attempts to
remedy the constitutional problems of the CPPA, in part, by narrowing the definition of what is child
pornography from any image that "appears to be" of minor engaging in sexually explicit activity to
"a computer image or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from that of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct." COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(a).
165. The Free Speech Coalition majority attacked the CPPA's affirmative defense as
"incomplete and insufficient" primarily because the affirmative defense failed to provide a defense
for possession. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256; see also House Hearing, supra note 146, at
5; COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3 (COPPA specifically addressed the Court's concern by including a
possession defense).
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with the augmented affirmative defense, would address the government's
interest in enforcing existing law while passing constitutional muster.'
66
Associate Deputy Attorney General Collins testified that COPPA
refocused on enforcing Ferber's prohibition of real child pornography in
five ways. 167 The first of COPPA's amendments was a revision of the
definition of child pornography to include only computer images or
computer-generated images. 8 Proponents of the bill claimed that this
narrowed focus addressed the major medium for transmitting child por-
nography. 169 According to COPPA's Congressional Findings and
Collins's testimony, most child pornography is trafficked over the Inter-
net and/or is found on computers. 70 Thus, by defining child pornography
to include virtual images on the computer, Collins argued, COPPA
would cover most of the material at the "core of the Government's prac-
tical concern." 7' Moreover, COPPA's circumscribed application to
cover only computer images implicated a suppression "not . .. of any
idea but rather to uses of particular instruments in a way that directly
implicate[d] the Government's compelling interest in keeping the child
pornography laws enforceable."'
' 72
Second, COPPA refined the definition of child pornography further
by substituting the unconstitutional "appears to be" language of the
CPPA with "virtually indistinguishable from that of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.' 73 Collins argued that by limiting the applica-
tion only to images that "to an ordinary observer ... could pass for the
real thing," ensured that the government could successfully prosecute
purveyors of real child pornography.
74
COPPA further limited the scope of regulation for virtual child por-
nography by restricting prosecution of virtual child pornography to only
those images depicting "lascivious" simulated intercourse. 75 Thus, ac-
cording to Associate Deputy Attorney General Collins, COPPA would
not place limitations on movies such as Traffic, since "'simulated' sexual
intercourse would be covered only if... the depiction is 'lascivious' and
involves the exhibition of the 'genitals, breast, or pubic area' of any per-
166. See House Hearing, supra note 146, at 10-11.
167. Id. at 4-5.
168. Id. at4.
169. Id.
170. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2 6; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
171. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4.
172. Id.
173. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(a)(B); see also Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 265, 268
(dissenters argued that the CPPA should be narrowly construed to apply to only images that are
"virtually indistinguishable" from a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct).
174. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5.
175. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(b)(i).
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son."1 7 6 From the testimony, it seems evident that the intent of this provi-
sion was to respond to the Free Speech Coalition's concern for movies
and other artistic performances or representations that were prohibited
under the CPPA.
177
In conjunction with narrowing the focus of the government interests
and the definitions of what constituted child pornography, COPPA also
attempted to refine the affirmative defense in an effort to limit the reach
of the bill. 178 As discussed above, both the majority opinion and Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion expressly left open the possibility that an
appropriate affirmative defense might aid the constitutionality of the
CPPA. 179 Taking into account this opening, COPPA specifically ad-
dressed the stated insufficiencies of the CPPA's affirmative defense by
including a defense for possession or production of child pornography
requiring a showing that real children were not used in the production
thereof.180
The Free Speech Coalition majority found the CPPA's affirmative
defense insufficient to "save" the statute from being overbroad.' 8' The
majority criticized the CPPA's affirmative defense on two grounds.'
8 2
First, the Court determined that the affirmative defense failed to provide
a defense for possession. 83 "While the affirmative defense may protect a
movie producer from prosecution for the act of distribution, that same
producer, and all other persons in the subsequent distribution chain,
could be liable for possessing prohibited work.''84 Second, the Free
Speech Coalition majority found fault with the CPPA's failure to provide
an affirmative defense to producers of images created not using real chil-
dren. 85 COPPA specifically attempted to remedy these criticisms by
including a defense that the images were not created using actual chil-
dren. 186 Thus, under COPPA, a defendant charged with either possession
176. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 8 (quoting COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(b)(i)).
177. Id. ("Notably, this change alone [the definition of sexually explicit conduct for simulated
intercourse] eliminates most of the overbreadth identified by the Court; it was the breadth of the
definition of sexually explicit conduct that led to distracting and unhelpful arguments over whether
movies such as 'Traffic' and 'American Beauty' were covered.").
178. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5; see also Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256 (finding the CPPA's affirmative defense to be "incomplete and
insufficient").
179. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256, 259-60.
180. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(c).





186. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3(c) (amending the unconstitutional provision of the CPPA, 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(c), as follows: "[1]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating this
section that the alleged offense did not involve the use of a minor."); see also House Hearing, supra
note 146, at 5.
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or distribution of child pornography could assert an affirmative defense if
he could prove that no children were used in the production of the im-
age.1
87
COPPA also attempted to refine the provisions concerning pander-
ing of virtual child pornography by prohibiting any offer to purchase or
sell real child pornography without requiring proof that such material
actually exists. The challenged provision of the CPPA criminalized
sexually explicit depictions that were "advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct."' 89 According to Associate Deputy Attorney
General Collins, the Court criticized this provision because the "prior
law criminalized materials based on how they were marketed."' 90 In con-
trast, proponents of COPPA's new pandering provision suggested that
the bill moved the focus from how sexually explicit material is marketed
to the fact that sexually explicit material is marketed at all.' 91 According
to proponents of COPPA, this modification effectively responded to the
Court's sharp criticism of criminalizing as pandering any offer to buy or
sell child pornography. 1
92
B. COPPA's Constitutional Problems
Proponents of COPPA contended that the bill effectively narrowed
its focus and refineed the definitions and affirmative defense to accom-
plish the limited interest of enforcing the constitutional ban on child por-
nography produced using real children. If new legislation in the 108th
Congress successfully works its way through the legislative process and
becomes law, its constitutionality may again be challenged. While
COPPA arguably narrowed the unconstitutional provisions of the CPPA,
some clear problems still existed, and the constitutionality of new
COPPA-like legislation is tenuous.' 93 In fact, in a hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the subject of child pornography, two
witnesses, both law professors, claimed that COPPA, as drafted, was
187. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3; House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5.
188. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 4.
189. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257 (quoting CPPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)).
190. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5, 8 (statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General
Daniel P. Collins, on behalf of the Dept. of Justice).
191. Id. at 8.
192. Id.
193. Kurt Indvik, VSDA Says New Child Pornography Bill Will Likely Not Pass Judicial
Muster, VIDEO STORE, July 14, 2002, at 13, available at 2002 WL 24537763 (According to Sean
Bersell, Vice President of public affairs for the Video Software Dealers Association, "We have
looked at the house bill and we think that it would still fail the Supreme Court test under the Free
Speech Coalition case.").
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unconstitutional.194 Indeed, even Representative Adam Schiff, 95 a mem-
ber of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security, expressed his view that COPPA might fail constitutional mus-
ter. 1
96
First, at least six justices have already rejected the government's ar-
gument for the "prosecution rationale," which is at the heart of COPPA' s
reworked provisions. 197 In Free Speech Coalition, the government ex-
pressly argued that the CPPA's provisions were necessary to prevent
purveyors of real child pornography from claiming an automatic defense
that the images were virtual and did not use real children.198 The majority
rejected this argument, stating: "The argument, in essence, is that pro-
tected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This
analysis turns the First Amendment upside down."'199 Moreover, even
though Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, expressed his view
that this prosecution rationale may one day prove sufficient to justify
limits on virtual child pornography, he noted that "the Government as-
serts only that defendants raise such defenses, not that they have done so
successfully ... this speculative interest cannot support the broad reach
of the CPPA.,,200 Thus, unless the government can point to defendants
who have been acquitted under a "virtual" defense, it is unclear whether
the Court will be willing to acknowledge any proscription of virtual child
pornography, under COPPA or similar legislation.20 '
Though COPPA may have narrowed its asserted purpose to enforc-
ing child pornography laws, little changed in the interim between Free
Speech Coalition and this proposed legislation. 2  In short, the govern-
194. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statements of Frederick Schauer, Professor of the First
Amendment at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Ann Couglin, Class of
1948 Research Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School. They both testified that
COPPA was unconstitutional.).
195. Representative Schiff (CA-D) was elected to the United States House of Representatives
in 2000 following a four-year term as a state senator in California. Prior to holding elected office,
Mr. Schiff served in the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, California. Representative
Schiff is a graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Law School.
196. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 15-16 (Statement of Rep. Adam Schiff) ("I think that
the problem of child pornography is such a serious one that the Supreme Court decision really has to
be addressed legislatively .... I think that this bill does do that. It's still, I think, going to be a very
close constitutional question, but I think it's one that we have to raise, if we're going to effectively
combat this problem.").
197. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254-55.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. See id.
202. In fact, Congressional Findings supporting COPPA indicate that the technology to create
computer images virtually indistinguishable from real child pornography does not exist. COPPA,
H.R. 4623, § 2. For example, paragraph five states that "[t]he technology will soon exist, if it does
not already, to make depictions of virtual children look real," and paragraph seven states that
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ment has already tried to assert the prosecution rationale as a compelling
government interest, and it has failed.2 °3
However, even if the Court eventually accepts the prosecution prob-
lem as a justification for regulation of virtual child pornography, COPPA
still proscribed a substantial amount of protected speech; the question is
whether it was too much?2°4 Even though COPPA, at least on its face,
narrowed the scope of speech regulable as child pornography, instances
remain where potentially nonobscene virtual images of children are still
within the ambit of COPPA. Moreover, many of the purportedly nar-
rowed provisions of COPPA amount to little more than just a restatement
of the same definitions already found unconstitutional in Free Speech
Coalition."'
For example, COPPA allegedly restricted its reach by applying to
only computer images or computer-generated images.2 °6 In Free Speech
Coalition, a majority of the Court specifically found that the First
Amendment protects such images.20 7 Associate Deputy Attorney General
Collins argued that COPPA "extends not to the suppression of any idea
but rather to uses of particular instruments, such as computers, in a way
that directly implicates the Government's compelling interest in keeping
the child pornography laws enforceable., 20 8 However, there is no practi-
cal difference between the two since, according to COPPA's Congres-
sional Findings, most virtual child pornography is produced and trans-
mitted using computer technology.20 9
Moreover, videos, photographs, and other images fall within
COPPA's definition of child pornography so long as they are found on a
computer. 21° Thus, even a protected image might be subject to COPPA if
"[tlhere is no substantial evidence that any of the child pornography images being trafficked today
were made other than by the abuse of real children." Id. at V5, 7.
203. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 254-55.
204. See Indvik, supra note 193.
205. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Ann Couglin) ("Indeed, it is difficult to
understand how the House bill could be interpreted as an effort to correct the defects in the CPPA
that were identified in Free Speech Coalition. Instead, the House bill seems to embody a decision
merely to reenact the CPPA all over again.").
206. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3.
207. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Ann Coughlin). Professor Coughlin
notes of the Free Speech Coalition decision, "In particular the Court concluded that the prohibitions
covered materials: (1) that were not regulable under Ferber because they were not the product of
child abuse ... and (2) that were protected by Miller because they were of serious literary, artistic,
scientific, or other value." Id.
208. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
209. See COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 2.
210. See House Hearing, supra note 146, at 22-23 (Deputy Attorney General Collins, in
response to Congressman Schiff's questions, acknowledged that the COPPA covers videos and
photographs, or any image found on a computer.).
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it was found on a computer or created using computer technology.2 1' For
example, with the increased accessibility, economic benefits, and abun-
dance of the Internet, many movies already advertise trailers online. As
technology advances, it is not beyond imagination that movies and other
legitimate, and non-obscene, media may be available over the Internet.
Given the scope of COPPA's definition of child pornography, many of
the same concerns raised by the majority about the proscription of mov-
ies like Traffic and American Beauty might be proscribed under
COPPA.
212
In addition, by extending to all computer-generated images, COPPA
might reach documentaries on child sexual abuse, which use computer
graphics to avoid using real children, or even movies like Titanic or A.I.,
which have already used computer technology to supplement and even
213replace real actors.
Proponents of COPPA also argued that the scope of the bill was fur-
ther limited by confining the definition of child pornography to any
computer image that is indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct. 214 However, this very suggestion of restrict-
ing the CPPA to material indistinguishable from real child pornography
was proffered by the dissenting justices in Free Speech Coalition215 and
was rejected by the Court.216 Professor Schauer, in his testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, criticized the addition of the "indistin-
guishable" definition:
Even if no person at all could tell the difference between materials us-
ing real children and materials using computer-generated images, the
absence of real children in the latter case is exactly why the Supreme
Court in Free Speech Coalition refused to find Ferber applicable, and
no degree of indistinguishability in [t]he image can create a real child
where none existed before.
217
Thus, it is at least questionable whether COPPA meaningfully solved any
of the constitutional flaws of the CPPA.21 s COPPA's acceptance of lan-
guage that was expressly rejected by the majority, and failure to provide
"any explanation for why this definition would be greeted by the Court
as an improvement over the definition it just rejected, 21 9 makes clear the
211. Id.
212. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 247-48.
213. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 393.
214. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 4 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
215. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), 268-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 249-51 (dismissing the government's "virtually indistinguishable" construction
argument).
217. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
218. See id.
219. Id. (statement of Ann Coughlin).
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difficulty in regulating virtual child pornography after Free Speech Coa-
lition. However, it is also clear that this new definition is highly suscep-
tible to the same kind of overbreadth challenge that plagued its predeces-
sor, the CPPA.22 °
In response to the potential overbreadth problems, COPPA also at-
tempted to accommodate Free Speech Coalition by revising the affirma-
tive defense found insufficient by the Supreme Court.22' Associate Dep-
uty Attorney General Collins suggested of the changes, "The affirmative
defense is explicitly amended to include possession offenses ... [and] is
also amended so that a defendant could prevail simply by showing that
no children were used in the production of the materials. Prior law only
granted an affirmative defense for productions involving youthful-
looking adults." 222 According to proponents of the bill, the narrowed
definitions of child pornography, in tandem with the supplemented af-
firmative defense, ensured that COPPA's prohibition of virtual child
pornography was not overbroad.223
According to the Vice President of Public Affairs for the Video
Software Dealers Association, however, COPPA's affirmative defense
amounted to little more than a burden-shifting device requiring the ac-
cused to prove his innocence by demonstrating that the images were not
produced using real children.224 Moreover, although the majority in Free
Speech Coalition refused to specifically address the question of whether
the affirmative defense could "save the statute,' 225 the Court suggested
that there exists "serious constitutional difficulties [raised] by seeking to
impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not unlaw-
ful. '226 The Court also noted the difficulty of requiring a defendant to
prove his innocence after prosecution has begun. Justice Kennedy wrote
of the evidentiary dilemma, "Where the defendant is not the producer of
the work, he may have no way of establishing the identity, or even the
existence, of the actors. If the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for
the Government, . . . it will be at least as difficult for the innocent pos-
sessor. ' 227 Thus, even if COPPA's affirmative defense helped to suffi-
220. Id. (statements of Frederick Schauer and Ann Coughlin).
221. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 3. The COPPA also restricts its scope for sexually explicit images
by requiring that simulated sexual intercourse be "lascivious" to violate the bill. Id. § 3(b)(B)(i).
However, based on the hearing testimony, this restriction appears to be primarily intended to cover
movies and other artistic performances, not virtual pornography. See House Hearing, supra note
146, at 8.
222. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
223. Id.
224. Indvik, supra note 193; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 194 (statements of Frederick
Schauer and Ann Coughlin).
225. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.
226. Id. at 255.
227. Id. at 255-56.
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ciently narrow its reach, it is unclear that an affirmative defense can be
employed in the area of virtual child pornography to make an otherwise
suspect statute constitutional.228
In addition, Professor Coughlin also asserted that COPPA's affirma-
tive defense failed in substance.229 Professor Coughlin argued that
COPPA's affirmative defense was too broad and might create a loophole
for some defendants to escape criminal liability even for obscene mate-
rial.23 She suggested, "[T]he House bill proposes to put in place an
affirmative defense that could be read to authorize child pornographers
who produce and peddle materials that possess no redeeming social value
to escape prosecution on the ground that the materials were made with-
out using an actual minor.",23' Consequently, even if the constitutionality
of COPPA's affirmative defense was not at issue, the substance and one
potential loophole might compromise the validity of the statute.232
Finally, COPPA's amended provision on pandering 233 purported to
remedy the problems pointed out by the Court in Free Speech Coalition
by focusing on the act of marketing instead of on the character of the
234material. However, Congress's task in constitutionally regulating vir-
tual child pornography may not be as simple as suggested by Associate
Deputy Attorney General Collins.235 Again, attempts to regulate virtual
child pornography without regard to obscenity requirements could prove
fruitless. 6 Professor Schauer contends:
[COPPA] treats pandering as an independent offense without the ne-
cessity of a showing that the material pandered is in fact legally ob-
scene or is in fact child pornography made with the use of a real
child. In the absence of such a showing, the "advertising for an
unlawful transaction" rationale disappears, and the pandering provi-
sion appears instead as a prohibition on the advertising of an immoral
or unhealthy but lawful product, plainly protected by the First
Amendment under recent court rulings.
237
Once again, COPPA might be constitutionally suspect because of Con-
gress's repeated attempts to try to regulate virtual child pornography with
the same force of Ferber. After analysis, the best that can be said of
228. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer) (asserting the
Court's skepticism to use affirmative defenses in the area of child pornography).




233. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 4.
234. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Daniel P. Collins).
235. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
236. See id.
237. Id.
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COPPA is that it may still be unconstitutional. 38 Even proponents of
legislation attempting to regulate virtual child pornography in the after-
math of Free Speech Coalition acknowledged the potential failings of
COPPA. 39
Even if COPPA or a similar bill were passed into law in the 108th
Congress, the constitutionality of regulating virtual child pornography is
unclear at best. Some commentators have argued that Congress is grand-
standing or attempting to force defenders of the First Amendment to util-
ize limited resources in order to keep challenging the constitutionality of
statutes implicating First Amendment restrictions.24 Wendy Kaminer,
for example, said of Congress's response to Free Speech Coalition and
COPPA, "Maybe Congress and the White House doesn't [sic] care
whether laws like these are constitutional .... Maybe they care mainly
about getting credit for their passage (while draining resources of free-
speech organizations by forcing them to challenge unconstitutional
laws)., 241 This comment will not predict the future, but instead pose the
questions that are likely to be litigated in the lower courts. And indeed, if
passed, COPPA might suffer the fate of other statutes passed in response
to Supreme Court decisions by floundering in the lower courts.
24
2
Though the future of any COPPA-like statute is unclear, if history is any
indication, the constitutionality of such a bill will likely be challenged.
This is clearly an undesirable result.243 According to Professor Schauer,
"As the six-year course of litigation under the previous Act so well dem-
onstrates, constitutionally suspect legislation under existing Supreme
Court interpretations of the First Amendment ...puts the process of
prosecuting the creators of child pornography on hold while the appellate
courts proceed at their own slow pace. While there may be room in
the Constitution for symbolic legislation, "for Congress to enact sym-
bolic but likely unconstitutional legislation would have the principal ef-
238. Id. (statements of Frederick Schauer and Ann Coughlin asserting that COPPA was likely
unconstitutional and the provisions amounted to little more than a second attempt at the same
provisions of the CPPA that the Court found unconstitutional in Free Speech Coaltion).
239. House Hearing, supra note 146, at 15-16 (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff).
240. Wendy Kaminer, Porn Again, AM. PROSPECr, July 1, 2002, at 9, available at 2002 WL
7761513; see Mark Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case
ofInternet Pornography, 25 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 977, 999, 1030 (2002) (arguing that, in the
realm of Internet pornography, Congress enacts unconstitutional laws in order to meet public
concerns after laws are found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional).
241. Kaminer, supra note 240.
242. See id. (discussing the enactment of the Child Online Protection Act of 1997 passed in
response to the Supreme Court finding the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional. After a
federal appeals court struck down the Child Online Protection Act, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and sent the case back to the lower courts while continuing to enjoin enforcement of the
Act).
243. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
244. Id.
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fect of postponing for conceivably six more years the ability to prosecute
those creators of child pornography whose prosecution is consistent with
the Supreme Court's view of the First Amendment. 245
C. The Easy Answer: Miller
Though the constitutionality of a COPPA-like statute is debatable,
the controversy will likely end in the Supreme Court. Given the clear
reluctance of the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the CPPA' s ban
on virtual child pornography, the best and most effective option may be
to enforce existing law and prosecute virtual child pornography as ob-
scenity.2 '4 While the Miller obscenity standard is certainly more malle-
able and less severe than Ferber's outright ban on child pornography,
much of the worst or hardest types of even virtual pornography will
likely meet the standards of obscenity. Though obscenity may not be the
most effective method for stamping out child pornography, it is one of
the few sure formulas for regulation left standing after Free Speech Coa-
lition.
As discussed above, the government may regulate obscenity under a
Miller statute if the material, taken as a whole: 1) appeals to the prurient
interest; 2) is patently offensive; 3) in light of community standards; and
4) lacks scientific, literary, artistic, or political value.247 In the realm of
child pornography, virtual or otherwise, any material, whether on a com-
puter or elsewhere, that appeals to the prurient interest in a way that of-
fends community standards and lacks social value can be regulated under
existing and well-recognized obscenity laws.248 Thus, under a Miller
statute, Congress may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of virtual
child pornography as obscenity.
While burdens of prosecuting pornographers are certainly eased un-
der Ferber and its progeny,249 a Miller obscenity statute will still reach a
great deal of virtual child pornography because most child pornography
fits within the definition of obscenity.250 Moreover, a Renaissance paint-
ing or movie like Traffic, both of which the Free Speech Coalition Court
worried might be banned under the CPPA,25' would not foster criminal
liability. Given the Court's reluctance to accept the government's argu-
ments in defense of the CPPA, addressing the problems of virtual child
245. Id.
246. Treglia, supra note 8 (arguing that state obscenity laws are still in force after Free Speech
Coalition).
247. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973)).
248. See Treglia, supra note 8.
249. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
250. See id.
251. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241.
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pornography as obscenity and aggressively prosecuting offenders may be
the government's most viable means of regulating virtual child pornog-
raphy.
In addition to COPPA's constitutionally questionable amendments
for regulating child pornography, section five of the bill also proposed
additional and more stringent penalties for obscene materials depicting
pre-pubescent children.252 Even the Free Speech Coalition Court ac-
knowledged that the age of the persons engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct might be relevant in determining whether material is obscene. 53
Thus, more stringent penalties may be one way to combat virtual pornog-
raphy within the constitutional rubric of Miller.
The applicability and constitutional attractiveness of using a Miller
statute to regulate virtual child pornography is evident. 254 The Miller test
requires satisfaction of four prongs.255 Under Miller's first prong, mate-
rial may be obscene if it appeals to the prurient interest. 256 This prong is
to be adjudged by the trier of fact based upon whether the average person
would find the work to appeal to the prurient interest. 57 If adult pornog-
raphy can meet this first prong, certainly child pornography, whether
virtual or not, will likely be found by the average member of any com-
munity to appeal to the prurient interest in sex.
Miller's second prong requires that, for a work to be regulated as
obscenity, the material must depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way specifically defined by law. 8 The Miller Court suggested that "pat-
ently offensive" might be defined as "representations . . . of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted" or "representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals. 259 In the context of virtual child pornography, COPPA's definitions
of "sexually explicit conduct" likely comply with the patent offense re-
quirement. Moreover, similar descriptions were included in the proposed
Senate bill, PROTECT. In addition, Professor Schauer testified that
"there has never been any indication that the activities specified are not
within the range that a legislature may constitutionally find to be patently
252. COPPA, H.R. 4623, § 5. The constitutionality of these provisions is beyond the scope of
this Comment. The significance lies in Congress's ability to set more stringent penalties for
obscenity involving children.
253. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240.
254. Treglia, supra note 8; see Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick
Schauer) (arguing that the Senate bill, PROTECT, is constitutional because it requires that material
be obscene in its definition of covered child pornography).




259. Id. at 25.
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offensive. 26° In conjunction with this second prong, Miller also requires
that regulable obscenity be patently offensive in light of community
standards. 261 As is discussed further below, regulation of virtual child
pornography under Miller is unlikely to be hampered significantly due to
a "community standards" requirement.
Finally, Miller protects certain materials by defining as obscene
only those which, taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, scien-
tific, or political value.262 This requirement leaves open an exemption for263
a Renaissance painting, movies, and pictures in scientific texts. Con-
gress could easily rewrite a constitutional virtual child pornography stat-
ute by providing exemptions for materials with serious social value.2 4
Since virtual child pornography does not exploit actual children in the
production process, protecting works with social value does not risk fur-
ther harm to children, the basis for Ferber's ban on real child pornogra-
phy. 265 Moreover, even the Ferber Court acknowledged that there might
be instances where depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct have some social value.266 However, to protect both children and
the First Amendment simultaneously, the Ferber Court suggested spe-
cifically that youthful looking adults be used in place of children if real
scientific or artistic value would be lost without the inclusion of the
sexually explicit conduct.267 In short, Congress could constitutionally
regulate virtual child pornography so long as the statute reached only
images without serious scientific, artistic, literary, or political value.
Though virtual child pornography is regulable under a Miller ob-
scenity statute, some commentators have argued against applying the
Miller test to the context of child pornography.268 For example, in Fer-
ber, the community standards requirement was found inappropriate when
balanced against judging the primary harm to a real child in the produc-
260. Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer). Although Professor
Schauer's testimony focused on the proposed Senate bill, PROTECT, with the exception of the
proposed Senate bill's inclusion of an obscenity requirement, the descriptions of sexually explicit
material are the same for both PROTECT and COPPA.
261. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
262. Id. at 24-25.
263. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240-41.
264. Meeting the criteria for Miller's third prong could be accomplished simply by adding a
provision to the statute that required the prosecutor to prove that the work in question lacked serious
literary, artistic, scientific or political value. See id. at 246-47 (asserting that the CPPA lacked any
accommodation for works with social value as defined by Miller).
265. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
266. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762-63.
267. See id. at 763.
268. See Anderson, supra note 13; Matthew K. Wegner, Note, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks:
Why Traditional Free Speech Doctrine Supports Anti-Child-Pornography Regulations in Virtual
Reality, 85 MINN. L. REv. 2081, 2110 (2001) (citing Dennis W. Chiu, Obscenity on the Internet:
Local Community Standards for Obscenity Are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185, 188-89 (1995)).
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tion of child pornography.269 Avoiding the possibility that real child por-
nography might be judged obscene in one community while not in an-
other was one of the justifications the Ferber Court gave for moving
beyond the traditional obscenity test.270 In short, the Ferber Court recog-
nized the primary harm to a child in the context of real child pornogra-
phy and concluded that the government could constitutionally protect
children from this harm in every state without examining local standards
of decency.
However, in Free Speech Coalition, a majority of the Court found
no direct link between virtual child pornography and pedophilia.27 1 Thus,
after Free Speech Coalition, it will be hard to argue secondary harm to
children in virtual child pornography cases since the Court has already
272addressed and rejected this argument. Given the limitations on regulat-
ing virtual child pornography after Free Speech Coalition, as well as the
decreased fear that differing community standards might lead to vari-
ances in the primary harm to children, Miller continues to be the light at
the end of the tunnel for regulating at least some virtual child pornogra-
phy. While some virtual pornography may fall through the cracks of the
obscenity test, most communities from Bangor, Maine, to Los Angeles,
California, will find virtual depictions of children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct to be offensive.
Though the government may regulate the distribution of a substan-
tial amount of virtual child pornography as obscenity, 273 under Stanley v.
Georgia274 possession of obscenity in the home cannot be constitution-
ally prohibited. 75 This is likely one reason Congress drafted COPPA
(and the CPPA) without regard to the Miller requirements. For propo-
nents of the strict regulation of virtual child pornography, the inability to
regulate possession of explicit but virtual images of children presents a
clear problem to which there is no easy answer. Even with advances in
technology, it is easier for the government to monitor materials posted on
a Web site than to track and locate the individuals who choose to access
the Web site to view or download pornography. In addition, those dis-
tributing virtual child pornography from shops and storefronts are more
easily located than those who possess movies or magazines in their
homes. Certainly, this logistical practicality argument is of little comfort
to those who aim to stamp out the market for child pornography. How-
269. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
270. Id.
271. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
272. Id.
273. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
274. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
275. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
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ever, finding and punishing the purveyors of child pornography may be
the most effective way to target the industry.
Additionally, some have argued that Miller's community standards
prong is problematic when applied to regulating the distribution of vir-
tual child pornography over the Internet.276 Matthew K. Wegner, in argu-
ing for the creation of a new category for virtual child pornography and a
.national obscenity standard, suggests that the Miller standard's focus on
local community standards is outmoded as community standards have
become increasingly global. 7 Wegner further argues that regulation of
obscenity over the Internet presents a notice problem as materials pass
jurisdictional boundaries over the Internet into communities that may
have more or less strict standards than the location from which the mate-
rial originated.278 However, if the argument supporting the globalization
of community standards is true, then it is unlikely that obscenity will be
judged differently in distinct jurisdictions. That is, if global standards
exist, material found obscene in one jurisdiction will likely be obscene in
another. In short, with the globalization of community standards the
problem of notice becomes increasingly obsolete. 9
The Miller approach, though not perfect in the context of virtual
child pornography, provides a proven method of regulating the type of
material at the heart of the CPPA and COPPA. The Ferber prohibition
on child pornography provides stronger medicine for battling the child
pornography industry.2 80 However, even under Ferber, written material
about child pornography cannot be constitutionally regulated. 28' Thus,
even the Ferber Court recognized the need to limit the application of its
decision to pornography involving and harming a real child. 82 The Free
Speech Coalition majority was unwilling to equate the primary harm to
children inherent in the Ferber rationale with the secondary effects of
virtual child pornography argued by the government.283 Without more
convincing evidence of the primary harm to children, for now, at least, it
seems that virtual child pornography has more similarities to written ma-
276. Wegner, supra note 268, at 2110 (citing Chiu, supra note 268, at 188-89).
277. Id. at 2110 (citing Chiu, supra note 268, at 215).
278. Id. (citing Chiu, supra note 268, at 188). Wegner further argues that the Supreme Court
should adopt a national obscenity standard. However, this argument has not been accepted by the
Supreme Court.
279. In other computer crimes, many states have adopted broader jurisdiction requirements that
encompass the global nature of the Internet. See Eric J. Bakewell et al., Computer Crimes, 38 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 481, 519 (2001) (citing Terrence Berg, State Criminal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Is
There a Sheriff on the Electronic Frontier?, 79 MICH. B.J. 659, 661 (2000)).
280. See Senate Hearing, supra note 145 (statement of Frederick Schauer) (arguing that the
procedural and substantive obstacles to enforcing obscenity may make PROTECT, a bill otherwise
constitutional because of the inclusion of Miller requirements, ineffective).
281. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
282. See id. at 764.
283. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250-51.
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terial than sexually explicit images produced with real children. Given
the current backdrop, the war against child pornography-and specifi-
cally, virtual images-must be waged with Miller. In short, though
Miller may not be the best method of abolishing the market for child
pornography, it seems to be the most certain.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Free Speech Coalition, Congress needs to re-
think its approach to regulating virtual child pornography. Unless Con-
gress can persuade the Court that the existence of virtual child pornogra-
phy directly harms children, and legislation is necessary to enforce the
existing laws, restrictions like those in the CPPA and COPPA will likely/7.
continue to be deemed unconstitutional. Whether the Court will ever
accept that the mere existence of child pornography, virtual or real, cre-
ates direct harm to children is an open question. However, if the dire
predictions are correct and more children are molested because of the
Free Speech Coalition decision, then, absent more convincing empirical
evidence of primary harm, both the federal and state legislatures must
find a constitutional way to protect the nation's children from abuse.
Though the future is uncertain, there are strong arguments to be made
that COPPA is little more than just a loosely reworded version of the
very statute the Supreme Court struck down in Free Speech Coalition.
And while courts are attempting to determine whether the rewording
narrows the bill's application enough to pass constitutional muster, time
and resources are directed toward arguing semantics and away from
prosecuting purveyors of child pornography and obscenity.
In the end, critics of the Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition
may not be satisfied with a Miller response. Nonetheless, to be certain
that at least some, if not most, of the worst purveyors of pornography are
prosecuted, Congress should revise COPPA to comply with Miller, en-
suring that the law prohibits at least "hard core" virtual child pornogra-
phy. If existing obscenity laws are enforced effectively, the law will, as it
should, protect both the sanctity of our ideas and the innocence of our
children.
Lyndall Schuster*
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law.
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THE KYLLO CONUNDRUM: A NEW STANDARD TO ADDRESS
TECHNOLOGY THAT REPRESENTS A STEP BACKWARD FOR
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
INTRODUCTION
An oft-quoted maxim of judicial wisdom is Oliver Wendell
Holmes's observation that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience."' Applied to the field of thermal imaging surveillance
technology, this maxim demonstrates the complicated and often conflict-
ing standards by which application of technology has been judicially
evaluated. The most recent development in this area of technological
jurisprudence has been the Supreme Court's opinion in Kyllo v. United
2States, where a sharply divided court concluded that use of a thermal
imaging device constituted a search that invoked the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.3 The Court also concluded that a new "bright line"
needed to be drawn so that courts could apply Fourth Amendment doc-
trines to new and evolving technologies.4
Part I of this comment reviews the skeleton of Fourth Amendment
analysis, from its basis in trespass and property to the advent of the Katz
two-prong test, and the application of Fourth Amendment analysis to
other modem and new technologies. Part II discusses thermal imaging
basics and prior decisions addressing the application of the Fourth
Amendment to this type of scan. Part HI analyzes the Court's decision in
Kyllo v. United States. Part IV concludes that the Court actually returned
to an intransigent view of Fourth Amendment application; one that is
dangerously ill-equipped to handle future evolution of surveillance tech-
nology.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WITH RESPECT TO
EVOLVING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
A. Early Origins and History
The early American colonial experience with unconstrained writs of
assistance produced a fundamental distrust of unfettered investigatory
powers.5 British common law had established the primacy of a man's
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881), reprinted in PRAGMATISM: A
READER, at 137 (Louis Menand ed.,Vintage Books 1997).
2. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
4. Id. at 36, 40.
5. See, e.g., Navigation Act, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. H, c. 11, § 5 (Eng.) (This investigatory
power is reflected in the British Navigation Acts, which authorized officials to "go into any house,
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domicile, but the colonists found little comfort in this concept when this
protection was tested against the magistrates' authorities. 6 In order to
enforce colonial revenue laws, British authorities used writs of assistance
to authorize the bearer to enter into any house or other place to conduct a
search for taxable commodities. In response to the predictable abuses
that occurred, the drafters of the Bill of Rights adopted the Fourth
Amendment, guaranteeing that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." 8 As interpreted by the courts over the
years, this has come to stand for the need to ensure dispassionate judicial
review of evidence prior to issuing a warrant to law enforcement person-
nel.9
As the body of law supporting the Fourth Amendment has grown,
three essential doctrines have developed that are specifically applicable
to the integration of new technology into the police investigatory arsenal.
The first doctrine concerns the need and ability of law enforcement per-
sonnel to secure a warrant prior to surveillance activities. The second of
these doctrines involves the shifting recognition of property rights as
invoking a fundamentally different level of Constitutional protection.
The final doctrine considers the relationship between Fourth Amendment
protections and various private and administrative searches.
B. The Shift Away from Warrants to Reasonableness
One of the central debates that has influenced the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is whether warrantless searches can
pass constitutional muster.' 0 This has clear application today as courts
struggle to define the scope of police investigatory power in light of an
shop, cellar, warehouse or room... and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests, trunks and
other package, there to seize, and from thence to bring, any kind of goods or merchandize
whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed.").
6. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 194 (K.B. 1604) (citing the famous proposition
that "every man's house is his castle").
7. O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause Of the American Revolution, in THE ERA
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40,40-41, 43-44 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Mark Young, What Big Eyes You
Have!: A New Regime for Covert Government Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1047-48
(2001).
10. Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (expressing the "cardinal
rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants
wherever reasonably practicable"), and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) ("The
[Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches
that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence. In the
scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the requirement that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause,' plays a crucial part."), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950)
(stating that the relevant test is "not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable").
[Vf--I. 80:2
THE KYLLO CONUNDRUM
ever-evolving technological landscape that makes searches less intrusive,
quicker, and easier to conduct. 1 The starting point for the debate in-
volves revisions to the draft of the Fourth Amendment submitted by
James Madison. Madison's introduced version provided: "The rights of
the people to be secured.., from all unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause ....
At some point before final ratification, the House defeated a motion to
substitute the phrase "and no warrant shall issue" for the phrase "by war-
rants issuing."'13 However, the text of the final amendment includes this
supposedly defeated provision, invoking decades of debate about
whether the two clauses-"the right of the people to be secure .. .
against unreasonable searches" and "and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause"-are to be read together (with searches presump-
tively unreasonable if they lack a warrant), or if they each stand alone
(allowing for the recognition of a "reasonable" warrantless search).
14
Early Supreme Court decisions seemed to support the former inter-
pretation, indicating strong preference for police investigatory activities
supported by warrants. 15 However, the Court gradually began to support
the latter interpretation. Starting in the arena of "searches incident to
arrest," courts began eroding the warrant requirement as they recognized
a "well established right of law enforcement officers to arrest without a
warrant for a felony committed in their presence."'
' 6
This exception to the need to obtain a warrant blossomed into pro-
tection for all "reasonable searches," as recognized in the seminal case of
United States v. Rabinowitz.'7 Since that decision, the Court has vacil-
lated between these two competing doctrinal approaches, 18 looking most
recently to enhance the power of law enforcement by recognizing that
searches themselves must only comport with a general "reasonableness"
11. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 36.
12. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-41, 450, 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
13. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrTUTION 101-03 (1937).
14. See Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1988).
15. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627, 630 (1886) (approving of Lord Camden's
argument that "it is now incumbent upon the defendants to show the law by which this seizure is
warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass").
16. Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 704 (overruled on other grounds); see also Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (observing that, in American jurisprudence, the legality of a search incident
to a lawful arrest is not in doubt); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (recognizing
the legality of a search of an individual following a lawful arrest); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914) (noting the uniform acceptance of the government's right to search the person of the
accused upon a legal arrest of that person); Sundby, supra note 14, at 387-90.
17. 339 U.S 56, 65-66 (1950).
18. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 ("In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the
requirement that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,' plays a crucial part.").
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criteria.19 This shift away from a hard and fast warrant requirement has
been a precursor to the rise of balancing tests, designed to measure "rea-
sonableness" by weighing governmental regulatory interest against the
individual's privacy interest. ° Clear application of this phenomenon can
be seen in the next area of Fourth Amendment evolution, the transition
from property-based claims to a personal sense of privacy.
C. Property or Portable Reasonableness?
1. Actual Physical Invasions
As the courts strayed from the presumptive unconstitutionality of a
warrantless search or seizure, it became necessary to determine when the
Fourth Amendment applied. In order for Fourth Amendment protections
to apply, there must be a "search" under the color of official action, with
a subsequent attempt to use what is seized.21 The early jurisprudential
basis for privacy rights was derived from English common law, reflect-
ing Lord Camden's idea that "the great end for which men entered soci-
ety was to secure property ... [and] every invasion of private property,
be it ever so minute, is a trespass. 22 The Supreme Court echoed this
property-based rationale in an early case involving the application of
developing technology, Olmstead v. United States.23 In this case, the
Supreme Court concluded that wiretapping was not a constitutionally
recognizable search, relying principally upon the lack of physical inva-
sion of the defendant's property.24 Specifically, a 5-4 majority concluded
that the wiretapping was permissible because (1) the agents gained ac-
cess to the telephone wires without any "entry of the houses or offices of
the defendants," and (2) the agents obtained the content of the conversa-
tions that passed over the wires but did not acquire physical objects.25 In
a somewhat ominous note foreshadowing later developments in this area
of law, Justice Brandeis in his dissent noted that the "progress of science
in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to
19. See Matthew Pring, Survey, The Death of A Doctrine: The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
and Random Suspicionless Urine Drug Testing Eroding the "Special Needs Doctrine," 79 DENV. U.
L. REv. 457, 458 (2002); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184-86 (1990); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 340-43 (1985).
20. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
21. See Fredrick Alexander & John Amsden, Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 75 GEO. L.J.
713, 714 (1987); see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). But see State v. Helfrich,
600 P.2d 816, 818-19 (Mont. 1979) (holding that under the Montana Constitution, the right to
privacy is protected from actions by both state and private actors, extending protection to all invasive
actions).
22. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (K.B. 1765).
23. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
24. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
25. Id. at 464-65.
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stop with wire tapping. 26 The persistence of this "actual physical inva-
sion" test is seen in the fact that that this property-based view of the
Fourth Amendment persevered even after wiretapping was made unlaw-
ful by statute. 7
2. The Introduction of "Reasonableness"
New technology and an evolving recognition of the limits of prop-
erty law to address privacy interests eventually produced a fundamental
shift in the basis for Fourth Amendment protection. In the case of Katz v.
United States28, the Supreme Court rejected Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of property, ruling instead that the Amendment "protects people, not
places. 29 In Katz, FBI agents overheard the defendant's end of a tele-
phone conversation by attaching an electronic listening and recording
device to the exterior of the public telephone booth from which he was
calling.30 The Court refused to decide the issue on the basis of whether a
person has a personal right of privacy in a phone booth based on property
rights.31 Instead, the Court found the use of this "detectaphone" consti-
tuted a search invoking Fourth Amendment protections, since what a
person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected., 32 In doing so, the Court
shifted the focus of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the individual
and away from her property.33 As the Court noted in reaching its final
holding, "One who.., shuts the door behind him.., is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world.,
34
The two-part test proposed by Justice Harlan in his concurring opin-
ion in Katz eventually came to be recognized as the new measuring stick
for the legitimacy of government searches. 35 The first prong of the test
involves evaluating whether the individual in question "exhibited an ac-
26. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. See Frank Eichenlaub, Carnivore: Taking a Bite Out of the Fourth Amendment?, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 315, 334 (2001); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-12 (1961) (ruling
evidence gathered by law enforcement officers inadmissible because the evidence was gathered
through means of a listening device that had intruded unlawfully upon the premises occupied by the
defendants); Goldman v United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133-35 (1942) (holding that officers' use of a
"detectaphone" to hear defendants' conversations emanating from next room did not constitute
trespass or violation of Fourth Amendment).
28. *389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 350.
32. Id. at351.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 352.
35. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Jonathan Todd Laba, If You Can't Stand the Heat,
Get Out of the Drug Business: Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth
Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (1996).
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tual (subjective) expectation of privacy.' ' 36 Many judicial commentators
have criticized this first prong as being circular in nature.37 Even the
creator of the test, Justice Harlan, came to recognize its limitations, ex-
plaining in United States v. White,38 "Our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the
customs and values of the past and present."39 This eventually led Justice
Harlan to reject this prong of the test in its entirety, stating that the Court
"must ...transcend the search for subjective expectations."4° Corre-
spondingly, as technology allows new levels of intrusiveness into the
private domain, and citizens become aware of these new surveillance
techniques, their subjective expectations of privacy must necessarily be
lowered.
4 1
The second prong of the Katz test involves assessing whether one
has a legitimate expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.' ' 42 As the Supreme Court has noted, there are some
expectations that society is simply not prepared to accept.43 In practice,
this standard has come to reflect a balancing test between the needs of
law enforcement and the importance of the individual interest threatened;
if societal standards dictate that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in
a particular area, then the scope of the invasiveness may increase.44 Criti-
cism has been directed at this prong of the test because it fails to include
36. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. See Laba, supra note 35, at 1445.
38. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
39. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 n.5 (1979) (noting that, in certain circumstances, the two-prong Katz test would be an
inadequate measure of Fourth Amendment protections. For example, the government could not
destroy all grounds of subjective expectation by simply announcing that henceforth all homes would
be subject to warrantless entry, and thus destroy the legitimate expectation of privacy.).
40. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. See Melvin Gutterman, A Formation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 677
(1988).
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. See Gutterman, supra note 41, at 665-66; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-41 (1988) (holding that no expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable
existed in garbage left outside a home); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (recognizing
that no expectation of privacy remained in an area outside of a home that could be observed by all
commercial air travel); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983) (holding that there could be no
reasonable expectation of privacy for material placed in a shipping container subsequently opened
and inspected by customs agents); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (rejecting petitioner's claim of a
reasonable expectation of privacy for numbers dialed on a telephone after police had monitored and
gathered such numbers through use of a pen register); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437,
440-43, 445 (1976) (identifying no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records).
44. See Pring, supra note 19, at 458. Compare United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 811
(1982) (noting that expectations of privacy in personal luggage and other closed containers must be
substantially greater than in the area of an enclosed automobile), with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979) (noting if the personal luggage is found in a car, the expectation of privacy must
correspondingly be less).
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some appraisal of underlying conduct.45 For instance, if two kidnappers
take their victim to a secluded location, they would expect privacy in this
location. However, given the criminal nature of their activities, a court
would probably not recognize their expectations as reasonable, irrespec-
tive of this second "objective" expectation of privacy test.
The Katz test has been applied to a number of "new" technologies in
an effort to define the proper balance between investigative necessity and
individual rights.46 Regarding binoculars and telescopes, courts have held
that use of these devices does not constitute a search. 47 The Supreme
Court has twice addressed the use of beeper tracers in the cases of United
States v. Knotts48 and United States v. Karo,49 developing a somewhat
contradictory line of precedence for use of this technology. The Knotts
agents used a beeper tracer to monitor a chloroform container while in-
side a cabin.50 The Court found that the beeper tracer had initially been
used on public streets, and applied the second prong of the Katz test to
conclude that since there could be no legitimate expectation of privacy
on these public streets, there was no search. 5' However, in the Karo case,
the Court concluded that a beeper being monitored by agents while in-
side a house revealed "a critical fact about the interior of the premises
that [they] . . . could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.,
52
As the Court expounded, "Private residences are places in which the in-
dividual normally expects privacy free of government intrusion ... and
that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable. ' 3
45. See John M. Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink,
15 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 515, 527-29 (1984) (stating the subjective component of Katz distorts the
protections of the Fourth Amendment); see also White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("This question must.., be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely
extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as
a technique of law enforcement.").
46. See Gutterman, supra note 41, at 717 (arguing against questions of search and seizure
depending on technology).
47. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (holding that the use of a searchlight is
the same as the use of field glasses, therefore not a search); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38
(4th Cir. 1973) (holding that use of binoculars is not a search); People v. Hicks, 364 N.E.2d 440, 444
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that use of night vision binoculars is not a search).
48. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
49. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
50. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-79.
51. Id. at 281-82, 285.
52. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
53. Id. at 714.
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3. Statutory and Judicial Interplay Involving Surveillance Technol-
ogy
Title IfI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,54 passed the year after the Katz decision, specifically addressed the
subject of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. 55 Under this legisla-
tion, government officials were given the authority to apply to a federal
judge for an order permitting interception of wire or oral communica-
tions, when such activity may provide evidence of certain enumerated
crimes. 56 A judge may then grant the order ex parte, upon belief of prob-
able cause that the named individual is committing the alleged enumer-
ated offense, but for no longer than "is necessary to achieve the objective
of the authorization," or in any account, not longer than 30 days.57 One
other important factor associated with this provision is that when one of
several named officials finds that "an emergency situation exists that
involves (i) immediate danger of death .... (ii) conspiratorial activities
threatening the national security interest, or (iii) conspiratorial activities
characteristic of organized crime," an interception without prior judicial
authorization is permitted.58
Dalia v. United States59 reflects how the Supreme Court has viewed
the broad authorizations statutorily established by Congress. In Dalia,
F.B.I. agents entered an office to install a listening device and then reen-
tered to remove it, all pursuant to a court order obtained under the Title
HI authorizations.60 Rejecting arguments about the trespassory nature of
the agents' activities, the Court concluded that:
one simply cannot assume that Congress, aware that most bugging
requires covert entry, nonetheless wished to except surveillance re-
quiring such entries from the broad authorization of Title III ....
Those considering the surveillance legislation understood that, by au-
thorizing electronic interception of oral communications in addition
to wire communications, they were necessarily authorizing surrepti-
tious entries.
6 1
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000).
55. See id.
56. Id. § 2516(1).
57. Id. § 2518.
58. Id.; see also Geoffrey North, Carnivore in Cyberspace: Extending the Electronic
Communications Act's Framework to Carnivore Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
155 (2002) (discussing the Act and digital surveillance).
59. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
60. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241, 245.
61. Id. at 252.
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The Dalia decision became controversial for its additional holding that a
court did not need to specifically authorize the covert entry of agents.62
The relevance of this point to other forms of electronic surveillance can
be found in Justice Brennan's dissent from the case, in which he noted
that the "practice entails an invasion of privacy of constitutional signifi-
,,63cance distinct from that which attends nontrespassory surveillance.
Inherent in the dissent's position is a property-based distinction that sub-
scribes to the idea that the Fourth Amendment offers different levels of
protections depending upon the degree of actual physical intrusion asso-
ciated with the process.
D. The Interplay Between Private and Public Actors
1. Third Party Actor Involvement
In the Katz decision, the Supreme Court concluded, "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 64 This language is the starting
point for judicial review of the actions of third parties as proof of the
scope of personal privacy expectations. Primarily, the Fourth Amend-
ment protects individuals from government action, and as such, it applies
only when a government actor is involved.6' However, third parties can
act as agents of the government, thereby invoking the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.66
Another rationale for not applying Fourth Amendment protections
to private searches and seizures is that as a person exposes something to
a private actor, both his subjective expectation of privacy and the objec-
tive status society is willing to accord that expectation decrease.67 As one
example of this, when a person conveys information to a third party,
even during an apparently private conversation, that person cannot rea-
sonably expect the information will remain protected within the context
of the Fourth Amendment.68 This doctrine has been extended to cover the
actions of third party institutions, such as a bank69 or telephone com-
62. Id. at 257 ("Nothing in the language of the Constitution . . . suggests that . . . search
warrants also must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed.").
63. Id. at 259-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
65. See Alexander & Amsden, supra note 21.
66. See id. at 715 & n.13 (discussing various court tests to determine if an actor is a
government agent).
.67. See Brian Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model For Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 627 (1989).
68. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (ruling on a government
informant who reported the conversation to government agents).
69. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
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pany,7° when these actors subsequently convey the information to law
enforcement personnel.
2. Open Fields Surveillance
The most significant application of this doctrine to the field of
Kyllo-type surveillance comes from the so-called "open fields" doctrine.
Under this principle, espoused initially in the case of Oliver v. United
States,7' the Court started by recognizing "the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic. 72 The Court then concluded "open fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. 73 Con-
sequently, in areas outside the immediate surroundings of a home, indi-
viduals have a reduced expectation of privacy and society is prepared to
recognize only minimal protections as reasonable.74 If government actors
can view areas the general public can also view, the search is constitu-
tionally permissible, because the area is akin to an "open field., 75 For
example, in Florida v. Riley76 the Court concluded that observation of a
greenhouse by a police helicopter was a constitutionally permissible
search because the test was "whether [the helicopter] was in the public
airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with suffi-
cient regularity that respondent's expectation was not one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 77 Here again, the fact that a pri-
vate citizen could observe what law enforcement officials ultimately saw
was used as proof by the Court that no legitimate expectation of privacy
existed, even in an area closely associated with "the overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home."
3. Private Naked Eyes
The final relevant application of private actor searches depends on
the general public's availability and current use of the surveillance tech-
nology employed by government actors. The Court has concluded that
when devices employed by law enforcement personnel merely enhance
the surveillance capability that ordinary citizens could use to observe a
70. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742, 745-46.
71. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
72. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
73. Id. at 179.
74. See Susan Moore, Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions,
Remote Sensing, and the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 819 (1994).
75. See Young, supra note 9, at 1054.
76. 448 U.S. 445 (1989).
77. Riley, 448 U.S. at 446.
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defendant's activities, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.78 How-
ever, with increasingly sophisticated technology, the likelihood that the
general public would use these technologies decreases. When this occurs,
courts have been more willing to circumscribe police activities by invok-
ing Fourth Amendment protections. 79 The natural progression of tech-
nology has required judicial officers to consider the use of items as com-
monplace as binoculars and as complex as thermal imaging devices.
II. USE OF THERMAL IMAGING TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. What is Thermal Imaging Technology?
A basic understanding of thermal imaging technology can help de-
fine precisely what sorts of intrusions occur when these devices are em-
ployed by law enforcement personnel. Any object with a temperature
above absolute zero emits radiation in the infrared spectrum.80 A thermal
imaging device detects this infrared radiation and then converts the heat
reading into a two-dimensional picture.81 The picture depicts various
shades of gray according to the levels of heat radiated by objects; hotter
objects appear lighter in color due to the fact that they radiate more infra-
red energy.82 The thermal imager neither alters nor enhances the radia-
tion, but solely detects differences in heat between the target and the
ambient background.83 Most importantly, there are no beams penetrating
a structure when the device is employed; thermal imagers merely pas-
sively scan the surrounding environment to measure respective heat sig-
natures.
84
Thermal imaging technology has been widely adopted by law en-
forcement personnel in the search for illegal drug cultivation.85 Indoor
78. See Moore, supra note 74, at 851; see also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 239 (1986) (holding use of an aerial camera did not invoke Fourth Amendment protections
given); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (holding that an electronic tracking device attached to a car did not
constitute a search because the movements of the car could be observed by the naked eye).
79. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 720-21 (holding that a beeper tracer that reveals information not
available without unaided surveillance does invoke Fourth Amendment protections).
80. Thomas D. Colbridge, Thermal Imaging: Much Heat but Little Light, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 18 (Dec. 1997), at http://www.fbi.gov/publicationsleb/1997/Aeb97.htm.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also M. Annette Lanning, Thermal Surveillance: Do Infrared Eyes in the Sky
Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771, 1773 (1995) (describing how FLIR
systems operate).
83. See Matthew L. Zabel, A High-Tech Assault on the "Castle": Warrantless Thermal
Surveillance of Private Residences and the Fourth Amendment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 267, 280 n.100
(1995) (stating that thermal imaging devices detect only heat emissions).
84. Mindy G. Wilson, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technological
Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections Against
Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky. L.J. 891, 897 (1995).
85. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1518-19 (W.D. Wis. 1994); United States v.
Penney-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225-28 (D. Haw. 1991).
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growing of marijuana requires high intensity growth lamps for optimum
yields.86 These lamps produce hot exhaust gases that must be vented in
order to maintain an optimum growing temperature of 68 to 72 degrees
Fahrenheit.87 Thermal imaging devices allow law enforcement personnel
to detect hot exhaust gases emanating from structures by comparing the
relative heat passively radiated from different environments.88 An agent
is able to tell the relative heat signature of an object by simply directing a
thermal imaging device at it; no probes or sampling devices need to be
attached to the target structure.89 A thermal imaging device requires no
special modification to be employed in this drug detection role; no
transmission of penetrating rays or pulses is necessary to see the exhaust
gases. 90
B. Pre-Kyllo Decisions Dealing with the Use of Thermal Imaging De-
vices
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was the
first court in the federal system to rule on the pre-warrant use of thermal
imaging devices. In the case of Pinson v. United States,9' the court con-
cluded that the use of these devices did not constitute a search because
they failed the second prong of the Katz test.92 The court decided that
even if a defendant could show an expectation of privacy, that expecta-
tion would not be one that society would accept as reasonable for two
reasons. 93 First, the court concluded that thermal imaging devices merely
detected waste heat, and by analogy, this was similar to the waste left at a
curb. 94 The significance of this reasoning was that the Supreme Court
had concluded, in the case of California v. Greenwood,95 that the police
could search waste left at a curb because the individual had demonstrated
86. Wilson, supra note 84, at 893.
87. Lynne M. Pochurek, From the Battlefield to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance and the
War on Drugs Place Privacy Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137, 150 n.99 (1994).
88. Tracy M. White, The Heat is On: The Warrantless Use of Infrared Surveillance to Detect
Indoor Marijuana Cultivation, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 295, 295 (1995).
89. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding the use of a
thermal imaging device to be passive and non-intrusive); Wilson, supra note 84, at 896-97.
90. Wilson, supra note 84, at 896 n.54.
91. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
92. See Sean D. Thueson, Fourth Amendment Search-Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New
"Bright Line" Rule in Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 Wyo. L.
REV. 169, 183-84 (2002).
93. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59.
94. Id.
95. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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that he no longer maintained an expectation of privacy in the contents of
that waste.96
The second reason the court concluded that there was no search was
that the use of infrared sampling devices was similar to a search by a
canine unit. As the court noted, "Just as odor escapes a compartment or
building and is detected by the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine
sniff, so also does heat escape a home and is detected by the sense-
enhancing [thermal imager]. '97 Again, the significance of this compari-
son is that in the case of United States v. Place,98 the Supreme Court had
concluded that a canine search by a narcotics detection dog was clearly
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 99
Concerns about the application of this rationale to thermal imaging
devices can be found from a closer scrutiny of a typical "canine-sniff'
decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the case of
United States v. Solis0 ° is illustrative of this line of thinking. The court
concluded that a canine sniff did not constitute a search because "[n]o
sophisticated mechanical or electronic devices were used [and the] ...
investigation was not indiscriminate, but solely directed to the particular
contraband."' 1 This stands in obvious contrast to passive heat detection
where sophisticated mechanical devices are used. However, the majority
of pre-Kyllo courts that considered the constitutional implications of
thermal imaging devices agreed with the Eighth Circuit, concluding that
their use did not constitute a search.
10 2
In addition to the "waste heat" and "canine enhancement" doctrines,
courts have also relied upon the "plain view" doctrine to conclude that
use of these devices is not a search. 0 3 The "plain view" doctrine simply
states that officers are not required to obtain a warrant prior to observing
details that would be readily observable by any member of the public' °4
This is an extension of the "open fields" doctrine discussed above. Al-
though applying "plain view" to seeing through walls appears somewhat
96. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35 ("It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left along
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of
the public.").
97. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058.
98. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
99. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (Defendant's conviction was eventually overturned because the
officers had detained the defendant's luggage for an unreasonable period of time and because the
officers failed to communicate to the defendant where they were taking his luggage.).
100. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 at 882.
102. E.g., Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850; United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056; United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (1 1th Cir. 1994); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
103. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 853.
104. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1986).
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attenuated based on common English definitions, when the subject mat-
ter is an object's invisible heat signature, at least one court has indicated
that if used from a position where any member of the public could law-
fully be located, an agent has not performed a search.10 5 Support for this
approach was also drawn from the Court's decisions in Florida v. Ri-
ley' °6 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,107 cases involving the first
applications of technology generally available to the public as a means to
restrict the sphere of privacy rights. 108
The pre-Kyllo minority viewpoint that determined that use of a
thermal imaging device did constitute a search relied upon different ra-
tionales to reach this conclusion. Some courts expressed a concern about
revealing the "intimate details regarding activities occurring within the
sanctity of the home,"' 1 9 while others focused on the "indiscriminate"
nature of the device." 10 The first court to conclude that use of a thermal
imaging device did constitute a search, found that such searches were "at
least as intrusive" as the electronic beeper that was the subject of the
Supreme Court's holding in the Karo case."'
Other courts have rejected the claim that the passive nature of these
devices precludes them from intruding upon the sanctity of the home,
concluding instead that the principle reason for use of this technology is
to enable an agent to view intimate details of the home."12 The case of
State v. Young," 3 decided by the Washington Supreme Court, is illustra-
tive of minority viewpoints on waste and canine sniff analogies. In
Young, the court decided that the emission of waste heat was not similar
to the garbage at issue in the Greenwood case because unlike the disposal
of garbage, a person does not foresee the use of sophisticated instruments
to detect waste heat emissions. 14 In a foreshadowing of the rationale
used in the Kyllo case, the court noted that thermal imaging "produces an
image of the interior of the home . . . [and allows] the government to
intrude into the defendant's home and gather information about what
occurs there."' ' 5 The court also rejected the canine sniff analogy by es-
105. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854.
106. 448 U.S. 445 (1989).
107. 476 U.S. 227.
108. See Riley, 448 U.S. at 446; Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238-39 (stating the conclusion
that the plant area at issue fell somewhere between 'open fields' and curtilage for privacy interest
purposes, and that surveillance of these areas with highly sophisticated devices might be
constitutionally prohibited, but the mapmaking camera at issue in the case would not reveal enough
intimate details to violate the Fourth Amendment).
109. Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. 1999).
110. People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996).
111. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602 (Wash. 1994).
112. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
113. 867 P.2d 593.




tablishing that canine sniffs are unique because they detect the existence
or non-existence of illegal drugs. 116
These polar opposite outcomes, based upon essentially similar tests,
illustrate that the Katz framework was ill-equipped to provide judicial
consensus about the nature of an individual's right to privacy in light of
technological advances. Courts diverged on both prongs of the Katz test,
namely on what society considered reasonable and whether society was
prepared to recognize that heat loss observation should be constitution-
ally protected.' 17 Kyllo provided the Court with an opportunity to address
these differing positions.
Ill. KYLLO V. UNITED STATES
118
A. The Facts of Kyllo
In 1991, Special Agent William Elliot of the Department of the Inte-
rior, Bureau of Land Management, came to suspect Danny Kyllo was
growing marijuana in his home. 19 Agent Elliot first attempted to confirm
his suspicions by subpoenaing and then examining utility records to
compare average electricity use against dwellings of similar size.'
20
Based in part upon the confirmed higher electricity demand, Agent Elliot
requested Staff Sergeant Daniel Haas of the Oregon National Guard to
examine the triplex where Mr. Kyllo lived with a thermal imaging de-
vice.' 21 In the early morning hours of January 16, 1992, a thermal scan
was conducted from the passenger seat of Agent Elliot's vehicle, which
was parked across the street from Mr. Kyllo's residence.' 22 The scan took
only a few moments and showed that the roof over the garage and a side
wall of the petitioner's house were relatively hot compared to the rest of
the home and to other homes in the triplex area. 123 Agent Elliot used this
information, the higher electricity usage, and tips from informants to
convince a federal Magistrate to issue a search warrant for Mr. Kyllo's
116. Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S.at 707).
117. See Gindlesperger, 753 A.2d at 903 (holding "that the proper focus of our inquiry should
be on whether Appellee was able to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the heat-
generating activities occurring within his home").
118. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
119. Kyllo, 533U.S. at29.
120. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Or. 1992), aff d in part, United States v.
Kyllo, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir.
1994), rev'd, United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn, United
States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d
1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (Agent Elliot examined the utility records because
higher power usage is consistent with the need to run high power growth lamps used to stimulate
marijuana plant growth.). But see Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047 (stating that utility records may reveal
high power usage, but do not by themselves disclose the purposes behind the higher consumption).
121. Kyllo, 140F.3dat1251.
122. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
123. Id.
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home.124 When the search was conducted, agents discovered "an indoor
growing operation involving more than 100 plants," ultimately leading
Mr. Kyllo to conditionally plead guilty to one count of manufacturing
marijuana.
125
The procedural history of the case is confusing, starting with the de-
cision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to re-
mand the case to the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon for an evidentiary hearing to determine the constitutional implica-
tions of thermal imaging.126 The district court subsequently concluded
that given its non-intrusive nature, use of the thermal imager did not con-
stitute a search, a conclusion with which a three judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit disagreed. 127 The government then moved for rehearing, and the
Ninth Circuit eventually affirmed the decision of the district court, hold-
ing that use of the thermal imaging device did not constitute a search.
128
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in the winter of 2000.129
B. The Kyllo Ratio Decidendi
The first interesting point to note about the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Kyllo is that Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the court,
joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Breyer. 3 ° This is
noteworthy because of Justice Scalia' s nearly universal application of the
principle of strict interpretation of the Constitution in assessing the im-
plications of judicial decision-making.131
The Court introduces its analysis with a passage establishing the
constitutional primacy of the home as being "at the very core of the
Fourth Amendment."'' 32 The Court then cites precedent for the principle
that "with few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."
133
However, the Court then notes that decisions have "decoupled violation
of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from a trespassory violation of
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kyllo, 37 F.3d at 531.
127. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255.
128. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1041.
129. Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
130. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
131. See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation:
Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539 (2001); Daniel Farber, The
Scholarly Attorney as Lawyerly Judge: Stevens on Statutes, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxxv,
xxxvii; Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (commenting on the standards of constitutional
interpretation).
132. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).




his property,"' 134 citing the Katz decision for the familiar principle that "a
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a sub-
jective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."'
' 35
The Court acknowledges that this principle has included the constitu-
tional recognition of the legitimacy of home surveillance by authorities
under certain circumstances.'
36
The majority then wastes no time in attacking this standard, citing,
among other supporting documents, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Minnesota v. Carter,'37 for the proposition that the privacy-expectation
doctrine is circular in nature. 38 Having thus concluded that the corner-
stone test of Fourth Amendment application is flawed, the Court con-
cedes that "it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas
such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even ... uncovered portions of
residences are at issue."' 39 The majority then proceeds to draw the line at
what they consider to be the "prototypical . . . area of protected pri-
vacy," 140 the interior of homes. In rejecting the government's contention
that pre-warrant use of a thermal imaging device is constitutional be-
cause it does not "detect private activities occurring in private areas,"141
the Court notes that "any physical invasion of the structure of the home
'by even a fraction of an inch' [is] too much."'' 42 The Court then con-
cludes by establishing a "firm line at the entrance to the house,"'43 ruling
that "where ... the Government uses a device that is not in general pub-
lic use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without a physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and
is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."'
44
C. The Dissent
Justice Stevens authored the dissent, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Conner, and Justice Kennedy joined.145 Ironically,
the dissent invokes the principle of strict constitutional interpretation, a
Scalia refrain notably missing from the majority opinion, citing the
Fourth Amendment for the principle of protecting the right of the people
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 33 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
136. Id. (citing Florida v. Riley, 458 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
137. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
138. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
143. Id. at 40.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"to be secure in their houses,"'146 and not to extend that privacy to "heat
emanating from a building." 1
47
The dissent attacks the majority opinion on two grounds. First, Jus-
tice Stevens invokes shades of the plain view doctrine by comparing the
surveillance conducted in the instant case to the ability of officers "to
gather information exposed to the general public."'' 48 The dissent accuses
the majority of deciding the case based upon "the potential of yet-to-be-
developed technology," raising the specter of the Court issuing an advi-
sory opinion based on facts not yet before them.' 49 The dissent further
elucidates this critique of over-inclusiveness by noting that this new pro-
tection blocks inferences about the interior of the home drawn from ob-
servation with sense-enhancing equipment. 1 50 Justice Stevens provides an
example, noting that "under that expansive view... an officer using an
infrared camera to observe a man . . . entering the side door of a house
... carrying a pizza might conclude that its interior is now occupied by
someone who likes pizza,"' 51 an observation that would amount to an
unconstitutional search under the majority's new test. 152
The second critique by the dissent is that the term "in general public
use" fails at its stated goal of drawing a line "not only firm but also
bright."' 53 The dissent notes "how much public use is general public use
is not even hinted at by the Court's opinion,"'' 54 precluding establishment
of a clear standard. 55 Interestingly, the central concern associated with
this new standard is that there is no set or quantative standard for future
judicial application, a critique applicable just as easily to the Katz test.1
56
Therefore, courts are in no better position than they were before, left with
a test without precedent and no workable definition or standard of "gen-
eral public use."
As the use of technology like this becomes more common, "the
threat to privacy will grow," and the vital protections of the Fourth
Amendment will fail at precisely the time the general public has the
146. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
147. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see North Carolina v. Rice, 92 S. Ct. 402, 404 (1971) ("To be
cognizeable in federal court, a suit must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief ... as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be based upon a
hypothetical state of facts.").
150. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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greatest need of them. 5 7 This author's position is that, because of this
failure, the Supreme Court should reject the new Kyllo test, and return to
an insistence upon the fundamental value underlying the Fourth
Amendment, the need for protection against unreasonable searches of not
just a person's home, but also her "person, . . . papers, and effects."'
' 58
IV. THE KYLLO CONNUNDRUM: THE COURT FAILS TO ADVANCE A
STANDARD THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE FLEXIBLE NATURE OF PRIVACY
RIGHTS
The majority in Kyllo acknowledges that the Katz decision marked a
transition from a purely property-based approach to Fourth Amendment
analysis, to a flexible protection tied to an individual's privacy inter-
ests. 159 In its critique of this judicial reasoning, the Court points out that
because what is objectively reasonable varies with development of more
invasive technology, a Katz-based analysis ultimately leads to "subjec-
tive and unpredictable" decisions. 60 However, the new test developed by
the Court falls victim to this same critique in two critical areas. First, the
Kyllo test fails in its adoption of the "device not in general use" standard.
Second, the Court reverts back to a property-based analysis of Fourth
Amendment rights, one ill-equipped to handle the challenges of an in-
creasingly mobile and transitory society.
A. What is General Public Use?
To begin with, numerous commentators have criticized the Kyllo
decision for its failure to articulate guidelines for what is meant by the
term "device not in general public use."' 6' As the dissent even notes, the
majority's criteria suffers from the same defect as its intellectual prede-
cessor in Katz, as the protections inherent in this test will fail as more
intrusive equipment becomes increasingly available. 62 For example,
hunters and other outdoorsmen 163 currently employ thermal imaging de-
vices for private use, and consumers may soon see them installed on new
vehicles.' 64 Fire departments 165 and border patrols' 66 are also pushing the
157. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
159. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
160. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
161. See Sarilyn E. Hardee, Why the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United
States is Not the Final Word on the Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMBELL L. REV. 53,
69 (2001); Thueson, supra note 90, at 192-95.
162. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Steven, J., dissenting).
163. See Accurate Locations, Target Location Viewer: Thermal Imaging Detector, at
http:www.accuratelocators.comitargetinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
164. See Raytheon, Transportation: See Better, Decide Faster, Drive Safer, at http:www.ray-
theoninfrared.com/transportation/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003); United States v. Cusumano,
67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing application of thermal imaging technology).
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use of this technology into new and unexpected areas. However, the dis-
sent and other commentators have not reflected on the implications this
standard has for the broad spectrum of Fourth Amendment protections,
especially in light of the cumulative effects of the inevitable cross-
application between residential and general uses of new technology.
Although the Kyllo ruling was limited to the context of investigation
of the interior of a house, the majority opinion does espouse as one of its
principal objectives the need to "account for more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or development."' 16 One very apparent critique of
this line of thinking is that it violates the Court's long established prohi-
bition against deciding issues that are not yet properly before the
Court. 168 Another, more subtle, critique of this reasoning addresses its
obvious implications for other aspects of Fourth Amendment protections.
Although James Tomkovicz, the lawyer for Mr. Kyllo, believes that "it's
hard to know what they'll do with equivalent technology outside the
home," it's easy to see how application of this rule to other areas of
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law could occur. 169 The perva-
siveness of jurisprudential references to the Greenwood case (involving
domicile-based activity) in non-residential applications demonstrates the
ease with which home-oriented tests translate into other areas of search-
and-seizure law. 170
If the "general public use" test sufficiently provides protection for
the residential "core of the Fourth Amendment,"1 71 then courts will more
likely allow use of invasive technology in areas less tied to the traditional
Fourth Amendment centers of personal privacy: "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects."1 72 Imagine a world where the commercial use of Inter-
net "cookies" ultimately served to justify random scans of all e-mail, or
government tracking of a citizen's Web use. Certainly, this would seem
to be inside the spectrum of protection envisioned in the "papers ... and
165. Firefighters Test New Thermal Imaging Devices During 3 Fires, at http:www.nassaufire-
rescue.com/thermal.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
166. FLIR Systems, Border Patrol, at http:www.flir.com/ground/application.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2003).
167. Id. at 36.
168. See, e.g., Thueson, supra note 92, at 201.
169. Jeffrey Benner, Kyllo: Taking the 5th on the 4th (July 3, 2001), at http://www.wired.com-
Inewslprivacyl0,1848,44785,00.html.
170. See Wabuni-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that use of an F-stop
for exposing photographs sufficiently defeats a claim of Fourth Amendment protection, just as the
trash in Greenwood displayed a similar lack of subjective expectation of privacy); United States v.
Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11 th Cir. 1995) (discussing the portability of the Greenwood test to commercial
property); Powell v. State, 776 A.2d 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (citing the Greenwood test in
deriving its holding that leaving a paper bag full of drugs in a gutter amounts to a loss of a subjective
expectation of privacy).
171. Kyllo,533U.S.at3l.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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effects" term in the Fourth Amendment. 173 However, the Supreme
Court's new standard would establish that general use of this technology
would preclude any constitutionally protected privacy right. As these
examples demonstrate, the cumulative effect of the introduction of home
and personal effects-based applications of technology would produce a
spiral of ever increasing general use. This, in turn, would produce an
ever-shrinking zone of personal privacy protection, a situation that the
majority could hardly have intended. This shrinking zone of privacy is
also reflected in the next major shortcoming of the Supreme Court's test,
the reversion of privacy protection to a property-based rationale.
B. Reversion to Property-Based Standards
In Kyllo, the majority refused to apply the traditional Katz test, in-
stead resurrecting old Constitutional theories under a new name. The
Kyllo test refocuses the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the
common law protections of the "prototypical and hence most commonly
litigated are of protected privacy," 174 the interior of the home. This crite-
ria ensures "preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted," 175 a not-so-
subtle nod to the jurisprudential bias of Justice Scalia. However, the Su-
preme Court's new test leaves unanswered the question of how cases like
Olmstead and Katz would be decided under this "details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion"
standard. 176 Although Justice Scalia's critique of the Katz-standard as
being circular in nature was on target, these early decisions at least made
reference to a zone of privacy that extended beyond a person's property.
The language of physical intrusion suggests that trespassory concepts are
again the critical underpinning of Fourth Amendment protection. These
concepts seem least equipped to handle potential controversies of inves-
tigatory action in areas where the highest technology thresholds exist.
For example, the Supreme Court's new test provides no viable stan-
dard for evaluating technology like the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Carnivore program. 177 Carnivore is designed to sweep through a large
volume of e-mail without being detected, looking for key words and
phrases that match a profile.1 78 Since it performs this sweep by merely
intercepting transmitted message data, it falls short of the "physical in-
trusion" of personal property. In addition, most, if not all, of the intrinsic
173. Id.
174. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 40.
177. See Eichenlaub, supra note 27 (discussing the Carnivore program).
178. See Jerry Seper, FBI Follies Continue, WASH. TIMES, June 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL
2912066; Catherine M. Barrett, FBI Internet Surveillance: The Need for a Natural Rights
Application of the Fourth Amendment to Insure Internet Privacy, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16 (2002).
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information in this electronic message traffic reveals information not
about the intimate details of a person's home, but information personal
and particular to an individual. This is exactly the same information re-
jected as a basis for specific constitutional protection by Justice Scalia,
179
and, as a result, the individual can expect no protection from any Carni-
vore-derived technology due to the ruling in Kyllo.
C. The Precision Offered to Police
One other substantial concern can be identified from the new
"bright-line" standard offered by the majority in the Kyllo decision. As
one of its critical goals, the majority seeks to develop a standard that will
provide clear guidance to law enforcement personnel. 180 The dissent
notes a shortcoming of this standard in its failure to account for new
technologies clearly outside the "general public use" standard but still
oriented toward receiving or analyzing details in which the subject is
clearly no longer manifesting any expectation of privacy. 18' The exten-
sion of this analysis includes criticism of the "details of the home" stan-
dard as being overbroad in its restraint of the powers of law enforcement
investigation, which the dissent notes in its pizza delivery example.1
82
While the dissent does point out some interesting potential applica-
tions that clearly appear jeopardized by the decision in Kyllo, the greatest
impact missed by even the dissent is on already existing law enforcement
technology successfully employed in numerous previous investigations.
For example, the Court notes that in Smith v. Maryland,183 application of
the Katz test led the Court to conclude that use of a pen register by police
at the phone company to determine numbers dialed from a private home
was not a search. 184 Under the new Kyllo rationale, however, the pen
register would most likely be found to be 1) "a device that is not in gen-
eral public use" and 2) a device that would reveal "details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without a physical intru-
sion" (arguably, the phone numbers a person dials fall into this area). 85
As the majority opinion acknowledges, the difficulty lies in provid-
ing a standard that enables an officer to know before the surveillance
begins whether she is encroaching on personal privacy to an extent pro-
179. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
180. Id. at 39 ("The people in their houses, as well as the police, deserve more precision.").
181. Id. at 47-48 (decrying the inability to account for mechanical substitutes for dogs, or more
pragmatically, devices that could detect deadly bacteria or chemicals).
182. Id. at 48 ("Under that expansive view, .... an officer using an infrared camera to observe a
man silently entering the side door of a house at night carrying a pizza . . . would be guilty of
conducting an unconstitutional 'search' of the home.").
183. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).




tected by the Fourth Amendment.186 However, by completely eliminating
any reference to objective expectations of privacy and replacing them
with the "details of the home" standard, the Court actually invites a re-
gressive view of surveillance into its jurisprudence. What was a simpler
analysis for law enforcement personnel to conduct (the degree to which
the person is demonstrating an expectation of privacy distinct from pub-
lic access) is now much more problematic for the officer (what details,
no matter how accessible to the general public, are within the "details of
the home?"). Instead of allowing an officer to use her experience and
common sense in assessing what a reasonable person would consider a
private area, the Court now asks that officer to decide what a court would
consider "details of the home," a subject as yet undefined in any juris-
prudence.187 By failing to define these essential terms of the Kyllo test,
the Court leaves both law enforcement officers and the courts without
guidance as to how to evaluate the subjective determinations of officers
on the street, a situation that will inevitably result in extensive Constitu-
tional appeals.
CONCLUSION
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court clearly articulated
some of the faults of the existing legal standards for assessing an indi-
vidual's right to privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment. How-
ever, despite the meritorious attempt to define a bright line standard that
would address the application of new investigatory technology, the ra-
tionale expressed in Kyllo actually represents a step back for privacy
protection. By failing to provide an objective standard-such as society's
willingness to accept a manifestation of privacy as reasonable-Kyllo
fails to provide a static target for dispassionate judicial review of law
enforcement activities. In addition, the re-introduction of trespassory
concepts as the basis for privacy rights represents a severe limitation on
the application of Kyllo to preemptively address new law enforcement
technology.
Reginald Short*
186. Id. at 39 (discussing why the Court could not establish a standard based upon the principle
of "intimate details").
187. See Thueson, supra note 92, at 197.




FREE SPEECH AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
CENSORSHIP INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES. By Lawrence Soley. New
York: Monthly Review Press. 2002. Pp. xi, 260. $23.95
(paperback).
Reviewed by Robert E. Riley, Jr.*
Americans typically believe that government represents the greatest
threat to free speech. They can point to certain laws and precedent setting
cases as examples of government's attempts to control freedom of ex-
pression. However, how many Americans would expand the discussion
to examine the ways that private enterprise attempts to control free
speech? Professor Lawrence Soley' does exactly that in his book Censor-
2
ship Inc.: The Corporate Threat to Free Speech in the United States.
Soley thoroughly documents and critically analyzes the efforts of
private parties to stifle. His thesis is that American corporate growth
combined with the judicial system's willingness to recognize artificial
entities as possessing the same rights guaranteed to individuals creates an
expanding environment where private property rights are trumping free
speech rights. Although Soley makes a convincing case to support his
argument, he sometimes lets his general suspicion of corporations and
conservative politics color his analysis with the almost clich6 leftist doc-
trine that big business is the enemy.
Soley's purpose in writing this book was "to stimulate a debate
about what constitutes censorship in the 'land of the free."'' Accord-
ingly, this review will examine Soley's arguments and challenge some of
his assertions. Part I will discuss the historical incidents of private or-
ganizations limiting citizens' free speech. Part II will look at more mod-
em attempts to silence speech through the use of strategic lawsuits
against public participation known as "SLAPPs." The elevation of pri-
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Denver College of Law; CPA.
1. Colnick Professor of Communications and Professor of Journalism, Marquette University,
Milwaukee, WI.
2. See LAWRENCE SOLEY, CENSORSHIP INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (2002).
3. See id. at 16-20.
4. Id. atxi.
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vate property rights over constitutionally guaranteed rights as evidenced
by covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&Rs") and publicly fi-
nanced shopping malls will also be covered. Part IH will analyze private
organizational attempts to censor news content through advertiser and
conglomerate pressures on the media.
I. A TRADITION OF AMERICAN PRIVATE CENSORSHIP
Soley meticulously reviews employers' tactics to limit employee
speech. 5 Using perhaps the ultimate employee speech-limiting situation,
the company-owned town, Soley explores the lengths to which employ-
ers were willing to go to limit criticism. This discussion demonstrates
that whatever private censorship we are currently experiencing, it is not
new. Rather, it is simply a more modem version of a very old struggle.
The analysis begins with the pervasiveness of "company-owned
towns." Approximately 2,500 company-owned towns were built between
1830 and 1930, encompassing everything from New England mill towns
to Western mining towns.6 By owning employee housing, town roads,
local stores, and often times employing private police forces, companies
exercised social control. 7 For employers, stifling the free speech of un-
happy workers was a primary goal.
Because such towns were frequently located in remote areas, few al-
ternatives existed for the employees when the compan Z controlled the
local movie theater, library, or other information outlets. If an employee
spoke out against the company or took issue with a company favored
position, the employee could be fired from work, blacklisted to prevent
reemployment, and evicted from company-owned housing.9 With organ-
ized labor just beginning to have an American presence, there was pre-
cious little redress for wronged employees.
Soley argues that New Deal laws such as the Wagner Act and court
decisions such as Marsh v. Alabama ° helped eliminate the ability of
companies to coerce free speech by providing for greater union organiz-
ing activities and retention of free speech rights on private property."
However, the company-owned, which directly exploited citizens and
suppressed their speech, evolved into "company-dominated towns" util-
izing indirect, paternalistic pressure. 2 Company-dominated towns in
5. See id. at 23.
6. Id. at 26.
7. Id. at 27.
8. Id. at 25.
9. Id. at31.
10. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).




which employees are pressured to curtail public discourse still exist to-
day. Citing areas as seemingly different as North Freeport, Maine, the
home of L.L. Bean, and Newton, Iowa, home to Maytag, Soley makes a
credible case that these towns' financial interests are so entwined with
the local company that citizens feel compelled to subjugate their speech
to their economic welfare.' 3 As an example, in 1996 L.L. Bean requested
and received a tax agreement that provided for millions of dollars in tax
rebates.' 4 Residents became concerned that L.L. Bean was placing the
bottom line over community responsibility.15 Although numerous citi-
zens disliked the tax plan, they were "reluctant to harshly criticize Bean.
They d[idn]'t want to be ostracized by their neighbors, lose their jobs
with the company or get cut off from business contacts."1 6 Soley notes
that "[w]hen public relations campaigns, lobbying, and threats to lay off
employees fail to achieve the company's policy objectives, SLAPP suits,
media pressure, and other techniques are used to limit the expression of
opposition viewpoints."' 7
If one company-town's citizens self-censor their speech, is this
really suppression of First Amendment rights? A more logical conclusion
is that with modern society offering mobility and many alternative in-
formation sources, people are deciding that economic security is more
important than the right to criticize.' 8 Such choices occur on a regular
basis. For instance, after the September 1 lth attacks, some polls showed
First Amendment support deteriorating in deference to increasing na-
tional security.' 9 Perhaps people are consciously weighing their free
speech in light of their present social and economic conditions.
Soley is not afraid to examine the speech stifling efforts of his own
profession, academia. Drawing a chilling analogy between the traditional
company-owned town and the politically correct world of academia,
Soley observes:
Today, private colleges and universities most closely resemble tradi-
tional company towns, providing housing for students and sometimes
faculty, operating restaurants and stores, having their own police
forces, and creating rules of behavior that students and faculty are ex-
13. ld. at 27-28.
14. Scott Thomsen, Realities of the '90s Strain Bean, Freeport Relationship, Some Residents
Fear Retail Giant Now Cares More About Tax Breaks and Profits Than People, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Feb. 24, 1996, at IA, available at http://www.MaineToday.com.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. SoLEY, supra note 2, at 27-28.
18. See William Glaberson, Claiming a Right Not to Know; Town Smarts as a Paper Bites the
Hand That Feeds It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at B2.
19. See Amber McDowell, Poll Shows Free Speech Support Down, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug.
29, 2002, available at http://www.sacbee.com/24hour/nation/story/51 6 89 4 p-4 102578c.html.
2002]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pected to follow. If students or faculty fail to abide by these rules,
they can be expelled or fired.
20
Soley's observation is accurate but does not go far enough. Colleges
and universities reinforce "diversity" as being a worthy goal, yet often
apply the concept more to race and gender than to the truly important
concept of diversity of ideas.2 ' Can institutions that overwhelmingly fa-
vor politically liberal oriented professors really claim that they are creat-
ing an environment that encourages free speech?
22
Another historical tenant of Soley's investigation is the use of
"blacklists" to suppress free speech.23 A blacklist is a list of people "who
are disapproved of or are to be punished or boycotted."24 He notes that
the motion picture industry developed the Hollywood blacklist in re-
sponse to the late 1940s House Un-American Activities Committee in-
vestigations.25 Although this is perhaps the most famous blacklist, it is
not an isolated incident. Private industry used blacklisting, beginning in
the early nineteenth century, to protect itself from competitive pressures
26and to prevent unionization. Soley points out these similarities that
many Americans might not realize exist.
By noting the historical antecedents of New England textile working
papers, without which a mechanic could not get further employment, and
tracing up to the current modem day whistleblower cases, Soley presents
a cohesive illustration that although times may change, the tension be-
tween parties with unequal bargaining power does not.27 Soley is not
afraid to name names either. He backs up his analysis with specific ex-
amples of blacklisting.28 He illustrates that private organizations, rather
than governmental bodies, are more likely to try and suppress critical
speech using blacklists.
II. CIVIL ASSAULTS ON FREE SPEECH
Soley makes an interesting and damning assessment of how Ameri-
can businesses use the judicial system. He notes that although citizens
use the courts to obtain relief from governmental "abridgment" of free
20. SOLEY, supra note 2, at 47.
21. Nat Hentoff, The Twilight of Free Speech at Colleges, WASH TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at
A23, available at 2002 WL2919661.
22. See Paul Celia, Cella's Review: Politics, Culture, The Public Square (Aug. 31, 2002), at
http://cellasreview.blogspot.conf/2002_08_25_cellasreview-archive.html.
23. SOLEY, supra note 2, at 55.
24. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 119 (10th ed. 1998), available at
http://www.m-w.com (enter "blacklist" in search box).
25. SOLEY, supra note 2, at 55.
26. See id. at 55-56.
27. See id. at 55-80.
28. See id. at 56-67.
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speech rights, corporations actually use the courts to limit the free speech
29of citizens. Soley describes the various speech stifling tools used by
corporations.
Corporations attempt to get courts to issue gag orders and seal re-
cords concerning litigation. These same corporations may require legally
enforceable, signed confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements.3° If
they still cannot win, corporations may employ "SLAPP" suits against
citizens. 3' Corporations through their lobbyists have even obtained pas-
sage of "product disparagement" laws designed to stifle agricultural criti-
cism.32
Soley particularly focuses on the use of strategic lawsuits against
public participation, "SLAPP" suits, and product disparagement laws in
order to demonstrate that modern free speech stifling by private entities
is alive and well. He explains that SLAPPs are civil suits without merit
utilized for intimidation and designed to suppress criticism of business
activities.33 He claims that "[m]any corporations have filed frivolous,
vexatious lawsuits, alleging copyright violations, patent infringement,
defamation, business torts, process violations, civil rights violations, and
a laundry list of other alleged injuries, not expecting to win the suits but
seeking simply to silence critics. 34
Citing University of Denver College of Law Professors George W.
Pring and Penelope Canan, the originators of the term SLAPP, Soley
believes that "SLAPPs transform public debates in three major ways., 35
Formerly public controversies are converted into private legal disputes.
36
The dispute then enters the private legal forum instead of remaining in
the public arena.37 Finally, by entering the legal arena, a financial burden
is shifted onto the defendants.38
Suing for silence is not always necessary. Soley argues that some-
times the mere threat of a multi-million dollar lawsuit is enough to quiet
critics. He states that many times companies bring SLAPP suits "expect-
ing to drop them before they go to trial. 39 Corporations and other private
entities compound this indignity by often requiring settlement to be
contingent on signing a non-disclosure agreement that prevents the critic
29. Jd. at 81.
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. Id. at 82.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 88.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 88-89.
36. Id. at 89.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 90.
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from commenting on the case.40 Soley justifiably points out that because
many SLAPPs are filed against investigative media outlets, public dis-
course can be tremendously impacted.
Soley also provides numerous examples where SLAPPs are used by
businesses against individuals or organizations. Noting that motions for
summary judgment often fail in SLAPP suits, Soley explains that nine-
teen states have adopted anti-SLAPP laws with varying degrees of pro-
tection.4 1 He does a particularly good job of sorting out the various typesof protections afforded and explaining the nuances of each approach.
Soley documents the agricultural industry's attempts to stifle free
speech by lobbying for passage of so called agricultural disparagement
laws.42 These laws were originally justified on the grounds that "false
statements create huge losses for producers of perishable products, which
decay and become worthless if not sold quickly., 43 He claims that these
disparagement laws often require food critics to prove the veracity of
their statements rather than requiring the plaintiffs to prove that such
assertions are false.44 This shifting of the burden of proof may then re-
quire the introduction of scientific evidence proving that the statement is
accurate.4 5 Such laws are often directly targeted at animal rights groups
or consumer "food police" who want to alert the public to potentially
troubling issues.46 However, the extension of product disparagement
laws to non-perishable industries, such as cattle raising, appears to be a
slippery slope. Soley postulates that industries such as chemical, phar-
maceutical, energy, and others may also want to lobby for passage of
such laws to silence critics and protect their product sales.4 7
With a warning reminiscent of Eisenhower's admonishment about
the military-industrial complex,48 Soley argues that businesses, indus-
tries, and politicians are all guilty of placing profits, or campaign contri-
butions, ahead of the public welfare and the Constitution.49 Indeed, they
are willing to risk the public's health by silencing the debate.50 Soley
40. Id. at 90-91.
41. Id. at 95.
42. Id. at 115-16.
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 116-17.
45. Id. at 118.
46. Id. at 116.
47. Id. at 120.
48. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm.




views a possible solution as being the public financing of campaigns to
remove the influence of big business lobbyists.
5'
However, the reader is left wondering what rights should businesses
be afforded where their interests are concerned? For instance, should
cigarette companies be banned from advertising their products because
activists believe such advertising campaigns are targeted at children?
52
Isn't this the stifling of free speech? And should corporations remain
silent when activists lead product boycotts against them?53 Glass com-
pany Coming Inc. lost a billion dollars in market capitalization in a sin-
gle day after the local paper ran a story saying the company was in a
"state of emergency., 54 It removed all of the newspaper's vending boxes
from its property and deposited them in the newspaper's parking lot.
55
Did the newspaper have an inalienable right to sell its product on another
party's property?
Soley's discussion is thorough but largely one sided. His argument
that such disparagement laws are not truly designed to assist the family
farmer or rancher but rather big business seems to discount the fact that
such laws may directly impact the smaller rancher and farmer. Although
his point may be overstated, it has merit. Undoubtedly, large commercial
concerns and agricultural federations receive a tremendous benefit from
these laws.
Ill. PROPERTY OVER SPEECH
One of Soley's major themes is that the places where free speech is
protected are shrinking because corporate power is increasing and the
influence of labor unions is declining.56 Soley contends that the courts,
and in particular decisions by the United States Supreme Court, have
effectively constrained First Amendment free speech rights at malls and
shopping centers.57 By elevating commercial property owners' rights
above individual's free speech rights, Soley demonstrates that the logical
consequence is the current increase in common interest developments, or
homeowner association governed communities, which limit constitution-
ally protected rights through the use of covenants, conditions, and restric-
tions known as "CC&Rs.
51. See id. at 133.
52. See Richard T. Kaplar, An Irresponsible Approach to Free Speech, at http://median-
institute.org/digest/97winter/editors/1.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
53. See Kenneth MacKendrick, The Boycott Page, All Things New, at http://www.scm-
canada.org/atn/atn94/atn941_p5.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
54. Glaberson, supra note 18.
55. Id.
56. SOLEY, supra note 2, at 135.
57. Id. at 136.
58. See id. at 173.
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If there is one element of this book that Soley seems truly passion-
ate about, it is that private shopping malls have encroached on the public
sphere of free speech. He sets his argument's context with facts and fig-
ures concerning the growth of shopping malls.59 In modem America,
there is certainly no disputing that shopping malls are an important and
pervasive component of our society.
What seems to really upset Soley is that shopping malls are fre-
quently subsidized, directly or indirectly, by public tax dollars and repre-
sent themselves as being modem town squares. They often contain gov-
ernment functions such as police substations and post offices, and yet
still feel they are "private property, where free speech may be cur-
tailed.,, 60 He dutifully recites the line of federal court cases that support
the stifling of political and labor protest and lays blame at the feet of
conservative political ideology.
61
However, it's not only the federal system that allows this contrac-
tion of free speech rights. Soley explains that while three states interpret
state constitutions to recognize free speech rights in shopping malls, thir-
teen state supreme courts have in fact rejected "state constitutional pro-
tections for free speech in shopping malls. 62 Perhaps just as worrying to
Soley is that there is a trend for governments to abdicate accountability
for traditional government services by privatizing them. 63 The concern is
that if speech is protected from government intrusion but not private
party intrusion, then merely replacing government oversight with private
management creates a situation where free speech protection may be
diminished. Schools are an example of this, and Soley states that such
"privatization of the public sphere has substantially reduced the space
available for public speech." 64
The conflict between governmental functions, such as protecting
citizens' free speech rights and the capitalistic goal of making money, are
increasingly common. Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator for
the United Kingdom's Financial Times, "warned that corporations may
be encroaching on the realm of politics. '65 He went on to caution that
corporations should "focus on the basics" and "[t]heir role is to be good
59. Id. at 141-42 (noting that in any given week 70% of the U.S. population shops at privately
owned shopping centers and that privately owned shopping centers have increased from around 3000
in 1960 to over 40,000 today).
60. Id. at 144.
61. See id. at 151-52.
62. Id. at 160.
63. Id. at 151.
64. Id.





businesses, not to save the planet."66 Increasingly, this leads to a situation
where, because business executives are not democratically elected, a
question of accountability arises.6 7
However, the privatization of the public sphere extends far beyond
the commercial realm. Soley argues that the marked increase in common
interest developments, where typically a homeowners association man-
ages common areas such as parks and enforces regulations binding on its
members, creates a situation where a private party is able to pass restric-
tions that, if passed by a municipal government, would be unconstitu-
tional.68 He makes a convincing argument. Private homeowners associa-
tions are able to act as pseudo-governments by passing and enforcing
covenants, conditions, and restrictions limiting or prohibiting political
yard signs, the flying of flags, the displaying of religious symbols, and
the distribution of leaflets and campaign literature.69 Soley concludes that
what CC&Rs effectively do is "assure that people with different cultural
outlooks cannot express themselves. 70
However, Soley notes that in many instances these restrictions are
one of the primary reasons that people want to live in such communities.
Where he displays his bias is when he contends that Republicans, whose
ideology seems completely opposed to such restrictions, populate these
areas.7 1 Without citing any demographic figures to support this assertion,
Soley comes across as having a partisan agenda, which detracts from his
largely well reasoned work.72
Where Soley's work seems most debatable is how commercial ad-
vertisers impact news media, thereby creating media self-censorship.73
Although he recites numerous instances where companies have with-
drawn their advertising dollars because they did not like the content of a
particular news story, or where media companies have not run stories
because they did not want to upset advertisers, the real question is,
"What is wrong with that?" The fact of the matter is that it is a com-
pany's prerogative to spend its resources in the manner it sees most fit.
Soley's analysis comes across as displaying a bit of an entitlement men-
tality, where newsrooms should be able to collect advertiser's money on




68. SOLEY, supra note 2, at 172.
69. Id. at 174-75.
70. Id. at 178.
71. Id.
72. In the interests of full disclosure, the reviewer is a registered Republican who lives in a
covenant-controlled community.
73. SOLEY, supra note 2, at 213.
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However, he makes a much more persuasive case when he notes
that deregulation has allowed corporate conglomerates to acquire news-
papers and broadcast media, while having other lines of business that are
often the subject of media stories.74 This inherent conflict of interest
seems to create exactly the set of circumstances required to allow coer-
cive censorship. Soley cites a number of examples, such as General Elec-
tric's ownership of NBC, that demonstrate the free speech chilling effect
that having a conglomerate for parent owner can create.75
CONCLUSION
Soley makes a solid case that market forces as applied through de-
regulation and privatization have, rather than increasing freedom of
speech, in fact fostered greater censorship. His observations that the line
blurring between public and private spheres has contributed to an expan-
sion of stifled free speech are well documented. Soley's contribution to
the free speech realm is intriguing because it shifts the discussion away
from government suppression to the more pervasive but seemingly little
noticed area of private censorship.
If his goal is to get people thinking about what free speech really
represents, then he has succeeded. This book, although occasionally one
sided and illustrating certain political biases, makes the reader consider
the multitude of ways that private organizations help to suppress individ-
ual free speech. Soley's work is well worth the investment of a thought-
ful read as the payback is a greater appreciation of how we all-too-easily
acquiesce in surrendering our free speech.
74. See id. at 229-30.
75. Id. at 230.
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